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Besides the shift of economic and financial power from Western to Eastern countries, and 
particularly to China, a fundamental shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics is recently redefining 
the international geo-strategies of the states.  The thesis discussed how geoeconomics is being 
applied as a new geo-strategy to attain global order, instead of the traditional military means and 
warfare.  It highlighted the shift that is happening from geopolitics to geoeconomics and studied 
whether economic means will completely replace military ones in bilateral wars.  Specifically, this 
research explored what has China been aiming for since the collapse of the Soviet Union by 
implementing its geoeconomic capabilities, and whether by following this geo-strategy it is going 
to achieve international primacy.  The study placed much emphasis on Eurasia, for which most of 
the geopolitical theoreticians have given great importance to control the destinies of the world, and 
therefore the region in which China has concentrated its main foreign policy initiatives and 
promoted its geoeconomic interests.  And since Eurasia is Russia’s backyard, the thesis studied 
the impact of China’s geo-strategy on its bilateral relations with the Russian Federation, whether 
in realizing a regional integration or leading to a non-ending rivalry between them.  In order to 
answer all these questions, it was appropriate first to analyze secondary data by adopting the 
descriptive – analytical and comparative methodology, and then carry out an empirical qualitative 
research, whereby primary data collected from in-depth interviews were analyzed to validate the 
findings obtained from the document analysis.  The results concluded that China is having an 
intangible aim to rule the world by reaching a large scope of international primacy, expanding its 
capabilities, and shaping the future of Eurasia.  The Sino-Russian relations are proved to be 
complex with no clear image regarding their reality.  And while results have also shown that there 
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          One century ago, the English geographer Sir. Halford Mackinder affirmed in his famous 
article “The Geographical Pivot of History” (1904), that the Chinese would expand their power 
well beyond their borders, and that this process will disturb the rest powers of the World, after 
explaining that Eurasia - the supercontinent extending from Lisbon to Shanghai or even Jakarta; 
combining between Europe and Asia - (Maçães, 2018) is the geostrategic fulcrum of World power 
and mentioning that the Chinese foreign policies “might constitute the yellow peril to the World’s 
freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, 
an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region” (Mackinder, 1904, p.437). 
          After eleven years of publishing Mackinder’s article, James Fairgrieve published a book 
entitled: “Geography and the World Power” (1915) where he strongly asserted that China was in 
an excellent position to control the interior of Eurasia (Fairgrieve, 1917) …  That was a hundred 
of years ago, but nowadays, China is truly willing to reshape the World by its specific policies. 
          Thus, Eurasia is the landmass formed by Europe and Asia; it “stretches from the Atlantic 
Ocean with bordering countries of Portugal and Spain in the west to Russia's easternmost point, at 
the Bering Strait between the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Eurasia's northern frontier 
consists of Russia, Finland, and Norway bordering the Arctic Ocean in the north. The southern 
boundaries are the Mediterranean Sea, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Southern border countries of 
Eurasia include Spain, Israel, Yemen, India, and continental Malaysia. Eurasia also commonly 
includes island countries associated with the Eurasian continent such as Sicily, Crete, Cyprus, Sri 
Lanka, Japan, Philippines and Island Malaysia” (Rosenberg, 2019).  
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          The director of the European council on foreign relations, and the expert in the Chinese 
affairs, Mark Leonard has noted in his intervention in the World Economic Forum on the Global 
Agenda Councils on Geoeconomics (2014 - 2016) that: “If the big China story of the past few 
decades was about growth, exports and investments, the story of the next decade will be about 
creation of a Chinese economic and political order” (Leonard, 2016, p.3).  In other words, China’s 
fast economic prosperity has propelled it to acquire high economic capacity that will compel China 
to participate in political actions (Thies, 2015). 
          Trade, Investments, Finance, Internationalization of the Chinese Currency, and 
Infrastructure Alliances, most prominently the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, are the five keys 
instruments of China’s geoeconomic toolkit (Leonard, 2016). 
          The high rate China is having lately between the world powers is due to a combination of 
policies adopted by the Chinese government in order to realize the full Rise of China.  According 
to Xuetong (2006), scholars admit that the rise of a nation implies a growth in its political power 
and superpower status.  Most of the policies adopted by China are focusing on a geoeconomic 
discipline, to attain the final objective that all the geopoliticians of the World, especially Alfred 
Mahan, Sir Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman and Zbigniew Brzezinski, have talked about in 
their theories: Ruling the World!    
          Eurasia is being now the center of attention of all those great powers, since controlling its 
lands may end up in controlling the destinies of the whole World, and this is actually the main 
purpose of the global policies of the competing states. China is one of the most important 
competitors in this international World game, and it necessarily has its own special methods and 
geo-strategies that may lead it to the Euro-Asian throne. 
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          In his turn, Ian Bremmer, president of ‘Eurasia Group’ affirmed that: “As a non-violent yet 
unquestionably potent foreign policy tool, Geoeconomics is the perfect weapon for a relationship 
between frenemies” (Bremmer, 2016, p.18), in his intervention in the World Economic Forum on 
the Global Agenda Councils on Geoeconomics (2014 - 2016) entitled: “China’s Geoeconomic 
Power and The United States”. And China is evidently employing this weapon in its multilateral 
“relationships”, not only with the U.S, but with Russia also, as in geopolitics there are no friends 
neither enemies; there are “frenemies” demonstrating muscles at all the levels of the game, and 
competing to win the final battle! 
          The international system is already being changed by the Chinese ascendancy which is 
encouraging the development of moderate institutions, stimulating new norms and assumptions 
better than those established after the Second World War (Leonard, 2016), but what is China 
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Figure 1: China’s Political Map 
 
Source: On The World Map 
 
Regarding the geographical location of China, we have to mention that it has many specificities 
and qualifications:  
1- China is on the eastern front of the Euro – Asian continent, in 20° - 40° of latitude, bordering 
the East China Sea, Korea Bay, Yellow Sea, and South China Sea (The World Factbook, 
n.d.); It is located between North Korea and Vietnam, and is about:  9,596,960 sq. km (The 
World Factbook, n.d.), with a land boundary of about 22,800 km (Sandikli, 2010). 
2- On its land side, China has a great stretch of high ground with the highest stretch of 
highland in the World, the Tibet (Fairgrieve, 1917).  
3- On its sea borders curved in the shape of a circle’s quarter, there is no part of Asia beyond, 
and no land of any country till the other side of the pacific (Fairgrieve, 1917).  
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4- The Peoples’ Republic of China is the largest country in Asia and the third largest one in 
the world, after Russia and Canada (Sandikli, 2010). 
5- “From north to south, the territory of China stretches from the center of the Heilong River 
north of the town of Mohe to the Zengmu Reef at the southernmost tip of the Nansha 
Islands, covering a distance of 5,500 km. From east to west, the nation extends from the 
confluence of the Heilong and Wusuli rivers to the Pamirs, covering a distance of 5,200 
km” (Sandikli, 2010, p.1). 
6- The Chinese territorial seas has an area of 380, 000 sq. km (Sandikli, 2010).  Its mainland 
faces the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, on the 
east and south (Sandikli, 2010).  
7- Its mainland coastline is about 18,000 km, and that of its islands is about 14,000 km; and 
that gives China a total coastline distance of 32,000 km, making it the eighth longest one 
in the world (Sandikli, 2010).  
8- We can also find cultivated lands, forests, grasslands, deserts, and tidelands, all over China, 
without forgetting the huge number of rivers and lakes across its lands (Sandikli, 2010). 
9- It is also rich in mineral resources, as geologists have affirmed recently; it has reserves of 
158 different minerals that put it in the third rank in the world in term of total mineral 
reserves (Sandikli, 2010).  
          Concerning Eurasia, the People’s Republic of China has concentrated its main foreign policy 
initiatives since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and moreover with the American declaration of 
the War on Terror in 2001 – after the 9/11 attacks, in the promotion of its trade and investments in 
the Eurasian lands (Guriev, 2016). Its flagship projects: founding two multilateral development 
banks in mid-2015: the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) which is headed by China 
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and backed by 57 countries – members, and the NDB (New Development Bank) also known by 
the BRICS Bank which is operated on an equal basis between the BRICS nations: Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa, have done a big shift in the World order from the globalism to the 
regionalism, in which the “one size fits all” western centric approach is no longer tenable (Dove, 
2016).  
          These multilateral projects are at the core of the Chinese geo-strategies in securing its energy 
resources for the growth of its economy, in addition to supporting international trade. And to be 
clear, the Chinese investments in Russia and Central Asian countries are necessary and vital for 
the “New Silk Road” project that connects China to the leading markets in Europe and the MENA 
region (Guriev, 2016).  
          “It’s only a matter of time before China rules the World” (De Jonquières, 2012, p.48) say 
most of the strategists nowadays, and that is because of the big amount of power that characterizes 
China.  Its growing power in all aspects will definitely result in national and international changes 
(Rozman, 2013).  That economic, financial and political power will absolutely lead this country to 
the global domination path; and the most repeated quote recently is: “That economic and financial 
power is shifting from West to East” (De Jonquières, 2012, p.48) … And this quote is becoming 
the “mantra” of our age, which is being repeated insistently that it became considered as self-
evident (De Jonquières, 2012).  
          In a speech at the UN General Assembly in April 1974, Den Xiaoping, the paramount leader 
in the 1980s who lifted China out of backwardness with economic reforms, highlighted by his 
motto “Hide your strength, bide your time” (Huang, 2018), declared that: 
“China is not a superpower, nor will it ever seek to be one. If one day China should change its 
color and turn into a superpower, if it too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere 
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subject others to its bullying aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should … 
expose it, oppose it, and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it” (Bergsten et al., 
2008, p.1). 
          But nowadays, China cannot anymore refuse to be a superpower! And the entire world has 
to know much information and details about that economic and political combination that the 
Chinese government is actually doing in its backstage to transform its country into an emerging 
superpower which is recently playing an important role in managing the global balance of power 
at its own desires, and in accordance with its interests.    
          This powerful country which had a “booming” economy in the last decades, has designed 
its own spheres of influence, especially in the economic domain, and exercised a high level of 
affection on the overall balances in the World (Sandikli, 2010).  
          “With Economic Strength, Come Geoeconomic Influence” (Rediker et al., 2016, p.11) … 
Over the past decade, the Chinese rise has been striking nationally and internationally as an 
economic and trading superpower which competes with the world’s largest economy: The United 
States. Indeed, its economy has doubled since 2009, and its government has become a motivation 
to the world, for the Chinese growth has provided a large market, and secured a source of foreign 
investments and low-cost exports; this growth is now challenging the United States in the global 
economy (Rediker et al., 2016).  
          As for the recent period, exactly on March 22nd 2018, Mr. President of the USA Donald 
Trump, has “narrated”, as mentioned in the New York Times magazine, that the United States has 
been humiliated by “savvier nations not restrained by naïve notions like global trading rules”, and 
by these nations he meant China as a primary “villain” and predatory power which has exploited 
the weakness of the US to steal factory jobs and to sow pessimism (Goodman, 2018). 
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          Because of that, Trump has advanced a policy of combative trade, as a sanction on China, 
which puts tariffs on steel and aluminum, in addition to the battle of electronics and clothing 
(Goodman, 2018) where the Trump administration readied $60 billion worth of tariffs and 
penalties on the imported goods from China, and put restrictions on Chinese investments in the 
United States (Myers, 2018).  And in its turn, China responded with penalties on around $3 billion 
of American products (Zhong & Mozur, 2018).  
          In these policies Mr. Trump wanted to strengthen the American position in grappling with 
China, but most of the trade experts have affirmed that they will do the opposite: These policies 
will weaken America and diminish its place in the world, by “alienating allies, undermining the 
potential for collective action among countries nursing shared grievances with China” (Goodman, 
2018), knowing that only 2% of the aluminum and steel produced in China are used in the United 
States and the largest supplier is Canada (Goodman, 2018). 
          The Chinese economical booming was due to its trading policies that exploit the gaps in the 
global rules and breach them usually; and that is the main cause behind the straggling economic 
development in the Chinese government, which still supports key industries, state-owned 
companies, and puts challenges and barriers on the foreign competition path (Goodman, 2018). 
          By these punitive sanctions unveiled by President Trump, China will face some difficulties 
in maintaining its rise and realizing its global ambitions… A professor of international relations at 
Renmin University in Beijing, Shi Yinhong, said that: “People in the U.S. and China have for years 
said the wolf is coming, the wolf is coming, but the wolf hasn’t come… This time, the wolf is 
coming” (Myers, 2018). 
          This dissertation is done to shed light on this special Chinese phenomenon in the world; it 
will answer many questions about this topic, to know more about the fact behind its ascendance, 
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the strategies adopted to attain all the targets, the special methods utilized by the Chinese 
government since the collapse of the Soviet Union, etc… But the most important of all those 
questions is the one that asks: How will China deal with the ‘Wolf’ attacking its economic and 
political rise? And how skilled are the Chinese people as policymakers to face it? (Myers, 2018).  
          Besides, this dissertation will talk about the Eurasian region as a rich subject for the studies 
and research of the students of Political Sciences and International Relations on one hand, and for 
the experts, strategists and analysts on the other, knowing that it is a “heavy material” for strategic 
studies, in addition to the fact that the rise of China is an important phenomenon attracting all the 
“scientific eyes and brains” of the world to analyze its impacts on their states, and to put and 
develop strategies in order to confront it or cooperate with it. 
          And since the international scene is witnessing today unprecedented and unpredictable 
changes in term of the foreign policies of the states toward each other’s, or in term of their internal 
strategies of development, this topic was chosen, hoping that this dissertation will add a valuable 
page to the huge book of international relations, in order to satisfy the curiosity of knowledge we 
all have.  
          While there are many warnings in the financial domain blinking in the world, some 
characteristics of the Chinese government reduce the risks of financial crisis, and give this 
government all the time it needs to manage the emerging issues if there was an authentic political 
will in the leadership’s mind (Dollar, 2018).  
          The main problem statement that this dissertation will turn around is: What is the Chinese 
government, through implementing its geoeconomic powers and capabilities as a new geo-strategy 
to invest in its national and international geopolitical interests, aiming for since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union? And what are the impacts of this new geo-strategy on its bilateral relations with 
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the Russian federation? Will it contribute positively in realizing a regional integration or 
negatively in leading to a non-ending rivalry between them? 
          In other words, how is the world’s order affected by China’s geoeconomic capabilities and 
potentials? And what are the impacts of its new geo-strategy?  
          And besides the main problem statement, there are many questions in which their answers 
will be found in this dissertation: 
1- Compared to the policies of the Superpowers in this world, why is China having a 
different point of view and perspective concerning its foreign policy?  
2- Why is it fixing its strategies with a geoeconomic background instead of a 
geopolitical one? 
3- Is replacing geopolitics with geoeconomics in foreign policies a good option? What 
are the impacts of such a strategic shifting?  
4- How can geoeconomics be a discipline adopted by a superpower for international 
primacy? 
5- How will this Chinese new strategy affect its relations with Russia in the Eurasian 
area? Will this change lead to cooperation or rivalry between those Superpowers?  
 
          In order to treat the presented problem statement, and in an attempt to answer the questions 
that accompanied it, we found it appropriate first to analyze secondary data by adopting the 
descriptive – analytical methodology, which will be used beside the comparative one in accordance 
with the proposed plan of the dissertation.  Therefore, books, academic journals and newspapers 
were used for data collection.  
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         Then we have dedicated a chapter for empirical analysis, in which we have conducted in-
depth-interviews with scholars of political sciences and international relations, researchers, 
diplomats, political analysts, and journalists, in order to validate the findings of our document 
analysis and cover all the details that we could not get from the secondary data.   
          There is no doubt that the proposed approach to treat this subject has brought some 
difficulties especially that it has not been treated in this way before. Therefore, we collected a large 
number of different references so that we can provide a comprehensive study containing all the 
required details and covering the various aspects of the topic. Another frontier has faced us and it 
was about the difficulty in translating the references in Chinese and Russian languages into 
English.  
 “The foundation of China’s geopolitical power is its economic might” (Bremmer, 2016).  
But what are China’s geoeconomic powers? What are its aims and its means? To answer these 
questions and all the questions above, this study will be divided into three principal parts: 
•  The first part will present the theoretical difference between geopolitics and 
geoeconomics in its two chapters, where the first one will display the geopolitics 
theories and the geoeconomics approaches, and the second one will discuss the shift 
from geopolitics to geoeconomics in the world.  
• The second part will feature the Chinese assets and geo-strategy in its two chapters. 
The first chapter will discuss the local and foreign assets that build its geoeconomic 
potential, and the second one will talk about its new geo-strategy for international 
primacy. 
• The third and last part will proffer the integration phenomenon between China and 
Russia in Eurasia, in its first two chapters. The first one will present the interests of the 
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two countries in Eurasia, and the second one will discuss their cooperation and 
competition in this specific geopolitical zone of the world.  As for the third chapter, it 
will involve an empirical analysis, in which information from interviews will be 
collected, analyzed, and compared with the point of view discussed in this thesis.  
 
          This way to study the subject will provide us with much information to answer the problem 
statement and its hypothesis, in order to attain a sealed conclusion that will be an addition to the 
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Part I: Difference between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics 
Chapter 1: What are the Geopolitics Theories and the Geoeconomics Approaches? 
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Chapter 1: What are the Geopolitics Theories and the 
Geoeconomics Approaches? 
 
          Before discussing the geopolitics and geoeconomics disciplines, we should do a brief 
introduction for the chapter, which will substantially define the “Geopolitics” and 
“Geoeconomics” concepts, helping us in understanding all the aspects of the subject. 
Geopolitics:  
          At its peak period, Geopolitics was known as “a scientific branch that studies the impacts of 
the physical and geographical environment on the states’ politics in the seventh and the eighth 
decades” (Hlihor, 2014) … 
          It is important to know that geopolitics has started long decades ago Before Christ, and that 
the strategic principle of “know your enemy” was originally developed by the Chinese military 
strategist Sun-Tzu in his famous book “The Art of War” written 400 BC; His emphasis on the 
necessity of understanding the enemy has been rediscovered and valued by the U.S. defense 
community in the recent decades (Rousseau, 2012).  
          Rudolf Kjellen, the Swedish - German geography expert has first initiated and circulated the 
term of Geopolitics in the university and academic world in a public conference on April 1890 
(Hlihor, 2014) … He was known by the “Swedish Father of Geopolitics” (Rudolf Kjellén, 2011). 
          And Geopolitics has firstly showed itself during the periods of rivalry between the Great 
powers… It is a branch of social sciences that focuses on analyzing the relations between 
geography and political powers, and capabilities of the states within the international relations 
(Hlihor, 2014). 
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          Most of the researchers have agreed on the idea that: “Coming up with a specific definition 
of geopolitics is notoriously difficult, for the meaning of concepts like geopolitics tends to change 
as historical periods and structures of world order change” (Tuathail et al., 1998, p. 1). 
 
Geoeconomics:  
          The “Geoeconomics” term was first mentioned by an American military strategist: Edward 
Luttwak in 1990, while he was arguing that: “following the Cold war, the importance of military 
power was giving way to geoeconomic power…” (Petsinger, n.d.).  
          In his Essay: ‘From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of 
Commerce.’ Luttwak said: “‘geoeconomics’ is the best term I can think of to describe the 
admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce.” (Baru, 2012, p. 3). 
          After Luttwak, Samuel Huntigton in his Essay: “Why International Primacy Matters?” 
published in 1993, said that: “in a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely, 
economic power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of 
states” (Baru, 2012, p. 3). 
          We can also mention that geoeconomics can be defined in two ways (Baru, 2012, p. 2): 
1- The relationship between economic policy and the changes in national power and 
geopolitics (The geopolitical consequences of economic phenomenon). 
2- The economic consequences of geopolitical trends and national powers.  
          So, “the trade follows the flag” means that there are economic impacts of the projection of 
national powers; and “the flag follows the trade” means that there are geopolitical consequences 
because of economics phenomena” … These two notions can clarify for now the concept 
‘geoeconomics’ as a prelude to its detailed determination in this chapter. 
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Section 1: Geopolitics’ Theories 
 
          Because of its correlation to the employment of the states’ components in their foreign 
policies in a particular way, and in the relations between those states in a general one, Geopolitics 
is not a constant factor, but per contra it changes over time under the effects of the internal 
circumstances of the states and with the modulation of their foreign policies toward each other. 
          According to the Center for Research on Geopolitics (2015), The ‘Geopolitics’ concept first 
appeared clearly with the Swedish geographer Rudolph Kjellén; He first used this term in a 
Swedish publication in 1899, and defined it as: “The theory of the state as a geographical organism 
or phenomenon in space”, where power as influence and politics, and space as territory and soil 
were very important.  Professor Kjellén has since that time gotten the surname of the “Father of 
Geopolitics”, and the term of geopolitics has been daily mentioned in international news 
broadcasts since that time, as indicated by the Center for Research on Geopolitics (2015).  
          The word “Geopolitics” conjures images up, in another term, it provokes ideas of war, 
empire and diplomacy… Briefly, it is “The practice of states controlling and competing for 
territory” (Flint, 2006, p.13).  But, it is not only limited to that, it also presents “a way of seeing 
the world” (Flint, 2006, p.13), and that is why this world has known many geopolitics 
theoreticians, where each one of them had his own theories in classifying the world into particular 
regions, and their classifications were based on particular understandings they had absorbed from 
their countries’ points of view (Flint, 2006).  
         According to the Center for Research on Geopolitics (2015), Geopolitics has passed in many 
ups and downs during the past decades, especially after the Second World War, because of the 
German geopolitics that made it a “bad name”, with Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolph Kjellén - who 
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developed Ratzel ideas -, and without forgetting General Karl Haushofer. All of them were aiming 
to increase the size of the German State eastwards and create a larger state as a final target (Flint 
2006).  But the Center for Research on Geopolitics (2015) affirms that geopolitics is now 
witnessing a great revival, and the first reason for that, is the recognition that the recent global 
political changes are mainly based on the geographical environment.  
          Besides Kjellén, the American famous admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan was a classical 
geopolitician who gave the sea power a great importance. His thesis discussed “the relationship 
between the political control of the sea and the impact of a powerful navy on a state’s foreign 
policy”, as indicated by the Center for Research on Geopolitics (2015).  He demonstrated in his 
book published in 1890: The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, that the sea power has an 
important role to play in the foreign policies of the States, and he presented for that, the essential 
elements of sea power that a strong state should have (Center for Research on Geopolitics, 2015). 
          After Rudolph Kjellén and Alfred Thayer Mahan, one of the founding fathers of classical 
geopolitics, Halford J. Mackinder (1904), presented a lecture in the “Royal Geographical Society” 
in London in 1904, and described the core of political power (the Russian federation nowadays) 
as the “eternal geographical pivot of history”. After that, he published a study entitled: Democratic 
Ideals and Reality in 1919, where he replaced the term “pivot” by the term “heartland”, describing 
that strategic space of the globe situated in the core of Eurasia. Later on, he became the most well-
known and influential geopolitician (Flint, 2006), and we will discuss his theories in this part of 
the chapter.   
          Away from the German school of geopolitics, after Mahan and Mackinder, and while the 
United States began to develop its role as a post-war world power, many geopolitical strategies 
were generated by some new geopolitics theoreticians (Tuathail et al., 1998): Nicholas J. Spykman 
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and his “Rimland” theory, Georges Kennan and his “Containment” Doctrine, Francis Fukuyama 
and his “End of History” theory, Georges W. Bush and “The New World Order” strategy, Samuel 
Huntington and “The Clash of Civilization” theory, …, and recently Zbigniew Brzezinski and 
“The Middle Space” theory in his most famous book “The Grand Chessboard”.  
          In this chapter we will not talk about all the cited doctrines, strategies and theories, but we 
will focus on those which will help us in answering the main problematic of the thesis and its 
related questions.  
          That is why, this section of the chapter will be allocated to discuss, successively:  
a) Admiral Alfred T. Mahan’s Theory: Seapower 
b) Sir Halford J. Mackinder’s Theory: Heartland / Landpower 
c) Professor Nicholas J. Spykman’s Theory:  Rimland  
d) Professor Zbigniew K. Brzezinski’s Theory: Middle Space in the Grand Chessboard   
 
A- Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s Theory: Seapower  
          Alfred Thayer MAHAN (1840-1914), son of Dennis Hart MAHAN, an important instructor 
at the United States Military Academy at West Point in New York. He graduated from the United 
States Naval Academy in 1859 and served in the Union Navy for 40 years, according to the editors 
of Encyclopedia Britannica.  
          He wrote his first book in 1883: The Gulf and Inland Waters, as a study of naval 
engagement in the Civil War (Sempa, 2014).  Stephen Luce, president of the Naval War College, 
invited Mahan in 1884 to lecture on Naval History and Tactics there… After that in 1886, Mahan 
became the president of that college until 1889; and in 1890, he published the lectures he has done 
in the college in his most famous book: The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1660 – 1783) 
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(Encyclopedia Britannica).  That book became the “Bible” for many navies around the world, and 
it was the one who brought him national and international fame (Sempa, 2014).  He discussed in 
it the exponential importance of sea power in national historical supremacy, as indicated by the 
editors of Encyclopedia Britannica.  
          In 1892, he published another book: The Influence of Sea Power upon the French 
Revolution and Empire (1793 – 1812). That book “stressed on the interdependence of the military 
and commercial control of the sea and asserted that the control of seaborne commerce can 
determine the outcome of wars” (Encyclopedia Britannica).  
          In 1896, he was retired from the U.S navy, but he was subsequently recalled to service 
(Encyclopedia Britannica).  Then in 1898 he published his third book: The Interest of America 
in Sea Power, Present and Future (Hlihor, 2014).  In this book he was aiming to “arouse his 
fellow Americans to a realization of their maritime responsibilities” (Encyclopedia Britannica). 
          Those three books are acknowledged today as belonging to Geopolitics (Hlihor, 2014); they 
have had a great influence in the building up of naval forces before the First World War, especially 
in Great Britain and Germany, as mentioned in Britannica; and they also revolutionized the 
strategic thinking for naval operations (Hlihor, 2014).  
          Beside those books, and four years before his death (1914), he published a great book in 
1900: The Problem of Asia. In this book, he took the Far East as a zone of analysis, and identified 
the case of confrontation in the strategic belt situated at 30° - 40° north latitude, between maritime 
powers on one hand, such as Great Britain and USA; and continental powers on the other, such as 
Russia (Hlihor, 2014).  
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          The solution he presented to that case was to establish a balance and counterbalance system 
controlled by the powers from outside Eurasia, by using the fleet and trade, and in accordance with 
the interests of maritime powers (Hlihor, 2014). 
          In his studies, Mahan focused on the oceans, and especially on the power that characterizes 
those who controlled them… He compared the advantages of maritime powers to continental 
powers in order to prevent aggression as he thought, through the maritime control of the 
transportation routes and the condition offered by nature in favor of those maritime powers (Hlihor, 
2014). 
          For that professional naval officer Admiral Alfred Mahan, The road to national greatness 
was through naval expansionism (Tuathail et al., 1998) … For him, the path to that national 
greatness lays in commercial and naval expansionism, and he argued that all truly great powers 
were naval powers (Tuathail et al., 1998). 
          He clarified that, it is not that necessary to occupy all territories, because that will turn to 
colonialism, and the United States always tries to show its image as an anti-colonial nation; and 
he explained that what the United States need was “an informal empire based on ‘open door’ trade 
and a string of overseas naval bases that would give its navy the ability to project power in a 
troublesome region whenever it needed to do so” (Tuathail et al., 1998, p.18). 
          Starting from the point that the USA cannot rely and depend only on the security and 
protection offered by the natural distance, Mahan traced the strategic guidelines of the American 
defensive policy by recommending an extension of the defensive frontiers to the opposite sides of 
the oceans shores around the American waterline. He also recommended the construction of 
strategic bases on the Atlantic and the Pacific’s Islands (Hlihor, 2014). And after that, it became 
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obvious that the preservation of the American power was the role of the American military and 
commercial fleets (Hlihor, 2014). 
          Besides these specific recommendations, and in order to ensure the importance of the 
Seapower, Mahan visualized a geopolitical scenario known as “The Anaconda Politics”. This 
scenario was all about a policy of surrounding the Eurasian continental mass with a chain of naval 
bases (Hlihor, 2014).  
          And because of that scenario, the control of the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean became 
the core of the United States’ geopolitical policy; and by that, Mahan became “the theoretical light” 
behind the United States’ move to globalism (Flint, 2006).  
          Mahan’s Seapower Doctrine started from “The Influence of Seapower upon History”; this 
book was the basis of almost all of his later work. In its first chapters was Mahan’s thesis about 
Seapower and his firm belief that “Sea power was the key to national security and World’s 
dominance”: the theory that Mahan defended in all his future work (Liu, n.d., p.2).  In the same 
context when describing the rise of the maritime security, Bueger and Edmunds (2017) explained 
that the sea was considered as the platform where geopolitical power is displayed and the space of 
confrontation between the superpowers. 
         The first Chapter of Mahan’s book was a discussion of the elements of sea power; Mahan 
enumerated and explained in it six principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations:                  
I. Geographical Position. II. Physical Conformation (including natural productions and climate). 
III. Extent of Territory. IV. Number of Population. V. Character of the People. VI. Character of 
the Government (including the national institutions) (Mahan, 1890).  
          By Geographical Position, he meant that: “if a nation be so situated that it is neither forced 
to defend itself by land nor induced to seek extension of its territory by way of the land, it has, by 
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the very unity of its aim directed upon the sea, an advantage as compared with a people one of 
whose boundaries is continental”. He also affirmed that: “The geographical position of a country 
may not only favor the concentration of its forces, but give the further strategic advantage of a 
central position and a good base for hostile operations against its probable enemies” (Mahan, 1890, 
p.16). 
          In the Physical Conformation, he described that: “The seaboard of a country is one of its 
frontiers; and the easier the access offered by the frontier to the regions beyond, in this case the 
sea, the greater will be the tendency of a people toward intercourse with the rest of the world by 
it. If a country be imagined having a long seaboard, but entirely without a harbor, such a country 
can have no sea trade of its own, no shipping, no navy” (Mahan, 1890, p.18). 
          In explaining the Extent of Territory, he said that: “As regards the development of sea power, 
it is not the total number of square miles which a country contains, but the length of its coast−line 
and the character of its harbors that are to be considered. As to these it is to be said that, the 
geographical and physical conditions being the same, extent of sea−coast is a source of strength 
or weakness according as the population is large or small” (Mahan, 1890, p.22).  
          He clarified the condition of the Number of Population, by saying that: “It has been said that 
in respect of dimensions it is not merely the number of square miles, but the extent and character 
of the sea−coast that is to be considered with reference to sea power; and so, in point of population, 
it is not only the grand total, but the number following the sea, or at least readily available for 
employment on ship−board and for the creation of naval material, that must be counted” (Mahan, 
1890, p.22). 
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          By National Character he meant that: “If sea power be really based upon a peaceful and 
extensive commerce, aptitude for commercial pursuits must be a distinguishing feature of the 
nations that have at one time or another been great upon the sea” (Mahan, 1890, p.25).  
          And finally, to clarify the condition of the Character of the Government, Mahan explained 
that: As the various traits of a country and its people constitute the natural characteristics through 
which a nation – as a man - begins its career, the conduct of its government in its turn, corresponds 
to the intelligent will-power implemented in; Herein, the success or failure in a man’s life or in a 
nation’s history will be determined according to their energetic, wise, and persevering conduct 
(Mahan, 1890, p.29).  
          Finally, according to Elson Liu, we can say that Mahan’s doctrine and efforts brought some 
changes into the naval policies of the super powers in the last decade, especially to the United 
States, Great Britain, and Japan…  Mahan’s impact on global affairs has been distinguished more 
than that of any other historian (Rodger, 1999).  In a review of the United States’ military policies 
after the Second World War, we found it clear that their foreign policy doctrine was built along 
the lines of Mahan’s theory so far; and it is relevant to mention here the statement of the U.S state 
secretary H. L. Stimson: “Neptune is God, Mahan is his prophet, and the USA navy the only real 
church” (Hlihor, 2014) … 
          After the death of Mahan in 01 December 1914, the Sea power Doctrine got engaged in most 
of the foreign policies of the Seapower countries as a new theoretical and geopolitical vision in 
that time, which helped the states become classified as maritime powers according to the 
conditions presented by Mahan, in attaining their geostrategic targets.  
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B-  Sir Halford J. Mackinder’s Theory: Heartland / Land Power 
 
          Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861 – 1947), a British political geographer and son of a 
physician of Scottish descent, studied natural biology and modern history in the Christ Church – 
Oxford, and was a president of the principal debating society at the university: The Oxford Union. 
After leaving Oxford he worked as a lecturer for the Oxford extension movement which gives 
educational opportunities to people unable to attend university, while he expounded what he called 
“the new geography”, known for its combination between natural sciences and humanities, and 
won attention (Crone, 1998). 
          At that time, and learning of Mackinder’s success, the Royal Geographical Society in 
London, invited him to address it on that “new geography”, where he won the challenge boldly 
with his paper “The Scopes and Methods of Geography”, which got excellent feedbacks. In 1887 
he became the first lecturer of geography at Oxford. And when the Royal Geographical Society 
established the Oxford School of Geography in 1899, there was not any doubt that Mackinder will 
be its first director, and that is what happened (Crone, 1998).  
          But in January 1904, the time when he presented his paper entitled: “The Geographical Pivot 
of History” at the Geographical Society, that was the time when Mackinder became a central figure 
of the geopolitical thinking (Hlihor, 2014).  In this paper, he was studying the prerequisites for a 
stable peace settlement during the First World War, and he argued that Interior Asia and East       
Europe had become the pivot area or the strategic center of the World Island (Asia, Europe, and 
Africa) because of the decline of sea power against land power (Crone, 1998).  He analyzed the 
differences between the great maritime powers and the continental powers, and realized that the 
role of a pivot regime in politics and the world history was the key aspect (Hlihor, 2014).  But he 
said that his aim will not be to discuss the influence of any kind of features, or yet to make a study 
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in regional geography, but to exhibit human history as part of the life of the world organism 
(Mackinder, 1904). 
          In that paper, he presented a geopolitical formula which would express certain aspects, at 
any rate, of “geographical causation in universal history” (Mackinder, 1904, p.422), and set into 
perspective “some of the competing forces in current international politics” (Mackinder, 1904, 
p.422).  He implicitly admitted that: Who rules the Pivot Area, commands the World – Island; and 
who commands the World – Island, commands the World.  Commanding the pivot area requires 
ruling its inner crescent, and ruling that inner crescent requires ruling the outer one; so 
commanding the pivot area will lead in its final steps into commanding the World.  
          Mackinder pictured Europe and Asia as one great continent: “Euro – Asia”, and his argument 
behind his formula was that Euro – Asia, the pivot area of the world, measures 21 million square 
miles, more than three times of the North American area, and more than two times the measure of 
the European continent; The center and north of Euro – Asia, he pointed out, measure “some nine 
million square miles, (…) have no available waterways to the ocean, but, on the other hand, (…) 
are generally favorable to the mobility of horsemen” (Mackinder, 1904, p.431).  In the North it is 
ice-girt and water-girt everywhere else; to its east, south and west there are marginal regions 
accessible to shipmen, ranged in a crescent shape as Mackinder said, and those regions are four in 
number because of their coincidence with the spheres of the four great religions: Buddhism (Indian 
Ocean Region), Brahmanism (Pacific Ocean Region), Mohametanism (Nearer East or the Land of 
the Five Seas), and Christianity (Europe) (Mackinder, 1904). 
          He also mentioned in this paper that the sea power of Britain, Canada, the United States, 
South Africa, Australia and Japan are “inaccessible” to the land power of Euro – Asia; but many 
events have increased the land power significance as he said, and that power still remains 
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(Mackinder, 1904).  “The Tudor century, which saw the expansion of Western Europe over the 
sea, also saw Russian power carried from Moscow through Siberia” (Mackinder, 1904, p.433), he 
argued. Thus there were many differences between the modern land power and the sea power, in 
the sources of their ideals and more in the material conditions of their mobility (Mackinder, 1904). 
 
 
Figure 2: The Natural Seat of Power as presented by Mackinder 
 
Source: Mackinder, 1904, p.435 
 
          And if we get back to the “pivot area” we can see in figure 1 above, that it is that vast large 
area of Euro – Asia; Outside of it there is its great Inner Crescent which includes: Germany, 
Austria, Turkey, India and China; and the Outer Crescent includes: Britain, South Africa, 
Australia, The United States, Canada, and Japan (Mackinder, 1904, p.436). 
          Mackinder then warned that: “the oversetting of the balance of power in favor of the pivot 
state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit the use of vast 
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continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight” 
(Mackinder, 1904, p.436). 
          In the conclusion of his paper, Mackinder said that even if the control on the pivot zone 
(Russia) of the pivot area was changed due to the power competition over it, that would not reduce 
the significance of the pivot position; arguing that either a Russo – German alliance or a Sino – 
Japanese empire (which conquered Russian territory) could contend for world hegemony. In either 
case, “oceanic frontage” would be added to “the resources of the great continent”, thereby creating 
the geopolitical conditions necessary for producing a great power that was supreme both on land 
and at sea (Mackinder, 1904, p.437).  
          After the First World War, and exactly in 1919, Sir Halford Mackinder modified and 
clarified his formula about the pivot region, into a definite theory, in his published book: 
“Democratic Ideals and Reality”, arguably “the most important work on international politics 
ever written by a geographer” (Sempa, 2002, p.14).  He substituted the “pivot area” concept with 
the “heartland” and pointed in the preface of his new book that “the war has established and not 
shaken” his former points of view (Mackinder, 1919) … In the following pages “Mackinder 
presented a masterful synthesis of historical and geographical analyses that has withstood the test 
of time” (Sempa, 2002, p.14). 
          After studying the facts of the world’s geography, Mackinder advised in his book that in 
order to prevent future world conflicts, we must recognize the geographical realities and take step 
to counter their influence (Mackinder, 1919) ...  And if we get back to the geographical terms, we 
find that Mackinder’s world as sketched in Democratic Ideals and Reality is consisted of 3 main 
sections (Sempa, 2002, p.14):  
1- One ocean covering 9/12th of the globe; 
2- One great continent encompassing Europe, Asia and Africa (World-Island); 
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3- Several smaller islands including Britain, Japan, North America South America, and 
Australia. 
 
But the most significant feature of the World-Island in Mackinder’s theory was the Heartland 
which he described as: “a great continuous part in the north and center of the continent… from the 
icy flat shore of Siberia to the torrid, steep coasts of Baluchistan and Persia” (Mackinder, 1919, 
p.73).  This Heartland was “inaccessible to navigation from the ocean” because of its great rivers 
(Lena, Yenisei, Obi, Volga, and Ural) emptied into the frozen Arctic Ocean, and the others are 
inland seas (Caspian and Aral) (Sempa, 2002).  But in the other hand, the Heartland included one 
great “lowland” that constituted “a broad gateway from Siberia into Europe”, which is suitable to 
highly mobile land power (Mackinder, 1919, p.74).  
          Following the defeat of Napoleon, during the nineteenth century, and until the rise of the 
German empire and the First World War, a geopolitical struggle broke out: the “great game”, it 
was when the British sea power sought to contain Russian land power (Sempa, 2002).  During that 
game, Mackinder perceived a basis for the British policy, where he explained in his book that “We 
were opposed to… the Russian Czardom (Russian power and authority) because Russia was 
dominating, threatening force both in East Europe and the Heartland for a half century” 
(Mackinder, 1919, p.142).  He also explained that they were opposed to the German Kaiserdom 
(German power and authority) because “Germany took the lead from the Czardom, and would 
have crushed the revolting Slavs, and dominated East Europe and the Heartland” (Mackinder, 
1919, p.143).  This strategic approach formed the basis of the Second theory of Mackinder: “Who 
rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; 
who rules the World-Island commands the World” (Mackinder, 1919, p.194).  This theory 
influenced the British and the German policy makers who adapted it to promote their expansions, 
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even Karl Haushofer considered Mackinder “the author of the greatest of all geographical world 
views” (Sempa, 2002, p.17). 
          Years later and after the Second World War has broken out, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the 
editor of Foreign Affairs journal, asked Mackinder to write an article, where he updated his 
Heartland Theory, and so it was; Mackinder published an article entitled “The Round World and 
The Winning of the Peace” in July 1943 (Sempa, 2002, p.18), where he wrote that his concept of 
the Heartland “is more valid and useful today than it was either twenty or forty years ago”, and 
redefined the Heartland concept in mentioning that it is: “the northern part and the interior of Euro-
Asia,” extending “from the Arctic coast down to the central deserts,” flowing westward to “the 
broad isthmus between the Baltic and Black Seas” (Mackinder, 1943, p.597).  He wrote that it was 
equivalent to the Soviet Union territory minus the east land of the Yenisei River (Sempa, 2002, 
p.19).  
          Mackinder estimated a second geographical zone to be of “almost equal significance to the 
Heartland”: “The Midland Ocean” formed by the eastern half of Canada and the United States, the 
North Atlantic basin and its “four subsidiaries (Mediterranean, Baltic, Arctic, and Caribbean 
Seas)”, Britain and France (Mackinder, 1943, p.604).  He also wished that Heartland Russia 
cooperate with the powers of the Midland Ocean to prevent the zone from future aggressions in 
the postwar world (Sempa, 2002).  
          Nowadays, strategists, political observers and researchers affirm the influence of 
Mackinder’s theories in the international relations upon the decades, and declared that the politics 
of the twentieth century have been shaped by the geopolitical vision of Mackinder (Sempa, 2002).  
Furthermore, many nations and power have been influenced by Mackinder’s vision: The People’s 
Republic of China, located at the gates of the “Pivot Region”, has access to the sea and possesses 
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human and natural resources to rise over Eurasia in the future; and Russia still occupies the 
Heartland zone currently, and also possesses natural and human resources as well as thousands of 
nuclear weapons which could help it in the fundamental application of Mackinder’s theories 
(Sempa, 2002).  So as MacFarlane (2015) said in their review of the book Central Asia in 
International Relations: The Legacies of Halford Mackinder: “Like it or not, Mackinder, or some 
variant thereof, is alive and well” (p. 241). 
          After Mahan and Mackinder, Spykman had got his own geopolitical vision for Eurasia and 
the World, so the next part of this chapter’s section will discuss his theory. 
 
 
C- Professor Nicholas J. Spykman’s Theory:  Rimland 
 
          Born in Amsterdam, on October 13th 1893, studied and earned his doctorate from the 
University of California in 1923, Nicholas John Spykman was a Dutch-American instructor in 
political sciences and sociology from 1923 to 1925 in the university he graduated from, before 
going to Yale in 1925. Ten years later, he became chairman of the Department of International 
Relations there and Director of the Yale Institute of International Studies until 1940; he died on 26 
June 1943 (Thompson, 1980).  
          As a young journalist from 1913 to 1920 (Thompson, 1980), sociologist, political scientist, 
and geopolitician, Nicholas J. Spykman became a “chief among the diffusers of geopolitics from 
Europe to America” (Wilkinson, 1985, p.77).  By his works, he mainly influenced the ideological 
bases of the foreign policy of the United States since 1941; he was known as a “theoretical 
geopolitician” for he debated over Mackinder’s Heartland doctrine, and counter posed his own 
Rimland theory (Wilkinson, 1985). 
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          After publishing his book “America’s Strategy in World Politics” during the war in 1942, 
where he elaborated and developed a geopolitical critique of the American isolationism (Hlihor, 
2014), he planned to publish another book “in which he would develop further his views on the 
subject of power in international relations and on the place of geopolitical analysis in the 
formulation of a security policy” (Sempa, 2006).  The Yale Institute of International Studies 
decided then to realize Spykman’s plan by publishing a book based on the lectures he gave in the 
University, his notes correspondence and maps, so Helen R. Nicholl, his research assistant, was 
tasked with arranging and editing the text and the result was a classical book in the geopolitical 
analysis field, entitled: “The Geography of the Peace” published in 1944, one year after his death 
(Sempa, 2006). 
          In that new book, Nicholas Spykman divided the world into two areas: the Heartland, and 
the Rimland, and presented a new theory: “Who controls the Rimland dominates Eurasia, Who 
controls Eurasia controls the world destiny” (Hlihor, 2014, p.29).  
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Figure 3: Spykman’s Rimland 
 
Source: Shian, 2016 
 
          If we look at figure 3 and compare Spykman’s theory to Mackinder’s one, we can notice 
that Spykman highlighted Mackinder’s interpretation grid of world politics (Hlihor, 2014) by 
replacing the Inner crescent with Rimland (Flint, 2006), in another meaning Spykman did not 
present anything new. 
          It is important to know that Spykman did not oppose Mackinder’s geographical concept of 
the Heartland, but disagreed on his overrating of the potential of the region’s power (Sempa, 
2006).  Spykman considered that the key region of world politics was not the Heartland but the 
coastal areas, the Rimland which he described as follow:  
“The Rimland of the Eurasian land mass must be viewed as an intermediate region, 
situated…between the heartland and the marginal seas. It functions as a vast buffer zone of conflict 
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between sea power and land power. Looking in both directions, it must function amphibiously and 
defend itself on land and sea” (Spykman, 1944, p.41). 
          We can notice here that Spykman had given importance to land and maritime power, not 
only for land power as Mackinder has done, because of the accessibility of the Rimland to the 
Heartland and the marginal seas, as it is open landward and seaward. 
          At the beginning of 1942, a political alliance between Germany and Japan helped both of 
them to realize their objectives in Eurasia and was a strategic challenge to the United States foreign 
policy in the Second World War when it was obliged to fight them there.  
          So Spykman explained that: “The most significant fact… about the situation which 
confronted us when, at the beginning of 1942, Germany and Japan had achieved a good part of 
their objectives, was the existence of a political alliance between them. We were then confronted 
with the possibility of complete encirclement, in which case we might have had to face the unified 
power of the whole Eurasian land mass. The strength of the power centers of the Eastern 
Hemisphere would then have been over-powering. It would have been impossible for us to 
preserve our independence and security” (Spykman, 1944, p.34).  
          And then he realized that the security of the United States would be threatened if any nation 
or alliance of nations emerged as dominating power in either the Heartland or the Rimland; that 
is why according to Spykman the American policymakers should take this fact as their primordial 
concern to resolve (Spykman, 1944). 
          In an analysis of Spykman’s Rimland theory, we can rely on the threat to the U.S security 
he warned about when he said that: a single power domination of the Eurasian land mass is the 
great threat to the U.S security (Spykman, 1944), to conclude why he suggested changing 
Mackinder’s famous dictum about the control of the Heartland which will lead to ruling of the 
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world into his pre-mentioned one: “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia 
controls the destinies of the world” (Spykman, 1944, p.43). 
          Away from that, and in his predictions for the postwar period, Spykman expected that China 
would be the dominant power in the Far East, and the Soviet Union will be its counterpart and the 
strongest land power on the continent (Sempa, 2006). He also foretold that the Rimland regions of 
Europe, the Middle East and the Far East, which were the battle zones of the Second World War, 
would remain the areas of greatest strategic significance in the postwar world (Sempa, 2006). 
 
          After his predictions, Spykman pointed out that “It is the peace-time relationship between 
the power factors which will make or mar the security of the world in general and the Western 
Hemisphere in Particular” (Spykman, 1944, p.51).  Those factors had a geopolitical meaning: the 
U.S was “obliged to safeguard its position by making certain that no overwhelming power is 
allowed to build itself up in these areas” (Spykman, 1944, p.51).  
          Spykman agreed with Mackinder about his predictions that the postwar struggle would 
potentially pit a Heartland nation: Russia, against U.S sea power for control of the Rimland 
(Sempa, 2018).  And if we get back to his predictions for China, he said that one day it would be 
a “continental power of huge dimensions”, and its size, geographic position, natural resources and 
population would oblige the U.S to ally with Japan in order to preserve the balance of power in 
Asia (Sempa, 2018). 
          And nowadays, just as Spykman predicted more than seventy years ago, the Asiatic 
Mediterranean has become a geopolitical territory for conflict and battle between the People’s 
Republic of China, the United States of America, Japan and many other regional powers… The 
energy resources, the economic influence, the control of important sea lanes, the political control 
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of territory, and the overall balance of power in the Asia-Pacific Region, all are at stake in this 
struggle (Sempa, 2015).  
          As Spykman was presenting instructions for the American policymakers through his 
writings, he warned them in the end of his book The Geography of Peace that the security interests 
of their nation in the Asia-Pacific region and everywhere else will not be protected nor preserved 
by the world community, so he advised the statesmen of his day that they shall remain depending 
on their own national strength and not relying on anyone because “the failure of a great state to 
consider power means its eventual destruction and conquest. It has meant the downfall of all the 
empires that have been tempted by the flabby ease of unpreparedness” (Sempa, 2015). 
          Thereby American foreign policy was based on Spykman’s geopolitical percepts, so the 
alliances the U.S has done after the war, most prominently NATO, had the objectives of countering 
direct Soviet pressures on the Rimland of Eurasia on one hand, and withstanding Communist China 
on the other (Sempa, 2002). 
          After discussing Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman’s geopolitical theories, it is important to 
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D- Professor Zbigniew K. Brzezinski’s Theory: Middle Space in 
the Grand Chessboard   
 
          One of the most influential figures in the American foreign policy, Zbigniew Kazimierz 
Brzezinski (1928 – 2017) American – Polish, served as a US national security adviser in the 
administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977 – 1981) and was the most famous figure among 
those who held that position at all, as he played the most prominent role in the U.S – U.S.S.R 
negotiations: SALT II Nuclear Weapon Treaty (1979); and played also key roles in U.S efforts to 
sustain the rule of the shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, according to the editors of 
Encyclopedia Britannica. 
          Z. Brzezinski graduated from McGill University in Montreal in 1949 where he studied 
economics and political sciences and earned a master’s degree there in 1950; then he went to 
Harvard which granted him a PhD in political sciences in 1953 and appointed him as instructor 
there; in 1959 he decamped to Columbia University (Lewis, 2017). 
          Before serving as US national security adviser with President Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski 
acted as his foreign affairs adviser during his presidential campaign; he was also a foreign affairs 
adviser to the Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson during the 1960s. And after the 
mandate of President Carter in 1981, Brzezinski resumed teaching at Columbia’s University (1981 
– 1989) and then worked as a senior research professor of International Relations at Paul H. Nitze 
School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University (from 1989), according to 
the editors Encyclopedia Britannica.  
          One of the most important achievements Brzezinski has also done was in his assiduous work 
to improve the Sino-American relations, and under his advice the United States opened its so first 
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official embassy in Beijing since the communists assumed power in 1949 (Encyclopedia 
Britannica).  
          And it was after the loss of Jimmy Carter to Ronald Regan in 1981 when Brzezinski decided 
to turn to other things, including becoming a consultant on international affairs and a senior adviser 
for the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, in addition to 
his American foreign policy teachings at the University of John Hopkins (BBC News, 2017).  
          Daniel Lewis (2017) said: “He was, in short, a man who could be counted on to have strong 
opinions and a boundless eagerness to share them”.  And this was the truth, as according to 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Z. Brzezinski has written many studies and published many successful 
books:  Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era (1970), Game Plan (1986), 
The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (1989); The 
Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (2004); and Strategic Vision: America and the 
Crisis of Global Power (2012); but the most important book, which will be very prominent to our 
study is: The Grand Chessboard (1977) (Sempa, 2002).  
          In The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski identified Eurasia as “the mega-continent”: the 
geopolitical stage on which the great powers will vie for predominance in the future (Sempa, 2002, 
p.113).  He believed that this continent has been the “center” of the most resolute, determined and 
dynamic countries in History… Its political space comprises India and China, the two most 
powerful and densely populated countries, which are candidates for competing with the United 
States in its global ascendancy; knowing moreover that the challenges facing U.S strategies came 
only from this particular Eurasian region (Brzezinski, 1997). 
          Furthermore, the “next six larger economies and the next six biggest spenders on military 
weaponry are located in Eurasia” (Brzezinski, 1997, p.31) …  Eurasia contains 75% of the world’s 
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population, 60% of the GDP, and 75% of the world’s energy resources (Hlihor, 2014, p.34).  This 
is in addition to its important strategic geographical position, vicinity to main powers in the 
neighborhood, and the increasing leverage of external powers (German, 2016).  That is why 
Brzezinski considers this continent as “the CHIEF geopolitical prize” for America (Brzezinski, 
1997, p.30).  
          By its book title The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski wanted to point out that Eurasia was 
the region where geopolitical and geostrategic battles between black and white kings’ teams occurs 
until the Checkmate happened and world political leadership is gained after the game is over. 
However this game board is oval as Brzezinski pointed out, and not only two players, but several 
players compete on it; each player and his team possess different amounts of power, and settle 
mainly in the East, West, Center and South of the board, as each of those four zones has its own 
advantages and qualifications and the attack-defense games happens in its space (Brzezinski, 
1997).  
          Hence we can see that with Brzezinski, geopolitics has shifted from regional to global 
dimensions, since according to him: “preponderance over the entire Eurasian continent serves as 
the central basis for global primacy” (Brzezinski, 1997, p.39) …  From this statement we can 
conclude Brzezinski geopolitical theory which clearly affirms that: “Who dominates Eurasia, 
dominates almost automatically The Middle East and Africa” (Brzezinski, 1997, p.31) ... 
          He presented this theory directly after explaining that: A power that dominates Eurasia 
would control two of the world's three most advanced and economically productive regions 
(Brzezinski, 1997) … 
          And from this geopolitical approach, Brzezinski reached two conclusions of high strategic 
value to the United States at that time (Hlihor, 2014): 
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1- Developing American policies towards Europe, and different ones towards Asia is not 
enough anymore, but we must have in view specific policies for Eurasia as a whole; 
2- Having given that U.S.A had a different geostrategic perspective on which its naval forces 
depended, interpreting its relations with other states from its situation as “island”, 
Brzezinski identified the Mediterranean and Central Asian regions as highly instable, and 
located on the so-called “Arch of Instability or crisis”. 
          It should be noted here that prior to the Cold War between the Eastern and Western poles, 
the conflict was mostly happening at the Eurasian Border. The Sino-Russian pole, at that time, 
controlled most of its territory, but did not control its borders, and that was what opened the doors 
to the U.S.A to straddle the Eastern and Western coasts of Eurasia, where its self-defense became 
the first fundamental and strategic step which has subsequently paved the road for the Cold War 
(Brzezinski, 1997). 
          As for the third defensive front, which emerged to the south of the continent, it took place 
in the final phase of the Cold War; and that was followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and its American competition through supporting the Afghan local resistance (Brzezinski, 1997).  
          Since Brzezinski was through his analyses and studies aiming to preserve American interests 
on the international scene and to keep its position of world global power which controls the affairs 
of various countries in the long term, he feared from potential rivals that would emerge at any time 
in the Eurasian continent (Brzezinski, 1997), because every new challenge and all emerging and 
competing countries have Eurasian roots (Brzezinski, 1997).  He sees that focusing on all the major 
players and the accurate and correct evaluation of their reality should be the starting point in 
developing the necessary geo-strategy to achieve the American objectives in the Eurasian arena 
(Brzezinski, 1997). 
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          This geo-strategy must benefit from the fact that the United States has a high, if not the 
highest power range in the world; militarily, it possesses unmatched global capabilities; 
economically – even if it encounters obstacles and challenges from Germany, China, and Japan – 
it still maintains its progress compared to the global growth as a whole, and this is the same for 
technology as well (Brzezinski, 1997). 
          As for the “Middle Space” Theory that Brzezinski described in his book, it indicates that 
the global domination of the United States remains incomplete unless it is strengthened by the 
control of the Eurasian continent, which is very similar to the geostrategic vacuum that is expected 
to be filled in order to complete its global domination. And that is what assures that the Eurasian 
chessboard is the battle-zone where the game’s objective is to achieve global sovereignty 
(Brzezinski, 1997). 
          This Middle Space stretches between western and eastern borders of Eurasia, is sparsely 
populated and politically fluid, and “was formerly occupied by a powerful rival to the U.S 
preeminence, a rival that was once committed to push America outside of Eurasia”, as Brzezinski 
said (Brzezinski, 1997, p.34). 
          But, according to Brzezinski (1997), on this oval-shaped game board which stretches from 
Lisbon (Far West of Europe) to Vladivostok (Southeastern Russia), there are several players as 
mentioned above, and the United States dominates the western extremity, few neighboring islands, 
and half of the peninsula located on the far east of the continent.  As for the area on the southern 
tip of Eurasia, it is "a politically anarchic but energy-rich region" and is of great importance as 
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Figure 4: Brzezinski’s Middle Space 
 
Source: Brzezinski, 1997, p.34   
 
          Brzezinski considered this Middle Space as provider of the “Game’s Settings”: 
1- If there is a possibility of dragging the middle area of the Eurasian continent and annexing 
it to Western orbit where the American dominate; 
2- If the South Eurasian side is not subject to the rule of one player; 
3- If the East is not unified in a manner that prompts the expulsion of America from its 
offshore bases; 
          In case all these conditions get achieved, it will be possible to say that America will prevail 
over the Eurasian continent and thus fill up its geostrategic “vacuum space” and thereby achieve 
its international sovereignty. But any circumstance contrary to these points will inevitably lead to 
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Section 2: Geoeconomics’ Approaches 
 
          After presenting, explaining, and clarifying the scientific theories of Geopolitics, it is time 
to shed light on the Geoeconomics approaches, in order to get a clear image that enables us to dive 
deep into the subject.  
          As pre-mentioned according to Petsinger (n.d.), the word “Geoeconomics” was first invoked 
in 1990 by Edward Luttwak, an American strategist who said that the importance of military power 
was giving way to geoeconomic power after the cold war… He observed that “the methods of 
commerce were displacing military methods with disposable capitals in lieu of firepower, civilian 
innovation in lieu of military-technical advancement, and market penetration in lieu of garrisons 
and bases” (Luttwak, 1990, p.17). 
          In his 1990 essay “From Geo-politics to Geoeconomics”, Luttwak states: “Geoeconomics… 
the best term I can think of to describe the admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of 
commerce (…) or as Clausewitz would have written, the logic of war in the grammar of 
commerce” (Luttwak, 1990, p.19) … 
          In another side, the main target of Geoeconomics policy is “to improve the state’s 
geopolitical potential and to use the available instruments of economic policy (and the capacity of 
the country’s economy) to maximize benefits in external relations” (Grosse, 2014, p.40), and that 
is what this section is going to clarify gradually. 
          We all have to know that “Geoeconomics” has become so substantial in the late 20th and 
early 21st century because of the discovery of a new tool of deterrence, the nuclear weapons, and 
their destructive powers and abilities, that prompted the nations to consider a new non-military 
approach to manage their international affairs (Gasimli, 2015) …  That is why Geoeconomics 
disciplines were found as non-military tools. 
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          In the word “Geoeconomics”, three main concepts seem to be acting in the backstage: 
Geography, Economics, and Politics. Those concepts have influenced each other during the 
history, and their interrelations have given birth to “Geoeconomics”.  The geographical location 
of a nation determines its possession of natural resources, the existence of a specific territory, a 
defined distance, a particular population, and many other geographical factors which are 
fundamental in the economic development (Gasimli, 2015); which means that geography is a 
contributing factor in the formalization of economics, and it absolutely has its impacts on politics. 
          Herein, Geoeconomics is “the study of interrelations of economics, geography and politics” 
(Gasimli, 2015, p.11) in three different directions (Gasimli, 2015): a) Aironomics: which studies 
the infinity of the universe from the surface of the earth; b) Surface Studies: which refer to land 
and water surfaces; c) Undergroundonomics:  which studies the underground resources.  
          This dissertation will only be based on the Surface Studies, and as much as possible on the 
Undergroundonomics, because the universe’s space will not provide us with any help to resolve 
the posed problematic for now.   
          Regardless of that, this research requires focusing on geoeconomics; therefore, this section 
of the chapter will first present many global perspectives on geoeconomics; Second, it will present 
the composing elements of this new discipline; Third, and based on the information provided, it 
will answer the question: what are the geoeconomics capabilities of a nation? And what are the 
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A- Global Perspectives on Geoeconomics 
 
 
          “As a non-violent yet unquestionably potent foreign policy tool, geoeconomics is the perfect 
weapon for a relationship between frenemies” (Bremmer, 2016) … Many approaches have been 
done globally trying to exactly define the meaning of “geoeconomics”, starting with Luttwak and 
Lorot (1990), passing by Huntington (1993), and many other scholars (…), finishing with the new 
geoeconomics with Blackwill and Harris (2017) (Blackwill & Harris, 2017) … 
          This part is going to shed light on those approaches in order to conclude one exact definition 
which will be used all over the next pages of this dissertation helping us to clearly understand this 
new concept; because, and as Joseph Nye said, “Geo-economy is like the weather. Everyone 
depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it” (Nye, 2004, p.1). 
          And while Deudney (1998) in Encyclopedia Britannica defines the notion of geopolitics 
clearly by saying that it is the “analysis of the geographic influences on power relationships in 
international relations”, it did not provide any definition of the geoeconomics concept. 
          But the most important information to know here is the one provided by Grosse, who said 
that: “from the perspective of geoeconomics, the main target of economic policy is to improve the 
state’s geopolitical potential and to use the available instruments of economic policy (and the 
capacity of the country’s economy) to maximize benefits in external relations” (Grosse, 2014, 
p.45).  Meanwhile, the connection between geography, economics, and politics of a nation results 
in a discipline that aims to positively influence the geopolitics of that nation, and which is named 
by “geoeconomics”.  
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          Herein, it is necessary to enroll the most popular global approaches on geoeconomics, 
knowing that they are classified as Luttwakian and Non-Luttwakian Approaches, and to discuss 
them briefly, in order to conclude a new definition in the end of this part: 
 
1-  Edward Luttwak’s and Luttwakian Approach 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American strategist Edward Luttwak used the term 
“geoeconomics” in an article published in 1990, to describe how the prime territory of rivalry 
between the nations after the Cold War would be economic rather than military (Scholvin & 
Wigell, 2018).  
Three years later he published his ideas in a book entitled: “The Endangered American Dream: 
How to stop the United States from becoming a Third-World Country and How to Win the 
Geoeconomic Struggle for Industrial Supremacy”. Edward Luttwak is known for “The 
Machiavelli of Maryland” (Meaney, 2015); he gives consultations for presidents of states, prime 
ministers, and even for the Dalai Lama, to help them in finding strategic solutions for their states’ 
problems (Meaney, 2015). 
“He’s a hell of a lot smarter than Clausewitz” (Meaney, 2015), says the former chief of staff of the 
US air force, Merrill McPeak, who sought Luttwak’s advice in 1990 while planning the bombing 
of Iraq during the first Gulf war (Meaney, 2015).  As for Zbigniew Brzezinski, Luttwak is “a strong 
intellectual, inclined towards categorical assertions, penetrating in many of their insights, but 
occasionally undermined by the desire to have a shock effect on listeners. Nonetheless, he’s almost 
always worth listening to” (Meaney, 2015) ... 
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By his writings, he opened a new analytical academic field in International Relations, the 
“Geoeconomics”. Hence, in his article “From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, 
Grammar of Commerce (1990)” Luttwak (1990) affirmed that “the waning of the Cold War is 
steadily reducing the importance of military power in world affairs” (p.17).  He also stated that the 
influence of the armed power in the governments dealings over various fields, including economic 
ones, has greatly declined then, and he predicted that it will decline further in the next period 
(Luttwak, 1990). 
That decline was substituted by the ascension of new methods denying the “old” military ones: 
“the methods of commerce are displacing military methods – with disposable capital in lieu of 
firepower, civilian innovation in lieu of military – technical advancement, and market penetration 
in lieu of garrisons and bases” (Luttwak, 1990, p.17). 
And after detecting that substitution of methods, he realized that after the decline of the importance 
of military power, the left actors in international relations were purely “economic entities” - such 
as labors – sellers, entrepreneurs and corporations – so Luttwak (1990) stated: “Only the logic of 
commerce would govern world affairs” (p.17), and World Business through economic interactions 
will replace World Politics on the international scene.  
Those circumstances would lead into “competitive or cooperative” economic alliances “to 
capitalize ventures, vertically integrate, horizontally co-develop, co-produce, or co-market goods 
and services”, so the logic of conflict itself would be replaced according to Luttwak (Luttwak, 
1990, p.17). 
Hence, the witnessed changes and transformations of that period were caused by the emergence of 
“geoeconomics” as it was affirmed by Luttwak (1990) … And he clarified this “neologism” by 
saying that “it is the best term I can think of to describe the admixture of the logic of conflict with 
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the methods of commerce – or, as Clausewitz would have written, the logic of war in the grammar 
of commerce” (Luttwak, 1990, p.19).  
The competition between states to achieve their goals increased after the Cold War, and impelled 
them either to preserve or to enhance their role, so they were urged by that to acquire a 
geoeconomic substitute for their “decaying” geopolitical role (Luttwak, 1990).  
Edward Luttwak (1990) compared between the logic of conflict and that of commerce in case of 
struggle nationally and internationally “in the past” and after the Cold War, and explained that: 
• In the past and on the international scene, if the logic of conflict commanded to 
cooperate against a common enemy, and on the other hand, the logic of commerce 
commanded to compete, “the preservation of the alliance was almost given priority” 
(p.20). But nationally and as much as the cohesion is preserved against divisive 
tensions, the armed conflict or the threat of it was the best solution to unite nations. 
  
• But after the Cold War, and because of the waning of the military threats and military 
alliances, “geoeconomic priorities and modalities” (p.20) start dominating in state 
action; because of the states’ fear of an economic non-ending cycle of punitive 
measures which could be taken to contain trade quarrels (This is the case of China and 
U.S.A trade war recently). Political interventions for the strategic preservation of 
alliance cooperation against a common enemy is no longer suppressing, and “if 
international cohesion has to be preserved by a unifying threat, that threat must now be 
economic” (p.20). 
Here, and according to Luttwak, it could be said that with the emergence of “Geoeconomics” in 
the states’ external and internal strategies and policies, quarrels and conflicts could get resolved 
through reciprocal economic punitive measures, and prevent the world from military wars.  
After Luttwak, many scholars have used the term “geoeconomics” with or without referring to his 
article: Valerie Hudson and her colleagues for example, defined geoeconomics as strategies for 
controlling territories through economic means (investments and trade…) (Hudson et al., 1991);  
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As for James Hsiung (2009), geoeconomics is a shift from military concerns to economic security 
ones (regarding to China’s role in the new global politics)… 
However, Luttwak faced much opposition because of the geoeconomics failure in entirely 
replacing military means of statecraft (Scholvin & Wigell, 2018).  Many researchers and scholars 
considered then that geoeconomics and geopolitics may co-exist, and may be used by states 
depending on what they see appropriate and suitable to face their specific challenges, and 
statecrafts don’t only depend on geoeconomics means (Scholvin & Wigell, 2018). So many 
approaches, contrary to the Luttwakian one, had been done, and they will be discussed below. 
 
2-  Non – Luttwakian Approaches 
 
Most of the scientific publications about “geoeconomics” relate the concept and the studies to 
Edward Luttwak because he was the first to use this term in the academic field. But after Luttwak, 
many political and economic analysts discussed “geoeconomics” without approving Luttwak’s 
approach on the concept as economic statecraft, and defined it in a contrary way to his definition 
(Scholvin & Wigell, 2018).  
But before presenting the Non-Luttwakian approaches, it is important to mention that the revival 
of geoeconomics is a pure French phenomenon, knowing that in the 1980s and 1990s there was a 
French dominance in the field of geopolitics even when this concept was a taboo, for the French 
universities admire the art of syntheses, and that manifests also in the French intellectual and 
academic life (Søilen, 2012).  But nowadays, Geoeconomics has become universal, permanent, 
and its home is the world and not one country of it exclusively anymore (Søilen, 2012). 
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For now, and concerning geoeconomics approaches that did not agree with Luttwak, many scholars 
and researchers volunteered, and provided the political academic domain, and the international 
relations field with their opinions and statements, which will be briefly presented hereafter: 
Scholvin and Draper (2012), as well as Scholvin and Malamud (2014) also talked about the impact 
of material structures in specific geographical spaces on specific regional economic relations. 
Contemporary studies are focusing on the fact of how economics is increasingly being critical for 
power politics (Scholvin and Wigell, 2018).  Scholvin and Wigell (2018) explained that in 
contradiction to Luttwak’s approach, geoeconomics has not substituted military means neither in 
the national policies nor in the international relations, but economic instruments and military 
means co-exist, and are being applied in the statecrafts. 
Domosh (2013) for example considered that the term of “geoeconomics” does not represent a 
circumstance or describe a situation, but in contrary it evokes many meanings, places and cultures 
which could help in the description of the actual situation.  In other words, Geoeconomics- 
according to Domosh (2013) – provides a way of understanding the world where economic spatial 
strategies become rational and eligible.  
The most recent approach was done by Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris in their book 
published in 2017: “War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft”; they stated that the 
rising powers nowadays are being attracted to economic instruments due to their influence on 
geopolitical conflicts in the twenty first century (Blackwill & Harris, 2017); and that is obviously 
happening in order to compete and challenge the United States’ primacy on the globe (Blackwill 
& Harris, 2017). They also suggested that:  
“For today’s most sophisticated geoeconomic actors, geoeconomic and military dimensions of 
statecraft tend to be mutually reinforcing” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.9). 
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It is important to mention that many states of rising entities such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa) and MIKT (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey) have adopted 
degrees of state capitalism, meanwhile they hold economic capabilities which make them able to 
achieve geopolitical targets, and to compete on the international scene (Troxell, 2018).  
And to be clear, “State Capitalism” is: “hybrid economic structures in which large segments of the 
economy are controlled by the state but operate side-by-side with a largely market-oriented private 
sector” (Troxell, 2018, p.8).  
Most of the scholars did not adopt Luttwak’s ideas, considering that his realist geoeconomic 
approach is not compatible with the era of liberalism that the world is witnessing since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, for the economic integration and cooperation became dominant in the foreign 
policies of the nations, not the economic conflict or “war of commerce” as Luttwak stated 
(Scholvin & Wigell, 2018, p.4).  
          After the analysis of those approaches and depending on how nations practice those 
disciplines in their foreign policies, and knowing that Liberalism in international relations is more 
attracting than the Realism concerning the application of the concept of geoeconomics (Scholvin 
& Wigell, 2018), we can say that geoeconomics is: 
          A scientific method that studies the internal economic statuses of the nations and their 
international relations based on concrete elements and components, in order to develop a strategic 
economic policy that helps those nations in realizing their geopolitical goals, commanding their 
national situations, and manipulating the ties that bind the states economically together. So, 
Geoeconomics does not only refer to a foreign policy strategy that represents the implementation 
of economic means of power to achieve strategic goals, but it also refers to a particular strategic 
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practice, or a new statecraft which substitutes by its application the use of military power policies 
nationally and internationally. 
          This was our definition of the ‘geoeconomics’ concept, but what are those aforementioned 
elements on which geoeconomics is based? And could geoeconomics methods get practiced and 
implemented without facing any challenge? The answers to these questions will be provided in the 
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B-  Elements of Geoeconomics and its Decoding Scale 
 
          After obtaining a clear image about ‘geoeconomics’, being aware that in the next decades 
the geoeconomics domain will represent “the most critical arena for nation – state competition”, 
appears to be a must (Troxell, 2018, p.18).  This is why understanding the components and means 
related to geoeconomics is also a must in its turn; thus, this part of the section will discuss the 
elements and components of geoeconomics first, and clarify its decoding scale second. 
          In one of his published articles, Lorot (2001) stated that geoeconomics brings together all 
the instruments at the disposal of a State which will be able to mobilize them in order to achieve 
its assigned objectives. 
          Sanjaya Baru, who defines geoeconomics as “the mutual impact of economics and 
geopolitics” (Baru, 2012, p.47), argued in his article “Geoeconomics and Strategy” that Japan 
became in the 1980s an economic power, but it never turned a geoeconomic one, due to its failures 
in converting its new economic force into military and political power (Baru, 2012).  
          But what turns out a nation to be a geoeconomic power? In other words, what are the two 
main elements of geoeconomics which if implemented and applied in statecrafts; transform the 
nations into geoeconomic ones? The answer to this question will be provided hereafter. 
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1-  The Doctrine of Nareland 
 
          Klaus Solberg Søilen, one of the modern researchers in the geoeconomics field, generated 
in his book “Geoeconomics” published in 2012, a new term that replaces the geopolitical terms 
that are the core idea of the geopolitical doctrines “Heartland” and “Rimland”; the new term of 
Søilen was: “The Nareland” which means the Natural Resources Land (Søilen, 2012). 
          Analyzing the idea claiming that “the greatest natural fortress on earth” held by the 
“Heartland” was the key to rule the world in the main geopolitical doctrines of Mackinder first, 
then Truman, Eisenhower, and finally Carter (Søilen, 2012); and the idea saying that dominating 
the coastal areas of Eurasia, the “Rimland” in Spykman’s Doctrine, is an introductory step to 
dominate the world (Søilen, 2012); Søilen (2012) found himself urged, especially with the shift 
from geopolitics to geoeconomics, to upgrade the strategic thinking. He stated that “the focus is 
no longer the Heartland or the Rimland, or any coherent geographical region, but the set of all 
geographical locations containing economically-important natural resources what we shall call the 
Nareland (Natural Resources Land)” (Søilen, 2012, p.56). 
          It is clear that this new logic represents a practical shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics; 
the author divided the geographical places of the world, defined the Lands of Natural Resources, 
and then stated that those lands are the new strategic goals of the great powers of the world. He 
validates his theory with the example of the United States’ presence in the Middle East because of 
the hydrocarbon reserves in its lands, as well as the example of the Chinese interests in the African 
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2-  The Normative Intelligence Analysis 
 
          In the second element, Søilen (2012) proclaimed that in the field of geoeconomics, 
researchers are concerned with studying macro factors that we cannot be certain about, which is 
different from the field of competitive intelligence that mainly studies micro factors. So, the study 
and analysis of macro factors, where “guessing is often required” is called: “Normative 
Intelligence Analysis” (Søilen, 2012, p.59). 
          A large number of problems in social sciences get discarded and ignored due to the 
uncertainty of their causes that demands “some form or degree of speculation or guessing” from 
the researchers. This is because “if a question cannot be examined empirically (in that field), it is 
often easier to choose a different problem than to have to use a less acceptable method” (Søilen, 
2012, p.60).  
          But as Søilen (2012) provided, in intelligence studies, living with speculations to make real 
decisions is necessary, especially that in some situations “we want to mesh our interests with 
existing theories” (p.60).  And even in today’s world where we have a better access to information, 
“information asymmetry is the natural state” (Søilen, 2012, p.60); but this problem is not to 
overcome since using normative intelligence is the only method, and that means that some decision 
may be wrong, but “there is a little we can do about that” (Søilen, 2012, p.60).  
         Søilen also argued that the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) for example was ignored for 
many times from the part of the American presidency (Bill Clinton, Georges W. Bush) that 
preferred to rely on the military intelligence of the pentagon (Søilen, 2012).  That was because of 
the “error of rationality” – as Søilen described it – when the USA invaded Iraq following the fault 
predictions provided by the CIA that Saddam Hussein possessed mass destruction’s weapons, 
which made this agency a “poor intelligence” (Søilen, 2012, p.60).  Many other mistakes were 
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done before the decision of the American administration not to rely on the CIA “precognitions”, 
and Søilen (2012) considered that the cause of those mistakes was that we cannot assume to have 
exact information about critical situations happening around the world as this kind of intelligence 
agencies do; otherwise, our predictions about those situations and events will fail.  On the contrary, 
“the analytical skills which this situation demands of us are closer to those associated with 
literature students rather than students of political science” (Søilen, 2012, p.60), for the guessing 
skills are more required than the skills of collecting information and analyzing them in such cases. 
          Herein, we can say that the administration that knows what kind of norms it should respect 
in its analysis will definitely make successful decisions in developing suitable strategies in the 
geoeconomics field, especially that this domain requires a Normative Intelligence Analysis; 
meanwhile, nations “who have the best information will receive the highest economic return” 
(Søilen, 2012, p.154), so when this element is available and applied in a right manner, the nation 
becomes technically qualified as a geoeconomic power.     
          After mentioning that the “Nareland” or the Natural Resources Land, and the Normative 
Intelligence Analysis are the main elements of a geoeconomic power, it has become necessary to 
get a concrete clarification about the scientific scale that measures or decodes the geoeconomic 
power of a nation, and that is the mission of the State Scale Entities (SSEs). 
 
The State Scale Entities (SSEs): 
          In this dissertation, the evolution of a state is studied as a process indispensable in decoding 
its geoeconomic qualification. And if we refer to the international law, especially the first article 
of Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), we can see that it stipulates 
that: “The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: 1- a 
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permanent population; 2- a defined territory; 3- a government; and 4- a capacity to enter into 
relations with other states” (p.3).  In other words, an entity is qualified as a state if it possesses the 
Population, the Ground, the Government, and the Capacity of Interaction. But nowadays, 
according to the ICMAIF: International Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and International 
Finance (2016), those characteristics have evolved into becoming: Human Resources, Markets 
(Consumers), Hierarchic Governance, and Projection of Power.  
          But how can a recognized state be qualified as a geoeconomic power? This is the main role 
of the SSEs, the State Scale Entities. And since Pascal Lorot have mentioned that the purpose of 
geoeconomics policies is not to control lands as in geopolitics, but to attain supremacy in 
technology and commerce; and expanded the perspective of Luttwak and included “multinational 
enterprises as geoeconomic strategists” (ICMAIF, 2016, p.12), the perception of geoeconomics 
get expanded to include actors other than recognized Nations-States such as Multinational 
Corporations, State Owned Enterprises, Cyber Giants, and State Mimicking Entities to cover the 
spectrum of global economic activity (Stergiou, 2015, p.1).  
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Figure 5: Taxonomy of State Scale Entities 
 
 Source: Stergiou, 2015, p.13 
 
           Herein, the SSEs become “the core of the geoeconomic discourse and constitute its main 
actors” (Stergiou, 2015, p.4).  So technically, the entities have to possess certain characteristics in 
order to be included in the SSEs, those characteristics are the following: 
1- High skilled, trained and educated human resources which are necessary to face complex 
economical operations, in other words an economical intelligence is required (Stergiou, 
2015); 
2- Seven basic functions on which the structure of the organization should be based: 
Administration, Distribution, Economic Intelligence, Finance, Legal, Production, 
Sustainment-Logistic (Stergiou, 2015); 
3- Projecting power and influence should be the target of their mode of operation (exclusively 
in the case of the state), and their actions should affect other SSEs macro and 
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microeconomics’ global environment, or exercise influence on their own actions at least 
(Stergiou, 2015); 
4-  The ability to adapt to changes in regulatory frameworks is also an essential characteristic 
for those entities (Stergiou, 2015). 
          So, mainly, the aforementioned entities (China between them) in the figure 4 conduct 
geoeconomic operations which have strategic impact on local, regional, and global micro and 
macroeconomic because they possess the enumerated attributes and characteristics… And in 
conclusion, “An SSE is considered any entity with State organization and international conduct, 
whose size and resources allow it to be capable of implementing independent ‘policy’ actions that 
project market power and influence at a local, regional and global level” (Stergiou, 2015, p.4).  
          In other words, the state capability of implementing independent economic policies locally, 
regionally and globally is what transforms this state (or entity) into a geoeconomic power; knowing 
that this capability is obtained through a specific discipline, a strategic power, and economic 
resources of that state.  
          Being a geoeconomic power is a status that provides the states with many capabilities that 
help them in implementing their policies, but those implementations will surely be faced by many 
challenges; the next and last section of this chapter will clarify the geoeconomic capabilities 
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C- Geoeconomic Capabilities and Probable Challenges 
 
          Unfortunately, although geoeconomics has acquired a high level of important features of 
regional powers’ strategic disciplines, the academic field of studies still lack tools to identify and 
compare those strategies analytically to define the geoeconomic capacity and strength of the 
competing states when everything will be taken into consideration at the end of the day (Wigell, 
2016). 
          Herein, it is a must to do some efforts in order to clarify what are the capabilities of a state 
qualified as a geoeconomic power according to the SSEs and what was explained in the previous 
section.  Moreover, this new perspective will definitely help in developing an analytical 
differentiation in the rank of geoeconomic powers that will contribute in its turn to understand 
deeply the geoeconomic agenda that China is applying in its local and foreign policies.  
          Practical geoeconomics, or geoeconomics as a strategic practice, is the application of 
economic means of power by states in order to attain geostrategic goals and targets; in other words, 
it is the use of economic means to manipulate and control geopolitical objectives (Morris, 2018).  
So in the time a state uses economic means in order to achieve geopolitical ends, we can talk about 
geoeconomics! 
          Hence, it could be stated that the geoeconomic capabilities of a state arise from economic 
means which are usually divided into positive and negative actions amongst Trade, Finance, Aid 
and Policy…  
          The following figure shows up in details how are they classified: 
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Figure 6: Economic Instruments 
 
 Source: Troxell, 2018, p.10 
 
 
          If we look deeply into the above figure, we can clearly see the seven tools that Blackwill 
and Harris thought were suitable for geopolitical application – knowing that they admitted once 
that “states can and often do design geoeconomic policies that simultaneously have multiple 
interests: geopolitical, economic, and otherwise” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, pp. 27-31) – those 
tools are: Trade Policy, Investment Policy, Economic and Financial Sanctions, Financial and 
Monetary Policy, Cyber, Energy, and Commodities (Blackwill & Harris, 2017)...  And as Troxell 
(2018) stated, “The first five tools are readily recognized as economic activities, and energy and 
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commodities could just as easily be considered a subset of trade policy representing perhaps a 
more critical category of tradable goods” (p.11). 
          So whenever a state possesses those economic tools and has the ability to use them in its 
policies that have geopolitical objectives whether locally or internationally, we can say that this 
state has geoeconomic capabilities.  
          But what do those capabilities look like? Or what are “the geoeconomic states” capable of 
practically? The answer will be provided in the next paragraph. 
1-  Geoeconomic Capabilities of a Geoeconomic State 
 
a- Economic Force  
“Power is as much a function of prosperity as prosperity is a function of power” (Baru, 2012, 
p.9), and nowadays power and prosperity are derived from the economic force of the state. By 
its economic capability, a state can exercise or project more political and military power than 
what is warranted without the possession of that economic force (Baru, 2012).  For the third 
year in a row, China was the world’s largest economy in 2017 by producing $ 23.1 Trillion in 
economic output (according to the World Factbook); the EU ranked in the second place with 
$ 19.9 trillion. Those powers together generated 33.9% of the world’s economic output of $ 
127 trillion. And the United States, by generating $ 19.4 trillion, remained in the third place. 
These world’s largest economies produced 49% of the world’s total economy ($ 62.4 trillion 
of $ 127 trillion) (Amadeo, 2018).  And by their economic forces, these powers are controlling 
the destiny of the world.  
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b- Diplomatic – Cultural Influence  
 
The Diplomacy and the Culture of a state are two main pillars of influence especially when 
they are highly present outside that state, for maintaining a high profile internationally is one 
of the attributes of world influence (Hudson et al., 1991).  Cultural exchange activities 
(international students’ exchange) are recently taking place between states, and are 
increasingly having positive effects upon their relationships. Those exchange activities work 
as “Soft Power” tools, helping the powerful actors in implementing their cultural behaviors, 
languages, and lifestyles in the less developed countries. As for their rivals and competitors, 
diplomatic means are most convenient to play the influence game, knowing that diplomacy 
represents the second facet of the soft power’s coin which originally aims “to attract and 
persuade rather than coerce others” (Singh & MacDonald, 2004, p.7).  In conclusion, states 
that have diplomatic capabilities and cultural influence abilities are considered as powerful 
states on the international scene, since according to Xuetong (2006), soft power is as much 
important as hard power. 
 
c- Natural Resources Possession – Control / International Trade Competitiveness  
 
The 21st century has known an increasing rise of two other main pillars defining the 
geoeconomic power of states; those pillars are the Natural Resources and the Competitiveness 
in International Trade (Hudson et al., 1991), which are reshaping the international relations 
geoeconomically. These pillars seem as twin factors, where achieving one helps in realizing 
the other. In other words, possessing or having control over natural resources locally or 
externally, assists the country in its competition in International Trade. So, the country that has 
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power to impose control over natural resources in foreign lands, or already possesses natural 
resources all over its own land will automatically form an important competitor in International 
trade. 
 
d-  General Security Capabilities  
 
“While security is vital, who provides it also matters” (Gompert et al., 2008, p.175) … If the 
security environment in a state is too dangerous, none of the improvement activities can be 
conducted by the government, whether in infrastructure,  education, hospitality, or even in 
politics (elections) (Gompert et al., 2008).   Herein, the creation of a safe and secure 
environment is a necessity in the realization of the prosperity and growth of the state, if it is 
willing in reality to make fundamental reforms in politics and economics, internally and 
externally (Gompert et al., 2008).  So a secure state is a powerful state, which can also provide 
security for the less developed countries which suffers from terrorist threats, and can evidently 
get “acceptance” from those countries, because of the help and assistance it is offering them. 
          In conclusion, a state that enjoys (beside of its military capability) an economic force, has 
diplomatic and cultural capabilities, possesses or controls natural resources, and has the ability to 
provide its own territory and those of foreign states with peace and security is definitely a 
Geoeconomic State. In other words, Economy, Diplomacy, Culture, Natural Resources, and 
General Security represent all together the capabilities that a Geoeconomic State enjoys literally. 
And as an organization cannot build a good future without good Human Resources, nor do the 
countries if their citizens have no abilities to learn and no capabilities to innovate and participate 
in the growth of their states; so, a conscious population is also a capability that geoeconomic states 
enjoy (or should enjoy). 
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2-  Probable Challenges  
 
          Due to the competition between great powers, many challenges will face them while trying 
to achieve their geoeconomical goals. These challenges - that will be discussed in the following - 
are seven as stated in a report published by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2015 and written 
by a large number of experts (Bhatia et al., 2015):  
a-  Economic Warfare  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the world is witnessing a new kind of war reflected as conflicts 
between great powers, which are taking trade controls, and sanctions as their main weapons in 
the face of their “enemies” in the battle. Bhatia and Trenin (2015), stated in their study that: 
the policymakers in USA consider sanctions as “the drones of the future”, and “highly targeted 
weapons that can be deployed to devastating effect” (p.5).  Fundamentally, those sanctions are 
the causes behind the outbreak of the recent economic warfare that constitutes a difficult 
challenge for the emerging geoeconomic countries such as China and Russia, knowing that 
economic sanctions and restrictions can span from “stricter sanitary controls to a full-blown 
economic blockade” (Bhatia & Trenin, 2015, p.5).  These sanctions are also a double-edged 
sword because they can hurt the country that applied them by damaging its businesses and 
investments in the targeted country (Bhatia & Trenin, 2015).  So, the economic warfare is a 




UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





b-  The Geopoliticization of Trade Talk  
 
The world is also witnessing a new activism between countries, which is talks and negotiations 
about trade that took place sometimes regionally and others country-by-country (Mitachi, 
2015).  This kind of talks about trade came as eastern reactions to the western actions of 
economic warfare through sanctions and restrictions. China and Russia cooperate together in 
that field in order to challenge the western policies through developing “trade zones” and 
increasing their influence over their neighbors’ countries. This kind of battle mirrors the 
competition between the world’s largest economies in far border arenas which includes 
achieving geopolitical goals to each one of them: Russia is making efforts to exploit the current 
situation in order to build up its Eurasian Union that challenges the west’s interests, China is 
constructing the Silk (Trade) Road that has geopolitical results helping China in its expansion 
all over the world, and the EU and USA are trying to evolve the NATO alliance to provide 
themselves with an alternative actor to face the eastern offence. So the geopoliticization of 
trade talks consists of a challenge facing the great powers of the world aiming to realize 
geoeconomics objectives, because it represents the backdrop of a competitive economic war 
threatening the security of nations.   
c-  State Capitalism  
 
The competition between states’ governments has retaken its place after the global financial 
crisis in 2008, through the emergence of state capitalism. Countries that do not originally 
accept the idea of the limited intervention of the state adopted by the USA, are playing an 
important leading role in the “origin, destination, and intermediation of capital via markets and 
real economic sectors” (Rediker, 2015, p.7).  Those countries are attempting to take an 
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increasing role and to intervene in their markets in order to ensure the prosperity and to limit 
the busts periods. We can say that this phenomenon is not new in the international scene, but 
today the governments are expanding their influence in ways more powerful than those used 
in the past to further their strategic goals (Rediker, 2015). Central Banks are being politicized 
by the governments to advance national policy interests with global impacts in some cases, and 
that factor damaged the financial system stability, due to political pressures, alleged monetary 
policy and supervisory independence (Rediker, 2015).  The risk of the emergence of state 
capitalism is increasing day after day; and advancing national interests is happening through 
economic and regulatory and other policy tools; this will eliminate the ambitions and 
aspirations of emerging countries in achieving geoeconomic objectives, for they will be bound 
to obey the rules set by the great powers and to comply with them.   
 
d-  Competition for Gated Markets, Not Natural Resources 
 
 Another major challenge or obstacle took its place: the competition between countries became 
driven by “a quest for markets rather than national resources” (Guriev & Khar, 2015, p.8).  
While the competition between nations is turning around direct control over lands and seas 
which contain large amounts of natural resources, and new strange alliances were created - 
since the Cold War ended - with the leadership of “OIL”, the world economy is suffering 
because of the global economic crisis and its repercussion of instability; this circumstance is 
prompting the countries to amend and change the nature of their strategic competition (Guriev 
& Khar, 2015).  Dependence on traditional suppliers of natural resources is diminishing 
because these resources are becoming cheaper “due to the shale gas and oil revolution and 
other technological advancements” (Guriev & Khar, 2015, p.8).  On the other hand, the 
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emerging markets that require economic growth and human capital development are turning 
out to be major sources of global demand and of relatively cheap qualified labors (Guriev & 
Khar, 2015).  This fact was the cause behind the great shift that happened in the interests of 
modern multinational corporations, which superseded their policies from the competition for 
access to resources, to the competition for inroads into new markets (Guriev & Khar, 2015).  
So the competition over the possession of natural resources shifted into the competition for 
markets, and this suggests in its turn a big shift in the geo-strategies of the nations, and a full 
readiness to deter any probable breach attempt; a hard obstacle to pass.      
 
e-  The Survival of the Biggest and Hollowing Out of the Periphery 
 
 Many “core” countries are getting strengthened and empowered in their respective regions 
due to the breakdown happening at the global level; they are developing “core-periphery 
relationships that benefit the core often at the expense of periphery states” (Bremmer, 2015, 
p.9).  It seems clear that this kind of relationships will damage the countries of the periphery 
and “hollow them out” in order to strengthen the countries of the core and improve their 
powers. This new phenomenon will negatively influence the geoeconomic powers trying to 
build stable relationships with foreign nations, for it will ruin their global leadership due to the 
tarnishing of their autonomy in prompting those peripheral countries to depend on their role 
(role of the core countries) to ensure the stability and sustainability of their internal situation 
(Bremmer, 2015).  “Three major examples of this hollowing out around the world can be seen 
today. It is most obvious in Russia’s relationship with its ‘near abroad’. But it also extends to 
Germany’s role in Europe, as well as a rising China’s disruptive posture in the East and South 
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China Seas (and beyond)” (Bremmer, 2015, p.10).  This is literally a fundamental challenge 
that countries should succeed in, if they truly want to achieve their geoeconomical goals. 
 
f-  China’s Infrastructure-Driven Alliances  
 
With its infrastructure projects, China turned out to represent a big challenge for the great 
powers in the 21st century. The focus of its foreign policy on financing infrastructure projects 
as a main tool, both in Asia and worldwide, helped China either in getting access to raw 
materials, or in making its exports attain key markets, with whom it is building “infrastructure 
alliances”, rather than “genuine geopolitical affinities” (Khanna, 2015, p.10).  The People’s 
Republic of China has increased its investments in “countries where it seeks to enhance access 
to commodities” in. (Mongolia, Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Russia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Eastern 
Coast of Africa, and some countries in Latin America such as Panama, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela) (Khanna, 2015, p.10).  And we can say that China will benefit from this 
infrastructure connectivity with markets in Asia and worldwide, without forgetting that the 
exporting country will also benefit from the higher quality infrastructure (Khanna, 2015).  
Hence, countries would feel it difficult to stand up to China and compete with it in the fields 
of infrastructure, trade, and natural resources… China itself became a challenge to the 
geoeconomics states, and this is an evident proof of its high geoeconomical potential and 
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g-  The Decline in Oil Prices  
 
The instability of oil barrel prices is also a big challenge that geoeconomic countries are facing, 
knowing that oil is critical to three main factors: National Economies, International Security, 
and Climate Change (Levi, 2015).  In 2014, oil prices plunged, dropping from $ 115 a barrel 
in June to around $ 60 by December (and it has been the case of instability in prices for the last 
decade at least) (Levi, 2015, p.11). When a small excess of world supply over demand 
happened, the prices have declined, knowing that the feature of oil markets comply with this 
rule: “An increasing of demand over relative supply could push prices up”. So when oil supply 
increased more than it was expected to be, and demand decreased, the world anticipated lower 
oil prices (Levi, 2015).  This volatility in oil prices represents bad news to the geoeconomic 
states relying on natural resources; it influences the economic-policy makers negatively, and 
it is a sort of confusion for them, because when prices are falling the benefits go for the major 
importers of oil (China, European Union, and somehow USA), and the troubles affect the 
exporters (Russia and KSA) (Levi, 2015); and when prices are increasing, the opposite is true. 
This fact will lead to: an uncertainty in shaping the future oil production, consumption and 
trade; a confusion in the development of policies and strategies; bad consequences nationally 
and internationally. This volatility in oil prices represents a geoeconomic challenge with 
negative geopolitical outcomes.  
          Amid all these challenges, great powers permanently try to look at issues through a “zero 
sum lens” (Leonard, 2015, p.12), and Leonard (2015) stated that they only work together “when 
their interests are very closely aligned” (p.12).  Herein, they tried and try to develop methods that 
ensure their control over their affairs, and Leonard (2015) via the Global Agenda Council on 
Geoeconomics provided them with five thoughts that, according to him, may help those states in 
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preventing mistakes in their strategic methods to succeed in passing the probable challenges. These 
thoughts are the following: 
1- States must develop their rules of the road for economic warfare: By these rules, Leonard 
meant the “infrastructure” of global economy, for as it was mentioned above, the 
geoeconomic warfare – via economic sanctions – constitutes a high and hard challenge for 
the emerging geoeconomic countries. So those states must fortify their economic and 
political structure as a shield against any probable economic warfare that may appear in 
the horizon (Leonard, 2015).    
2- States must find the right economic role and pursue new forms of engagement: In order to 
pursue realizing strategic goals and targets, Leonard (2015) affirmed that nations must 
“find the right balance between ‘laissez-faire’ and ‘intervention’ through defining the 
framework of their economic role and activities. Herein, each nation will have its own role 
on which it will work. China for example, with its model of infrastructure, provides sources 
of capital and loans that might be alternative to the western assistance through the 
Monetary Fund. New forms of engagement between states could take places all over the 
world, and China will definitely lead the majority of those emerging engagement because 
of its “geoeconomic strength” (Leonard, 2015). 
3- Staying attuned to the “survival of the biggest” and the pooling of the weak: When “core 
countries” get strengthened over the peripheral ones – as mentioned above - they try to 
develop “core-periphery relationships that benefit the core often at the expense of periphery 
states”. This challenge limits the ability of small countries to pivot and maintain economic 
and strategic options for themselves that makes them dependent and reliant on regional 
powerhouse, as Leonard (2015) stated. That is why, they have to improve their work in 
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order to pool their resources and challenge those regional hegemons. As for the powerful 
states, they should recognize the benefit of having small countries in their neighborhood, 
for their need to deepen ties with powerful states constitutes a domination and rising 
opportunity that can give them “breathing rooms” (Leonard, 2015). 
 
4- Businesses can keep their eye on the global prize but play by new rules in the interim: In 
order to minimize the risks caused by geoeconomic challenges, competitions, and 
variables, businesses have to pursue open globalization (Leonard, 2015). This is because 
they should be a strong support for trade liberalization and foreign investments “which 
deepens international bonds and diminishes protectionism and incentives for conflict” as 
Leonard suggested (Leonard, 2015, p.12). Businesses have to stabilize the global prize, but 
they also have to work hard in order to be seen as local in different markets. For example, 
“China may be very sensitive to foreign investment in the telecommunications sector but 
to combat rising pollution, it may welcome foreign expertise in renewable and alternative 
energies” (Leonard, 2015, p.12). So businesses must be flexible and wise at the same time 
in order to secure their marge of competitiveness and combat the probable challenges, 
especially if their states aim to be geoeconomic powers. 
 
  
5- A focus on key regional players and sub global politics rather than worldwide institutions 
is necessary: The fifth and last suggestion that Leonard (2015) gave to the emerging 
geoeconomic powers to combat potential challenges, was mainly for their civil societies, 
which should – according to him – be more pragmatic in resolving their global problems. 
They should be careful in looking at regional and sub-regional layers of integration, rather 
than relying on universal conclusions and lessons. Each nation should have its own way in 
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combating dangerous and challenging phenomenon happening all over the world, and 
should rely only on its potentials – and not on global institutions – in order to fight any 
threat that may adversely affect its growth, without forgetting that pragmatism is the master 
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Chapter 2: The Shift from Geopolitics to Geoeconomics 
 
          Besides the shift of economic and financial power from Western to Eastern countries, and 
specifically to China (De Jonquières, 2012), a fundamental shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics 
is recently redefining the international geo-strategies of the states.  Latest developments indicate 
the shift of the international order to a Geoeconomic one away from the liberal order of the post-
Cold War period (Roberts et al., 2019).  And while the globalization mode is turned on, power and 
control shift from governments to economic entities, and “the role of geoeconomic factors is 
gradually replacing the magnitude of geopolitical parties” (Alymenko & Bhatti, 2017, p.1). 
          Recent studies have raised the argument that, after the Cold War, Geoeconomics has 
acquired great prominence as a new form of power relations (Flint and Xiaotong, 2019).  Lately, 
geoeconomics started to be taken into consideration from the higher levels in the systems of 
concerns and policies of different states, for in its core it includes “both macro-level of governing 
the power and micro-level of implications for the economy parties” (Alymenko & Bhatti, 2017, 
p.2); in other words, geoeconomics is a  global statecraft that includes different management 
strategies that nations may rely on in their policies. 
          Nowadays, when the highest peak in the history of the exploitation of natural resources had 
been reached, and while the dangerous environmental threats are increasing, the economic 
development that comprehends the innovation’s and modernization’s applications on ground has 
become an essential issue (Gasimli, 2015).  
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          And knowing that geoeconomics is a specific “strategic practice providing an alternative 
option to military-based power politics” (Scholvin & Wigell, 2018, p.2), states will definitely 
prefer to adopt it as geostrategic statecraft alternative to the geopolitics one.  
          Hence, in order to realize their states’ ambitions, the diplomats started holding a double bag, 
diplomatic and economic, as Dale (1996) stated.  As for Pascal Lorot, he affirmed that since this 
world is becoming more and more globalized, the economic interests of nations are gaining 
increasing importance over their political interests; and this shift means that a new era is getting 
released; it is the era of geoeconomics (Lorot, 2009). 
          Therefore, this chapter is going to discuss the differences between the two concepts of 
geoeconomics and geopolitics in its first section, and to study the fact of the replacement of 
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Section 1: Differences between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics 
 
          Many analysts argue that there is no difference between geopolitics and geoeconomics, and 
that in fact the main core of politics is economics, and economics in the end is all about politics, 
but even if they are right, their analysis is too simplistic (Søilen, 2012), because it ignores the 
essence of both concepts. 
          No one can ignore the emphasis on need-to-know information that both of geopolitics and 
geoeconomics disciplines have in common, nor on finding vital information: what is really 
important to know as opposed to what is merely nice to know. Both focus on what the French call 
“Les Grandes Lignes”, and the important global transformations (Søilen, 2012, p.142). 
          But recently, and despite of the common points between geopolitics and geoeconomics, and 
even if politics and economics are related, it is being obvious that disjunctions have taken place 
between theoretical politics and applied politics on ground (Ebrary, 2012); and that there are 
disjunctions between theoretical economics and applied economics also. So how will then be the 
case regarding geopolitics and geoeconomics?   
          Wigell and Vihma (2016) argue that geopolitics and geoeconomics have exceptionally 
distinct characteristics and impacts on both the national and international levels.  Different points 
of view, distinct perspectives, diverse core ideas, and various core ideas for both concepts 
Geopolitics and Geoeconomics, are many divergent starting points in both disciplines that will 
definitely lead to contrasting conclusions through distinct geo-strategies, means and statecrafts. 
          Colin flint stated that: “Geopolitics is more than the competition over territory and the means 
of justifying such actions; Geopolitics is a way of seeing the world” (Flint, 2006, p.13).  But no 
one can deny here that geoeconomics is also a way of seeing the world, but the eyes through which 
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it sees the world are different from those of geopolitics.  The goal of controlling the world is 
common between both disciplines, but the means and strategies adopted in order to attain and 
achieve that goal are merely different. 
 
          In this section of the chapter, the difference between the core idea of geopolitics and that of 
geoeconomics will be discussed in the first part; the second part will argue the logic and 
perspective of these two different concepts. And by the end of the section, a table of comparison 
will be drawn to show up the main points of difference, in order to help us in framing the next 
section of the chapter that is directly related to the “famous” shift from geopolitics to 
geoeconomics.  
 
A- The Core Idea: Heartland vs. Nareland  
 
• The core idea in the geopolitical thinking, the essence of Sir Halford Mackinder 
geopolitics, the central plan in the Truman Doctrine, the basis of Eisenhower Doctrine, 
and the Carter Doctrine was literally the Heartland, that zone of the planet described 
by the key zone to controlling the civilized world, as it was discussed in the first chapter 
of this dissertation.  
As for Spykman, the core idea of his geopolitical theory shifted towards the Rimland 
that dominated the coastal areas of the Euro-Asian continent… Anyway, and by all 
means, the core idea of the geopolitical thinking was that the powerful state (or group 
of states) that reaches through its own political and military efforts the potential of 
controlling the Heartland (or the Rimland), is the state that will control the rest of the 
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world’s destinies regardless of the followed tactics presented by each of the 
geopoliticians. 
And, in his article, “From geopolitics to geoeconomics”, Luttwak (1990) affirmed that 
“the waning of the Cold War is steadily reducing the importance of military power in 
world affairs” (p.17), and that means in other words that the military power was the 
main mean employed before the cold war, and this literally was the core idea of the 
geopolitical theories adopted then. 
If we take a look at the policies and statecrafts adopted recently in the world, we can 
recognize the American foreign policy in its attempt to control Iraq and Afghanistan as 
an application of geopolitical theories, through military means, as an introduction to its 
next steps in the Eurasian continent, the most strategic geographical zone of the whole 
planet as confirmed in the theories of Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman, and Brzezinski. 
 
• On the other hand, and as opposed to geopolitics, the core idea of geoeconomics, 
appeared clearly in the statement of the Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu about the non-
military Chinese victories when he said that “the highest excellence is to subdue the 
enemy’s army without fighting at all” (Søilen, 2010, p.2).  This is according to Søilen 
(2010) because wars through military means have high costs over human lives, 
resources, and morals.  
The core idea is in controlling the competitors’ resources, instead of using military 
means in destruction and threatening human lives (Søilen, 2010), in order to make them 
(the competitors) under the auspices of the state controlling their resources.  
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In order to attain such goal – controlling the resources of its competitors – in the era of 
globalization, Søilen (2010) suggested that the state should build economic strength 
and implement economic control…  And obviously this is the logic of geoeconomics 
discipline. 
If we took a look, as we did in the core idea of geopolitics, at the applied policies and 
strategies of the Superpowers in the world, we see that the United States and the 
European Union, are still “locked in the rational of geopolitics” in contrast of the 
Chinese policymakers that have moved to the logic of geoeconomics “because they are 
able to see clearer and further ahead” (Søilen, 2010, p.2). 
We can conclude here that the main aim of the global geo-strategies is no longer a 
geographical region, whether is it the Heartland or the Rimland, it becomes all 
geographical locations that contain important natural resources, and that what is named 
by Nareland (Natural Resource Lands). 
For many classical authors, such as Smith (Wealth of Nations; 1776), Machiavelli (The 
Prince; 1935/1952), Polo (The Travels of Marco Polo; 1932), and recently Michael 
Porter (The Competitive Advantage of Nations 1990), the shift happening in statecrafts 
and disciplines, from military means to economic ones, “is not only a return to Political 
Realism but a return to the understanding of competition as the Competitive Advantage 
of Nations” (Søilen, 2010, p.3). 
Herein, Nareland is the core idea of the geoeconomic discipline, knowing that it 
represents the main factor of power that this discipline studies (Søilen, 2010) and helps 
states in working on it and controlling it in order to increase the advantage of 
competitive advantage of that state globally. Briefly, geoeconomics is all about 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





competition and regulation of statecrafts in order to economically and politically secure 
and strengthen nations in the international battlefield.  
So the core idea of both geopolitics and geoeconomics disciplines is the main difference 
between them, but actually it is not the only one; logic and perspective also differ from 
geopolitics to geoeconomics, and that is what will be argued next. 
 
 
B-  The Logic and Perspective  
 
• As James Brunham said in his book “Suicide of the West”: Geopolitics is about 
“effective political control over acreage” (Burnham, 1985, p.14), it is when 
“international politics takes place within a geographical concept” (Sempa, 2002, 
p.104).  
Each nation had its own logic and perspective within the geopolitical discipline, 
whether through land or maritime power… But theoreticians who supported land 
power, and their colleagues who supported naval or maritime power, both believed that 
“the continent of Eurasia was the principle arena of struggle for the great powers” 
(Sempa, 2002, p.110). 
So, the centrality of the Eurasian continent was the standpoint of all the geopolitical 
disciplines perspectives. Mackinder named it “The Great Continent”; for Brzezinski it 
is “The Mega Continent”, since it is the largest landmass that contains most of the 
resources and people in the globe (Sempa, 2002). 
This importance of the Eurasian continent stems from the fact that “most of the key 
events of the world history occurred on its landmass or on one of its offshore islands” 
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and that “much of the rest of the world at one time or another became the object of 
expansion, settlement and colonization by one or more Eurasian or offshore Eurasians 
powers” (Sempa, 2002, p.111). 
Concerning the logic of geopolitical theories and disciplines, the facts show that it is 
traditionally related to slowly-changing variables, such as those of ethnicity, country, 
religion and language (Ebrary, 2012) …  The Islamophobia, Turkey’s accession to the 
European Union, the Chinese and Russian language, the Islamic States in Eurasia, and 
many others, are issues caused or studied by geopolitics.   
So the logic and perspective of the geopolitics disciplines are mainly geographical and 
related to the local and foreign policies of nations adopting them. 
 
• On the other side, the geoeconomics’ perspective and logic pave a different path. The 
logic here is less focused on ethnic or religious origin, or even on political ideologies, 
because in its perspective what really matters is the economic performance of the nation 
(Søilen, 2012), not the geopolitics variables of ethnicity, religion, country and 
language.  
Hence, geoeconomics disciplines are linked to rapidly-changing variables, especially 
those related to technological transformation and developments in global commerce 
(Ebrary, 2012). 
If we take the example of Turkey’s accession to the EU issue and its recent capability 
of negotiating its membership there, we can know that the cause is obviously economic, 
due to the fact that nothing has changed in the ethnicity of people, neither in their 
religion, nor in their language; but the fundamental changes happened when the country 
achieved “greater stability, development, and fairness” (Søilen, 2012, p.86), which all 
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are related to economics in their main sight. Here, it shows clearly that ethnic and 
religious opinions and historical conflicts arguments are secondary considerations 
compared to the economic one (Søilen, 2012). 
Wigell (2016) saw geoeconomics as “the geo-strategic use of economic power” 
(p.137), so we can conclude from his statement that geoeconomics is based on the 
strategic frame’s logic (either competitive or cooperative) and on the economic power’s 
perspective in order to achieve defined goals through defined (and peaceful) means. 
In parallel, geoeconomics in its reality is about the strategy of using economic means 
for the aim of controlling or ruling specific geographical zones and areas “such as a 
sphere of influence of a regional hegemon” (Scholvin & Wigell, 2018, p.3), that is what 
justifies the effectiveness of the geoeconomics’ perspective and logic, which are 
increasingly evolving the power politics practices through economic means instead of 
military ones. 
And while the nations’ competition is currently being “the predominant driver of 
international relations” (Scholvin & Wigell, 2018, p.2), nations prefer to engage in this 
global competition through means that are not prevalent military to avoid humane and 
material losses that might be caused by the actual implementation of those dangerous 
means. 
Many recent cases that happened and are still happening on the international scene such 
as (Scholvin & Wigell, 2018): China’s initiative “One Belt One Road”; Petro-
Diplomacy of Venezuela during Hugo Chávez’s era; Western sanctions against Iran, 
Russia, and recently China has proven that “military means appear to matter less” 
(Scholvin & Wigell, 2018, p.1) over the increasing importance of geoeconomics – 
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especially through its economic means - which is being “more critical to how states 
exert power” (Scholvin & Wigell, 2018, p.1).  Here, the perspective and logic of great 
powers’ strategies shifted to geoeconomics measures and statecrafts due to the damage 
that might be caused by the geopolitics perspective, logic, means and measures.  
 
          After defining the main differences between geopolitics and geoeconomics, regarding the 
core idea and the logic and perspective of both of the disciplines, it appears necessary to draw a 
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Table 1: Differences between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics 
Source: Sparke, 2014 
 
 
a) The Origin and Fact of Geopolitics and Geoeconomics: According to Sparke 
(2014), and as it has appeared in the previous table, Geopolitics and Geoeconomics 
have witnessed different beginnings and known various facts.  The Geopolitics’ 
concept  has shown itself after the end of the historical era of empires, and get 
developed when free trade was declining and national autarchy was augmenting.  
As for the Geoeconomics’ concept, it has risen at the end of the Cold War epoch, 
and evolved when free trade was increasing and national autarchy was decreasing;    
Table of Contrast: Geopolitics Vs. Geoeconomics 
Geopolitics Geoeconomics 
Began after the ending of the historical 
imperial era; 
Began in the end of the Cold War; 
Develops at a time of declining free trade 
and increasing national autarchy;   
Develops at a time of increasing free trade and 
decreasing national autarchy  
Reflects struggle between territorial states 
over hegemony over the world system; 
Reflects struggles for modality within a global 
hegemonic system within which the United 
States has imperious but not fully imperial 
dominance; 
Theoretically propounded by writers linked 
to the military as Halford Mackinder, 
Frederic Ratzel, and Spykman…  
Theoretically propounded by writers linked to 
business as Edward Luttwak and Kenichi 
Ohmae… 
High politics focused on dominance and 
alliance-building for “security”; 
High politics focused on competition and 
partnering for “economic leverage”; 
Employs spatial assumptions neatly nested 
and compartmentalized scales from city to 
nation to globe; 
Employs spatial assumption about networks 
that relativize discrete scales and accelerate 
scale jumping between the global and local;  
Idealized subjects: citizens and soldiers; Idealized subjects: customers and investors; 
Territorial imaginary organized around 
blocs, nation states and boundaries like the 
“iron curtain”; 
Territorial imaginary organized around 
modality, region states and linkages like “the 
web”; 
Fixates on borders, frontiers and place. Fixates on borderlessness, networks and pace    
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b) The Theoretical Formulation of Both Concepts: In addition to different origins and 
facts, each concept was theoretically formulized by distinct specialists thus by 
different perspectives and different points of view. And while Geopolitics’ 
disciplines - which reflect “the struggle between territorial states over hegemony 
over the world system” - were theoretically formulated and propounded by analysts 
linked to military as Ratzel, Mackinder, and Spykman…, the Geoeconomics ones 
- which reflects “struggles for modality within a global hegemonic system within 
which the United States has imperious but not fully imperial dominance” - were 
theoretically formulated and propounded by writers more linked to business than 
military, as Luttwak, and Ohmae;  
 
c) Visualized Targets, Goals, and Subjects of Both Concepts: Besides the last 
differences, each of Geopolitics and Geoeconomics disciplines has its own targets, 
goals, and subjects to visualize and achieve.  While the subjects idealized by 
Geopolitics theories are citizens and soldiers, they are investors and customers in 
the Geoeconomics disciplines. And while the major targets to visualize or focus on 
through Geopolitics are dominance and “alliance-building” to attain the main 
defined goal which is “security”, the major targets to visualize or focus on through 
Geoeconomics are competition and partnering to achieve the main goal which is 
“economic leverage”; 
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d) Used Means and Tools: In order to achieve the defined goals, policies implemented 
by both “statecrafts” should refer to use specified means and tools. Geopolitics 
“employs spatial assumptions neatly nested and compartmentalized scales from 
city to nation to globe” through fixating on borders, frontiers and place; As for 
Geoeconomics, it “employs spatial assumption about networks that relativize 
discrete scales and accelerate scale jumping between the global and local”, through 
fixating on borderlessness, networks and pace; 
 
e)  Territorial Application of Both Disciplines: Finally, and over and above all what 
was pre-described, the practical applications of those theories are also distinct. The 
territorial application of the geopolitics theories turns around blocs nation states 
and boundaries like the “iron curtain”; as for that of the geoeconomics disciplines, 
it turns around modality, region states and linkages like “the web”. 
          Richard Betts said that “Geoeconomics is the study of spatial, cultural and strategic aspects 
of resources with the aim of gaining a sustainable competitive advantage” (Betts, 2017).  He also 
stated that Geoeconomics is such a continuation of the logic of Geopolitics, but the difference is 
that Geoeconomics is applied in the era of globalization (Betts, 2017). 
          Betts studied in details the difference between the disciplines of Geopolitics and those of 
Geoeconomics, and found that they were different in two fundamental and major ways: 
 
1- Regarding the Topic: Geoeconomics is primarily concerned with economic activities 
rather than political and military ones which constitutes the major list of interests of 
Geopolitics (Betts, 2017); 
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2- Regarding the Actors: The aforementioned activities are done through different actors in 
those disciplines. According to the Geoeconomics’ discipline, they are chiefly undertaken 
by employees of private sector organizations, who are loyal to the owners of those 
organizations. But according to the Geopolitics’ one, they are chiefly done by individuals 
representing the nation state (Betts, 2017). 
          Betts (2017) affirmed that the study of Geoeconomics is more complex than that of 
Geopolitics where the State is the main actor by itself, but also stated that the study of both 
disciplines began first of all from a macro perspective to define the nations’ interests (Betts, 2017) 
and keep them on mind before doing any step. 
          After all what has been clarified, we can honestly affirm that even if Geopolitics and 
Geoeconomics are both strategies employed by nations to attain global goals in their general view, 
they have in fact many differences that will definitely lead to various consequences when applied 
on ground, and this what the next chapters will deeply discuss, especially while talking about the 
Chinese implementation of its own formulized Geoeconomics statecraft. But before that, it seems 







UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





Section 2: Geoeconomics Replacing Geopolitics 
 
          Recently, and specifically after the end of the cold war, “a new wave of interest in the 
interplay between commerce and strategy” (Vihma, 2018, p.1) occupied an important position 
globally, and that was when Geoeconomics became a key concept and a fundamental discipline 
on the international level.  
          After learning from the lessons of the past, and especially from the committed mistakes 
through implementing geopolitical theories and “military overstretch”, Barack Obama himself, 
tried to replace the US administration strategy with a new one based on expanding economic and 
financial relations in order to consolidate the US power (Humuza, 2015) …  This US increase in 
the adoption of economic tools in its geo-strategies, reflects a new Geoeconomic World Order 
(Whang, 2019).  This is due to the fact that no one can deny that the military strategies of the US 
in Afghanistan and Iraq have failed, and that this failure has shown to all the world the limited 
capabilities of military means (Humuza, 2015). 
          Herein, we can say that the failure of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan was the first 
spark that launched the big shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics, where “the troubled global 
power (US) has discovered trade agreements as a new mean to protect its hegemony in the 
international system” (Humuza, 2015, p.1). 
          By suggesting the implementation of a new strategy, Obama tried “to preserve the US status 
as the center of the world economy for the foreseeable future” (Humuza, 2015, p.1), for this new 
geoeconomic strategy, from his perspective, has new sanctioning methods that allow his nation 
“to exclude even big states from international trade and, more importantly, from the financial 
system” (Humuza, 2015, p.1).  
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          Besides the United States, the European Union has also shown interest towards the new 
wave of Geoeconomics; it has employed “trade relations” in order to protect and expand its sphere 
of influence under the umbrella of cooperating over development (Humuza, 2015).  And in order 
to link the preferential access of the market to political conditions, it exploited association and 
cooperation agreements as specific means to encourage reforms in the third states (Humuza, 2015). 
The application of this European vision has a main target beside liberalizing foreign markets to 
open them for its products, and it was adopting “democratic peace theory” that increases its 
security and welfare (Humuza, 2015).  
          Regardless of whether those nations continued to completely adopt and apply this new 
“unmilitary” strategy or not, we cannot deny that nowadays global powers prefer economic 
competition over military combats; and that is why “today, nations increasingly carry out 
geopolitical combat through economic means” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.367).  
          And after the global financial crisis witnessed in 2008, the emerging powers under the name 
of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), requested a bigger influence in the 
global governance, because of the growth of their economic importance internationally 
(Humuza,2015). And this was when China has clearly risen through its recent capability to 
establish its own international trade regime (Humzua, 2015), which has threatened the western 
predominance and hegemony as the only decision maker of the globe.  
          That financial crisis that hit the world has proven that the nations based on economic policies 
and means as a fundamental pillar for their own existence, are the most stable nations around the 
world, in comparison with those based on geopolitics discipline to withstand any potential 
competition that might face them.  
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





          Herein, the 2008’s crisis has been an exposure of the weaknesses of the western model of 
statecrafts, and of the strength of the BRICS’ one. Furthermore, and after witnessing the rise of its 
competitors during and after the global financial crisis, Brussels has directly modulated the 
strategic vision of its own trade policy (Humuza, 2015) in order to preserve “its status as an 
economic power, to secure its future access to energy and other important resources, to open new 
markets for European enterprises, and grab a piece of the pie of economic growth in the emerging 
markets” (Humuza, 2015, p.1), and through this manner it will eventually increase its own ability 
to compete economically with other trading powers on the international scene.   
          In addition to what was previously discussed, we have to remember that at the beginning of 
the 1990s, Luttwak (1990) and some strategists affirmed that Geoeconomics started to replace 
Geopolitics in the core of the globalizing international system.  For instance, in his review of the 
book “Geopolitics and the Quest for Dominance” by Jeremy Back, D’Agostino (2017) reveals how 
geopolitics appeared to lose its charm after the world wars and China’s formation of the Eurasian 
bloc. In addition to that, geopolitics did not tell us much in the cold war about areas outside Europe 
such as South America, the African continent, or Asia (D’Agostino, 2017).  
          And within the same context, Pascal Lorot stated: “Nations are engaged – alongside their 
national companies – in offensive policies to conquer external markets and to take control of 
sectors of activity considered to be strategic. For nations today the quest for power and assertion 
of their rank on the world stage depends more on their economic health, the competitiveness of 
their companies and the place they occupy in world trade” (Lorot, 1999). 
          Hence, the key concerns of the world leaders shifted from security concerns, to prosperity 
and competitiveness ones (Szabo, 2015).  And therefore, a large shift from geopolitics as global 
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powers’ discipline, to geoeconomics as powerful nations’ geostrategic statecraft has been 
witnessed all around the globe. 
          And in order to get deeply into the details of that emergence, we will discuss its global and 
local manifestations, argue for the probable implications that it might lead through affecting the 
course of events in the international arena, and finally shed light on what this emergence has caused 
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A- Manifestations of the Famous Shift on the International Scene 
 
It is important now to analyze how this shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics has manifested 
itself in reality, especially that the geoeconomics visions – since their rise – were obviously 
associated with the transnational business class perspectives, and they had also trans-nationally 
expanded since then, to replace militaristic concerns and territorial dominance with notions of 
networks and partnerships for peace all over the world (Sparke, 2014).  
Many factors prove the validity of the shift from Geopolitics to Geoeconomics, and here are 
some of them: 
 
1- In lieu of geopolitical concerns about citizens and soldiers, the Geoeconomics statecraft, 
increased or wanted to increase the level of the investors and customers’ entrepreneurial 
interests (Sparke, 2014); 
 
2- In place of focusing on national borders and place, geoeconomics gave the privilege to 
networks and pace as scope of application of its theories (Sparke, 2014); 
 
3- In contrast of doing efforts in building alliances for security through international politics, 
Geoeconomics concentrates its major efforts on building international ties and partnerships 
that advance ‘growth’, ‘integration’, ‘harmonization’, and ‘efficiency’, against the threats 
of ‘traditionalism’, ‘isolationism’, ‘anachronism’ and ‘anarchy’ (Sparke, 2014); 
 
  
4- War between the core nations of the globalized system “has become almost unthinkable…” 
(Szabo, 2015, p.105) because military power and classical diplomacy have lost their 
historical value in the strategic new arena of world affairs (Szabo, 2015); 
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5- In many countries, especially the European ones, a definite shift in the core idea of 
international security has been observed, which instead of defending territories against 
aggression, becomes an issue of maintaining order and stability over the lands (Sheehan, 
2008); 
 
6- Although wars between states have increasingly diminished, the international order 
remains reliant on individual territorially defined states that stick to adversarial competition 
in order to gain power and influence; but with the rise of Geoeconomics, that competition 
became chiefly channeled by economic means (Szabo, 2015) …  “Today developed states 
compete in the marketplace not on the battleground” (Aligica 2009);  
 
7- A big switch from a territorial state to a trade state invaded the world, because of “the 
increasing porousness of borders, the growing role of multinational corporations with 
global strategies and the decline of the national security state” (Szabo, 2015, p.106).  Those 
circumstances led to a shift in the political leaders’ key concerns in the central global core 
from security to prosperity and competitiveness (Szabo, 2015). 
Those manifestations and many others have led or will lead to large implications on the 
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B-  Implications of the Famous Shift on the International Scene 
 
          International political issues turned out to get more economic qualifications, national 
interests got defined in economic terms, the selective multilateralism replaced the (classic) 
multilateralism, the predominant role of business shaped the majority of nations’ foreign 
policies, economic interests got elevated over human rights and promotion of democracy, and 
nations started employing their economic power to impose national preferences on their 
competitors (Kundnani, 2011) …  All these changes and modifications shaped the international 
system geoeconomically, and procured many implications: 
 
1- The role of political and administrative leaders got reduced, for the major political 
strategies of nations had undergone alterations and transformations and became strategies 
of business interests for the sake of the export markets and natural resources which will 
lead them to domination and hegemony (Szabo, 2015);  
 
2- This new model of statecrafts changes the work procedures within the governments by 
enhancing the role of the chancellor’s office, the finance, economics, and technology 
ministries, and reducing the role of foreign and defense ministries on the other hand (Szabo, 
2015); 
 
3- The new geoeconomic approach highly promoted around the world decreased the value of 
non-economic factors such as human rights, and democracy – as previously mentioned – 
and substituted them with economic ones in order to transform the concerned nations into 
normative ones (Szabo, 2015); 
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4- Recently, Great Powers became obliged to work on their stability, predictability, and 
reliability of their reputation as stable economic partners more than ever, for those 
qualifications became a paramount to ensure their leverage and preserve their influence in 
the new geoeconomic world (Szabo, 2015); 
 
5- The wave of change also affected the instruments of state influence; the hard security and 
military natures became softer… The classic military roles of protecting the lands from any 
invasion or insecurity got downgraded: in Germany for example, the main role of the 
military became “to protect the German access to raw materials and to keep secure the sea 
lines of communication and other key trading routes” (Szabo, 2015, p.13). And here the 
statement of Luttwak (1990) “methods of commerce are displacing military methods” 
(p.17) was actually confirmed (Szabo, 2015); 
 
6- Markets got expanded due to the new globalization system, thus competition became at its 
peak. A large and deeper shift also reached the global distribution of power and the 
emergence of new powers due to the weakness of other non-economic ones (Szabo, 2015);  
 
7- The 2008 financial crisis and the dysfunctions of the American political system 
downgraded the significance and the influence of the United States on the international 
scene, and weakened countries’ foreign policies founded on relations and ties to the west 
(Szabo, 2015) … New powers emerged, and competition for markets, technology and 
natural resources got accelerated (Szabo, 2015) due to the new globalization system based 
on the geoeconomic approach.     
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          In that multi-polar world, and with Geoeconomics replacing Geopolitics, it becomes more 
and more difficult to unite developing countries and emerging powers on trade issues in forums or 
international organization due to competition and divergence of interests (Financial Express, 
2016).  But after seeing the failures of the United States in their military conducted combats and 
wars since the Second World War (failures were not only from a humanitarian perspective but 
from an economical one too), the emerging competitive nations started shifting their interests and 
resources towards SEPT: Science, Education, Production and Trade! This process is 
geoeconomically named by ‘the Golden Process’ (Szabo, 2015). 
          After the Cold War, at the turn of the 21st century, states started believing that “war is no 
longer a viable option for remaining in control” (Betts, 2017).  This belief will surely prevent the 
superpowers from engaging in large-scale wars with their competitors in the future, and from 
intervening in military conflicts with small states (Betts, 2017).  But hence what should they do to 
preserve their influence and hegemony over the world and to increase their competition potential 
and strength? Here comes the main role of Geoeconomics as a multidisciplinary global way of 
strategic thinking, used by states to achieve their targets and goals. 
          It is necessary here to recall the definition of Geoeconomics provided by Blackwill and 
Harris (2017) in their book ‘War by Other Means – Geoeconomics and Statecrafts’ (A Foreign 
Affairs Best Book of the Year 2016), telling that it (Geoeconomics) is: “The use of economic instruments 
to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical result; and the 
effects of other nations’ economic actions on a country’s geopolitical goals” (p.20).  
          Hence, the recent upgrade that Geoeconomics has known, refers to three main factors as 
Blackwill and Harris declared in their book: 
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1- In order to project influence and conduct geopolitical combats since the beginning of the 
twenty first century, emerging powers are getting attracted to use economic instruments 
rather than military ones (Blackwill & Harris, 2017); Because as the American Historian - 
Jeremi Suri said: “power turns out to depend less on common displays of charisma and 
strength, and more on unseen manipulations of markets and money” (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017, p.33); (Practical examples will be provided in the upcoming chapters of the study). 
It is true that “military muscles” became unfashionable or outdated nowadays, and it is also 
true that nations are increasingly tending to use economic methods to rapidly attain their 
geopolitical aims, but it is not right to deny that military force remains an important method 
in how many countries realize their strategic and geopolitical aims (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017). 
2- The second factor lies in that those states adopting the economic instruments for attaining 
their geopolitical goals, benefit from having vast energy resources at their direct disposal, 
in comparison to previous eras (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  This emerging phenomenon 
paved the way to the return of state capitalism (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). And we can 
honestly say that Governments “are now the largest players in some of the globe’s most 
important bond markets” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.37).  Because of resorting to 
economic displays of power, state-owned companies are replacing private firms: between 
2004 and 2009, in the ranks of Forbes’s list of the world’s biggest 2000 companies, 120 
state-owned companies were listed, while 250 private firms were dropped off (Kurlantzick, 
2012).  And according to the World Investment Report of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (2013), “80% of China’s stock market, 62% of Russia’s, and 
38% of Brazil’s are State-Backed companies”, which “have claimed – since 2005 – more 
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than half the world’s fifteen largest initial public offerings (IPOs)” (Woolridge, 2012).  In 
addition to the fact that “from 2003 to 2010, one-third of the world’s FDI (foreign direct 
investment) came from state-owned firms” (Woolridge, 2012).  Blackwill and Harris 
(2017) have affirmed that recently due to the big shift “from major industries to equity and 
bond markets, from capital flows to foreign direct investment, the state’s hand is visible 
and growing” (p.37). 
This is because in the 2000s the world economy was holding $ 2 trillion in reserves, but in 
2015, that number exceeded $ 11 trillion (Blackwill & Harris, 2017); and according to the 
International Monetary Fund (2017) the reserves of emerging nations have increased from 
just over $ 700 billion in 2000 to around $ 7.5 trillion in 2015.  
The financial crisis of 2008 has regenerated world leaders’ opinions already suspicious of 
the U.S capacities, economic, diplomatic or strategic; and helped in the emergence of that 
new model of “non – democratic” but larger, wealthier, and more global capitalist states, 
in comparison to their predecessors – mainly the USA (Blackwill & Harris, 2017) ...  
The new sources of power and foreign policy instruments recently laying in the hands of 
these “emerging” governments were founded by the famous shift that concentrated such 
wealth and large levers of influence under their control (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
Former U.S secretary of state Hillary Clinton outlined that new phenomenon in explaining 
that “today’s state capitalists are entering markets directly at times shaping themselves not 
just for profit but to build and exercise power on behalf of the State” (Clinton, 2011) … So 
the emergence of the new model of capitalism is the second factor that reveals the modern 
resurgence of Geoeconomics detected by Blackwill and Harris. 
 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





3- The third factor is more related to state changes into global markets and has less to do with 
evolving patterns of state behavior; for today’s markets exert more influence over the 
choices and outcomes of nation’s foreign policy – because they are deeper, faster, more 
leveraged and more integrated than ever before – this influence is increased since they are 
paying more attention to economic forces along their ways of evolution (Blackwill & 
Harris, 2017). 
And besides new statecrafts of using economic instruments to produce geopolitical results, 
the market forces and economic trend lines are themselves producing strategic outcomes 
all over the most important national interests of the United States (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017).  
The west’s greatest achievement in foreign policies so far in the twentieth century, and the 
closest U.S foreign policy partner, the Fate of the European Union, stayed for many years 
under the control of bonds markets instead of the European political capitals (Feldstein, 
2012). 
To conclude, the recent phenomenon of globalizing markets is the third main factor that 
reflects the authenticity of the shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics, and the revolution 
of energy is one of many practical examples that confirms that theory: The U.S 
Government Accountability Office (2012) have done a geological survey, which reported 
that the availability of recoverable gas resources have augmented more than 680% since 
2006, and the production of LTO (light tight oil) increased eighteen-fold between 2007 and 
2012…  Herein, because of the augmentation of the American LTO, the U.S oil imports 
declined, so countries rich with energy resources in West and North Africa, and the Middle 
East will shift their exports to the People’s Republic of China – as Blackwill and Harris 
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(2017) stated.  Hence, the foreign policies of those energy producing countries have 
redrawn themselves exactly as the trade routes have done, in order to leverage their 
growing economic strength (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
So the energy revolution caused a globalization in the markets and a big change in the 
foreign policies of the countries, and this constituted the third main factor that explains the 
rise of geoeconomics in the world. 
 
          Therefore we can affirm that geoeconomics’ power as geopolitics’ power are both a function 
of certain structural factors and policy choices (Blackwill & Harris, 2017); although as there are 
levels in state capacities to project geopolitical power, there are certain fundamental lineaments 
and factors, most specifically: geoeconomic endowments, that define the nation’s range of success 
in implementing geoeconomic tools in their policies (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).   These factors 
were determined previously, but what are the main changes that affected the development and 
operation of nations adopting the new geoeconomic statecraft? This is the question that will be 
answered in the following part. 
 
C- Structural Changes in Nations’ Foreign Policies 
 
          Blackwill and Harris have identified six manners through which the implementation of 
geoeconomic tools and approaches changed and are still changing the actual geopolitical frame 
and landscape, in addition to the development and operation of foreign policies themselves. 
Therefore, these changes will be defined hereafter in details: 
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1-  Geoeconomics Opens the Way for New Policy Choices 
 
The history of the Sino-Russian relationship would make a good example to explain and 
clarify that point. After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian economy has known 
fluctuations and inconstancy, knowing that in 1998, with less than $ 15 million in official 
reserves, Moscow was a customer of the IMF (Pinto et al., 2001).  But by 2008, the Russian 
economy has known a big “renaissance”, for Moscow could accumulate more than forty 
times its 1998 reserve levels, to obtain over $ 600 billion (Kramer, 2008), which had 
allowed the Kremlin to disrupt its neighbors (Ukraine and Georgia), and to protect its 
markets from any fallout (Kramer, 2008).  So Russia became then the country that is 
offering bailouts; and the most iconic example on that is its bailout to the “ailing 
Yanukovych regime in late 2013” (Kramer, 2008); Russia also wanted to help the EU’s 
own ranks, especially Greece, Cyprus and Hungary – its weakest links – with packages 
aimed at shattering the EU and weakening its alliance with the U.S (Higgins, 2015). 
Although Moscow is now trying to harden its friendships with “deep-pocketed” friends 
that might protect it from any economic fallout for their own geopolitical reasons; knowing 
that the Beijing of 1998 or even that of 2004 did not have the financial capability, or even 
the foreign policy inclination to cushion and advocate Moscow and help it flout the U.S. 
or the EU, but the Beijing of 2016 - according to Blackwill and Harris (2017) - appeared 
to be financially and politically susceptible to do so.  A new form of Sino – Russian alliance 
emerged then through energy, finance, and military deals, in order to achieve their own 
mutual geopolitical goals and to prevent the U.S. from achieving them (Baker, 2014). 
Briefly, the new geoeconomic statecrafts adopted by Russia and China, the “newly deep 
coffers, and the willingness to use them for the sake of geopolitics” (Blackwill & Harris, 
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2017, p.39) all contributed in opening the ways in front of them for making new policy 
choices, and enabling them to make powerful decisions at odds with the national interests 
of the United States (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
 
2- Geoeconomics Opens the Way for Implementing New Foreign Policy Tools 
 
In the same context, because of the large East-West competition, and besides enjoying a 
new set of policy choices and options, emerging geoeconomic states found that they are 
possessing new foreign policy tools due to the adoption of that new geoeconomic statecraft 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  
As an example of these new tools, the visit of the Chinese president Xi Jinping to Russia 
in March 2013 seeking a closer cooperation between the two nations (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017).  This visit had led to a $ 2 billion loan outlined by China to Rosneft - the Russian 
oil company – which got a period of twenty-five years to repay China, in Oil and not in 
Money (Rudnitsky & Bierman, 2013)!  This loan has shed light on a new foreign policy 
tool between those two allies, where the Chinese government guaranteed its access to 
Russian oil for twenty-five years (since 2013), and a Russian company guaranteed its long 
term financial support.   
And in another example also concerning the Chinese diplomacy and foreign policy tools 
as well; in April 2011, when Dilma Rousseff – the Brazilian President – officially visited 
China for her fist time and arrived to Beijing, the Chinese president Hu Jintao “greeted her 
with an order for thirty Brazilian Embraer planes plus five options, executed via three 
Chinese state-owned airlines” (BBC News, 2011) aiming to strengthen diplomatic ties 
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between their states (Blackwill & Harris, 2017), knowing that they are two of the BRICS 
countries. 
Herein, that new geoeconomic statecraft is confounding Western governments today 
“straining their ability to respond” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.41) due to the Eastern 
adoption of new tools in diplomacy and foreign policies different from those adopted in 
their states, which intensifies the actual competition.  
Recently, Russia’s economic intimidation of Ukraine and China’s economic tactics 
towards its own region (including Japan) formed such a struggle to U.S. allies, Europe and 
Japan, on which they could not reply effectively, and that led into a controversy between 
the United States and the European Union because of their inability to form “a fitting and 
collective geoeconomic response” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.41). 
Here, it could be concluded that the new geoeconomic statecraft opened the way before the 
emerging geoeconomic state to adopt new foreign policy tools that help them in their 
international competition through intensifying their strength and evolving their powers to 
an extent where their competitors will have no ability to reply and confront them.   
 
 
3-  Geoeconomics’ Statecraft Changes the Nature of Diplomacy as well as that of the 
Markets 
 
Besides changing the nature of states’ diplomacy due to the employment of geoeconomic 
tools, Blackwill and Harris noticed that the nature of markets has changed as well: The 
state-owned ICBC (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) aiming to refocus on Africa 
via increasing the bilateral cooperation, has bought in 2008, 20% of the stakes from South 
Africa – based Standard Bank (England & Schafer, 2014), but the deal did not work up, as 
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per Martyn Davies of Frontier Advisory – A Johannesburg based research firm, 20% of 
Standard’s stakes were not enough to allow ICBC to compete with fully state-owned 
entities, as indicated in The Economist (2014). MDFA explained that “for regions (like 
Africa) awash in state-baked deals, counterparties without diplomatic credentials may be 
at a disadvantage” (The Economist, 2014).  So, in order to intensify any bilateral 
cooperation between states, diplomatic platforms for discussion and negotiation are the 
most appropriate tool to make a direct footprint in their markets and to ensure the final win. 
Business merits are no longer the basis on which major deals are being decided (Blackwill 
& Harris, 2017).  
Returning to Chinese engagements and policies, and to take one more example, it is 
necessary to discuss Argentina and China’s tit-for-tat dispute that started with an Argentine 
policy to level new tariffs on low-value-added goods – a policy that looked like directed 
immediately towards China – on which Beijing responded with a counter policy that 
imposed spurious safety bans on Argentine beef (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.42).  And in 
order to push China to end this public safety embargo on Argentine beef, Argentina quelled 
Beijing by ratifying many contracts with Chinese state-owned enterprises, and between 
them was one for a prime rail project, and that was how the embargo was stopped (The 
Economist, 2011).  Knowing that the abstract goal of Argentine officials behind these 
contracts was not necessarily having the best bid, but calming Beijing down, and that 
resulted in a class of deals dedicated for more coercive reasons than on market logic; and 
such deals are only open for a few selected number of firms (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
It is clear that emerging geoeconomic states are behaving today like dealmakers, showing 
a high willingness to bargain through using uniquely sovereign tools such as: spurious tax 
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charges, forced joint ventures, police raids, state secrets, incarceration of business rivals 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  
Media reports in 2007 announced that Russia’s largest private equity fund with a sizeable 
global presence: the Hermitage Capital had a forfeiture of $ 230 million in fraudulent tax 
claims and charges (Harding, 2015). 
Business dealings occurring beyond market means or logic of profit, contribute to many 
changes in the market terms through imposing a level of international commerce unreached 
by private firms; and also to the creation of a new diplomatic front that might exclude many 
nations including the United States, as what was stated by Blackwill and Harris (2017). 
Such deals with geoeconomic specifications and qualifications might change the entire 
operation of markets, especially in the sectors with strategic importance: for example the 
sector of Energy (Blackwill & Harris, 2017) …  Beijing’s investments in international 
energy as attempts to “relieve” the risks caused by the insecurity of Chinese energy became 
a widely agreed fact on the international scene (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  Blackwill and 
Harris (2017) stated here that: “Where such geoeconomic logic is present, it can compel a 
different sort of deal structure” (pp.42-43). 
The example of some states led by China could clarify Blackwill and Harris’s point of 
view: Those states decided not to look to open markets in order to present the best price, 
but they have chosen to tie-up long term stocks by means of state-led contracts with other 
states’ governments, and to gather the national power in order to secure the best terms 
(Economy & Levi, 2014). 
As for China itself, and when in a wartime scenario, it develops new initiatives and policies 
to secure its need in petroleum “through equity oil arrangements and closer ties with 
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exporters like Saudi Arabia” (Kelanic, 2013) because it might find itself then unable to 
satisfy domestic demand (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
It can be concluded here, that this kind of state-led deal-makings can propagate itself 
through stimulating other nations and encouraging them “to nationalize defensively, or at 
least supplying pretext for preexisting nationalization agendas” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, 
p.43).  
This new behavior of geoeconomic states mirrors how global markets are nowadays 
operating with large geopolitical dimensions more than they had ever done (Blackwill & 
Harris, 2017).  (Even after the emergence of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries), energy markets were driven by private forces of supply and demand, 
intermediated by mostly private (not state-owned oil companies) (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017).  
Here, we can clearly say that geoeconomic tools have done vast changes to markets’ 





4-  Geoeconomic Deals Became Major Factors in States’ Foreign Policies 
 
The strategic investments made by China across the African continent are being directive 
and instructive, so we will take some of them as examples to clarify this fourth change 
made by the emergence of the new geoeconomic statecraft: 
• During his trip to Africa in May 2014, the Premier of the State of the Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, Li Keqiang declared the Chinese intention to expand its 
credits’ line to many African states from $ 10 billion to $ 30 billion, as indicated in The 
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Wall Street Journal (2014).  And it is obvious that behind such investment lie major 
development goals (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  Even if many times the amounts 
delivered are well short of those promised, but they were still substantial, and that was 
done several times with weak and non-democratic states, due to the Chinese opinion 
which thinks that these huge sums might influence the orientations of the foreign 
policies and the defined national interests of the governments adopting them (Blackwill 
& Harris, 2017).  So they pragmatically manage the distribution of such sums between 
states  according to their qualifications and specifications, in order to avoid negative 
ends to their implemented strategies and means. 
• Several African countries have received Chinese investments, despite its states policy 
of non-intervention (Blackwill & Harris, 2017);  According to Latin American Herald 
Tribune (2009), Beijing has slogged along the domestic political process of many 
African Countries such as Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Venezuela, through these 
investments - whether they were factors to stimulate China’s military modernization 
directly, or to intensify the reasoning of the members inside the CCP (Chinese 
Communist Party) who had invited for such a spending target for so long (Shinn, 
2009)…  And these investments helped in executing the buildup operation of the 
Chinese military through the terms of backstopping their resources overseas (Walker, 
2012). 
• The Sudanese example, with its big shift from a historical oil importer to a recent oil 
exporter with the help of China, may provide the strongest clarification:   
With the help of the Chinese government and investors, the Sudanese government was 
able to build three weapons factories near Khartoum (Blackwill & Harris, 2017); also 
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with the deployment of 4,000 Chinese troops to Southern Sudan, China helped in 
guarding the oil pipeline, while re-affirming its purpose to intensify the bilateral 
military collaboration and exchanges with Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria and Sudan 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017) …  
This Chinese help has turned Sudan from an importer to an exporter of oil, until it 
earned some $ 2 billion in 2005 from oil revenues, half of them came from China (Blair, 
2005) …  
And before the independence of South Sudan, about “80% of Sudan’s oil revenue went 
to the purchase of weapons for use in subduing separatist fighters in the South” 
(Goodman, 2004) … 
By these tactics, China became the largest trade partner of Africa, and also the largest 
provider of peacekeepers there of any of the five members of the UN Security Council 
(Goodman, 2004), through increasing its role in peacekeeping missions in the UN and 
more than 2000 Chinese peacekeepers contributing in ten mission of peacekeeping in 
2014 (Brookes & Shin, 2006).  
After briefing some Chinese investments projects in Africa, we can conclude that 
geoeconomic deals are recently becoming a conspicuous priority in foreign policies of 
states. 
  
5-  Autocrat to Autocrat Negotiated Contracts Bolster the Nations’ Regimes Effectively 
 
As for the fifth change, and as for Blackwill and Harris (2017): “Deals, especially bad ones, 
can be easier to negotiate autocrat to autocrat, unencumbered by the same levels of 
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transparency or scrutiny that democratic publics tend to demand. In these cases, the terms 
might well come with financing for an important political goal” (p.45). 
  
Concerning Chinese policies:  
• In 2012, while Hugo Chavez – former president of Venezuela – was a candidate in the 
presidential elections, PDVSA (the Venezuelan state oil company) agreed on an oil-
backed loan of $ 1.5 billion presented from ICBC (the Chinese state-run bank) in order 
to execute new housing construction projects – to be also built by a Chinese company: 
CITIC, which is the largest Chinese state-owned investment company – which 
appeared as a major part of Chavez’s campaign strategy (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
Here, “PDVSA was forced to sell a 10 percent stake in one of its most promising joint 
ventures (with Chevron) to CITIC as part of the deal” (Crooks & Orozco, 2012). 
• Where Beijing and Moscow have embraced and surrounded many autocratic regimes 
hostile to the western camp, as: Belarus, Uzbekistan, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Sudan, 
Angola, and recently Myanmar; “the same basic plot lines are found” as Blackwill and 
Harris stated (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.45) …  Such deals, and “supports” are 
obviously stimulated by material interests and benefices, “whether China’s need for 
oil, or Russia’s reliance on the sale of conventional weapons and nuclear reactors as 
important revenue sources” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.45). 
Rationally, if it should be commented on the origin of such deals, it should also be taken 
into consideration that Russia and China, the leading practitioners of geoeconomics in the 
world, are ranked as “the most important business partners and financing sources for some 
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of the world’s most brutal autocrats, typically in ways that strengthen the domestic political 
strength of these regimes” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.45).  
China aims to strengthen the ties with Venezuela, Sudan and Angola in order to preserve 
its access to oil when in insecurity, and to improve its relations with Myanmar to have 
access to port facilities in exchange (Kagan, 2006). 
 
6-  Security and Economic Tensions Are Reinforcing Each Other to a Greater Degree 
than that in Previous Eras  
 
The last change stated in the book “War by Other Means”, was related to large security 
and economic tensions caused by the fact that emerging states are getting used to “flex 
geopolitical muscle in economic terms” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.46) through their 
adoption of geoeconomic approaches.  
Superpowers such as U.S.A, China and Russia are increasingly spreading disagreements 
with their foreign policies “from export bans on key commodities to cyber-attacks on a 
country’s banking sector” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, pp.46-47).  Russia’s Intervention in 
Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 (Mälksoo, 2019), China’s behavior in the South East 
and China Seas (Kim, 2016), and America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Martini, 2017) 
are recent examples of showing up military forces to decrease security threats which have 
reinforced economic tensions exponentially (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  
It is necessary to clarify that security tensions are usually led and motivated by economic 
targets – such as the access to critical resources – and these cases are not new on the 
international scene (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  Nevertheless, even security tensions that 
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have no “inner” economic goals are increasingly provoking economic disruptions 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  
If we should explain the main reason of the growing security tensions in the region of East 
Asia, we should mention that they are caused by the Chinese perception of its own 
economic capabilities (Blackwill & Harris, 2017); and by its belief that the U.S.A., Japan 
and Korea are economically dependent on its government and reliant on its help to stand 
behind existing security commitments (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  According to The 
Economist (2009), these perceptions and beliefs emboldened in their turn aggressive 
behaviors from the competitors – nations, which have led to many security challenges 
under economic cover. 
The United States’ reactions and behaviors towards China’s threats in East Asia, may 
clarify what was argued above about occurring security challenges under economic cover: 
“While many states are repurposing economic tools for geopolitical use, the United States 
is moving in the reverse direction” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.47).  It is using geopolitical 
tools for economic purpose, because in fact, at the end of the day, it is searching for its 
economic welfare through developing and executing its foreign policies rather than aiming 
to invest in geopolitical outcomes (Blackwill & Harris, 2017) …  It is recently becoming a 
major principle that the United States’ foreign policy must be a “force for economic 
renewal at home” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.47).  
More than that, many analysts pointed out that the economic statecraft of the United States 
will develop and grow in its performance due to its importance to the American geopolitical 
fortunes than to “its possession of nuclear weapons or its seat in the UN Security Council” 
(Karp, 1992) ...  Admiral Michael Mullen – former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – 
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has warned his government many times from debts, considering them “the single greatest 
threat to national security” (O’Keefe, 2011)! … Herein, we can understand how a financial 
crisis can preoccupy foreign policy debates due to its resulting economic insecurities 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  
 
          For concluding, we must say that the new emerging geoeconomic forces are now tending to 
boost the odds of their success through implementing geoeconomic instruments and tools in the 
service of their major and strategic targets and goals that will definitely determine their 
effectiveness and leadership all over the international scene and define the new global sovereignty 
standards.   
          China is recently heading the list of these emerging geoeconomic states; but for attaining its 
goals and achieving its targets, it must possess many assets and capabilities in addition to 
developing a complete and comprehensive geo-strategy that will orientate its authentic 
performance on ground towards geoeconomics. What is this geo-strategy?  What are its essentials? 
And how the Chinese capabilities will support the government in applying it in reality? The next 
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Chapter 1: Assets behind China’s Geoeconomic Potential 
 
          After the Cold War, the international system which has been mainly controlled by the 
United States, has been trembled by the relative slump of the US economy and concurrent growth 
of China (Han & Paul, 2020).  For instance, in the Monday Briefing published by The New York 
Times on November 19th 2018, the author Alisha Haridasani Gupta wrote: “Imagine two 18-year-
olds, one in China, one in the U.S. Who has a better chance at upward mobility? Not too long ago, 
the answer might have been the teenager in the U.S. But China has risen so quickly that, today, a 
young person’s chance of improving their living situation vastly exceeds those in the U.S” (Gupta, 
2018).  The article has also shown the cause behind this rising fact in numbers (Gupta, 2018):  
• 800 million: The number of people in China that have been lifted out of poverty since 
1990. That is two and a half times the U.S. population. 
• 500 percent: This is the average per capita income growth in China between 1980 
and 2014 (The average per capita income was multiplied by 6). 
• $12,000: China’s economic output per capita. A decade ago, it was $3,500. 
• 1/4: The share of the world’s middle class that was in China in 2016. 
• 29: China’s score on the Gini coefficient, a worldwide measure of inequality, where a 
lower score represents a more equal economy. The U.S. scores 37. 
• Despite that progress, 40 percent of China’s population still lives on less than $5.50 a 
day. 
          The enormous rise in economic growth typically translates into a comprehensive vigorous 
influence (Chen, 2018). In other words, a country that enjoys an exponential rise in internal 
prosperity, fortune and wealth, will definitely benefit from the same rise on the external or 
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international scene… But this does not happen without the possession of certain local and foreign 
assets, which present the main reasons leading the country towards the greatest geoeconomic 
success in the future…  
          It is important to know that the Chinese geopolitics nowadays is over-determined by its 
maritime borders’ affairs and by the Sino - American relations (Duchâtel, 2017).  But it is also a 
necessity to point out that the economic successes of Beijing have been accompanied since the 
beginning of the 2000s by a considerable expansion of its multilateral commercial ties with the 
countries in which it is diversifying its own investments (Duchâtel, 2017).  
          This expansion turned China to become not only the world’s factory that attracts foreign 
capital because of its reduced production costs, but also to become a major actor in the 
International Economy because of its consumer power, its capital exports and many other 
important powers and capabilities which globalized the economic and security interests of this 
superpower (Duchâtel, 2017) … 
          And that is how China became a global geoeconomic superpower (not the only one, but 
definitively the most powerful).   
          So, what are those powers, assets, and capabilities lying behind the greatest historical 
transformation of China into ‘the most powerful global geoeconomic superpower’?  The answer 
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Section 1: Local Assets 
 
          As the People’s Republic of China is growing stronger day after day, its “weight is felt 
increasingly around the world” (Wang, 2010) …  In fact, Beijing’s economic, political and military 
capabilities and assets are limiting the implementations of its competitors’ geo-strategies, whose 
main threats arise from the Chinese strength.  
          Many assets have certainly accelerated the geoeconomic rise of China when employed geo-
strategically… Most of them are local ones; Herein, this part of the Chapter will discuss in detail 
each one of them, in order to help us in formulating a comprehensive conclusion about how the 
Chinese capabilities (the local and the external ones) have formulated China’s famous 
geoeconomic potential and rise:  
 
A- Geographical Factors  
 
          Geopolitically speaking, factors related to geography are highly valuable either in 
offensive or defensive geo-strategies for any nation… As for the Chinese land, according 
to the Global Fire Power (2018): it is 9,596,961 km² wide, and has a coastline of 14,500 
km, with 110,000 km waterways, and 22,450 km shared borders ...  In details: China is a 
country located in the Southeast Asian region, along the Pacific Ocean’s coastline; with an 
area of 9.6 million square kilometers, it constitutes the third largest country after Russia 
and Canada, and shares its borders with 14 other countries, as indicated in Travel China 
Guide (2018).  According to the Central Intelligence Agency (2018), China is also rich in 
“coal, iron ore, petroleum, natural gas, mercury, tin, tungsten, antimony, manganese, 
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molybdenum, vanadium, magnetite, aluminum, lead, zinc, rare earth elements, uranium, 
hydropower potential (world's largest), arable land”. 
          According to McColl (n.d.), author at the Center for Global Education - Asia Society, 
China has a distinct geographic “print” concerning physical and environmental features 
(climates, soil, topography, and location), and historical and cultural patterns ...  But what 
interests us for now is to understand how that “print” affects the geopolitical being of 
China. 
          First it is necessary to know that “Geopolitics is based on geography and politics” 
(Stratfor, 2012), and “Politics is built on two foundations: military and economic” (Stratfor, 
2012). These foundations interact and support each other, but in their core reality are 
distinct (Stratfor, 2012) …  Thus, economic and military features of China will be 
discussed in the following points, but what matters now is to clarify how Beijing turned its 
geography to be a useful capability in its large shift into geo-economy.  
          Contemporary China is an island not surrounded by water (which borders its eastern 
flank only), but due to the mountains and jungles and wastelands that border it, forming a 
terrain that is difficult to traverse, it has been described by Island (Stratfor, 2012).  That 
description reminds us of the statement of Mackinder (1904) in his famous article “The 
Geographical Pivot of History”, after explaining why he considered Eurasia as the 
“geostrategic fulcrum of world power” (p.473), he supposed that the Chinese should 
“expand their power well beyond their borders” (p.473) and that “might constitute the 
yellow peril to the world’s freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the 
resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the 
pivot region” (p.473).  
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          In other words, Mackinder feared that China might one day conquer Russia in 
Eurasia; he pointed that: whereas Russia “that other Eurasia giant, basically was, and is 
still a land power with an oceanic front blocked by ice” (Kaplan, 2010), China “owing to 
a 9,000- mile temperate coastline with many good natural harbors is both a land power and 
a sea power” (Kaplan, 2010).  Herein, it became clearer that China’s geographical location 
and characteristics constitute a distinguished capability that might be supportive in the 
execution of the government geo-strategies. 
          Furthermore, the virtual reach of China dilates from Central Asia region – 
characterized by its energy resources and wealth (minerals and hydrocarbons) – until the 
main shipping lanes of the Pacific Ocean (Kaplan, 2010) …  This large extension reminds 
us also of Mackinder’s prediction in his “Democratic Ideal and Reality” about the Chinese 
eventual will – in coordination with the United States and the United Kingdom – to guide 
the world through building “for a quarter of humanity a new civilization, neither quite 
Eastern nor quite Western” (Mackinder, 1919, p.227).  This statement was in 1919, one 
hundred years ago! And China of today is actually aiming to guide the world: Distinct 
allies, different strategies, but same target! 
Finally, it could be honestly stated that the “blessed geography of China”, as Kaplan (2010) 
described it, is a fact that “tends to get overlooked in discussions of the country’s economic 
dynamism and national assertiveness” (Kaplan, 2010), and this essentially means that 
China “will stand at the hub of geopolitics” (Kaplan, 2010) in its path towards global 
power, due to the strategic value of its geographical factors. 
          But before closing this argumentation about Chinese geography, we cannot forget 
the presence of the high critical South China Sea and the repercussions caused by the 
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international competition over its case… It constitutes an important shipping route and 
contains rich natural resources, specifically oil and gas (Pemmaraju, 2016).  According to 
Lowy Institute (n.d.) in Sydney, geographically, this Sea significantly plays an important 
role in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, for it is a critical commercial gateway for a large 
number of countries involved in world’s merchant shipping (it is bordered by 10 states: 
Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand and Vietnam) and due to their borders, each one of these countries had 
“competing claims over islands and smaller features in the South China Sea”.  Thus, it is a 
major economic and strategic arena, and this is why it constitutes a site for territorial 
international disputes which have re-caused the flare up of the conflicts and tensions within 
the region (Lowy Institute, n.d.).  
          The striking paradox in this dispute is that, by its official name “South China Sea”, 
the sea is attributed to China especially that the latter claims historical and dominion rights 
over the sea’s islands (Pemmaraju, 2016), and this has its own weight on the geopolitical 
scene… and on the geoeconomic one as well, because of the Chinese exploitation of its 
strategic reality as a significant site for international trade, and its serious trials and 
strategies to take full control over it…   
          The second chapter of this part will clarify the Chinese pragmatic thinking in 
benefiting from these geographic factors to improve the capacity of the government to 
realize its geo-strategic aims…  
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B-  Human Capability – Manpower 
 
          After discussing Chinese geography, it is obligatory to talk about the distinguished 
Chinese population… China is the most populated country in the globe with 1,379,302,711 
as per The Global Firepower (2018), and 1.38 billion in July 2017, as stated by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (2018).  
          The majority of the population abides the eastern half of the state, for the west half 
is all about rugged mountains and deserts invalid for habitation; according to the Central 
Intelligence Agency (2018), that does not mean that there is no population in these western 
spaces, but they remain sparsely populated.  The positive thing is that in spite of this huge 
population, the density overall the country is less than that of many other in Asia and 
Europe, it is only found in definitive places such as the Xi Jiang River Delta, the Yangtze 
and Yellow River Valleys, the Sichuan Basin (around Chengdu), in and around Beijing and 
in the industrial area around Shenyang (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018) …  And this is 
a realistic indication of the good urban planning and organization of the Chinese 
government. 
          According to a recent study published by Bloomberg, “China’s people, the sheer 
number of highly motivated workers moving off the land and into the urban economy, have 
been the secret of its extraordinary success until now” (Champion & Leung, 2018).  The 
authors Marc Champion and Adrian Leung were precise in saying ‘until now’ because in 
their opinion the former policy of “one-child per couple” will cause a decline in that 
“source of growth” (Champion & Leung, 2018), quoting the United Nations (2017) 
prospects which stated that “China’s 1.4 billion population is likely to decline sharply, 
beginning as soon as 2023”.  
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          Champion and Leung stated that the decline and aging of the Chinese population 
constitutes the biggest risk to the country’s ambition in being the world’s greatest power 
and shaping the 21st century through its outsized influence (Champion & Leung, 2018) …  
For instance, the shrinking of the working age population against the aging one would lead 
to public finance imbalances in terms of tax revenues and pension funds (McCann, 2017).  
Regardless of our acceptance or rejection of this analysis, it indirectly does indicate how 
important is the Chinese population, and how far can the Chinese people contribute in the 
growth and success of their country.  
          Moreover, from another point of view and another article published by Brookings 
Institution in 2010, the author Feng Wang pointed out that the decline of Chinese 
population (1.33 billion then) will cause a problem to the upcoming economic statecraft 
putting it under tensions of droppings in mortality and fertility levels “not very different 
from that of the developed countries (…) the United States, Britain and France” (Wang, 
2010) ...  
          If we objectively re-read what Wang mentioned in that comparison, two questions 
will arise: Do the mortality and fertility “low” levels negatively influence the developed 
countries (the United States, Britain and France)? And if that policy of “one-child per 
couple” – announced 40 years ago - is actually having a negative impact on the growth of 
China and is affecting it badly, then why have not the policy makers in Beijing taken the 
decision to amend it until now? 
          We should confess that, from the Chinese point of view, this state policy has had 
positive impacts over the general situation in the country and most specifically over the 
economic one, through reducing the burdens and loads that could result from unlimited 
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population density which would be the real demographic crisis if the Chinese pragmatic 
thinking was not on the lookout for it; for rapid population growth can be a main constraint 
to the Chinese development aiming recently to be the most powerful state ruling the world, 
and by this limiting policy Beijing devotes itself for realizing its main goal. 
          We cannot move to the next point without discussing the unique Chinese personality 
known by “Zhon Guo Ren” () – Which mean Chinese person – that is recently 
causing “fevers” to learn it around the world, in addition to the Chinese language taught by 
the so-called “Confucius Institutes” across the world (Hung & Herman, 2013) ... 
          Napoleon Bonaparte had some famous statements about China and the Chinese 
people; he historically referred to them as “a sleeping dragon” (Yutang, 2012), and said 
“let China sleep… for when she wakes she will shake the world” (Fish, 2016)!  And then, 
since the market reforms were introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 – after the death of 
Mao Zedong – China witnessed three decades of double-digit economic growth, which 
increased its influence on international relations (Duchâtel, 2017) …  And in early January 
2006, when global markets started to fall “in part because of renewed worries about China’s 
economic slowdown (…) China shakes the world. And so on” (Fish, 2016), until our days, 
through its economic “war” with the United States, China is still shaking the world. 
          Hence, China’s culture has graduated – and is still – Chinese leaders… The Chinese 
people manifest today certain common characteristics (mental and spiritual) that might be 
the results of their historical environment which is in one of its parts economic, and in the 
other cultural (Yutang, 2012).  What interests us now is the cultural part, and if we had to 
enumerate some main qualities – good and bad – of the Chinese people, we should say: 1- 
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Dexterity; 2- fecundity; 3- indifference; 4- industrial skills; 5- intolerance; 6- love of life, 
family and nature; 7- old roguishness; 8- patience; 9- sobriety (Yutang, 2012) …  
          Herein, the Chinese government knows very well how to motivate its people, how 
to benefit from its qualities and how to improve them and employ them for its own interests, 
especially the geoeconomical ones.  
           
C- Economic Health and Financial Stability  
 
          And here we come to the main Chinese powerful asset, the Economic Health and 
Financial Stability… Since ever, Beijing attempts to pursue active efforts in order to protect 
its economic status in its growth and to always be stable financially. In fact, and as per the 
Global Fire Power (2018), while China has 3,194,000,000,000 $ as reserves of foreign 
exchange and gold in 2018, the United States has 117,300,000,000 $ in the same year... 
And while China has 1,649,000,000,000 $ as external debt in 2018, the United States has 
17,910,000,000,000 $ in the same year (Global Fire Power, 2018). These numbers justify 
the fact the China’s economy is threatening the global sovereignty of the United States, 
and help us in understanding why the American president Donald Trump is imposing trade 
taxes on the Chinese government as a prelude to a “cold” trade war…  
          The Secretary of State - the former director of Trump’s CIA also - Mike Pompeo, in 
his interview with fox news on September 23rd 2018, stated that “the trade war by China 
against the United States has been going on for years”, and that the difference with Trump’s 
administration is that “to the extent, one wants to call this trade war, we are determined to 
win it” (Re, 2018).  What matters for us in this statement is not who will win the war, but 
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more specifically what they are willing to do to win it, especially that it “has been going 
on for years” and that it is done “by China against the United States” as Pompeo said.  
          In another interview on fox news (on September 20th 2018), Pompeo stated that: A 
highly centralized and non-transparent Chinese government which is aggressive in its 
military posture with its economic strength and treats are intellectual property and religious 
minorities horribly, poses a far greater threat to US than Russia (Sharma, 2018).  
          What concerns us now is China’s economic strength, so the following discussion 
will turn around the economic perspective and factors employed by China in its global 
strategies elaborating its geoeconomic potential.  
          In a study published by the WEF (World Economic Forum) on January 2016, the 
executive Dean of Fudan University Wu Xinbo had his own analysis about China’s 
geoeconomic power, and considers that its power particularly lies in five areas: 
 
I- Trade:  Since the Chinese economy has witnessed openness in the 1970s, China 
has had a growing influence on the international trade (Wall, 1996). Globally, 
China is the first global trader, it is actually the largest trading partner to over 130 
countries. The Chinese government led trade with regional economies which 
constitute a major part of the global production chain, and drove up their economic 
growth (Xinbo, 2016).  In fact, 50% of Asia’s economic growth is a result of the 
Chinese contribution in it, being the most substantial motive for that region. The 
Chinese economy has become, as per Xinbo (2016), the “significant barometer for 
the Asian economy”. 
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II- Investment: The second area of Chinese economic strength is that of investment, 
for China has become – since 2008’s financial crisis – an active provider of FDI 
(Foreign Direct Investment). Knowing that ‘Foreign Direct Investment’ “is an 
investment made by a firm or individual in one country into business interests 
located in another country. Generally, FDI takes place when an investor establishes 
foreign business operations or acquires foreign business assets, including 
establishing ownership or controlling interest in a foreign company.  Foreign direct 
investments are distinguished from portfolio investments in which an investor 
merely purchases equities of foreign-based companies” (Chen, 2020) ...  China 
today has become one of the major outward investors in the world (Sauvant & 
Nolan, 2015).  From 2012 to 2014, China has become the world third largest 
investor behind the US and Japan (Xinbo, 2016).  And according to the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2018), it is also becoming a major 
source of inward FDI in transition economies – as per the World Investment Report 
/ 2018 – and its FDI stock in the region has increased from $8 billion in 2011 to 
$23 billion in 2016, which turned it out to be the fourth largest source country in 
the world.  From 2012 to 2016, the outward FDI from China has increased from 
$88 billion to $196 billion, but has declined by approximately 36% in 2017 to $125 
billion as a result to the “policies to clamp down on outward FDI, in reaction to 
significant capital outflows during 2015-2016” (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, 2018, p.65).  
But that has not changed the fact that China ranked the first in the top 10 investor 
economies by FDI stock in 2016 with $893 billion in comparison with the United 
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States which had invested in $595 billion in the same year as it appears in the 
following figure (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2018). 
 
                Figure 7: Top 10 Investor Economies by FDI Stock, 2011 and 2016 (Billions of Dollars)  
 




All that confirms the fact that China is the most powerful country in investments, 
and that it does not miss a chance to take opportunities – and maybe create them - 
for its own economic growth; for its “growing overseas investment contributes to 
its geoeconomic power” (Xinbo, 2016, p.6).  
 
III-  One Belt, One Road Initiative: The Silk Road Economic Belt, the 21st Maritime 
Silk Road is a project developed by Beijing under the concept of the “One Belt, 
One Road Initiative”.  “The “Belt” refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt…while 
the “Road” refers to the 21st century Maritime Silk Road” (Dunford & Liu, 2019, 
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p.148). The first links China’s mainland to West Asia and the Middle East passing 
through Central Asia, and the second links China through the South China Sea to 
the South Pacific in one path and to Europe in the other (Ghouri, 2016). And as 
Xinbo (2016) stated, this initiative “aims at promoting China’s economic 
cooperation with countries in South-East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, West 
Asia, and Eastern Europe” (p.6), through drawing on Chinese large geographical 
connections with Eurasian States and wide capabilities and opportunities for 
economic growth that this region promises (Xinbo, 2016).  It is through these 
connections that China will reach to the western world (Ghouri, 2016).  Moreover, 
the Belt and Road Initiative seeks cultural interchange among the distant 
civilizations and foster global stability and progress (Dunford & Liu, 2019). 
Herein, this initiative presents a recent area where the Chinese economic power 
lies, for it is planned to facilitate trade and investments, to improve traffic 
connectivity and to ameliorate trade and monetary cooperation (Xinbo, 2016).   
Xinbo affirmed in his report that the Chinese “One Belt, One Road Initiative” will 
“not only expand China’s economic ties with related countries but also enhance 
China’s geoeconomic influence in Eurasia as it effectively transforms China into 
the hub of an extensive hub-and-spoke system” (Xinbo, 2016, p.6).  In other words, 
this initiative extends China’s shade over large areas of Eurasia and major parts of 
the world, especially in countries in which its involvement has been relatively 
decent (Ferdinand, 2016). 
The main cause behind the effective enhancement of China’s geoeconomic 
influence in the Eurasian region is that many Eurasian countries have expressed 
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their interests in Beijing contribution in their infrastructure development that will 
remove the major bottleneck to their economic growth  caused by their 
underdeveloped transport system (Xinbo, 2016).  The building of new 
infrastructure in such countries can enhance trade in the region, provide new market 
entries, and lead to better living conditions (Nurgozhayeva, 2020). Thus, the Belt 
and Road Initiative does not only benefit China on the level of global economic 
influence, but also promote the economic performance of the countries that are 
mainly connected or part of this initiative (Brakman et al., 2019).  Furthermore, this 
rail connection is of great importance for the economic and environmental 
reliability it offers to these countries, in comparison with the maritime or air 
transport (Pomfret, 2019). 
 
            Figure 8: The OBOR Initiative 
 
 Source: Cai, 2017 
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The Silk Road Economic Belt represents an economic corridor between China and 
Pakistan, and between Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar; knowing that for 
instance, China is helping Pakistan and Kazakhstan to upgrade their railway 
facilities (Xinbo, 2016).  In addition to that, the investment agreements between 
China and Pakistan reveal a much profound economic consolidation between the 
two countries (Ghouri, 2016), knowing that the Sino-Pakistan relations have always 
been characterized by durability (Shaffer, 2018). Likewise, Kazakhstan has 
occupied a big portion of the Chinese investments due to the crucial role that 
Kazakhstan plays as China’s hub to the European continent (Nurgozhayeva, 2020).  
This is the reason why, according to Nurgozhayeva (2020), the Belt and Road 
project was unveiled by the Chinese president during his official call to Kazakhstan 
in 2013. 
The growing commitment to the BRI is stimulated by the ascending Chinese 
economic and political power in the 21st century, which many consider it will be 
the Chinese century (Brakman et al., 2019).  Therefore, it became clear that the BRI 
project is helping China to increase its geoeconomic influence in Eurasia, whereof 
it constitutes a major political and economic capability to the Chinese government, 
which positions China as “the leader of a new form of globalization” (Hillman, 
2018, p.7).  
 
IV-  Multilateral Financial Institutions: In order to provide fiscal support to recent 
development projects such as the OBOR Initiative and the Infrastructure 
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Maintenance in BRICS countries, Beijing has initiated the establishment of the 
AIIB: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Knoerich & Urdinez, 2019) and NDB 
BRICS-led New Development Bank (Stuenkel, 2016). 
In the AIIB, China holds over 30% of the shares and 26% of the voting rights; and 
in the NDB, it holds 41% of the shares – more than any other member (Xinbo, 
2016).  These percentages clearly reflect the great role of China as a rule maker and 
developer of operations in these two institutions (Xinbo, 2016), and as Wilson 
(2019) described it as the country’s evolution “from an institution-follower to 
institution-builder” (p.148).  In other words, China is no more interested in joining 
the current international order, and it is instead building its particular multilateral 
infrastructure (Stephen, 2020). 
People’s Republic of China’s memberships in these multilateral institutions 
constitute tremendous opportunities to wield its influence on regional and global 
finance, economy, development and politics… And exercising its influence within 
these institutions and over the region’s and world’s economy exponentially justifies 
its geoeconomic strength and potential; for China is strategically benefiting from 
its membership there to prove that it is in reality an economic powerhouse and a 
political entity to reckon with (Guttal, 2007). 
 
V-  The Internationalization of the Renminbi (RMB): After the global financial 
crisis of 2008, and exactly since 2009, Peoples’ Republic of China has been 
working on a policy to internationalize the Renminbi (RMB) in order to encourage 
and increase its use in international trade and investment, and to pave the way to its 
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inclusion in the reserve assets held by central banks in other countries (Xinbo, 
2016).  Jenkins and Zelenbaba (2012) point out the importance of this rational 
policy, for it is a necessity for the largest exporting country to have its currency 
exchanged in the international financial market, which enables countries to hold 
reserves and finance their imports in RMB. 
China’s policy has succeeded, for it concluded until 2016 as per Xinbo, 10 
agreements on direct exchange of RMB with other currencies (Xinbo, 2016), 
treaties on clearing banks in 15 countries (Xinbo, 2016), and 15 country-specific 
RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor Quotas (Xinbo, 2016).  This is in 
addition to the fact that since 2010, 37 central banks have entered the Chinese 
currency in their reserve portfolio (Liao & McDowell, 2016). 
The largest number of these policies and agreements have been done in China’s 
neighboring countries; and in addition to main official arrangements, the RMB is 
already widely used in China’s neighborhood from Vietnam to Myanmar, and 
Mongolia to North Korea, which is – as Xinbo (2016) Stated – RMB 
internationalization de facto.  And knowing that China’s ODI (Overseas Direct 
Investments) is exponentially increasing, this will definitely lead to a further 
expansion of RMB internationalization (Xinbo, 2016).  
In view of the rise of the Chinese economy, the Renminbi is expected to play a 
crucial role in the international monetary system (Eichengreen, 2011).  According 
to Chen (2018), the internationalization of the RMB will change the rules of the 
game in the world politics and economy. Economically, it will reduce the pressure 
on China from holding high USD reverses which leaves China susceptible to any 
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change in the American monetary policy (Chen, 2018). From a political point of 
view, it will nourish China’s economic consolidation which will fortify China’s 
economic and political power on the international scene (Chen, 2018).  Herein, it 
is absolutely obvious that this policy of internationalization of the official Chinese 
currency is a pure financial policy that positively affects the nation’s economy, and 
that it is mainly a major capacity that is improving China’s geoeconomic 
performance globally. 
          Therefore, the economic health and financial stability in China reflects a major asset 
that plays a tremendous role in deducing its geoeconomic statecraft regionally and globally. 
And as per the conclusion of Xinbo (2016): “Although China’s economic growth will 
gradually slow down, as compared with the past few years, its share of the global economy 
will continue to climb, as will its foreign trade and overseas investment. This will surely 
lead to the further expansion of its geoeconomic power in Asia-Pacific and beyond” (p.7). 
 
D- Diversity in Available Means (Aerial, Land, Maritime) 
 
          After discussing three main Chinese local assets related to geographical factors, human 
power, and economic and financial strength, it is time to discuss a different strength point that 
firmly distinguishes Peoples’ Republic of China: the diversity in available means (Aerial, Land, 
and Maritime). 
          As per the Global Fire Power (2018), and concerning the airpower of China, its total aircraft 
strength has increased to 3,035 by 2018, ranking the third internationally after USA (with 13,362 
of total aircraft strength), and Russia (with 3,914 of it) by the same year.  China is increasing its 
aircraft due to its valuable importance which is recently expanding on the global battlefield, 
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because according to the Global Fire Power (2018), “despite all other technological and doctrinal 
advances made on the modern battlefield, air superiority is still a major component in achieving 
total victory”. 
          On the other side, and concerning the land strength, its way of counting differs from that of 
the aerial craft: 
  
- The Combat Tanks value is: 7,716 (2nd in the world after Russia with 20,300; while, as per the 
Global Fire Power (2018) USA ranked 3rd with 5,884), knowing that “tank strength continues to 
be the primary symbol of power for any modern land army” (Global Fire Power, 2018). 
 
- The Armored Fighting Vehicles according to Global Fire Power (2018), value is: 9,000 (10th 
in the world; while USA has 38,822 ranking 1st and Russia has 27,400 ranking 2nd), knowing that 
“the armored fighting vehicles follows to help claim territory” (Global Fire Power, 2018). 
 
- The Self-Propelled Artillery Strength value is: 2,000 (3rd in the world after Russia with 5,970 
and North Korea with 2,250, as per Global Fire Power (2018)).  And “the Self-Propelled Gun is a 
critical mobile artillery component and regularly found in the inventories of land armies around 
the world” (Global Fire Power, 2018). 
 
- The Towed Artillery according to Global Fire Power (2018), value is: 6,246 (1st in the world; 
while Russia has 4,466 ranking 2nd and USA has 795 ranking 17th).  
 
- The Rocket Projectors value is: 2,050 (3rd in the world, after North Korea with 5,000 ranking 
1st and Russia with 3,816 ranking 2nd, while the United States has 1,197 ranking 6th), as per Global 
Fire Power (2018).  
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          And finally, concerning the maritime strength, China’s total naval means, as per the same 
report of Global Fire power (2018), has increased to 714 in 2018, ranking the 2nd in the world after 
North Korea with 967, while the United States has 415 as total naval assets ranking the 3rd in the 
world; and Russia has 352 ranking the 5th. 
          It is true that Geoeconomics is “the systematic use of economic instruments to accomplish 
geopolitical objectives” (Blackwill, 2016), and that these means/instruments are more military than 
economic; and military force is hard power, but we have to remember that it can also generate soft 
power (Nye, 2011).  When a country increases and expands its available military means, it does 
not only develop its military capability but it shows its strength and ability to compete with its 
rivals through its large defense budget and consumption; this is Soft Power that China manages 
masterly… 
          So a country that is economically powerful, such as China, can consume a large budget on 
its military means as a soft contribution in the attainment of its defined geopolitical targets, 
regionally and globally: this is geoeconomics.    
             
E-  Nuclear Power 
 
          In an article published by “Geopolitical Futures” on April 2017 about The Geopolitics of 
Nuclear Weapons, the authors George Friedman, Xander Snyder, and Cheyenne Ligon stated: 
“Nuclear bombs have a strange quality: They are a type of weapon that countries spend enormous 
sums of money to develop but don’t actually intend to use” (Friedman et al., 2017).  
          This kind of weapon fundamentally alters the relations between states due to the fact that 
they will be forced to think deeper about their rivals’ securities imperatives (Friedman et al., 2017). 
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But it is important to affirm that “no country has detonated a nuclear bomb since the end of the 
World War II” (Friedman et al., 2017). 
          The World Nuclear Industry Status Report of 2018 noted that the global nuclear power 
generation declined for the third year in a row, in contrast with China which has been consistently 
increasing its development, and ranks the first in the world “in terms of the scale of its nuclear-
power programs under construction and is also enthusiastically expanding its international 
collaborative programs through the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative” (Han & Zhou, 2018, p.11).  
          China occupies the third rank in the world in terms of nuclear power, after the United States 
and France (Andrews-Speed, 2020).  And as per the World Nuclear Association (2018), China has 
about 45 nuclear power reactors operating, about 15 under constructions, and more about to start 
getting constructed, and “the government's long-term target, as outlined in its Energy Development 
Strategy Action Plan 2014-2020, is for 58 GWe capacity by 2020, with 30 GWe more under 
construction” (World Nuclear Association, 2018). China’s nuclear power is expected to overpass 
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Figure 9: Nuclear Power Plants in China 
 
 
 Source: World Nuclear Association, 2018 
 
 
          Nuclear power has its own important role and efficacy that exists from the ability of nuclear 
weapons to “deter aggression, as the potential of massive devastation forces countries to rethink 
moves that threaten an adversary’s essential national security interests” (Friedman et al., 2017). 
          Peoples’ Republic of China is not only willing to increase its nuclear capacity, but it is also 
showing an unprecedented will to achieve the world’s best standards in nuclear safety (World 
Nuclear Association, 2018).  For instance, China has adopted safety standards to reassure its 
citizens and the international community about its responsibility in controlling nuclear security 
and safety, and has become a key participant in nuclear conventions and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (Andrews-Speed, 2020). After all, nuclear power contributes in expanding the 
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economic development of the nuclear state, and in the case of China, its nuclear assets both in 
reserve and under construction are assisting its government in attaining its geoeconomic goals 
locally, regionally and globally. 
 
F-  National Interests, and Relations with Eurasia 
 
          China’s national interests and its relations with many Eurasian countries are considered a 
fundamental asset by themselves helping China in building its geoeconomic kingdom… Why? A 
simple analysis of Blackwill and Harris definition of Geoeconomics will provide us with the 
answer; they stated that Geoeconomics is “the use of economic instruments to promote and defend 
national interests and to promote beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations’ 
economic actions on a country’s geopolitical goals” (Blackwill, 2016). 
          China’s governmental acts, politically and economically towards the country’s national 
interests in order to defend them, are the main causes behind its huge local and global success at 
the economic level… Beijing is ‘accumulating’ economic power since long time ago, and this 
accumulation is enabling it to exponentially pursue its long-deferred national security goals 
(Pollack, 2012).  This is how it benefits geopolitically from the application of its economic 
statecrafts, and this is simply Geoeconomics at its core. 
          In a study published in 2008 by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the author 
Albert Keidel stated that: “China’s likely continued success will eventually bring an end to 
America’s global economic preeminence, requiring strategic reassessment by all major economies, 
especially the United States, the European Union, Japan, and even China itself” (Keidel, 2008, 
p.1).  That was written since about 13 years ago, and is becoming clearer nowadays with the 
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American-Chinese geopolitical “trade war” under the banner of ‘a Geoeconomic New World 
Order’.  
          China’s institutions – including the political ones – are now mature more than these in the 
Maoist decade, in ways consistent with its level of economic development and welfare... We can 
say that China’s economic policies and strategies contributed in attaining this level of strength and 
stability in its governmental and political institutions as a main geopolitical goal; and this is also 
Geoeconomics at its core.  
          In the same study done by Albert Keidel, and under the title: “How Big is China Now? And 
How Big Could It Become?” Keidel mentioned the conservatives’ opinion: “China will overtake 
the United States as the largest economy in the world in thirty years’ time” (Keidel, 2008, p.5). 
And now, - before that thirty years’ time passes - with a simple visit to CIA World Factbook 
website, we can find that in 2018, China has become the largest economy in the world, ranking the 
first with a GDP of $ 23 trillion (Central Intelligency Agency, 2018) …  Furthermore, a report 
done by professional services firm PwC, says that China will have an economy of nearly $ 58.5 
trillion, while India’s will be around $44.1 trillion and America’s $ 34.1 trillion by 2050 (PwC, 
2017).  
          Achieving these numbers, does not only represent a strategic goal for the People’s Republic 
of China, but it will at the same time constitute a powerful economic instrument assisting it in 
protecting and investing in its national interests, and in attaining its geopolitical goals; in another 
word, it will establish the fact that China is individually developing a Geoeconomic New World 
Order, after the Geopolitical one. 
          Besides its direct defense of its national interests, China has had and is still having ambitions 
in rearranging its neighborhood, and to provide new ways in cooperating regionally; the New Silk 
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Road is one of those new ways (Kaczmarski, 2018).  This project has provided China with access 
to new foreign markets, and has also shown its willingness to present public goods and its readiness 
to share international responsibilities (Kaczmarski, 2018).  It is a flexible project with no strict 
geographical boundaries, because China is interested in the practical benefits of cooperating 
regionally, and is aiming to prevent its adversaries from establishing political and economic blocs 
in Eurasia. Here it could be affirmed that this BRI is harmonized with Russia’s goals and ambitions 
in Eurasia for increased economic connectivity… This integration for a “Greater Eurasia” will be 
discussed in the last chapter of this dissertation… 
          But for now, we can say that China has launched a new geoeconomic model with this project 
through its vast foreign reserves utilized to develop “strategic industries, transportation corridors 
and financial instruments such as international investments banks, trade regimes, and global 
transaction/payment systems” (Diesen, 2018), and to establish “the Yuan as a trade / reserve 
currency” (Diesen, 2018).  
          This is how China’s geoeconomics is consequently evolving and changing the regional and 
global distribution of power (Diesen, 2018), and that has incentivized Beijing to take the lead in 
developing high leveled strategies either in Eurasia or on the international scene… Briefly, China 
is making new steps and paving new paths through being a pioneer offering imperative assets in 
modern geoeconomics; it utilizes its own capabilities, invest in them, develop them and benefits 
from their geopolitical results and geoeconomic revenues.  
          Looking ahead, China will eventually benefit from its local assets and from other countries’ 
political experiences and economic failures, particularly Germany (Wolf, 2014) and the Soviet 
Union (Meisels, 2012), for raising and strengthening up its Geoeconomic potential. And recent 
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phenomenon such as the Sino-American tidal conflict, indicates that Beijing has a big chance of 
pursuing its “reforming” policies as an introductory to its global sovereignty.  
          But it should be noted that China’s political and economic statecrafts have also given it 
additional potentials to invest in foreign assets, turning them out to become Chinese capabilities 
beyond the Chinese geographical boundaries… The following section of this Chapter will clarify 
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Section 2: Foreign Assets 
 
          China has invested in many foreign assets - through using many technical, political, 
economic, and diplomatic policies - in order to ensure the success of its global geo-strategies that 
are under the process of implementation … These assets have been transformed into Chinese 
capabilities out of its geographical boundaries, and became exploited by its government to assist 
it in formulating its geoeconomic potential.  
          Chinese leaders consider these capacities of investing in foreign assets for China’s own 
benefit, as integral to its credibility as a major power, and to the protection of its national security 
interests (Pollack, 2012).  These assets had also increased China’s role in regional security, 
representing an authentic and continuing challenge to its adversary, the United States of America, 
which pushed it to review its geo-strategies and policies, and make necessary amendments and 
adjustments (Pollack, 2012). 
          Herein, the Chinese government got involved in many cooperative projects with its 
neighbors in Asia as first step, passed by Europe through its One Belt One Road project, and had 
arrived to the African continent recently… In other words, China is gradually expanding its 
influence and authority throughout the planet to obtain reliable focal points that can constitute the 
basis for its major geopolitical goals and geoeconomic objectives. 
          This section of the chapter will introduce the foreign assets China is investing in, in Taiwan 
and in India-Pakistan, and discuss how China is transforming them into mainstays to its 
Geoeconomic kingdom, despite of their presence outside of its geographical borders.    
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A- China’s Assets in Taiwan 
 
          In his article published in Foreign Affairs Magazine on 2010, Leslie Gelb noted that “Beijing 
has been playing the new geoeconomic game at a maestro level” (Gelb, 2010), it is staying out of 
wars and political confrontations and zeroing in on business, which helped it exceeding its 
influence even far more than its existing economic strength (Gelb, 2010). 
          And because of being “the world’s leading practitioner of geoeconomic”, we will display 
China’s foreign assets in South Asia, mainly in Taiwan, to understand them as a first step towards 
understanding their contribution in rising China’s geoeconomic potential. 
          Taiwan has been a flash point for Chinese communist leaders since their earliest days in 
power, as Blackwill and Harris (2017) noted in their book. 
          From Beijing’s perspective, Taiwan constitutes an “inalienable part of China” (Blackwill & 
Harris, 2017, p.95) and meanwhile, from its own side, Taiwan insists on being a self-governed 
entity (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  Herein China aims for reunification with Taiwan, and 
understood very well “how the threat of force is far more useful for defending the status quo, than 
it is for forging any progress toward reunification” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.93). 
          That is the main cause behind Beijing’s adoption of a “two-prong economic encirclement 
strategy” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.93) which picked off Taiwan’s allies through implementing 
many Chinese geoeconomic measures, and putting pressures directly on Taipei at the same time, 
in order to oblige it to cooperate.  
          While studying the nature of Taiwan’s geopolitics, Chinese leaders had understood two main 
facts: 1- In peacetime, Taiwan could restrict China’s ability to develop and project naval power 
and maritime security (Gilley, 2010); 2- In times of high tension, Taiwan could serve as a base for 
foreign military operations (Gilley, 2010). 
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          Therefore, Chinese leaders are hoping that adhering to the One-China principle will lead to 
a peaceful reunification of these nations (Blackwill & Harris, 2017) and to the emergence of “one 
country, two systems” across the Taiwan strait (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.95).  But Beijing will 
not realize its hope through the use of force despite of the presence of 1,600 missiles pointed at 
Taiwan which were used as threat of force in a fixture of cross-strait relations for decades 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017) …  However, this threat of force cannot explain Beijing’s progress in 
tilting regional and international opinions and perceptions about Taiwan issue in its favor recently 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
          Based on that, and supported by its threat of force, Beijing has put pressure on Taipei through 
geoeconomically using a full package of assets found in the Taiwanese zone to support its desire 
for reunification.  According to Lee and Yin (2017), the economic activities over the years have 
been rising at a growing rate between China and Taiwan.  This would make Taiwan more and 
more dependent on China (Lee & Yin, 2017), and perhaps could lead the former to support the 
reunification with China (Wong, 2019). 
          These instruments are used as practical application to Beijing’s geoeconomic strategy 
relying on economic encirclement and penetration to urge Taiwan and to increasingly push it 
towards eventual reunification (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  And this will be clarified in the next 
chapter of this part. 
 
          In a small analysis we can find that the assets of China in Taiwan have two main 
geoeconomic sides:  
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1- The first reflects the way China uses geoeconomics in its international relationships 
to advance a One-China policy on its terms; it is multilateral (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017) … 
2- The second is similar to the first, but seen in the way China uses geoeconomics in 
its direct dealings with Taiwan; it is bilateral (Blackwill & Harris, 2017) …  
 
          This clarifies that the case of Taiwan could be studied in a way that helps us understanding 
the reality of China’s assets in Taiwan, and the way it benefits from them in designing its geo-
strategy geoeconomically, but also in understanding the way it benefits from its foreign assets in 
achieving its international objectives, through investing and managing them – the assets – in its 
proper geoeconomic approach. 
          After Taiwan presenting here a good example on China’s foreign assets to be used as 
geoeconomic capabilities, the triangular relation between China, Pakistan and India, has raised up 
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B-  China’s Assets in the Triangular Relation: China-Pakistan-
India  
 
          In order to know China’s assets in Pakistan and India, one must understand the reality of 
their trilateral relation first. Furthermore, to understand China’s relations with Pakistan, one must 
understand the relationship of both of them with India on a first sight. 
          Pakistan was the first country to put an end to the official diplomatic relations with Taiwan 
in 1950 and started an enduring “all weather-friendship” with China (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, 
p.121), in spite of the contrasting cultures and political systems of both countries (Shaffer, 2018).  
But unlike Pakistan, India’s relation with China has witnessed many twists and shifts from 
friendship in the 1950s, passing by the confrontation that has increased with the border war of 
1962, to different forms of conflicts and cooperation in the 1990s, which are lasting until now 
(Wagner, 2012).  
          Despite the frequent ups and downs, the triangular relations between these three countries 
had evolved in major ways: Before the rise of India to the ranks of global powers, New Delhi was 
a land of leverage to each of China and Pakistan which have considered each other for a long time 
as “a strategic hedge against India” (Sengupta, 2010).  But after the evolution of India, New Delhi 
has also evolved from a simple hedge in the triangle into “a full and direct participant in its own 
right” (Afridi, 2010);  
          It can be plainly put here that there is an external force which stimulates the execution of all 
the dealings between the three countries of the strategic triangle, and that force is certainly the 
United States… 
          China’s geo-strategy in Pakistan derives from USA’s perspective and geo-strategy there, 
which considers Pakistan a persistent strategic zone of global combat, and is largely focusing on 
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the Pakistani affairs (Afridi, 2010).  In other words, Beijing aims to have a strong relationship with 
one of the major concerns and interests of the United States – Pakistan – so it can overshadow the 
American influence there (Afridi, 2010). 
           Even if the interests of the United States and China are mutual in Pakistan, one major fact 
remains the same: Pakistan needs China far more than China needs Pakistan (Afridi, 2010); and 
as long as Pakistan is a continuous “headache” to the United States, Beijing’s influence over 
Islamabad, will be indirectly reflected as a source of high influence for Beijing in comparison with 
the United States (Perlez, 2013).  
          China’s influence is drawn wisely in Pakistan, especially vis-à-vis the United States’ and 
India’s strategies there… Therefore, when China detects that Pakistan’s acts are incompatible with 
U.S and India’s interests, it shows up as a ready supplier of large strategic choices and options to 
Pakistan. 
          The case of the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 has sifted and garbled the American 
and Chinese attitude towards Pakistan:  While the United States has over and over postponed the 
submission of F-16s to Islamabad, and has prohibited using them against India; China has 
accelerated a transact to sell Pakistan fifty more precedent fighter jets (J-10) (Kabraji, 2012) …  
This is how China has benefited from the actual situation and used its skills and know-how 
techniques to increase its influence over Pakistan. And that was when the Pakistani military has 
authorized  China to access the American Stealth Helicopter that has been destroyed and was 
abandoned during the attack on the compound of Bin Laden in Abbottabad (Kabraji, 2012). 
          On the other side, the fact that the American-Indian relationship was a subject of 
development and steady transformation since 2001, has caused the reinforcement of China’s 
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interest in Pakistan as an indirect barricade or hedge against the United States (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017). 
          The United States had recently reinforced its relations with India: In the period between 
2008 and 2014, they have signed contracts for defense for over than $ 9 billion, in comparison 
with less than $ 500 million in the years prior to that period, as per the U.S Department of State 
(2014).  Washington has also decided in 2010 to formally back India’s bid for a permanent seat on 
the UN Security Council (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
          It is true to think that the U.S support for India to stand out as a democratic power could 
hide the consequences of China’s rise as a superpower, but the new complexities which had 
emerged to the trilateral relations between India, China and Pakistan due to the pre-mentioned 
U.S-Indian convergence, could not be overlooked (Tellis, 2014).  
          In 2013, specifically in May after the visit of Chinese premier Li Keqiang to India, Chinese 
apprehensions from the enduring strong relations between Washington and Islamabad had clearly 
manifested (Blackwill & Harris, 2017), and Li stated then that China would not like to know that 
India is becoming a “tool of other major countries, especially the U.S., to counterbalance, or check, 
or contain China” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.123), especially that China engages India in several 
forums such as the Shanghai Pact (or SCO), BRICS, and through bilateral conferences 
(Tourangbam, 2020).  And after that statement, India explained that New Delhi’s policy aims to 
maintain equal distance between countries and not to be closer to one than the other (Blackwill & 
Harris, 2017).  Following this, the relationship between China and India has improved (Bajpaee, 
2015), and both countries witnessed constant interchange of political and official calls (Panda & 
Baruah, 2019).  It is important to mention here that China’s main concern in improving its relations 
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with India is not primarily to break the close ties between the United States and India, but also 
because of India’s emergence as a rising power in the region (Gancheng, 2016). 
          Premier Li visited India in his first trip outside China after taking office, and that trip was 
itself a practical and concrete manifestation of China’s geoeconomic power (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017). 
          For concluding, it can be stated here that China’s choice of geoeconomic policies in its 
approach to Pakistan and India is obvious, especially that this region is strategic for Beijing 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017) …  
          This fact opens the door for a substantial question about China’s geo-strategy to rule the 
world… What are Beijing’s plans, tactics and strategies to control Eurasia at the first sight in 
preparation for the ultimate control of the world? In the upcoming chapter, we turn to exactly 
answering these questions.    
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Chapter 2: Chinese Geo-Strategy for International Primacy 
 
          In order to achieve a global domination all over the world, many geopolitical theories were 
developed to constitute a base for major powers’ geo-strategies; and as it has appeared in chapter 
one of the first part of this dissertation, Eurasia has always been the focal zone of all the main 
geopolitical theories designed by geopolitical experts: Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman, and 
Brzezinski, and aiming to form a theoretical commencement for superpowers aspiring for global 
domination.  
          And for China, Eurasia constitutes the strategic backyard, and its government has launched 
many initiatives to strengthen its country’s influence over it, mainly the Silk Road Economic Belt 
(SREB) of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Rolland, 2019).  For the BRI, launched in 2013 by 
the Chinese President Xi Jinping, comprises two essential sections: The SREB: Silk Road 
Economic Belt, and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century. The first road extends from China 
to Western Europe, and the maritime road prolongs from the Indian Ocean towards the 
Mediterranean Sea (Rolland, 2019) ...  Experts see the inclusive Belt and Road Initiative of China 
– recognized as “a cross-border infrastructure-development project” (Rolland, 2019, p.10) – in its 
reality as “a reflection of the Beijing political elite’s vision for a boarder, integrated Eurasian 
region helmed by China” (Rolland, 2019, p.10). 
 
          Through this BR Initiative, China has promoted five main factors: 1- Policy Coordination; 
2- Infrastructure Construction; 3- Unimpeded Trade; 4- Financial Integration; and 5- People-to-
People Exchange (Rolland, 2019).  These factors carried with them a fundamental Chinese geo-
strategy for a greater Eurasia mainly helmed by its government.  
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          This chapter will hold the mission of discovery and dissection of this Geo-strategy in 
Eurasia, in order to understand the intellectual and ideological Chinese policies, and the manner 
in which the government implement them in Eurasia as first territory and then in the whole world… 
          And since this chapter mainly discusses China’s geo-strategy, it is necessary to define the 
scientific meaning of a Geo-strategy in order to configure an inclusive and clear understanding of 
this new concept before diving into China’s version of it in its foreign policies…  
          Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his book “The Grand Chessboard – American Primacy and its 
Geo-strategic Imperatives”, has defined the concept of geo-strategy in stating that it is “The 
strategic management of geopolitical interests” (Brzezinski, 1997, p.XIV).  
          Herein, we understand that China’s strategic management of its geopolitical interests in 
Eurasia constitutes by itself its inclusive geo-strategy in the continent. Therefore, this chapter will 
be divided into three main sections; the first one will present China’s geopolitical interests in 
Eurasia, then discover its strategic management of these interests.  In a way, this will help us in 
concluding the global geo-strategy of China in Eurasia, and can pave the road to the second section 
where we will understand china’s geo-strategy mainly implemented to rule the whole world, 
through presenting Beijing’s geopolitical interests in the Inner and Outer Crescents and describing 
its strategic way of management of these interests in order to achieve its final geopolitical goal: 
Achieving the International Primacy.  As for the third section, it discusses separately through case 
studies, the Chinese geo-strategies in each of Taiwan and India-Pakistan. 
          But before diving into the depths of this chapter, it is necessary to mention that the local and 
foreign assets of China – as displayed in the previous chapter – meet with its geopolitical interests 
in a large framework, and configure together the whole image of its geo-strategy. But what 
differentiates between them, is that the geopolitical interests focus on the political power linked to 
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the geographical space, while the assets are the collected “instruments or tools”, that when wisely 
used, help the country to “extract” its geopolitical interests. In brief words, assets lead towards 
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Section 1: Chinese Geo-strategy in Eurasia 
 
          In 1904, Sir Halford Mackinder has theorized that “whichever nation ruled the ‘World-
Island’ of Africa, Asia and Europe would command the world” (Daly & Rojansky, 2018).  In 2004, 
the General Secretary of China’s Communist Party, Xi Jinping, declared himself – in Astana, 
Capital of Kazakhstan – “the prophet, and China the engine of Afro-Eurasian integration” (Daly 
& Rojansky, 2018).  This was when the real era of China’s global rise had begun. 
          In his same published article in 1904, Mackinder explained that Eurasia is the geostrategic 
fulcrum of world power and stated that China would expand its power well beyond its borders, in 
a way that would disturb the rest powers of the World, then mentioned that the Chinese foreign 
policies “might constitute the yellow peril to the World’s freedom just because they would add an 
oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian 
tenant of the pivot region” (Mackinder, 1904, p.473). 
          Anyway, Mackinder continued in developing his geopolitical theory and Spykman followed 
his steps and theorized that: “Who controls the Rimland, rules Eurasia; and who rules Eurasia, 
controls the destinies of the world” (Spykman, 1944, p.43) ...  
          We can understand here that whoever aims to control and rule the destinies of the whole 
world should first control and rule the destinies of Eurasia… China is working hard on proving 
that it is one of the most important competitors in this international World game… In its daily 
challenge it is essentially working on special methods and geo-strategies that should lead it to the 
Euro-Asian throne, as a pre-step to the global throne. 
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          This fact implicates that China possesses many geopolitical interests in Eurasia, and that its 
government is strategically managing them in order to finally achieve their fundamental goal of 
controlling Eurasia. 
          Hither, in the following parts of this section, we will first define China’s geopolitical 
interests in Eurasia, then show up its strategic management of these interests, which will help us 
in concluding the whole geo-strategy that Beijing implements in order to achieve the final control 

















UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





A- Geopolitical Interests of China in Eurasia 
 
          “Eurasia is home to the most of the world’s politically assertive and dynamic states. All the 
historical pretenders to global power originated in Eurasia. (…) Eurasia is the world’s axial 
supercontinent” (Brzezinski, 1997).  This is how Zbigniew Brzezinski described Eurasia in his 
article published on the 1st of September 1997… He also added that “a power that dominated 
Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world’s three most economically 
productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia… A glance at the map also suggests that a 
country dominant in Eurasia would almost automatically control the Middle East and Africa” 
(Brzezinski, 1997). 
          Herein, it appears “normal” that powers race and compete to develop the most distinguished 
strategy to manage and increase their geopolitical interests on the lands of that “supercontinent”, 
in order to preserve their position and strengthen them; knowing that there is a prevailing 
geopolitical pluralism on the map of Eurasia, and Brzezinski himself has designed a strategy to the 
United States to take advantage of this pluralism for its own benefit… That strategy has been 
divided into three phases of time: 
• In the short term: U.S should consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing pluralism in 
Eurasia, to strengthen political maneuvering and diplomatic manipulation, in order to 
prevent the establishment of a hostile alliance that might challenge America’s interests 
(Brzezinski, 1997);  
• In the midterm, the previously mentioned tactics should – if applied – contribute in the 
emergence of partners strategically compatible with the United States’ perspective; 
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which might lead to the formulation of a cooperative system of security in the Eurasian 
continent (Brzezinski, 1997), that will protect America’s geopolitical interests there; 
• In the long term, what was previously applied in accordance with the presented steps 
“could become the global core of genuinely shared political responsibility” 
(Brzezinski, 1997). 
          It appears clearly here, that the United States’ perspective – as per Brzezinski – aims to keep 
the existence of the pluralism, and manipulate it in its own way, in order to protect its geopolitical 
interests there, and prevent its competitors from achieving their own goals… 
          But China in its turn has its own interests to protect, to invest in, and to increase; and 
therefore, it has not accepted what has been proposed, and has neither acquiesced nor bowed… In 
contrary, it has implemented and still, its own way of managing its geopolitical interests, which 
are many in Eurasia, and which will be exposed in details in the following. 
          In one of his articles, Philippe Bonnet, has stated that: “From my perspective, Eurasia is 
becoming something more than a geography thing. From my perspective, Eurasia is becoming a 
full economic reality, because China is progressively making it count when the West is lagging” 
(Bonnet, 2018). That means that China played a tremendous role in increasing the geopolitical and 
geoeconomic importance of Eurasia; we will understand the “why?” and the “how” in the next 
handling. 
1) The Vacuum of Influence: As presented above, there is no focal influencer on Eurasia, 
but it is the pluralism that governs it.  The West’s failing bids to settle down the region 
after the Cold War, in addition to the Soviet collapse, have led to the Eurasian downfall 
(Tsygankov, 2012).  This by itself presents a major geopolitical interest for China… for 
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who could fill that vacuum of influence other than itself? You might think that Russia or 
India, or even Japan could do the job, but it is in fact impossible. 
• Russia is a “complex patchwork between an energy superpower and a modern dictature 
with dodgy satellite friends” as Bonnet (2018) said. So it constitutes a very complicated 
mixture, and in addition it is still not a prime industrial partner in the region, therefore 
it is not certain that it could influence that supercontinent of Eurasia, or dominate the 
throne of its leadership (Bonnet, 2018). 
• As for India, known as the giant manpower, it is true that it has a “huge market 
potential” (Bonnet, 2018), but it has never shown a will for being a regional leader, and 
neither has the ability to become one, despite its demographic potential of 1.8 billion 
people in 2030, as per the expectations (Bonnet, 2018).  Furthermore, unlike China, the 
Indian economy is controlled by the private sector and therefore the government cannot 
force trade towards states or projects to achieve political goals (Lee & Gill, 2015).  
Nevertheless, geographically speaking, India does not share borders with any of the 
five Central Asian countries, and in fact is segregated from them by Afghanistan, the 
unsettled neighbor, and Pakistan the enemy one (Lee & Gill, 2015).  This obviously 
constitutes a big challenge for India to connect itself to Eurasia, a hurdle that China 
does not face. 
• Concerning Japan, the recent senior trade partner for Europeans and the state of 
significant economy since the 1980s, if it does not work on building an alliance with 
China and following its steps, then it will not succeed in its regional ambitions (Bonnet, 
2018).  On the contrary, Japan has shown its “willingness to follow in the ideological 
and geopolitical footsteps of the U.S” (Paramonov & Puzanova, 2018, p.141).  
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Moreover, and in accordance with what was pre-mentioned in the first part of this 
dissertation -  Tokyo has failed since that period, in transforming its emerging 
economic potential and force into a comprehensive political power, as Baru (2012) 
stated in his article Geoeconomics and Strategy.   
• As for powers and actors other than states, the organizations of APEC and ASEAN, are 
truly working on improving economic development in the region of Asia, but they also 
have no ambitions for becoming leaders there (Bonnet, 2018). 
          Thus, China will ‘fill the blank’ of influence in that region, which will make it (the region) 
bipolar: China on a side and Europe on the other (Bonnet, 2018) ...  This conclusion has led to a 
new geopolitical interest aiming to strengthen the connections between these two sides of the 
region! 
 
2) The Map of the One Belt One Road Initiative: Under this initiative – plainly explained 
and discussed in the previous sections of this dissertation - China was seeking “to build a 
network of infrastructure projects across Eurasia to encourage trade” (Chang, 2016).  In 
other words, China sought to profit from the geographical, economic and political 
conditions, to occupy the Eurasian zone, and build connections between them and Europe 
under the pretext of trade… We do not deny that China seeks to strengthen its economic 
ties with Europe, but the main interest China is willing to protect and invest in through this 
initiative, is that of the real “Road Map” extending between these two sides.  This is 
because the domination of this extent will lead in its turn to the command of the Eurasian 
continent… 
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In one of his articles, Moritz Pieper, - a lecturer in International Relations at the University 
of Salford – said that “an increasingly powerful China is playing its own long game with 
an eye on creating a new Eurasian order” (Pieper, 2018), controlled by its governmental 
interests and benefits… China looks able to manage that new geopolitical shift in its own 
way, and contain any other business interests or growing economic power emerging into 
the Eurasian lands, for it has protected the extremities of the continent through the OBOR 
Initiative, and the trade and economic ties “under construction” between Europe and its 
government… Briefly, China sees in the geographical space extending from its lands and 
seas to the European lands and seas, a major geopolitical interest, which if invested wisely 
and rationally, could lead to the creation of many other interests and to the increase of its 
current economic and political power, because of these two “crescents” it created around 
that Eurasian continent from the South to the West. (See Figure 10) 
 
      Figure 10: China’s Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 
 
 Source: Chang, 2016 
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3) Natural Resources: The primary obsession of the Chinese leadership is the constant and 
dependable access to energy and natural resources to satisfy China’s growing demand 
(Blank, 2006). As China aims to pursue its impressive economic leverage, its decision 
makers feature more prominently on their policies agenda, the necessity of the access to 
natural resources and raw materials (Cohen, 2003).  They try to ensure the capability of 
China to face any main deficiency in resources, through focusing on Eurasia as “a source 
of major energy resources, water, and food” (Cohen, 2003).  
The Chinese government has classified oil, water and grain, as “strategic commodities with 
maximum influence on economic development” (Cohen, 2003).  Although Beijing is the 
fifth largest oil producer in the world, its demand surpasses its economic production, and 
as per the expectations, and knowing that China’s oil demand is growing 5.8% a year, while 
its production is growing 1.7% a year; by 2020 it “will not be able to supply itself with oil, 
iron, steel, aluminum and other minerals” (Cohen, 2003).  
Herein, Beijing started cooperating with its Eurasian neighbors in order to prevent its 
government from any expected insufficiency in oil, gas or raw materials, since their region 
is rich in these resources. 
Chinese imports of these resources come from Russia (the third of its imports), Central 
Asia and the Caspian Sea, Middle East, Indonesia, Vietnam, and South – China Sea 
(Cohen, 2003): 
• The high importance of the Sino-Russian economic partnership is already known to the 
international scene of economic relations: China take a pride from its neighboring with 
Siberia which contains “the large oil fields in Kovykta in the Irkutsk oblast; natural gas 
fields in Yakutia (Sakha); and coal basins and millions of acres of pristine forests” 
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(Cohen, 2003).  In addition to that, the fastest growing Russian oil company, YUKOS, 
has agreed on plans to build a pipeline for gas extending to Daiqin, in North-Eastern 
China (Cohen, 2003). 
 
      Figure 11: Oil and Gas Pipelines between China and Russia (2014) 
 
 Source: Chang, 2016 
 
• The good economic ties with Russia had also helped China in consolidating its relations 
with Central Asian countries, to ensure its access to their raw material resources from 
one side, and to prepare the land and the people there to receive Chinese influence, 
especially that it lacks strong political power always capable of controlling its hold 
(with the exception of Kazakhstan) (Coulombe, 2012).  Knowing that Central Asia is a 
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region possessing subsoil rich in oil, natural gas, and minerals, which China is 
increasingly seeking to appropriate for the sake of its energy security (Coulombe, 
2012). 
As for Kazakhstan, China has already acquired developments rights for two oil fields in 
the Kazakh lands, through the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) (Cohen, 2003); 
and was studying in 2004, a project of 3000 km gas pipeline from Turkmenistan (Cohen, 
2003); which became in 2018, according to Wood Mackenzie (2018), one of the largest 
pipeline projects in the world, consisted of three lines (A, B, and C) delivering gas from 
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border to China. 
Through connecting these pipelines, and those of Russian and Iran, China is looking to 
create the “Pan Asian Global Energy Bridge” (Cohen, 2003), a web of energy pipelines 
connecting oil suppliers in the Arab Gulf, Central Asia and Russia all the way to the 
Chinese Pacific Coast (Sliwa, 2010). 
China and Russia are two superpowers, aiming to cooperate in establishing a “network of 
railroads and pipelines in Central Asia, building a Pan-Asian transportation corridor (the 
Silk Road) from the Far East to Europe and the Middle East” (Cohen, 2003). 
By these projects and policies, China can ensure its energy security, its consolidated 
relations with its neighbors, and most importantly, its implicit existence along the entire 
territories of the region…  
So, the geopolitical interest in Eurasian Natural Resources, when invested and developed 
by China, has under its pretext, paved a main road to its main goal: Imposing Chinese 
Influence on Eurasia’s Supercontinent. 
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4) Safe and Secure Borders: Since their independence from the former Soviet Union, the 
Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan), have suffered from the legacy of a thirty years old problem at the time; the 
problem of regional and border disputes, which had put China in the face of the Soviet 
Union for so long (Kellner, 2008).   
In 1991, Moscow and Beijing reached a common agreement to resolve the dispute in the 
Eastern sector of the border, but the one in the Western sector, linked to the Central Asian 
lands due to their geographical proximity, was not resolved at that time. This was what led 
to several problems that have undermined the integral relations of China and Xinjiang – a 
province in the far west of China, on the borders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
known for its separatist tendencies – because of that inheritance (Kellner, 2008).    
That crisis has lasted for a long time, and has known no significant developments in terms 
of finding solutions from both of the conflicting parties’ sides, in spite of the Chinese 
authorities’ considerations (agreed by the Central Asian Republics) that resolving this 
dispute will contribute in mooring transparency on the border problem’s issue, as well as 
in establishing peace and stability in the region (Xing, 1998).  
Thus, China has found itself facing a border negotiations’ problem, with a nascent political 
entity on the international scene… And after vigorous efforts and dozens of negotiations’ 
rounds, China and the Republic of Kazakhstan have reached in the 10th of May 2002, the 
final agreement on resolving the crisis and demarcating the border (Kellner, 2008).  
The Kyrgyz Republic was the second country to sign an agreement with the People’s 
Republic of China to re-delineate the border, after undertaking the same stages of 
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negotiations between China and Kazakhstan, but for a longer period; they signed the final 
protocol of the agreement in June 2003 (Kellner, 2008).  
Finally, for the Republic of Tajikistan and after several political and security obstacles, a 
final agreement was signed and the process of borders’ re-demarcation has started in 2006 
(Kellner, 2008). 
What we are aiming to clarify from all this, is that China in the Central Asian region, 
especially in the Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on its borders, has 
a high geopolitical interest in safeguarding its national security from any violation.  This is 
because the Chinese province of Xinjiang located in western China, on the borders of these 
three republics, is a constant spot of instability for China throughout the History, is always 
condemned to secession, and constantly requires vigorous efforts from the Chinese 
government to maintain its “rationality”.  So China’s settlement of border disputes with its 
Central Asian neighbors was primarily to suppress and prevent Uighurs in Xinjiang 
province to access foreign support (Fravel, 2007), for the sake of achieving national 
security. 
Many analyses and studies have discussed Xinjiang fact; it is a “real colony” (Tesquet, 
2009) on the Chinese territory; even though its name means “the new frontier”, indicating 
the inevitability of its separatists’ tendencies.  It is a predominantly Muslim province which 
runs counter to the Chinese (Tesquet, 2009), and creates many violent clashes with them. 
Briefly, it is a main geopolitical interest for China to maintain good relations with the 
Central Asian countries, especially with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan - as they 
border Xinjiang’s region - in order to prevent any establishment of Central Asian blocs 
against China, in case of deteriorated relations with any of them.  This is in addition to 
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prohibiting any infiltration of antagonists into the Chinese lands that would destabilize and 
violate the national security… Nevertheless, Pakistan (the birthplace of the Taliban) and 
India border that province from the south-west and this could increase the possibility of 
stealth of terrorists, drug dealers and saboteurs to the Chinese territory.  
That forces China to continuously work on consolidating its relations with the Central 
Asian Republics, in order to protect its national security from any harm, for if violated and 
destabilized, all its future projects which are in process of implementation, will stop, and 
China will lose then all the geopolitical interests that it has tried to invest in and maintain, 
in the region.   
          At the end of this paragraph, we can conclude that China’s main geopolitical interests in the 
Eurasian Region are represented by the vacuum of influence, the roadmap of the OBOR, the 
natural resources of oil, gas and minerals, and finally the maintenance of safe and secure borders, 
to protect its national security from any term of violation or harassment.  This is without forgetting 
the presence of special interests in its relations with Taiwan from a side, and Pakistan and India 
from another.  But how China manages and will manage these interests strategically, the answer 
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B-  Strategic Management of China’s Geopolitical Interests in 
Eurasia 
 
          “Any economic dysfunction has political implications” (Friedman, 2016).  This fact has 
been leading China’s strategic management of its geopolitical interests in its domestic and foreign 
policies; but before diving into that mechanism, one must first realize that China’s relations with 
the majority of the countries of this region are essentially multidimensional and relatively complex 
since nothing there matters to China more than its geopolitical interests represented by:  
 
1) The Eurasian Vacuum of Influence: 
Knowing that with the presence of Russia, Japan, Korea and India, the pluralism governs 
the Eurasian region, but there is no focal influencer over it. This fact by itself has exposed 
China in front of a new major geopolitical interest. Filling the blank caused by the vacuum 
of influence in Eurasia is relatively the first geopolitical interest which we are waiting to 
see how China has been managing strategically. 
 
2) The Roadmap of the OBOR: 
After filling the vacuum of influence, a new geopolitical interest appears in the 
geographical space extending from the Chinese lands and seas to the European lands and 
seas, which could give birth to many other interests if invested wisely and rationally, and 
could also increase the Chinese current economic and political power, because of the 
roadmap it created around that Eurasian continent from the South to the West. 
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3) The Natural Resources of Oil, Gas, and Minerals:  
The lack of developed investments in the sectors of renewable energies and natural 
resources existing in the region, fundamentally due in most of the cases to the authorities’ 
weak strategies of control in terms of public facilities, and more specifically in terms of 
oil, gas, and mineral reserves, constitute a major geopolitical interest ensuring and 
guaranteeing the energy security of China. 
 
4) The Maintenance of Safe and Secure Borders:  
China has transformed the security threats against the weak zones of the Eurasian Region 
into a geopolitical interest that invokes its intervention under the pretext of combating these 
threats. This kind of intervention assists China in achieving its geopolitical influence over 
the region, and helps it in ensuring that its geopolitical interests are protected from potential 
danger and threats.  
 
          But we cannot neglect the fact that China has special assets in Taiwan and Pakistan and 
India – as described in the first chapter of this part – and that these assets are being transformed 
into geopolitical interests, holding a major attention of China’s policy makers, and turning them 
into a specific geo-strategy for these specific zone of Eurasia.  This will be discussed in the part of 
China’s Strategic Management of its Geopolitical Interests in Asia.   
 
          Furthermore, and as per Georges Friedman, China has three main strategic imperatives 
(Friedman, 2016), aiming at safeguarding and investing in its geopolitical interests. Two of these 
imperatives are internal and the third is external and “unattainable in any meaningful time frame” 
(Friedman, 2016): First it must maintain its control over the province of Xinjiang and over the 
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Tibet (Friedman, 2016); second it must preserve its own regime and apply actions of repressions 
in order to prevent regionalism (Friedman, 2016); and third it must implement a definitive strategy 
in order to literally realize its main goal: becoming an international superpower. 
          Recently, according to Jacques (2019), we have witnessed huge transformations’ projects in 
the infrastructure of approximately all the regions of the planet in a sudden and simultaneous way: 
1)  A new deepwater port, as per Jacques (2019), is being linked to a large road and rail 
network of 2,000 miles in Pakistan;  
2) Jacques (2019) said that, in Montenegro, the first border-to-border motorway of the country 
is being laid through the roughest terrain of the nation;  
3) As for the remote Kazakhstan, around a newly constructed massive rail terminal, a bustling 
town is springing up (Jacques, 2019);  
4) A new-built bridge in Laos has recently broken the world record of the longest span 
between two piers (Jacques, 2019); 
5) The landlocked country of Rwanda is being connected to the port of Dar El Salam in 
Tanzania through a new railway (Jacques, 2019); 
6) Railways systems are being fund in Kenya, Ethiopia, Angola, Djibouti, and Nigeria (Tubei, 
2018);  
According to Jacques (2019), the common factor between all these projects (and many other more) 
is that they constitute parts of a global geoeconomic initiative done by one nation: China. 
          To achieve all that and to “carve out a vast swath of economic influence”  (Seidel, 2019) in 
the entire Eurasian region, China’s government has been developing a geo-strategic plan … 
Therefore, in these terms and context, the following will show up that plan in separated texts 
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starting with the one implemented in Europe, and passing by the Asian one, in a manner that could 
help us conclude the nomination of that great Chinese geoeconomic project. 
 
1-  China’s Strategic Management of its Geopolitical Interests in Europe 
 
Europe is constituted of three distinct zones as per Chinese investors: The West, the South, 
and the East; this portioning is based on variances in economic wealth, technological 
advancement, geographic location and institutional framework (Zeneli, 2019).  And in a 
related context, China’s interests in Europe are various: New technologies access, high-tech 
assets, knowledge, and most importantly commercial access to the markets, and entrance to 
third markets – such as the United States – through European corporate networks (Zeneli, 
2019). 
Herein, China has been increasing its footprint in the European investment in the last decade: 
“the Chinese FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) in the EU has increased by almost 50 times in 
only eight years from less than $ 840 million in 2008 to a record high of $ 42 billion (35 billion 
euro) in 2016, according to Rhodium Group statistics” (Zeneli, 2019). 
Chinese strategists realized then that strategic steps are essential milestones in the path of 
becoming a “critical player” (Zeneli, 2019) across Europe economically; and through reaching 
that goal, China could reinforce its inclusive influence all over Europe.  
And if we return back to the Chinese strategic portioning of Europe into three main zones, we 
can easily affirm that Beijing has a diversified strategy for its investments there starting by 
focusing on “capital investments in the core EU countries” (Zeneli, 2019) and “complemented 
by large infrastructure development projects on its periphery” (Zeneli, 2019) … What matters 
for us in this part, is China’s strategy in Southern and Eastern Europe, knowing that its strategy 
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in Western Europe will be discussed in the forthcoming section, for, according to Zeneli 
(2019), China targets in that region the strategic assets and research and development networks 
in the wealthiest countries that are the main cause behind attracting those capital inflows from 
Beijing. This diversified strategy will be dissected below:  
 
• In Southern Europe, China has strategically mastered how to benefit from the economic 
crises and its prerequisites through making its companies focus on “large-scale 
privatization process and post-crisis restructuring”, as per Zeneli (2019).  Greece, Portugal 
and Italy can present a good example on what was pre-mentioned above;  
For in Greece, the COSCO holding company (a giant Chinese state-owned enterprise), has 
earned 67% stake in the port of Piraeus known as the largest passenger port in Europe 
(Zeneli, 2019).  Herein, this port has been considered “China’s gateway into Europe”, 
because, as Zeneli (2019) said, it has done a paradigm shift and has largely shortened the 
shipping times for Chinese merchandises and commodities by only one week.  Through its 
involvement in European ports, China’s perception in Europe has changed from a merely 
trade partner to a political influencer (Van der Putten, 2019). 
As for Portugal which has become the main receiver of China’s investments especially in 
energy markets (Pareja-Alcarez, 2016), and in terms of the per capita inflows to Europe, 
Beijing has taken part in the aftermath of 2010th financial crisis and invested with nearly 9 
billion Euros in many assets such as “electricity, transportation, oil, financial services, 
insurance, health and real estate” (Zeneli, 2019).  
And finally concerning Italy, where around 10% of China’s investment in the European 
stock market is being implemented; Chinese FDI there has approached 5 billion Euros in 
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2014, and when China gained over Pirelli (a multinational company based in Milan) 
through its state-owned enterprise ChemChina, Italy became the “top destination of 
Chinese FDI in Europe” (Zeneli, 2019). This acquisition permitted China to get access to 
“one of the most important car tires manufacturers globally, and an entry into the 
replacement market – a segment, until recently, dominated by the major European and 
Japanese brands” (Zeneli, 2019). 
 
• As for the Eastern and Central Europe, according to Stojanovic (2019) in his article China’s 
Spreading Influence in Eastern Europe Worries West, China has invested billions of dollars 
in different infrastructure projects.  It has implemented and led major infrastructure projects 
in the region such as the high-speed railway from the Hungarian capital, Budapest, to 
Belgrade in neighboring Serbia (Stojanovic, 2019).  This railway will connect with the 
Chinese-controlled port of Piraeus in Greece (Stojanovic, 2019), to benefit from it in the 
Chinese trade as an entry point for its goods to Central and Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, China is doing the “16+1 platform” in the Eastern, Southeastern and Central 
Europe, to combine together the largest number of European Union members and Non-
European Union members; in other words, Beijing works on increasing its influential scale 
in this region knowing that there “acquisition prices are lower, demand for preferential 
lending is high, human capital is cost-effective, and concessions for Chinese investors are 
simplified” (Zeneli, 2019).  These factors, in addition to the strategic location (above them 
all) transform the region into an ideal land of investments that attracts China’s strategists 
to develop plans aiming at attaining the main objectives of their Nation.  
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These objectives can be understood through remembering the transportation networks 
made available because of the execution of the One Belt One Road initiative, and through 
the sub-goals of investments and expansion of further capital within the European Union 
(Zeneli, 2019).  
“Building Roads” was the Chinese great strategy to manage its geopolitical interests! This 
reminds us of the statement done by the president of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (a Chinese-led institution with more than 80 member countries), Jin Liqun to the 
Financial Times Magazine: “The Chinese experience illustrates that infrastructure 
investment paves the way for broad-based economic social development, and poverty 
alleviation comes as a natural consequence of that” (Frankopan, 2018, p.94).  This is how 
China experienced how policy, infrastructure, and investment, can all together bring 
political and economic influence wherever they were implemented. This also reminds us 
of China’s vice minister of foreign affairs, Le Yucheng’s declaration to the Financial Times 
Magazine: “We Chinese often say that if you want to get rich, build roads first” (Frankopan, 
2018, p.95).  
He argued as well that the fundamental reason and the main cause of the weakness of some 
parts of the world is because of the “under-development of infrastructure” (Frankopan, 
2018, p.95). 
China’s strategy to manage its interests in Eastern Europe wafts from that point of view; 
that same article of Jamil Andrelini in the Financial Times effectively declared that the Belt 
and Road Initiative is designed to fix that under-development, flabbiness and slouch of 
many countries and their infrastructures (Andrelini, 2018).  
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Herein, the ties between Eastern Europe and China are getting stronger since 2013, the date 
when the official plan of building a westward economic corridor – the New Silk Road - has 
been developed (Chen & Mardeusz, 2015).  This initiative has led in 2014 to a list of 
agreements between China and many East European countries such as Hungary, Serbia, 
Macedonia, to execute rail lines projects designed to reduce internal train travel times, 
facilitate cross-border transports and tourism, and enlarge and accelerate the movement of 
commodities and goods between China and Eastern Europe (Chen & Mardeusz, 2015).  
 These projects of developments, especially the OBOR, represent “a new structure of 
interactions between the older European economies and a rising Chinese power” (Chen & 
Mardeusz, 2015).  
Many experts have declared that the New Silk Road has led to much transformation in the 
international politics and economics: “Economies traditionally based on resources 
extraction are transitioning to become transportation hubs, untouchable backwaters 
becoming regional centers of manufacturing, and previously irrelevant mid-tier cities 
becoming catalysts for high-tech innovation and consumerism” (Shepard, 2018).  We can 
admit therefore, that there is literally one main power behind all these transformations and 
it is the Peoples’ Republic of China; mentioning that those railways and infrastructure 
development projects in Eurasia constitute a big part of the story (Shepard, 2018).  
 
          This conclusion paves the road to the analysis of China’s strategic management of its 
geopolitical interests in Asia, which might lead to a clear understanding of its whole geo-strategy 
in Eurasia, and furthermore in the world… Thus, the upcoming paragraph will take the mission of 
dissecting China’s plan to invest in its interests in Asia.  
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2-  China’s Strategic Management of its Geopolitical Interests in Asia  
 
“China is now an economic powerhouse that all of the rest of Asia orients itself towards, and 
its policies on all matters are of crucial importance for the whole region” (Westad, 2012, p.9). 
But to attain that stage, China has experienced many strategies and policies, and has also 
passed many steps and milestones; thus what is distinguished in the Chinese path of evolution 
over the past 30 years, is its authentic “re-engagement with the rest of Asia” (Westad, 2012, 
p.8). 
The history of China in Asia was so negative in terms of its relations with the Asian 
countries… According to Westad (2012), three decades ago it was like diplomatically isolated 
from the whole continent, having close ties with North Korea only.  Beijing was even 
competing for position with Moscow in that period, and had territorial conflicts with all of its 
neighbors including North Korea (Westad, 2012)!  From its perspective it was like that the 
Asian continent represented the world, and that world expurgated it from its midst (Westad, 
2012).  “The central kingdom was no longer central; it was distinctly peripheral to the rest of 
the continent” (Westad, 2012, p.8). 
Studies and researches have affirmed that the reason of marginalization of China was mainly 
its policies contrary to its circumferences, and gradually its weak economic competition 
capabilities while other Asian economies were acquiring strong economic gains (Westad, 
2012).  
According to Worldometer (2019), if we compare these stories to what is happening 
nowadays, it would be very hard to believe that in the 1973 the Chinese GDP per capita was 
only about $ 800 with 881.9 million of population, while in 2019 it has become $ 16 800 with 
1.419 billion of population, and projected to trend around $19 700 in 2020.  By mentioning 
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the population, we aim to shed light on the fact that it equals the double population of the rest 
of East and Southeast Asia put together (Westad, 2012). 
That remarkable evolution happened because of policies China took to revitalize links with its 
neighbors, first those next-door and in a next step those in the Southern and Western regions 
of Asia (Westad, 2012). 
China became today the second largest economy in the world, but what matters more than this 
achievement are the policies it has developed and the strategies it has implemented to achieve 
it, and that is what we are aiming to know from this paragraph. 
In a study done by Robert Blackwill, in 2016 under the title of: China’s Strategy for Asia: 
Maximize Power, Replace America, it was stated that the recent strategic goal for China is 
nothing other than “the accumulation of comprehensive national power” (Blackwill, 2016). 
Chinese strategists are convinced that without amassing the power necessary to ward off, 
prevent and deter its “enemies” from acting on their own, China could never attain its destiny 
neither achieve its strategic goals (Blackwill, 2016).  This conviction is the main reason behind 
the will of extending and reinforcing power in all its dimensions: economic, technological, 
diplomatic, and even military (Blackwill, 2016). 
Blackwill also declared that China, that entity which is at the same time an ancient civilization 
and a modern polity, “grand strategic objectives are not simply about desirable rank orderings 
in international politics but rather about fundamental conceptions of order” (Blackwill, 2016).   
In other words, acquiring comprehensive national power could help China in increasing its 
internal control over its society, and in enhancing its capabilities in comparison with those of 
its rivals (Blackwill, 2016).  To do so, China has four strategic objectives, fixed since the 
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revolution, in which it invests its powers even if the tools used to achieve them had varied 
over time (Blackwill, 2016). 
According to Blackwill (2016), the four fixed strategic goals of China are:  
1) Maintenance of Internal Order 
2) Sustainability of Economic Growth 
3) Pacification of Extended Geographic Periphery 
4) Reinforcement of the International Status   
 
However, the Chinese comprehensive strategy in Asia should resolve “the larger tensions 
between its economic and geopolitical strategies” (Blackwill, 2016).  Herein, Xi Jinping’s 
foreign policy is known by its “willingness to use every instrument of statecraft, from 
military assets to geoeconomic intimidation, as well as explicit economic rewards” in 
order to “chase” the diverse geopolitical objectives of his country (Blackwill, 2016).  
Xi Jinping’s strategy, as per Blackwill’s approach has been known for its “bullying over 
territorial issues and selective beneficence on economic matters, with the looming 
application of geoeconomic coercion ever present” (Blackwill, 2016). 
This policy got reflected mostly in the Chinese relations with the Southeastern countries 
of Asia, which many of them are in territorial conflict with Beijing because of the 
competition over the South China Sea (Blackwill, 2016).  China then tried to benefit from 
these rivalries over the sea to gain influence within those countries through implementing 
investments and offering them trade packages (Blackwill, 2016).  Those geoeconomic 
actions, according to Blackwill (2016) were certainly coordinated centrally to protect and 
enhance China’s geopolitical interests in Southeastern Asia. 
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Thus, we will divide Asia into five main portions: South Asia, Central Asia, East Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and Western Asia in addition to Russia, to easily comprehend China’s strategy 
in all Asia:  
 
• In South Asia shaped like a peninsula and bordered by the Indian Ocean to the South, the 
Bay of Bengal to the East, and the Arabian Sea to the West (Pariona, 2018), China has been 
leading – since the 21st century – multi-dimensional cooperation with all the South Asian 
countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka (Khan, 2018).  And its relations with these countries have evolved to attain almost 
all fields: economic, communication, cultural exchange, energy, and even unprecedented 
security cooperation (Khan, 2018).  It is also important to mention that this region of Asia, 
covering a total area of 2 million square miles, is distinguished by being the most densely 
populated area in the world: 1.74 billion which is nearly the quarter of the global population 
(Pariona, 2018). 
By strengthening ties with the countries of this region, China can guarantee its access to 
the Indian Ocean and increase its presence in it, knowing that it “accounts for half the 
world’s seaborne container traffic and 70 % of the total traffic of the world’s petroleum” 
(Khan, 2018).  This ocean constitutes a large geoeconomic interest for China, for it actually 
is the most used path of transit to a high percentage of oil and commodities (Khan, 2018).  
Nevertheless, the size of the Indian Ocean as the third largest watercourse in the world and 
its geographical position realize its significance in the global political sphere (Hassan, 
2019).  Herein, China’s strategy concentrates on boosting its relations with South Asian 
countries as a part of the global policy aiming to extend its diplomatic and economic 
influence in Asia (Khan, 2018).  
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Moreover, China has been making efforts to acquire stronger influence over that ocean to 
guarantee its access to the natural resources vastly present there in case of any urgent 
interdiction that might occur due to the highest competition taking place through hostile 
states or any other opposite actor (Khan, 2018).  
In other words, China essentially strives in protecting the lines of communication in the 
Ocean from any kind of hostility because of the high dependence of its economy on its 
natural resources (Khan, 2018).  Furthermore, its desire to safeguard the ocean’s channels 
of shipping is also due to its rising national interests (Becker, 2020). 
Briefly, no one can deny that China has mastered its strategy in the South Asian countries, 
for it has managed to promote itself as impartial neighbor via its peaceful policies of non-
interfering in their internal affairs, and has most importantly offered them billions of dollars 
through loans with low conditions and chased each opportunity of infrastructural 
investment (Khan, 2018). 
Even India, that considers China’s strategy in South Asia as “a design of circumvent”, is 
also interested in expanding economic and commercial ties with China (Khan, 2018).  
Thus, they have signed 24 agreements and nearly $ 30 billion business deals (Khan, 2018). 
 
• As for Central Asia, politically divided into five countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan (Pariona, 2018), a specified strategy has been 
developed under the banner of “good neighboring” and challenging the United States 
strategic breakthrough which has had negative impacts on China’s hard achievements to 
improve and enhance its relations with the countries of Central Asia, especially after the 
events of the 11th of September 2001. That breakthrough has also affected its national 
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security because of the American promotion of the idea of democracy in the independent 
republics, which has worried Chinese decision-makers from losing their influence there…  
And to counter these worries, China sought then to work on improving its bilateral relations 
with each of the Central Asian countries apart, accompanied with strengthening the role of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Djalili & Kellner, 2006). And then, it has 
tried to exploit the cold relations between them and the U.S.A resulting from the “colored 
revolutions” wave that pervaded the region under the pretext of spreading democracy, in 
addition to the Iraqi war prerequisites (Djalili & Kellner, 2006). 
These circumstances prompted the Central Asian countries to sign cooperation agreements 
with China: Uzbekistan signed in 2004 a joint declaration with China paving the way to 
deepening bilateral relations in various fields: politics, economy, energy, minerals, 
transports, communication, in addition to the mutual action against terrorism (Djalili & 
Kellner, 2006). 
But before passing to another tactic, it is worth mentioning that all what was done has not 
protected China from the American competition of influence in the region, but it has 
protected its national security from the threat of separatist Uighur in Xinjiang province as 
a result of the joint anti-terrorism conventions signed by the Central Asian republics 
neighboring that province: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Djalili & 
Kellner, 2006).  
Central Asia, known by “the stans” based on the end of its countries’ names, covering a 
total area of almost 1.55 square miles with a population over than 69 million individuals, 
historically played an important role during the Silk Road trade epoch, in transporting 
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goods between China and Europe (Pariona, 2018).  And this role is definitely going to 
increase in the time being.  
 
• Moving on to East Asia, it is worth mentioning first that China’s political influence over 
this region specifically has been historically enormous before the century of humiliation in 
which the Chinese dynasty was subjugated by the imperial powers (Beeson & Li, 2015).  
Over the past 30 years, and particularly since 2001 when it has joined the World Trade 
Organization, China augmented its engagement in the East Asian economic corporation in 
order to consolidate its global competitiveness (Guerrero, 2007).  A remarkable shift 
targeted then the diplomatic strategy of the Chinese government, it has turned from that of 
a “developing country focused on issues of domestic concerns towards one that is taking 
regional and global leadership” (Guerrero, 2007). 
2001 was the year of transition for China, it has then joined the World Trade Organization 
(Guerrero, 2007), and the Shanghai Co-operation organization was then formed (Cheng, 
2013).  Since then Chinese leaders became certain that multilateral regional organizations 
were highly beneficent for their country, because they represent a systematic operational 
mechanism which will definitely assist its government to manage its interests, increase its 
influence, and strengthen its soft power, in addition to bolstering multi-polarity (Cheng, 
2013), whether in East Asia or all over the globe.     
This transitional period was very fruitful, for China has since then developed its well-
defined agenda and strategy which we are discussing in this dissertation (Cheng, 2013). 
Through organizational multilateral cooperation, China aimed for reducing its threats in 
the region generally and in East Asia more specifically, for this area is one of the most 
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complex areas in the world, on the political and security levels (Sørensen, 2010).  Taiwan’s 
issue, Korea nuclear crises, North and South China seas conflicts, and many other minor 
disputes created continuous tension and put many obstacles on the rising road of China 
(Sørensen, 2010).  Herein, Chinese decision-makers decided to pave another road to 
increase their economic, political and security influence in that region of Challenges. But 
before discussing the mechanism of paving that road, one must clearly understand the main 
causes behind China’s interests in this specific region of the world, known for its high level 
of challenges and complexity, which has been definitely defining its policy in East Asia 
(Sørensen, 2010).  The first main cause is that East Asia is the natural region of China, 
knowing that it is divided into eight countries and regions, which are: China, Mongolia, 
North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau, and that China is the 
largest country among them all (Pariona, 2018).  Second, this region has some of the most 
advanced technologies of the world, “which fosters economic development” (Pariona, 
2018), and almost everything that positively contribute in increasing its economic leverage 
constitute a major interest for its decision makers. Without forgetting the conflicts and 
multilateral competition of control over North and South China seas, which had always 
been urging China to maintain and strengthen its dominance there…  
When talking about the multilateral competition over the seas, Taiwan’s case came up to 
mind again. This affair should be studied in one specific section aside as a short case study, 
to understand how china designs its geo-strategies based on its so-considered geopolitical 
interests; and this will be done by the end of this chapter. 
For now, in short, in the majority of these pre-mentioned countries, or more specifically, 
in those existing in the strategic and geographic zone of East Asia, China has many 
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interests; and that is due to competitive visions or policies witnessed to benefit from each 
interest, which requires from China to design a specific strategy to supports its main aims 
there, in addition to always being ready to face any challenge that might arise.  
 
• In its turn, Southeast Asia also represents a region of interests to China. First, it is politically 
divided into 15 countries and territories: Brunei, Cambodia, Christmas Island, Coco Island, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and 
Vietnam (Pariona, 2018).  Southeast Asia is the only region of the world that is located on 
both sides of the equator (Pariona, 2018).  What characterizes this Southeast Asia the most 
according to Pariona (2018), is that its economy is rapidly developing, and Indonesia is 
Southeast Asia’s largest economy and the region’s only member of the G20. 
Southeast Asia covers almost 1.74 million square miles with more than 641 million 
individuals (Pariona, 2018); and according to the Council on Foreign Relations (2018),  
China is increasingly becoming a dominant security and economic actor there, for it - 
according to several participants in a workshop made by the Council on Foreign Relations 
(2018) on how can the U.S encounter China’s rise in Southeast Asia – is facing fewer 
obstacles there to the goal of being the dominant power, than those faced in any other 
region in Asia.  According to Yunhua (2013), it is dominating and controlling strategic and 
economic institutions in the region through a comprehensive strategy that includes:  
• Maintaining a peaceful surrounding environment; 
• Realizing regional integration; 
• Maximizing its own national interests; 
• Promoting peace, stability and prosperity there. 
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This distinguished strategy is divided into six main aspects that will be clarified in the 
following paragraphs:  
1) Protecting Chinese Overseas:  China’s strategy in Southeast Asia mainly targets 
protecting the Chinese and their properties in the mentioned region (Yunhua, 2013), 
for they are approximately 30 million – excluding those who became local citizens after 
receiving local Southeastern nationalities (Guotu, 2009).  And as it is implementing 
this “going out” strategy, and promoting the subsequent effect of China-ASEAN Free 
Trade Area, its investments in the region will definitively continue to increase, so its 
citizens and their properties will also do; that is why its duty is to protect them and 
secure them a stable environment which embrace their development (Yunhua, 2013). 
 
2) Advancing its Presence and Influence in the Region: Although there are 30 million 
overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia since a long period ago, it is only 15 years 
ago when the Chinese government started to deal with this region (Yunhua, 2013). 
Knowing that it is after the end of the Cold War, especially in the middle of the 90s 
when China started its “metamorphosis” to become an important actor which no one 
can ignore in that region. So due to the “new-born” relationship between China and 
Southeast Asia, its influence there cannot be compared to that of Japan or United States, 
this is why Beijing works strategically on advancing its presence and influence there, 
so it can compete from a position of strength.  
3) Safeguarding the Integrity and Unity of its Territorial Lands and Waters:  In its 
future foreign policy of Southeast Asia, protecting its national lands and waters’ 
integrity and unity constitutes the hardest challenge to face (Yunhua, 2013).  Although 
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all border conflicts between China and Southeast Asia were resolved, and the 
demarcation of the Beibu Gulf with Vietnam was successfully done, the sea disputes, 
often called by the South China Sea issue has not known any successful settlement 
(Yunhua, 2013).  
But what is that issue about? According to the reporter of South China Morning Post: 
“The South China Sea is a key commercial thoroughfare connecting Asia with Europe 
and Africa, and its seabed is rich with natural resources. One third of global shipping, 
or a total of US $ 3.37 trillion of international trade, passes through the South China 
Sea. About 80 per cent of China’s oil imports arrive via the Strait of Malacca, in 
Indonesia, and then sail across the South China Sea to reach China” (South China 
Morning Post, 2019). Herein, this Sea is subjected to competitions and rivalries 
between its river countries to decide who will impose its control and authority over it, 
and how to divide the shares… It is a historical conflict between China and Southeast 
Asian countries that has, until now, not known any final solution. 
 
4)  Cooperating for a Just, Fair and Reasonable Regional Order: While major 
powers: China, United States, India, Japan, and EU are present in the region since a 
long period ago, and since they are nevertheless competing to increase their presence 
and influence in the region; Chinese decision-makers work on developing a huge 
strategy that could create a balance between all of the pre-mentioned powers’ strategies, 
realize a peaceful coexistence between them, and define their shares of benefits to 
promote regional peace and development while avoiding further military and political 
conflicts (Yunhua, 2018).  
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5) Speeding-up Regional Integration for Mutual Development and Prosperity: 
Chinese decision-makers work on transforming their nation into a pioneer country that 
leads economic cooperation in the region into a sustainable and long lasting 
development between the Southeast Asian countries and its government (Yunhua, 
2018).  
Thus, China was the first to put a systematic example for world’s superpowers, for it 
has worked on establishing the Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN, and then Japan, 
the United States of America, India and South Korea followed its steps (Yunhua, 2018).  
The concept of FTA represents only the first step towards regional economic 
cooperation (Yunhua, 2018), and Beijing is evolving this idea to accomplish the 
development of its whole regional strategy. 
 
 
6) Mutual Promotion of the New Global Political and Economic Order: Given that 
China and ASEAN countries shares almost the same interests and concerns, the mutual 
cooperation to contribute in the establishment of a new fairer, more just and rational 
political and economic order for the international benefit, is a must and prior issue to 
work on multilaterally as per the Chinese strategy for its Southeast Asian relations 
(Yunhua, 2018). 
China has succeeded in building special relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, and 
this has changed their perception of China as a threat and propelled them for more profound 
political and economic interactions with their powerful neighbor (Astarita, 2008). 
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• As for Western Asia, located between Africa, Central Asia, and the Southeast of Europe, 
and covers 2.451 million square miles with 313.4 million individuals, is politically divided 
into 19 countries - the majority of them is known by the Middle East: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, “Israel”, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, in addition to the 
Sinai Peninsula to Egypt (Pariona, 2018). 
What distinguishes West Asia, is that it has several points of large access to water: The 
Aegean Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the 
Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea (Pariona, 2018). 
Strategically speaking, West Asia constitutes an important part of the economic corridor 
of the OBOR initiating from China, and passing by Central Asia to finally attain its 
European destination. That is one of the main causes behind China’s recent positive 
progress in terms of “policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, 
financial integration, and people-to-people bond” (Youwei & An, 2018) with West Asian 
countries. 
Herein, and within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative taken by President Xi 
Jinping, Western Asia region have become prior to China’s foreign policy (Ghiselli, 2018).  
This Chinese perspective is based on the natural resources existing in Western Asia, more 
than the rich European markets; In fact, these resources constitute the real targets of the 
BRI in contrast to what is being publicly promoted about the European markets as main 
target – as stated by many researchers (Jian, 2017).  
Therefore, Chinese presence in Western Asia is most likely a presence of short and long-
term trades and investments; economically and diplomatically with a high precision on not 
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to publicly politicize the carried-out projects in the region. However, its presence in the 
Middle East seems like a new alternative to that of the United States; and as it expands day 
after day, every decision of “where to invest or with whom to trade is going to be 
increasingly politicized” (Ghiselli, 2018).  And this cannot be avoided, for China’s 
capability to influence the course of events there is continuously growing (Ghiselli, 2018), 
and most of all, unpredictable but without any need to rely on its military power. 
• Reliance of major energy producers in the region on China; 
• Chinese demonstration that its dependency on the natural resources of the region is 
decreasing; 
• Chinese imposition of its preference in oil contracts; 
• Chinese improvement of its energy security…  
All these factors above (Ghiselli, 2018), and many others, prove that China is capable to 
determine the economic future of most of the countries engaged in all the regional hotspots 
(Ghiselli, 2018).  And by any action related to the West Asian countries taken by its 
government, China will affect the course of events in the region; this is why each and every 
step should be very deliberate and thoughtful in order not to ruin what was hardly built 
through efforts of trade and investment in any country of the region.  
For example, “China has bought oil and gas from both Sunni and Shiite countries without 
showing evident preference” (Ghiselli, 2018). It has interacted with both Saudi Arabia and 
Iran without any distinction (Shichor, 2006), for if it has done otherwise, its policies might 
be understood, or most precisely might produce impacts similar to military interventions 
prerequisites.  And this is in fact what Chinese decision-makers always aim to avoid. 
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Before concluding, one must not forget that West Asia, is a “dangerous” region of the 
world, for its countries “mostly speak the language of hard military power” (Ghiselli, 
2018), but China is aware of the challenges and difficulties resulting from investing in these 
countries. And in their turn, these countries are not objecting or refusing to deal with China, 
knowing that it has a good reputation among them, for it has never shown them any interest 
of being significantly present militarily, but at the same time “can already, and will 
increasingly be able to exert direct influence on their fortunes” (Ghiselli, 2018). 
 
• And here we come to the Russian Federation, the country that occupies and covers all the 
northern part of Asia’s continent with almost 143 million individuals (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2019).  China’s relationship with this country has evolved since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 (Burles, 1999).  Both countries declared in 1996, a new “strategic 
partnership”, and since then the strategic aspect of the bilateral relationships “attained a 
prominence not seen since the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s” (Burles, 1999, p. ix).  
This course of good relations has not continued for a long period due to the non-stop 
growing power of China, which has threatened Moscow’s leaders and paved the road 
behind prolonged tensions and suspicions between these two powers (Burles, 1999).  In 
other words, as China’s power increases, its visualization of the idealistic world order is 
probably to deviate from Russia’s perspective (Bolt, 2014). 
Herein, the framework of China’s strategy in Russia is based on four considerations 
(Burles, 1999, p.5):  
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1) China’s desire of stability on its borders and frontiers provinces; 
2) China’s aim to reinforce the economic development of specific inland regions; 
3) China’s growing needs of energy and natural resources;  
4) China’s concerns over its regional and international positions after 2001.  
In the light of these factors, Chinese decision-makers give greater attention to strategic 
considerations such as their foreign policy towards Russia, rather than any other less 
fundamental country (Burles, 1999).  
However, Sino-Russian relation has known many ups and downs, especially when it comes 
to their relative views on world order (Bolt, 2014).  Chinese experts on Russia see that the 
newest BRI project secures them a foothold in the Russian territory through its eastern 
stretch; and that will help it to lay the groundwork for specific geopolitical plays in the 
future (Lian, 2018). 
And according to Lian (2018) in her post at the Council on Foreign Relations, even though 
China strategically works on consolidating its influence in the Russian lands through 
economic development, it still treads a fine line between Russia the collaborator and Russia 
the competitor. 
But from another side, the Russian competition with the West over Ukraine has weakened 
its influence there, and has left it with no choice but to rely on Beijing’s assistance in 
finance and economic development (Lian, 2018).  This weak and needy Russian position 
was in its turn a great opportunity for “an energy-hungry China eager to diversify its energy 
sources and enhance its strategic positioning” (Lian, 2018). 
When talking about energy, we should mention that Russia’s influence regionally and 
internationally is in fact dependent on its energy and arms exports, as per Lian (2018).  But 
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what is recently happening in the events course of many regions of the world including the 
Middle East, Africa and Europe, China is literally challenging Russia’s role as a major 
energy and arms supplier through infrastructure investments as a consolidation of its 
geopolitical assets in these regions (Lian, 2018). 
In short, Sino-Russian relations are an authentic reflection of superpowers’ double-
standards in cooperating over mutual interests and competing over others. And this issue 
by itself needs to be studied alone regarding its academic and scientific value; however, it 
will be discussed in the final section, so it can be presented and clarified in a way that 
serves the main purpose of this dissertation.  
But before that, we should get back to Taiwan’s case study, to have one clear image about 
how china strategically acts in terms of managing its geopolitical interests in one country 
in Asia, which is Taiwan – as chosen here. 
 
          Therefore, we might say that the Chinese regional strategy in Asia is getting reshaped day 
after day based on its competitors’ actions and re-actions, vision and strategies for that region of 
the world… But what is always stable and fixed is China’s goal of stabilizing the rise of its 
international status as long as it is achieving its geoeconomic goals. 
          After the Cold War, China has witnessed a rapid rise that pushed its decision-makers to work 
on a stable region in order to attract sustainable development and prosperity… But what matters 
the most to China is to transform this stable and peaceful environment into “an important 
foundation for the country to promote connection and integration with the international political-
economic system” (Hsu, 2007, p.47). 
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          As Robert Zoellick stated, China took the role of a “responsible stakeholder” in the 
international community while pursuing the status and influence of a major power (Zoellick, 
2005).  Herein, being a “responsible stakeholder in the international community” is not an easy 
task, for it requires strengthening relations with neighbors while concentrating on its national 
economic development at the same time. Thus we can clearly understand the cause behind relying 
on multilateral organizational cooperation…  
          The recent evolution of China after a decade of marginalization and underdevelopment, 
transformed it into a fully integrated country in the international community, and even more China 
became today “the most dynamic country in the world in economic, political and military terms” 
(Zoellick, 2005, pp.2-3).  
          But what is really interesting in this concern is that many articles and studies have discussed 
the probability of China being a revisionist power in East Asia, or contrary being a status-quo 
power: Alastair Iain Johnston has done a study entitled: “Is China a Status-Quo Power?” 
(Johnston, 2003); Nitchakan Hongkarnjanapong wrote “Is China a Revisionist or Status-Quo 
Super Power?” (Hongkarnjanapong, 2016); Joseph Cheng discussed the same idea in his article 
“China’s Regional Strategy and Challenges in East Asia” (Cheng, 2013), Camilla Sørensen in her 
turn also talked about this theory in her study: “China’s Role in East Asia” (Sørensen, 2010); 
Suisheng Zhao also treated this problematic in his study: “China as a Rising Power versus the US-
led World Order” (Zhao, 2016), and recently Graeme Dobell wrote in The Strategist: “The US 
and China: Status-quo Powers in Revisionist Time” (Dobell, 2018).  
          Briefly, and based on the foregoing, although political scientists had a general consensus on 
the main idea, but there was a range of different perspectives that defined whether China is a status-
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quo or a revisionist power. These perspectives will be shortly discussed in the following, after 
defining the terms of status-quo and revisionist powers.  
 
“Whereas revisionists seek to change the way things are in international politics, status-
quo seekers strive to preserve things as they are” (Davidson, 2006). 
 
          In other words, the state is described by a status-quo power when it wants things to stay like 
they are on the international scene, while a state is described by revisionist when it wants to change 
the existing status-quo.  Steve Chan defines a status-quo state as a satisfied one that endorses the 
present norms of the global order (Chan, 2004).  Similarly, Randall Schweller in his book Deadly 
Imbalances, explains the concept of status-quo powers as those which are pleased to keep the 
fundamental features of the current international system, and he contrasts it with that of the 
revisionist powers as those which call for changing the already instituted order for the sake of 
promoting their growth and reputation in the system (Taylor, 2007).  
          As per Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson: “The policy of the status-quo aims at the 
maintenance of the distribution of power as it exists at a particular moment in history” 
(Morgenthau & Thompson, 1978, p.46).  They also stated that: “which leave intact the relative 
power positions of the nations concerned are fully compatible with a policy of the status-quo” 
(Morgenthau & Thompson, 1978, p.46).  
          In the same context but from the point of view of the founder of the Power Transition’s 
Theory A.F.K Organski and the theorist Jacek Kugler, the Status-Quo States are those who put the 
rules of the game and always work on benefiting from these rules, in contrary to their “challengers” 
– the Revisionists who do efforts to take a new place for themselves in international society in 
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accordance with their power; which means that they implement strategies to recreate the rules due 
to their general dissatisfaction on how the relations among nations are working (Organski & 
Kugler, 1980). 
          China is once described by a status-quo power and another by a revisionist one whether in 
Asia or in the world international community; and that is what we are going to clarify – in short – 
in the upcoming paragraphs. 
          In the past few years, specifically in the United States Strategies for National Security as per 
The White House (2017) and for National Defense as per the U.S. Department of Defense (2018), 
China was identified (in addition to Russia), as a revisionist state. This statement was done because 
of the American assessment of the international situations and circumstances which provides that 
China constitutes a central challenge for the United States because of its intention to reshape the 
world to be consistent with its authoritarian model (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).  
          Thus, in the American perspective, China is described by a revisionist power due to its 
“leveraging of military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce 
neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantages” (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2018, p.2).  The National Defense Strategy pursued in clarifying that statement by 
declaring that “As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through 
an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program 
that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States 
to achieve global preeminence in the future” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p.2). 
          Furthermore, in the Shangri-La Dialogue that took place in Singapore in June 2019, Patrick 
Shanahan – the acting US Defense Secretary – and while echoing the US Department of Defense’s 
Report about the Indo-Pacific Strategy (which define China as a revisionist state), has warned the 
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Asian countries from China, saying that “the greatest long-term threat to their safety and prosperity 
would be a rising power which seeks to undermine the rules-based international order” (Jiangyu, 
2019).  In other words, US is warning the world, and most specifically China’s neighbors, from 
the Chinese policies, identifying China as a revisionist power.  
          Herein, China refuses these false “accusations”, and in the same Dialogue, Wei FENGHE, 
the Chinese minister of Defense, had a speech that aimed to reassure the world community, and 
most specifically its neighbors, that China’s intentions are to pursue the peaceful development, 
and that its country does not seek hegemony.  
          However, and for not getting so long in explaining this point, we can say that China is a 
rising power, and no one can deny it. But what causes different opinions in this concerns, is that 
China aims daily to become a more dominant player on the international scene; and to do so, it has 
to take the place of an already existing dominant player.  
          This fact threatens the United States and constitutes another proof that supports its opinion 
about China being a “revisionist state”. But, from the Chinese side, the fact that their state is a 
rising power aiming to extend its dominance does not mean that it is aiming to break up the 
international recognized rules and customs, or even the international order: “its rise is not a 
challenge to the World Order” (Jiangyu, 2019).  
          To conclude, we should say that the two different opinions concerning whether China being 
a revisionist or status-quo power, are caused by the different understandings of respecting the 
World Order… As per the American perspective, the international world order was created seventy 
years ago by their own efforts, and any violation of its policy or any threat that might attain its 
principles will be considered as a revisionist policy aiming to destroy that order (Drzener, 2019). 
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          In contrary, and as per the Chinese perspective: pursuing wealth, power and influence, 
becoming richer, stronger, and more advanced than other countries, building partnerships and 
maintaining harmonious relations with other states for a long term, are not prohibited by the 
international order (Jiangyu, 2019), thus they are not considered as violation or intentions to 
destroy it.  
          However, both perspectives are logically interpreting the point of China being a revisionist 
or a status-quo power, therefore, both of them are right in their arguments… Thus, in my point of 
view, China is neither a status-quo power nor a revisionist one… but it should be considered as a 
neo-revisionist power which seeks dominance without changing the recognized rules of the 
World’s Order:  
1) Working on its national and regional stabilization; 
2) Investing in this stability to establish harmonious connections and integration with the 
international system;  
3) Geoeconomically influencing the international community, and most specifically the 
community of its neighbors;  
4) Concentrating on its economic leverage, political development and military strength.  
 
          These four terms justify that China has a rational distinguished geo-strategy implemented to 
influence the Eurasian part of the globe without being a revisionist power, neither being a “lazy” 
status-quo one… In conclusion, what was explained in the previous section constitutes the Neo-
Revisionist Strategy of the Peoples’ Republic of China in the region of Eurasia.   
          The necessary measures to expand its influence over the Eurasian region of the world appear 
clearly in its geo-strategy to rule that region, but China does not stop its efforts to protect them, 
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implement them and enforce them to make a difference in the world’s policies in a way that ensure 
the realization of its achievements leading into a distinguished model of global governance. 
“Under the Xi Jinping leadership, China has adopted a more assertive foreign policy that, in 
contrast to the behavior of the past leadership, confidently asserts China’s status as a great power” 
(Wilson, 2019) …  And by analyzing its actions and reactions in implementing its potential to 
“edit” the international image of the World Order without violating its standards, we can reaffirm 
that China’s geo-strategy in Eurasia is very accurate and requires a high level of precision to get 
applied… This geo-strategy shall be nominated by the Neo-revisionism.  
          And now, what are the characteristics of the ones implemented in the remaining regions of 
the World? In Africa, Australia, Western Europe? Are they similar to that of Eurasia? What about 
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Section 2: Chinese Geo-strategy in Africa, Australia, and Western 
Europe 
 
          The fast and precipitate increase in the economic (and military) capabilities of China, 
influenced the worldview of Chinese leaders and decision makers, especially that of President Xi 
Jinping and his lieutenants (Bekkevold, 2016) …  They are assuming that China has economically 
developed a new “muscle” which “entitles it to a position of greater international respect” 
(Bekkevold, 2016, p.5).  This assumption has had impacts on China’s foreign policies and 
strategies and turned them into “more assertive” ones (Christensen, 2015).  
          China has known a big shift in its foreign policies “from being a low-profile player in 
international affairs to taking a “can-do” approach in her foreign policy” (Bekkevold, 2016, p.5).  
And since then, Beijing’s strategic thinking is gradually upgrading in the framework of its rise… 
Chinese peoples had also pushed their leaders to take action in order to enforce the foreign policy 
of their nation and globally reflect the reality of that great power of China (Bekkevold, 2016). 
Chinese leaders responded to their peoples’ request for they are conscious of the national stability 
importance and of its impact on their nation’s position in the international order as superpower.  
          Hence, in November 2012 and before being elected as President, Mr. Xi Jinping promoted 
a new slogan “China’s Dream” … And re-used several times in his first speech to the nation as the 
head of state on 17 March 2013 (BBC News, 2013) …  Since that, “China’s Dream” slogan turned 
into a political campaign, then became a demarcation of the Chinese policy internally and 
externally… But what does this dream mean? 
          In his first presidential speech according to BBC News (2013), Mr. Xi said: “We must make 
persistent efforts, press ahead with indomitable will, continue to push forward the great cause of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great 
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rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.  So he was then promoting the “rejuvenation” of China and 
declaring that it will be his leadership policy in the days to come… He talked about the Chinese 
spirit highly required to build the Chinese road showing respect of nation and time, and ensuring 
the implementation of reform in addition to innovation in the future projects policies (BBC News, 
2013).  
          Xi Jinping’s “Dream” is to “make China the world’s dominant power” according to the 
retired Chinese colonel Liu Mingfu, who published a book in 2010 entitled “The China Dream: 
Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-America Era” (Mingfu, 2015).  Jinping 
has numerously stressed on that dream but has less specified how to practically transform it into 
reality…  
          In the last section of the Chapter, we have seen how China is being managing its geopolitical 
interests in Eurasia as a neo-revisionist power achieving a large part of the dream… And in this 
section, in order to perceive the geo-strategy of China in the other areas of the globe: Africa, 
Australia and Western Europe, we will discuss how the remaining part of the dream is being 
achieved there before overlooking the Chinese presence over the American Continent by its end.   
          China’s strategies and policies in most of the regions of that planet are being interpreted as 
attempts to expand its “sphere of influence”; and the world is now witnessing China’s steps 
towards achieving its DREAM… In order to realize it, China should be expanding the process of 
spreading and imposing its influence over Africa, Australia, in addition to the West of Europe, and 
not to limit it in the region of Eurasia exclusively.  
          Such policy constitutes a mechanism of achieving an increase in power to face any probable 
encirclement that might be caused by China’s number one rival: The United States of America… 
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This is why the Chinese decision-makers developed particular geo-strategies and policies related 
to Africa, Australia and the West of Europe… 
          In the upcoming paragraphs, China’s geopolitical interests in these pre-mentioned areas will 
be displayed and discussed; paving the road behind treating the way these interests are strategically 
managed in each region sequentially, starting from Africa, passing by Australia, arriving to the 
West of Europe with a brief overlook on the American continent.  
 
A- China’s Geo-Strategy in Africa 
 
          “China has taken the lead in the general competition for the control of the African Wealth 
(especially in the Congo) to the point that we speak today of the Chinafrica as we do about 
Françafrique – but with a very important difference: its influence is not limited to a traditional 
zone of influence, as is the case with France” (Rousset, 2018).  
          Overall, China is considered as a key player in the global governance… And as stated by 
Francois Godement, it practices a selective engagement through choosing its battles and investing 
its diplomatic resources only when clear gains are at stake for its interests (Duchâtel, 2017).  
          And by taking strategic steps and moves towards Africa, China is being clearly choosing its 
battles in a way compliant with its main aims and goals...  But why choosing that region of the 
world to lead battles on? What are the reasons behind that “scramble” for Africa? There is no doubt 
that Beijing has found many geopolitical interests for its nation there, let us define what they are 
and how is it strategically managing them:  
          The first primary motivation behind China’s move towards Africa are African Raw 
Materials, that satisfies China’s need to secure a solid base of materials strengthening its own 
rapidly growing economy; in addition to satisfying its desire to increase its global leverage 
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politically, and economically through benefitting from the major growth opportunity granted by 
the African emerging economic markets (Maverick, 2018).  These interests and their strategic 
management will be clarified in the below bullet points. 
 
1-  African Raw Materials: Fuel for China’s Growing Economy 
 
As mentioned above, the rapidly growing economy of China needs fueling to pursue 
its well-being and growth… That fueling shall be secured by high percentages of raw 
materials, and due to its rich-abundance in raw materials, Africa became the major 
destination of China…  
Africa’s continent is estimated to contain “90% of the entire world supply of platinum 
and cobalt, 50% of the world’s gold supply, two-third of world’s manganese, and 35% 
of the world’s uranium” (Maverick, 2018).  And what will also help in clarifying the 
reasons behind China’s destination towards Africa is that this continent “Accounts for 
nearly 75% of the world’s Coltan, an important mineral used in electronic devices, 
including cell phones” (Maverick, 2018).  This reminds us of Huawei, the 
telecommunications enterprises that is one of the largest groups in terms of 
international contracts (Duchâtel, 2017).  Huawei now is more than an enterprise; it is 
a different way of “geopolitics” … This thesis has no room to discuss the fierce 
competition between Apple and Huawei, but it is clear for all that this competition 
constitutes a tech cold war based on the implementation of geopolitical capabilities in 
a geoeconomic warfare between two fierce rivals… And one of the main causes behind 
their scramble for Africa could be understood after knowing that African countries are 
rich in Coltan. 
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Chinese decision-makers recognized their nation’s need for natural resources, and 
product markets, that is why they focused on rich Africa and done huge investments in 
its nations. “By working to secure a solid base of critical raw materials, China 
strengthens its economy for decades to come” (Maverick, 2018).  
And after mentioning the product markets, we opened the door behind another main 
geopolitical interest for China in Africa, the new emerging economic markets. 
 
2-  African New Emerging Economic Markets: A Magnet for Chinese Investments  
 
 
Known for its economic pragmatism, China has carefully studied all its investments 
projects before implementing them… Beijing has already heavily invested in Asian 
markets, as well as in Latin and South American markets (Maverick, 2018), but it is 
reconsidering now, where its primary benefits, interests and opportunities really exist, 
in which emerging economic markets…  
Chinese leaders found in the African markets, a treasure providing chances “to take 
advantage of excellent growth opportunities both for political reasons and investment 
returns” (Maverick, 2018). 
Thus, China urged to profit from continuing economic development in Africa, through 
investing via state-owned investing firms giving their nation a notable competitive edge 
when it comes to providing support for companies aiming to invest in African countries 
(Maverick, 2018).  
In other words, China became a stakeholder in Africa in terms of investments, assisting 
companies to execute their projects in addition to monitoring their execution; and these 
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companies can obtain substantial subsidies from the Chinese government (Maverick, 
2018). 
This point leads our minds to think about the political interest/benefit for China 
extracted from its economic existence on the African lands. 
 
3-  Underdeveloped Countries of Africa: A Political Motivation for China 
 
In addition to benefiting from African raw materials, and investing in African new 
emerging markets, China finds in the African continent a primary place to extend its 
geopolitical influence (Maverick, 2018).  We previously concluded in the last section 
of this Chapter that China is already the preeminent power in Asia, competing with 
India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Japan, and in a different manner Russia…  
And what is new for the international order, is that china is becoming extremely 
powerful in the African continent also, extracting its political influence there from its 
large economic investments in African infrastructures…  
Holding a considerable political alliance with African underdeveloped nations, make 
them relying on China’s existence there, on its aids, supports, and investments… As a 
matter of fact, China’s foreign investment in Africa is higher in the weak governance 
countries than those with relatively better governance environments (Chen et al., 2018). 
And this constitutes a major geopolitical interest exclusively existing on the African 
lands, leading to a global presence if correctly managed.  
 
          In addition to these three main geopolitical interests, China sees in the unsecure environment 
of Africa, a major opportunity from which it is benefiting and spreading its geopolitical influence 
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to the nations that really need a strong political and economic control… Thus “a number of African 
countries (particularly those with natural resource endowments) have come to occupy center stage 
in Chinese foreign policy, as potential sources of raw materials to fuel China’s growth” (Power & 
Mohan, 2010, p.1), and as a potential source of competing great powers such as the United States 
and reaping a distinguished control with respect to the non-interfering standard.   
          Herein, this is the way used by China to manage and invest in these geopolitical interests 
strategically … As for now we will move to displaying its geo-strategy in Australia. 
    
B-  China’s Geo-strategy in Australia  
 
China has many attempts at influence over the Australian continent, and in numbers, Beijing 
benefits from having a large presence there:  
• “In 2017, Australian exports to China accounted for 30% of its total exports” (Fournier, 
2019);  
• “Chinese tourism in Australia grew by 13% in one year, precisely 1.4 million Chinese 
persons spent more than 8.7 billion Euros” (Fournier, 2019);  
• “Of the 500,000 foreign students in the country, 30% are of Chinese origin. They 
brought 7.8 billion Euros in 2017” (Fournier, 2019). 
 
By looking into Australia, China seeks strategic influence, aiming to become superior in 
terms of economics and technology, without losing the Australian respect securing its 
freedom of action to work on attaining its goals (Jakobson, 2019) …  And from the other 
side, it wants Australia to accommodate its geopolitical interests in a way that helps it to 
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become more confident in competing with the United States, through constructive and 
cooperative relations with the Australian nations (Jakobson, 2019). 
Chinese leaders and investors see that Australia is safer and more attractive for investments 
than most other countries (Hendrischke, 2019) …  Their direct investments by industry in 
2018 comprehended Healthcare (41.7%), Commercial Real Estate (36.7%), Energy: Oil 
and Gas (8.8%), Mining (5.6%), Renewable Energy (4.8%), Infrastructure (1.2%), Food 
and Agribusiness (1%) and other services (0.2%) (Hendrischke, 2019). 
However, on the security perspective, China wishes that Australia constitutes a 
constructive factor for its peaceful rise. On the economic side, China wishes that its relation 
with Australia secures sufficient and sustainable resources and energy supplies for its needs 
(Liu & Hao, 2014). 
Herein, Chinese geopolitical interests in Australia could be understood through the 
understanding of its national interests… And they are divided into two major sections as 
mentioned above: the security interests and the economic ones. 
 
1-  Security Interests: China’s Main Obsession  
 
 
The unequal balance between the trilateralism of U.S.-China-Australia, where the 
United States was a global superpower, China a major power, and Australia a middle 
power, affirms the validity stating that China’s main interest in Australia is the interest 
of security (Liu & Hao, 2014).  And that is because China’s presence in Australia is 
affected by the American factor’s influence.  
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As per the American perspective, the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region also 
became a concern for Washington affected by the growth of China’s influence there 
(Liu & Hao, 2014).  
Thus, the interests of security are mutual interests between two main rivals, while 
Australia – being the weakest leg – enjoys its favorable position in dealing with two 
big competitors (Liu & Hao, 2014).  
And since Australia is in the Chinese periphery, and the United States of America is 
considered the most important strategic ally in the Asia-Pacific Area (Liu & Hao, 
2014), Chinese leaders called up to persuade Australia that it has been blindly following 
the United States, which exposes it to the threat of sustainable exploitation. At the same 
time, Chinese decision-makers worked on developing a counter policy of building 
partnerships and friendships with Australia, to ensure a peaceful and secure 
neighboring. 
This counter policy aims to protect China’s geopolitical interest of security, knowing 
that Chinese leaders were precautious from U.S. encirclement for their country, to 
implement a containment policy targeting its economy and markets due to its safe 
strong presence in Australia (Liu & Hao, 2014).  
 
2-  Australian Resources and Energy Supplies: China’s Economic Aims 
 
Australian economic resources of energy play an important role in defining China’s 
geo-strategy there, for they constitute a main geopolitical interest in the eyes of its 
leaders…. Thus, importing Australian resources became “an important source of raw 
materials and energy for China’s domestic thirst for growth” (Liu & Hao, 2014, p.384). 
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China became Australia’s “largest trading partner, largest export market, and largest 
import source since 2010” (Liu & Hao, 2014, p.384).  And by its economic engagement 
there, China made Australia highly depending on its trade with it.  Herein, we should 
not forget to mention that ChAFTA (China-Australia Free Trade Agreement), which 
has been complemented by China and Australia in 2015, has played an important role 
in achieving this successful economic interaction and considered “as ‘a 21st century 
model’ for Asia-Pacific trade agreements” (Hsieh, 2018, p.923).  This free trade 
agreement displayed China’s utmost engagement not just with Australia, but with the 
global economic system (Hsieh, 2018).  
China sees in Australia a significant energy provider especially in moments of fast 
economic leverage, and due to its aim of being an extensive development model, its 
need for resources and energy has “skyrocketed” (Liu & Hao, 2014, p.386), so 
Australian decision-makers, and because of the dependence of their state on the 
Chinese trade, considered that providing China with resources and energy supplies will 
positively influence and determine the character of their future bilateral relation (Liu 
& Hao, 2014). 
Furthermore, according to Liu and Hao (2014), the two indispensable materials for 
Chinese industrial development and economic construction: The Ore and Coal are 
found in Australia. So they became the top two imports of China from Australia. 
The iron Ore became highly needed because of the increase in consumption of the crude 
steel in which the iron ore is major for its manufacturing… Meanwhile, Australia is the 
top exporter of iron Ore in the world (it provided 40.4% of its global exports in 2011) 
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(Liu & Hao, 2014).  And in 2010, as per Liu and Hao (2014), China has spent almost 
80 billion $ on ore imports, 40% of which were imported from Australia.  
 
          This assists us in concluding that China, while building its economic success, is relying on 
benefiting from each and every opportunity in the world, including Australia. For building good 
ties with Australia, investing in it and benefiting from its resources and security, helps China in 
achieving its aim of becoming a strong steady regional power as well as a global power, for 
Australia is considered as a Western country, not an Eastern one; even if it is located closer to Asia 
than Europe or North America, and has strong economic ties with Asia… 
          Is the same way of thinking applicable for Western Europe’s case? Does China have 
geopolitical interests there and draws geo-strategies according to them also? That is what will be 
clarified in the upcoming paragraph.  
   
C- China’s Geo-strategy in Western Europe 
 
 
          In the second half of the last century, the world has witnessed a gradual development in the 
Sino-European economic relations (Huaqun, 2004).  In the last recent years, the contact between 
China and Western Europe has increased, which represented then, to all political and economic 
analysts, a big shift in Beijing’s strategy towards that region of the world (Bressi, 1972).  
          By a very simple analysis, that remarkable strengthening of the Sino-West European 
relations was, in its turn, definitely based on remarkable factors that, most probably, might be new 
geopolitical interests for China in the Western Europe lands.  
          According to the World Factbook, released and continuously updated by the CIA, Western 
Europe is constituted from seven countries: Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Monaco, 
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Netherlands, and United Kingdom (Kariuki, 2017).  Knowing that there are historical, economic, 
modern, and geographic definitions that shape the CIA main definition, and that is due to the fact 
the Western Europe is not an official zone, neither an official term such as that of the EU, or EFTA 
which are specifically defined (Kariuki, 2017).  
          Therefore, we will rely on the CIA official definition of Western Europe, and investigate 
China’s geo-strategies in each one of these countries.  
 
1-  China’s Geo-Strategy in Belgium  
 
In an article published by China Daily, under the title of “Beijing and Brussels Seek Common 
Areas of Interests”, the author Fraser Cameron affirmed that both Belgium and China are 
showing readiness to cooperate on connectivity, and that reflects the fact that both of them are 
enthusiastic to look for areas of mutual interests in order to strengthen and deepen their 
strategic partnership (Cameron, 2019).  
So, what is this area of mutual benefit, and how do these interests reflect themselves actually? 
Besides having large economic and diplomatic ties with a variety of countries across the world 
(Bodnar, 2017), Belgium is known as a highly developed country, due to its stable economic 
leverage in addition to its improving relations with foreign partners in terms of trade (Bodnar, 
2017).  In the recent updates, Belgium became the 19th largest exporter on the world basis with 
277.7 billion US $, in the list that contains super and global powers such as China, USA, 
Germany, Japan, South Korea, France, Hong Kong, Netherlands, UK, etc. (Dillinger, 2019) 
…  
This obviously leads to mutual cooperation between China and Belgium, for China is like 
“predator of opportunities” in a state of permanent vigilance looking for control under the 
pretext of cooperation opportunities and seize them in a way that serves its own interests.  
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Dating to 1971, the Sino-Belgian ties are of good long-standing friendship and beneficial 
cooperation, as the Ambassador of China to Belgium CAO Zhongming, stated in one of his 
interviews (Dietrich, 2019).  
But 2014 was the year of rejuvenation in terms of Sino-Belgian relationship, after the 
President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Belgium… “It was during that visit that our bilateral 
relations were upgraded to an all-around partnership for friendly cooperation” said Mr. 
Ambassador (Dietrich, 2019).  After that, H.M. King Philip paid a visit back to China in the 
following year (Dietrich, 2019) … 
To know what really happened during these visits, we are referring back to H.E President Xi 
Jinping Speech during “Le Soir of Belgium”, as published by the Embassy of the People’s 
Republic of China in Ireland on the 23rd of March 2014 (Jinping, 2014): 
1) Bilateral trade has increased more than 1,000 times; which made Belgium China’s Sixth 
Largest Trading Partner in the EU (in 2014) (Jinping, 2014); 
2) The Direct Investments of China in Belgium has grown 10 folds over the five years that 
preceded 2014, which has contributed in creating new job vacancies for Belgians (Jinping, 
2014);  
3) Also, according to the speech of President Jinping (2014), Cultural and Arts Events, such 
as the “Europalia China Art Festival” between China and Belgium, especially that of the 
40th anniversary of China-Belgium diplomatic relations, reinforced ties between the two 
cultures and the peoples of the two countries. 
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President Jinping stated that because Belgium – where the EU Headquarters are located – is 
known as the Heart of Europe, “the more strongly it beats, the more energy it will create for 
China-Europe cooperation” (Jinping, 2014). 
So if we analyze, his speech, and the fact that Belgium “sits at the most geostrategic portion 
of the North European plain: between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ardennes forests that lead 
into the foothills of the Eifel mountain range on the present-day German-Belgian border” 
(Stratfor, 2010), we can clearly understand that China aims to build good relations with 
Belgium in order not to benefit only in trade and exports, but also to benefit from good 
relations with the whole European Union on a wider scale.  
This is why, according to Yi (2018), Beijing has launched in October 2018 the project of “New 
Cargo Train Route” linking the Belgian City of Liege, to Zhengzhou, the capital city of Henan 
province in China.  This huge project, is the third of its kind to link cities of the two countries, 
which clearly marks “their growing interests to nurture closer economic and trade ties” (Yi, 
2018). 
In the article China, Belgium Launch New Cargo Train Route, published by Xinhua net, Yi 
(2018) states that: “The first cargo train route between China and Belgium was launched in 
June 2017, connecting China's Daqing city to Zeebrugge Port, followed by the second one in 
May 2018, linking north China's Tangshan City to Antwerp Port”. 
These routes denote the fact that China and Belgium are concentrating on continuous and 
sustainable goals in upgrading their bilateral policies of development (Yi, 2018), which 
reflects the presence of strategic interests for both countries. 
Even H.E. Ambassador CAO has expressed China’s will to expand its cooperation with 
Belgium, in areas as e-commerce, belt and road, third party market “so that both sides will 
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share the benefits of a ‘bigger cake’ of China-Belgium cooperation”, as stated by Dietrich 
(2019).  
 
2-  China’s Geo-Strategy in France  
 
According to Eleanor Albert in her article which discusses the Sino-French relations, 
“Maintaining stability in ties between Paris, Brussels, and Beijing is very much in China’s 
interest, especially as tensions between Washington and Beijing continue to simmer” (Albert, 
2019), this is how Eleanor Albert concluded her article published in the Diplomat magazine 
on the 3rd of May 2019 about the tension between China and France.  
This article is a result of many ups and downs in the Sino-French relationship lately… In 2015, 
when Emmanuel Macron was still France’s minister of economy, he pointed out to a 
conference of German ambassadors in Berlin, that “The world economy is recovering but not 
as much as we wish. It is a very long process. On the one hand, we have opportunities... but 
on the other hand, there are many risks, particularly China today”, as per Inge (2015) in her 
article which addresses the Chinese threats on the world economy.  He then considered China 
as a threat not only to France, but also to the global economy. 
But few years later, after he became president of the French republic, and after his sharp 
resistance to China’s OBOR (DW News, 2019), Macron’s perspective changed… In January 
2018, according to Zhen (2018) in her published article in the South China Morning Post, he 
signaled France’s interests in China’s massive New Silk Road ambitions and plans, and also 
called for more balanced trade with China.  
Macron offered France’s support to China in its ambitions to rejuvenate land and sea roads of 
trade aiming to connect Asia and Europe through massive infrastructure projects (Zhen, 2018). 
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In his turn, Jinping affirmed that “the world was facing great uncertainties and China would 
work closely with France on big international issues” (Zhen, 2018). 
Since then, according to the article published by France Diplomacy (2019), China became 
“France’s 7th largest customer (France has a 1.4% market share in China) and 2nd largest 
supplier (China has a 9% market share in France)”.  Herein, Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) is focusing on the most advanced economical states in EU, and most 
importantly on France, Germany, Italy, and Britain (Bickenbach & Liu, 2018) and turn 
around: transport, utilities, infrastructures, ICT (information and communication 
technologies), advanced industrial machinery, and equipment (Bichenbach & Liu, 2018). 
Chinese FDI in the pre-mentioned European states has also known a large increase in the 
recent years, as it appears in the graphic below. 
 
           Figure 12: Bilateral FDI Transaction Values in China and the EU 
Source: Bickenbach & Liu, 2018, p.16 
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And recently, on the 25th of March 2019, President Macron called for a “strong Europe-China 
partnership”, that was followed by a large bilateral agreement between France and China 
through a signing of 15 business contracts worth billions of Euros including projects of trade 
and transportation mainly, as per Norris-Trent (2019). 
 
3-  China’s Geo-Strategy in Ireland 
 
“China has long looked to Ireland as a model for its own IT industry” stated in an article about 
the Sino-Irish relations published by the Irish Times (2008).  And it added that Ireland needs 
a small support from the Chinese market in the fields of healthcare, agriculture, and 
manufacturing projects “to help offset the impact of sluggish demand from Europe and the 
US” (Irish Times, 2008). 
Thus, according to Fan Hong and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald in their article published by 
Rozenberg Quarterly, China and Ireland have established a good relationship of bilateral 
cooperation of “joint economic and trade committee as well as groups in the areas of science, 
technology and education” (Hong & Gottwald, 2009).  This cooperation has also extended to 
“two-way investment in the telecommunication, machinery and software sector” (Hong & 
Gottwald, 2009). 
Herein, and according to an article published by China Daily (2019), the Irish minister of 
Enterprise and Innovation Heather Humphreys said that “trade and investment are the 
cornerstone of Ireland-China relationship”. 
In a quick look to the built bridges between China and Ireland we can conclude that the 
connectivity between them has largely and significantly improved, for besides political 
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exchanges; they also have huge economic and trade deals, and this is what lasts in relations 
between countries in a way that ensures the interests of both of them.   
What also impress are those educational and cultural exchanges, for since 1985 China and 
Ireland have signed the agreement on cultural cooperation and exchange, but it is until recent 
years that the two countries have known a large number of students’ exchange, and the 
agreement on education cooperation have been signed in October 2000 (Embassy of the 
People’s Republic of China in Ireland, n.d.). 
China has also established two Confucius Institutes in UCC and UCD in 2006 in Ireland, in 
addition to the school of Asian studies in 2009, which has contributed in stimulating cultural 
and educational developments between them; in a way that assists China in expanding its 
distinct culture through a soft power policy on the Irish lands and between the Irish people 
marking the steady start of a new era of Chinese disciplines in Ireland (Hong & Gottwald, 
2009).  
And finally, since Ireland is an independent trade nation, it benefits from China’s interests in 
strengthening bilateral ties for expanding its influence, to secure future markets for its huge 
exports (Hong & Gottwald, 2009). 
 
4-  China’s Geo-Strategy in Luxembourg  
 
Trade, Economy, Culture and Education, are also the key points of China’s geo-strategy in 
Luxembourg… In order to benefit from its advantages, China signed many deals and 
agreements with Luxembourg as a soft geo-strategy ensuring the achievement of its aims of 
expansion. 
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The Bank of China is “one of the largest banks in the world by market capitalization value 
was the first of seven Chinese banks to have chosen Luxembourg as its regional EU regional 
hub”, as mentioned by Luxembourg for Finance (2019) in the article entitled: “Bank of China: 
Why We Chose Luxembourg”.  
And while asked about the Sino-Luxembourg relations, the GM of the BOC (Bank of China) 
Luxembourg Branch, Lihong Zhou stated that these relations “have always been excellent, 
with strong confidence and economic bond between the two countries” (Zhou, 2019).  It is 
obvious then, that China finds in Luxembourg a secure economic and financial zone to invest 
in. 
Zhou also declared that the aim of that good connectivity through the establishment of BOC 
in Luxembourg is not only to “expand footprints across Europe” but also to build “a bridge 
connecting Sino-European businesses and investments while promoting Luxembourg 
internationally” (Zhou, 2019) ...  It could be concluded herein, that China is “offering” 
Luxembourg an international trend, while obtaining beneficial opportunities to realize its aims 
and purposes in return. 
What makes Luxembourg an attractive country for Chinese business according to Zhou is 
(Zhou, 2019): 
1) The Robust Financial Eco-System; 
2) The Stability; 
3) The Multiple Cross-Border Business; 
4) The Multi-Lingual Workforce; 
5) The Leading Role in Green Bonds; 
6) Ever-Growing Renminbi Business; 
7) Perfect Gateway into Europe’s Financial Markets; 
8) 40% of all FDIs into Europe funnel through the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg as a Base 
for Strategic Acquisitions. 
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The last reason is a pure geoeconomical one, knowing that through having good relations with 
Luxembourg, especially in the financial and trade terms, China could have its proper influence 
on these FDIs entering Europe, and subsequently a larger influence on the global financial 
business of all the continent.  
It is also important to mention that the good relations between China and Luxembourg is not 
only in the financial sector, but according to Kinsch (2014) in his article about the importance 
of the Chinese and Luxembourg relations, China’s investments in the recent years have 
expanded to attain industrial, commercial, and telecommunication companies. 
And in 2017 Prime minister of Luxembourg Xavier Bettel, in an interview with Chinese press 
agency Xinhua, praised the OBOR Chinese initiative and stated that due to the both directions 
of transport that will be produced as a result of the establishment of that road, a “win-win 
situation” could be created for both of the states (Mironescu, 2017). 
Herein, China’s geo-strategy in Luxembourg is implemented through financial business, trade, 
commerce, and infrastructures…   
 
5-  China’s Geo-Strategy in Monaco  
 
Although they are geographically far away from each other, China and Monaco are day after 
day becoming closer geopolitically… During his visit to Monaco in March 2019, President Xi 
Jinping said that: “China-Monaco relations have been making steady progress with deepening 
practical cooperation on environmental protection, telecommunication, and mobile payment, 
becoming a pace-setter and a model for China-Europe cooperation”, as mentioned by Belt and 
Road News (2019). 
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This reminds us of how China benefited from its good ties with Luxembourg to expand its 
“footprints across Europe” (Zhou, 2019).  
Therefore, and since the pre-mentioned state visit of President Jinping to Prince Albert II, the 
diplomatic ties between the two countries of China and Monaco are being strengthened, which 
is positively affecting the commercial and trade relations that have grown remarkably (Jie, 
2019).  
Since then, the volume of bilateral trade has increased “by a factor of eleven within two 
decades” (Jie, 2019), in addition to a great improvement in terms of cooperation, for it has 
expanded into multiple new areas: “from traditional tourism and cultural industries to mobile 
communications and high-tech fields” as stated by the Monacan minister of Finance and 
Economy, Jean Castellini (Jie, 2019). 
On the other side, and during his multiple state visits to China, Prince Albert II was impressed 
by “the progress in China’s economic, cultural and social development” (Baijie & Desheng, 
2019) and particularly by “the achievements in ecological and environmental conservation” 
(Baijie & Desheng, 2019). 
In addition to what was displayed above, China and Monaco have distinguished educational 
and cultural exchanges also. They usually organize cultural exhibitions and festivals where 
teams and bands from both countries participate reciprocally. 
And finally, it is mandatory to mention that China has announced in March 2019 its 
commitment to strengthen ties and deepen cooperation with Monaco in terms of: 
“environmental protection, climate change, clean energy, low carbon and wildlife protection, 
under the Belt and Road Initiative” (Bo, 2019). 
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6-  China’s Geo-Strategy in Netherlands  
 
In 2014, China and Netherlands have signed a partnership agreement on openness and 
pragmatism, expressing that “China is willing to work with the Netherlands to strengthen high-
level visits and expand cooperation in various areas”, as mentioned by China Daily (2018) in 
a published article which addresses the China-Netherlands relations. 
And since then, the Chinese action in Netherlands has no stop, until it became a direct 
contributor to the development of the local Dutch economy according to an article published 
in September 2018 by China Daily, stating: “Direct investment of Chinese enterprises in the 
Netherlands has contributed to the development of the local economy by increasing 
employment, promoting international trade and accelerating innovation”, according to China 
Daily (2018). 
As per the Chinese perspective, or more specifically, according to the executive director for 
China at Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency Roland Brouwer, Netherlands is very 
strategic and substantial for China, for it constitutes: “an excellent gate for Europe to Chinese 
investors” (China Daily, 2018).  The Netherlands satisfies the distributional position of access 
to Europe for the Chinese, who in turn perform the assembly and production of goods for the 
Dutch (Butter & Hayat, 2011).  This reminds us also of China’s geo-strategy in Luxembourg, 
Belgium and Monaco benefiting from its good ties there to extend its influence and control 
over the entire European continent.  
Furthermore, Chinese banks (Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and 
China Construction Bank) have established their own branches in Netherlands to extend their 
business there, in addition to the creation of 15 000 jobs for the Dutch people due to the 
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establishment of over 680 branches of Chinese companies there (until September 2018) (China 
Daily, 2018). 
These numbers demonstrate the fact that the Chinese business is growing fast in Netherlands, 
and this is definitely due to many geo-strategic reasons and is not done randomly at all … And 
according to the minister and deputy head of mission at the embassy of the Kingdom of 
Netherlands to Beijing Bas Pulles, the ties between these two countries are already strong but 
after adding “business and cooperation in the high tech, pharmaceutical, food, e-commerce 
industries” (China Daily, 2018) we will “see a boom in the near future”, as mentioned by 
China Daily (2018) in a published article about the positive impacts of the Chinese 
investments on the economy of the Netherlands. 
In 2018 statistics according to an article published by China Briefing about the Sino-Dutch 
investment relations and opportunities, China was the second largest non-EU trade partner for 
the Netherlands, and Netherlands was China’s second largest trade partner within the EU 
(Fujino, 2018).  So Netherlands, besides being the “gateway to Europe” as we said before, it 
“plays a key role as a connective logistics hub” (Fujino, 2018) for itself seeks a further 
collaboration and cooperation with China on investment and trade (Fujino, 2018), and this is 
what China continually works on doing, as it falls under the framework of its own national 
interests and goals and commensurate with them.  
 
7-  China’s Geo-Strategy in the United Kingdom  
 
December 2017 was the date of celebrating the “Golden Era” of relations between the United 
Kingdom and China, and both countries have signed then agreements on cooperating more 
closely “in such arenas as financial services, trade and investments” (Turner, 2018).  
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In 2016, “UK was the EU’s top recipient for Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (€ 23 Billion) 
and became then China’s second largest trade partner in Europe (€ 62 Billion)” (Le Corre, 
2018).  In addition to that, China has achieved a “growing presence in the City of London” 
(Le Corre, 2018), and that was due to the business investments it is developing there: stakes 
in the most important companies and entities in UK such as Thames Water, Heathrow, 
Manchester Airports, the Cheesegrater (London’s tallest building), and we should mention 
that the telecommunication infrastructure company, Huawei (considered as a potential threat 
to the U.S. national security) is also on the list and is a “major supplier to British Telecom and 
employs about 1000 staff” (Le Corre, 2018). 
This huge flow of Chinese foreign direct investment to the United Kingdom, has reinforced 
the austerity policy of budget cutting that the Conservative party supports, and therefore has 
helped the party remain in power for many years (Harris, 2017). Moreover, China’s 
intervention in the UK has opened new opportunity frameworks for the British leaders to seek, 
such as an independent foreign policy away from its conventional partners in the North 
Atlantic, which may have also contributed to the decision of the UK to leave the European 
Union (Harris, 2017).  So, this clearly shows the Chinese influence in the UK and its impact 
on the politics of the Western world.   
But relations between both countries have known a dramatic shift due to two main factors: 
The U.S-China trade war (Westcott, 2019), and the EU Brexit decision taken by the UK.  
Knowing that China’s main aim from building good relation with U.K. – other than having 
good trade business and commerce – is to maintain a coherent structure to its influence over 
Europe, and if U.K. leaves EU in the future, this will lead to a decline in their relationship and 
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subsequently to a disruption of China’s ties with the EU, which means creating obstacles on 
its smooth road towards Europe. 
From another perspective, - knowing that more than half of the UK’s trade comes from Europe 
(Westcott, 2019) - the future horizon of UK’s trade with the EU is becoming blurry and 
uncertain day after day due to the Brexit matter (Westcott, 2019).  This instability led the UK 
decision-makers to search wisely for new trading partners as well as new trading opportunities 
(Westcott, 2019), that might be found in China.  
Herein, we can conclude that fluctuations are recently ruling UK-China’s relationship; so we 
should study China’s strategy there far away from the Brexit policy and its consequences 
especially after Boris Johnson’s victory as the prime minister of the UK, who seems amicable 
to China and at the same time aims to build a post-Brexit economy to the UK. 
Thus, in a technical analysis according to the UK Department for Business, Energy, and 
Industrial Strategy (2017), we can find that Britain “excels in basic science, research and in 
innovation”, in addition to being “a technological lead in a range of sectors”; and in its turn 
“China’s particular strengths lie in the innovation of engineering technologies and in new, 
innovative business, with a deep pool of talent and unique infrastructure”, as per the UK 
Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (2017). 
So in a simple cooperation between these two countries strengths, a new combination between 
research and innovation might arise a new China-UK bilateral strategy that deepens their 
collaboration for new “Golden Eras” to come.   
This combination gave birth to a joint strategy, between these two nations, for science, 
technology and innovation cooperation that comprehended all the potential factors between 
them “from research through to the commercialism of new technologies” (UK Department for 
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Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy, 2017), aiming to improve the efforts done in the 
fields of research and innovation to enhance the bilateral competitiveness and effectiveness.  
This new joint strategy marks clearly China’s interests in Britain strong points, and reflects its 
abstract strategy there, and actually leads the way behind many other nations for expanding 
their relationships to the extents of international cooperation. 
So, after the Brexit decision was officially taken, China will not stop prospecting for its geo-
strategic interests in the British mines, in a way that supports the achievement of its main 
grand geo-strategy in the world… 
And now, let us get into China’s strategy overall the American continent…  
D- Overlook on China’s Geo-Strategy in the American Continent 
 
 
          People’s Republic of China is always looking for innovative ways to expand its influence 
and control over the largest number of strategic zones in the world; between these zones is that of 
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1-  Northern America  
 
Figure 13: Geographical Map of North America 
 
 Source: National Geographic, 2019 
 
 
In what is related to the Northern America, geographically including: “the enormous island of 
Greenland in the northeast and the small island countries and territories that dot the Caribbean 
Sea and Western North Atlantic Ocean” (National Geographic, 2019), in addition to the 
United States and Mexico …  In details, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (2018),   
North America is mainly constituted of 23 countries: “Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, United States”. 
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But what interests China the most in that zone, is the Arctic Ocean, Canada, Cuba, Mexico, 
and above all the United States.  
For example, in June 2019 and according to the Caribbean News Now (2019), Cuba and China 
have focused on promoting more friendship after signing a MoU (Memorandum of 
Understanding) to promote economic cooperation in December 2018 (China Daily, 2018) … 
Briefly Peoples’ Republic of China is the “Caribbean nation’s second largest partner with 
strong economic ties and cooperation in multiple sectors such as renewable energies, 
agriculture, tourism, mining, transportation and infrastructure” (China Daily, 2018). 
As for the remaining zones, China’s expansion faces direct competition with its first rival 
mainly the United States of America in that zone… It is for sure not willing to win a full 
hegemony there, neither expanding all its influence and control, but it has certainly many prior 
objectives to achieve: 
 
• Political Objectives:  China aims at consolidating its global influence there, in addition 
to being an alternative recourse for the states that are habituated to have recourse to the 
USA, through offering its funding (Rousset, 2018).  What has also a high political 
influence is the fact that China has two special statuses in two special entities: An 
Observer Status in the OAS (Organization of the American States), and a membership 
in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (Rousset, 2018). 
 
• Geoeconomic Objectives: Beijing looks for different ways to expand its control over 
the resources of that region: the mineral, the energy and the agricultural ones; without 
forgetting its search for new trade markets to its manufactured products (Rousset, 2018) 
…  
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It is also spending money over infrastructures’ investments in that region, and gets 
involved in the evolution of the security system and the upgrade of the 
telecommunications’ one (Rousset, 2018). 
 
 
• Geo-Strategic Objectives: China is always having eyes on each opportunity that might 
arise in that region: if country needs assistance, it raises its hand and take the initiative, 
as it has done that in Haiti, where it has sent a contingent during the UN operations 
there as a peacekeeping mission (United Nations, 2017) …  And geo-strategically 
speaking, China was also able to pursue very important objectives such as acquiring an 
“extra-territorialized base in Patagonia (Argentina) which has the official (and real) 
aim of preparing the sending of a vessel to land on the hidden side of the moon – run 
by the army” (Rousset, 2018).  And as Pierre Rousset stated, this achievement enables 
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2- Southern America 
 
Figure 14: Geographical Map of South America 
Source: National Geographic, 2019 
 
Concerning China’s interests in Southern America’s continent composed from twelve 
countries: “Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falklands Islands, 
French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, 
Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019), an article 
published on the 15th of August 2019 by Carlos Roa in the National Interests magazine 
stated that “the United States is Losing Latin America to China” (Roa, 2019).  Why is that 
happening and how? What is actually pushing China to overcome that huge geographical 
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and political “distance” separating it from South America? And what really lies behind all 
its efforts in there? 
It all started with official bilateral states visits from the Chinese President and South 
American officials and business people (Creutzfeldt, 2019); these steps were able enough 
to build up a large growth in the bilateral trade value from $10 billion in 2000 to almost 
$280 billion in 2015 (Creutzfeldt, 2019). 
China benefited from the financial crisis of 2008 as well, and has enabled sustainable 
economic growth to the countries of the region after it, through increasing its loans and 
FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) there (Creutzfeldt, 2019). 
It is sure that this region holds the fertile lands of resources China needs in applying its 
national and international strategies and guaranteeing its sustainable development 
(Creutzfeldt, 2019); but besides that, and if we look to these countries in a macroscopic 
way, we can see them as a huge market – to be and have the potential to increasingly grow 
through China’s involvement and engagement in their internal economic policies. 
Besides that, and knowing that the majority of this region’s countries are under the United 
States sphere of influence (Creutzfeldt, 2019), and that most of their services: education, 
economy, land ownership, are under the dominance of “powerful elites” sacrificing 
“national interests and environmental concerns for their own priorities” (Creutzfeldt, 
2019), China seizes these “opportunities” to regulate these tendencies and fill in the blank 
caused by the alarming statuses in terms of financial and political stability there. 
Thus, the fact that South America is included in the OBOR initiative is in itself a vital 
confirmation of China’s perspective for the region, for in my opinion, the OBOR clearly 
reflects China’s interests, policies, strategies, and above all future geoeconomic ambitions! 
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Until the date of 29 May 2019, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay 
and Chile have signed China’s Belt and Road Memorandum of Understanding, knowing 
that Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela have also a Double Tax Treaty with China.  
And due to the rapid growth and strength of relations between them, China and the Latin 
American and Caribbean States, have established on the 17th of July 2014, the China-
CELAC Forum: “The Forum of China and Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2016, p.3).  The South American members 
of this forum are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela (Devonshire-Ellis, 2019). 
The main purpose of this forum is to promote “the development of the comprehensive 
cooperative partnership based on equality, mutual benefit and common development 
between China and LAC States” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2016, p.5).  Briefly, 
the forum was established due to the mutual perspective of both parties, and the same 
cooperative vision in terms of partnerships and development opportunities. 
For Beijing, this forum has opened the road to expand and deepen its influence over the 
region from one side, and to reduce that of the United States from the other as well 
(Devonshire-Ellis, 2019).  Herein, Chinese policy makers have stated their strategy 
showing up their intention to double the bilateral trade with the Southern America’s region 
to $500 billion in 2025 in addition to increasing the total investments in the region to $250 
billion in 2025 as well (Devonshire-Ellis, 2019). 
In Argentina, China is providing infrastructure projects; in Chile it is executing an under-
water Fiber-Optic network linking them together; Ecuador has received a reconstruction 
loan of $64 million, and a $30 million non-refundable assistance; Uruguay is benefiting 
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from China’s Belt and Road in terms of agricultural cooperation such as fishing industry, 
food processing and logistics (Devonshire-Ellis, 2019) …  
Here, we can understand why the article mentioned above stated that the United States is 
losing Latin America to China; and this could originally be the main aim for China which 
should not ever be underestimated. 
 
          For concluding, it is clear that China is softly invading the world, through expanding its 
geopolitical control through increasing its geoeconomic influence in each corner of each region of 
it, as it was clarified in this part of dissertation. 
          China has a large influence in Asia (North, South, Central, and West), in Europe (East and 
West), in Africa, in Australia, in the Two Americas; and this is happening while the planet is still 
thinking that the United States is its only ruler and leader… Its advanced and unique geo-strategies 
are offering it access to the achievement of its actual and future geo-strategic ambitions without 
any need for war to fulfill its aims.  
          Beijing is offering enormous investment projects to assist the largest number of countries in 
need for development; no one can assume that it is failing or succeeding in achieving what it is 
seeking; but those huge recent never-ending “battles” between its policy makers and Trump’s 
administration constitute a real evidence justifying China’s geoeconomic strength that is 
threatening the United States’ throne. 
          But, there is a Chess Stone missing in this sensitive Game of Nations between the two kings: 
China and the United States… That Chess Stone should be the Queen who will evidently change 
the path and the destiny of that game… Mother Russia!  We will discuss the Sino-Russian 
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integration in details in the next part of the dissertation, after discussing case studies about Chinese 
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Section 3: Case Studies: Chinese Geo-Strategies in Taiwan and 
India-Pakistan 
 
A- China’s Geo-Strategy in Taiwan  
 
Chinese policymakers has worked on maintaining a distinguished One-China policy, which 
proclaimed that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and countries cannot have relations 
with both China and Taiwan simultaneously”; They have also worked on extending that 
policy to the western hemisphere and Africa as well, through normalizing South Africa’s 
economic relationship with their government as first step. 
And from another side, according to Blackwill and Harris (2017), China has adopted a 
specific policy of sanctions against countries which may engage in measures that support 
Taiwan’s independent status …  In 2010, after the U.S. announcement of selling $6.4 
billion arms to Taiwan, He Yafei, China’s vice foreign minister threatened Ambassador 
Jon Huntsman that Beijing would “impose sanctions against (U.S.) companies that (…) 
engage in arms deliveries to Taiwan” (Browne & Solomon, 2010). 
That official declaration of use of economic sanctions has opened the path for more use of 
sanctions in the future (Reilly, 2012), including import, export, financial or investment 
sanctions…The Chinese government may extend its sanctions towards Taiwan to a level 
where it would reduce its interactions with the latter’s economy, which might create an 
asymmetric vulnerability that exposes Taiwan far more than China (Dean, 2010). 
Most probably, and after many ups and downs in the bilateral relations with Beijing through 
the years, Taipei has become aware of the geoeconomic pressure China can exert upon the 
island; for in 1995, and after the big loss (of 30%) of the total value of a Taiwanese Stock 
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Exchange (TAIEX), China was accused to have a direct hand in that loss… But it has 
officially denied any concrete manipulation, and linked the Taiwanese loss to tense 
political relations at the time (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  However, that reminded Taiwan 
of the huge economic costs of political and diplomatic rupture with China; it is when 
Taiwan first learned an important lesson with the suggestion of President Lee Teng-hui of 
Taiwanese independence: Political ruptures have economic consequences (Blackwill & 
Harris, 2017, p.97). 
Whereby, the real policy of China using geoeconomics in its dealings and relations with 
Taiwan started in 2000, when the Taiwanese President at the time Chen Shui-bian, lifted a 
ban of fifty years on direct trade and investment with Chinese mainland (Blackwill & 
Harris, 2017).  Official governmental reports of Taiwan cited then worries that China 
would use “economic interaction to force political concessions” (Chan, 1996); so Taipei 
was aware of the geopolitical risks that could be entailed by that economic opening, but 
the domestic challenges that were facing its government, such as the unemployment, and 
the worn-out economy had left no other choice for President Chen (Lander, 2001). 
Due to these challenges and risks resulting of political ruptures with China, Taiwan shifted 
from its “no haste, be patient” stance to one of “aggressive opening, effective management” 
which scrapped a long-termed ceiling of $ 50 million on individual investments in China, 
and allowed offshore units of Taiwanese banks to exchange money to and from China 
(Chieh-yu, 2000). 
After President Chen, and since President Ma Ying-jeou got elected in 2008, Taiwan 
initialized a series of special agreements that furthered economic ties and relations with 
China (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  The two countries restored in 2008 the “three direct 
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links”: postal services, trade and transportation across the strait (Ming, 2008); in 2010, they 
have signed The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) under the 
objective of establishing “a systematic mechanism for enhancing cross-strait economic 
cooperation” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.97), through the full elimination of nearly all 
cross-strait trade restrictions and opening markets on their sides in “unprecedented ways” 
(Sui, 2010).  Nowadays, Taiwan has opened more than 400 sectors and made them 
available for Chinese investments that might include manufacturing, services, public 
construction and finance (Cole, 2013).  
We can conclude that the Taiwanese effort on improving the economic ties with China, 
although when it has no other alternative, became a geoeconomic project with benefits for 
both sides (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  President Ma Ying-jeou affirmed that in a late 2013 
interview with the Washington Post, and described the way these new economic policies 
have changed cross-strait relations from a “vicious cycle” into a “virtuous cycle” 
enumerating a long list of economic benefits (Ying-jeou, 2013). 
But after all, no one can deny that these new – customized ties have kept Taiwan in a 
position of dependence on China (Blackwill & Harris, 2017) …  But these gestures were 
inevitable, knowing that the Taiwanese market will be negatively affected by hard Chinese 
geoeconomic consequences, if these gestures have not been adopted. 
The results explain Beijing’s vision in leading its dealings in Taiwan through a 
geoeconomic statecraft: 
1) By 2003, after three years of lifting the ban on direct trade and investment, China 
has replaced the United States, and has become Taiwan’s largest trading partner 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
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2) By 2020, Taiwan is expecting to send approximately 62% of its exports to the 
mainland of China which bolsters its substantial trade surplus with Beijing (U.S. 
Department of State, 2012).  This expectation is already being proven, for Taiwan is 
moving in its direction with China consuming 40% of its exports in 2015 (Rosenthal, 
2015). 
Concerning the Taiwanese Side, and after two months of signing the ECFA with China, 
Singapore expressed its willingness to sign an economic cooperation agreement with 
Taipei, and many other countries have shown their interests in holding talks to 
economically cooperate with it, as President Ma explained (Rosenthal, 2015). 
President Ma has had many statements about the economic cooperation with China, as 
attempts to fend off criticism over Taiwan’s vulnerability to Chinese geoeconomic 
pressure; but it could not be denied that “all paths to economic and political progress run 
through Beijing” (Cabestan & De Lisle, 2014, p.86), as Ma and all the twenty-one trade 
agreements that he signed with China during his first six years in office, made it clear 
(Cabestan & De Lisle, 2014). 
China has taken advantage of Taiwan’s economic dependence on it, and gradually imposed 
its attitude on political and military negotiations (Blackwill & Harris, 2017); during a 
meeting with Taiwan’s envoys in October 2013, the Chinese president Xi Jinping forced 
to reach “a final resolution on Taiwan’s status” and said that the island’s political 
estrangement from the mainland “cannot be passed on from generation to generation” 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017, pp.88-89).  
In fact, Beijing opposed Taipei’s steps towards independence during Chen Shui-bian years 
(2000-2008) who pushed to rewrite the constitution with an emphasis on the island’s 
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independence while allowing greater economic interdependence (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017), pursued the purchase of weapons from the U.S, adopted a name change policy 
dropping the reference to “China” from the names of many companies and enterprises, and 
took many steps aimed at solidifying Taiwan’s independent identity as per China (The 
China Post, 2007). 
Chen election and inauguration has caused many negative hits to the Taiwanese market 
and investments because of concerns that he would inflame the bilateral relations between 
his state and China. However, it is out of discussion that economic and political dependence 
could be separated for any purpose, and Chen’s steps toward political independence of 
Taiwan, has wreaked economic consequences (Chih-yu et al., 2003). 
Herein, Chinese officials had taken many steps as geoeconomic sanctions on Taiwan’s new 
policies: - China has established a ban on investments of pro-Taiwanese-independence 
businessmen (Kastner, 2009); - China has delayed the granting of visas to some Taiwanese 
trying to visit the mainland (Tanner, 2007); - China has boycotted the Computex 2004 
conference in Taipei (Tanner, 2007); - PRC has also targeted specific companies due to 
their ties with Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (TDPP) (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
Chinese have not been ambiguous about these gestures, but they explained honestly that 
their government has not stopped encouraging Taiwan investment in the mainland despite 
the continuous political tension between them, and that the policies they are adopting are 
based on a strong belief that “closer economic ties will benefit and help accelerate eventual 
re-unification of the mainland and Taiwan” (China Daily, 2004) … However, a small 
number of Taiwan’s investors have not respected these policies, and have funded pro-
independence politicians with profits earned from the mainland (China Daily, 2004), which 
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worsened the situation and pushed the former spokesman with the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs 
Office, Zhang Mingqing, to state as per China Daily (2004) that “Beijing does not welcome 
people who make money on the mainland and return to Taiwan to support independence”. 
After the reelection of President Chen in 2004, Beijing adopted new kind of geoeconomic 
policies towards the Taiwanese: It offered economic carrots to farmers in rural southern 
Taiwan who might be interested in gaining access to the Chinese market (Wei, 2013); it 
also allowed importing 18 types of Taiwanese fruits and gave duty-free status to fruit 
exports, in addition to its promise to ensure that custom clearance, inspection, and 
quarantine procedures were expedited (Wei, 2013). 
This was still the case, until the President Ma Ying-jeou was elected in 2008, and the 
TAIEX stock prices soared directly, what reflects the Chinese approval on the country’s 
investments (Bradsher, 2008) …  The fast use of Chinese geoeconomics could be easily 
detected here, for as Beijing has been quick with geoeconomic sanctions toward the pro-
independence administration, it has also shown a quick use of geoeconomic ways to reward 
the Taiwanese choice of leadership in their new President Ma (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  
A new Chinese geoeconomic approach has emerged: “The more economic 
interdependence there is between the two sides, the less likely Taiwan’s bid for 
independence becomes” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.100).  And this vision was supported 
by President Ma, and proved by the signing of a cross-strait swap pact in August 2012, 
which has opened the path for China to use monetary policy in order to influence the 
Taiwanese behavior globally (Wu, 2013). 
Four Chinese state-owned banks have issued in late 2013 the Renminbi-denominated bonds 
known as “Formosa Bonds”, as a booster to the Taiwanese bond market; and have also set 
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a precedent for other mainland Chinese issuers (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  The first 
issuance of these bonds, with combined values of RMB 4 billion, has helped China to get 
a border access to offshore Renminbi funds while the Formosa bonds market continues to 
develop (Song, 2013).  In other words, the reason of these Chinese efforts in currency – 
either with the issuance of the Formosa bonds, or with the swap agreement – seems to be 
purely economic (Wu, 2013); but that does not really matter from the Taiwanese 
perspective, as for them, when the case is related with the dealings with China, it is the 
“contingencies” that matter (Blackwill & Harris, 2017), because they cannot face any 
significant fluctuation in the Renminbi’s exchange rate - for average Taiwanese citizens 
are including Renminbi as part of their assets – that might undermine the financial stability 
of Taiwan (Wu, 2014).  This was a statement done by an economist at National Taiwan 
University, Kenneth Lin, who also said that: “With the Renminbi’s exchange rate 
controlled by the government rather than decided by the free market, Beijing could wield 
it as a weapon” (Wu, 2014). 
Another geoeconomic policy has been applied as the 2012 presidential elections in Taiwan 
approached, especially that China was aware that finding reliable friends across the strait 
was a hard mission, so it worked on the reelection of Ma (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  That 
policy aimed to execute another agricultural purchase from Taiwan; and a company based 
in Wuhan signed then a letter of intent to buy 200 tons of Taiwanese Milkfish and Milkfish 
products within two years (Blackwill & Harris, 2017) …  This geoeconomic gesture does 
not only visualize helping President Ma to win the elections, but in its latent objectives, it 
was targeting farmers who are concentrated in a part of the island that historically supports 
Taiwanese independence and favors Ma’s rival party: the Democratic Progressive Party 
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(Taipei Times, 2011); Meanwhile, it was implemented in order to support the Chinese 
government in attaining its geopolitical goals concerning the reunification with Taiwan 
deterring the liberalization waves showing up in the country.  
But, despite China’s failure in influencing the voters to elect Ma through that policy – 
because of the fanfare about how much money does its government spend on buying 
milkfish from Taiwan that offended its citizens’ sense of dignity (Yu, 2012) – one of 
Taiwan’s leading newspaper cautioned against dismissing China’s geoeconomic tactics, 
for they might be heavy-handed as they were before (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
But what was really surprising then, was not that China attempted to “buy” geoeconomic 
influence, or that its efforts literally failed but rather that Chinese leaders had a visit to the 
Taiwanese province to understand the cause behind that failure (Blackwill & Harris, 2017)!   
This step was explained by the deputy Chairman of the Taiwan Affairs Office, Du Yu, by 
the evidence that “Beijing is always learning, always seeking out ways to hone its 
geoeconomic techniques” (Yu, 2012). 
Chinese goals were not easily achieved in Taiwan, due to the late awareness of its citizens 
towards the vulnerability of their state to Chinese geoeconomic pressure, and the mass 
manifestations that erupted in Taipei in March 2014 rallying against the acceleration of the 
cross-strait services trade agreement (Spangler, 2014).  However, China has not 
surrendered, nor has it restricted itself to incentives and rewards only; but the patriotic 
Chinese army of hackers has used cyber warfare to attack Taiwanese government and 
infrastructure networks, to disrupt or paralyze Taiwan’s financial, transportation, shipping, 
military and other networks, as mentioned in the newspaper Liberty Times (2000).  These 
attacks convinced Taipei that “a targeted, coordinated cyber-attack could alter the strategic 
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calculus, possibly determining the tactical landscape before a kinetic Chinese military 
operation aimed at reunification” (Hsiao, 2013, p.11). 
What interests us here is that the use of geoeconomic instruments, such as “the far-reaching 
use of trade, investment, monetary policy, cyber warfare, aid and the threat of sanctions 
has helped prevent Taiwanese independence and supported regime behavior favorable to 
Beijing” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.102).  These results will definitively encourage 
Beijing to continue in its distinguished path using different geoeconomic tools and means 
to influence Taipei, and to gradually attain its main geopolitical goal in the island: the 
reunification (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
The vulnerability of Taiwan to the Chinese geoeconomic actions turns this country to be a 
foreign Chinese zone of capabilities by itself, due to “the financial center that Taiwan 
represents to the world” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.102), and the international jostle with 
its competitors Washington, Tokyo, or others in order to achieve one’s national goals and 
deter Beijing from taking Taiwan and walk its trajectory toward the gradual reunification… 
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B-  China’s Geo-Strategy in India-Pakistan  
 
After displaying China’s strategic management of its geopolitical interests in Taiwan, it is 
necessary to show up how it manages its geopolitical interests in India-Pakistan, knowing 
that there is a special triangular relation that distinguishes this case from any other as 
mentioned before.  
That triangular relation had grown deeper, but also had held with its growth more complex 
interactions and interests. 
Because of this growth and complexity, the triangle has come to rely more on geoeconomic 
strategies (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  As per Blackwill and Harris (2017), three main 
factors determine the fact of Geoeconomics being a “preferred medium of influence” 
(p.102) in the geo-strategies, among China – Pakistan – India: 
1- Chinese leaders refuse to escalate military tensions and rivalries in order to expand 
their nation’s influence in India and Pakistan - for these means will absolutely draw in 
the U.S. - therefore, - and learning from their “military” past and its substantial lessons 
- they “naturally” rely on geoeconomics to complete this mission (Macfie, 2013).  The 
lessons China has learned from its military policies to expand its influence in Pakistan, 
and from its contribution in building this country’s defense potential after the U.S 
embargo on weapons then, has helped its government to conclude that any cooperation 
with Pakistan will cause a negative reaction from the United States (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017). 
2- The second factor that “obliges” China to focus on geoeconomic assets in its relations 
with both countries is that India – due to its growth averages and global ambitions for 
more than a decade – has become “economically and politically valuable to China to 
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risk intensifying tensions” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.121).  Especially that many 
experts had expected then, that New Delhi will overtake Beijing in real growth in 2016 
(Crabtree & Mallet, 2015), but that has not happened. Despite that, no one can deny 
the massive economic power of both of India and China, which is not stopping to grow 
day after day; meanwhile no one can deny that any Sino-Indian economic cooperation 
might represent a potent challenge to the United States privileges (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017).  This bilateral cooperation between China and India, reminds us of the BRICS 
- a project of cooperation between each of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa, which is at its core a large geoeconomic strategy facing that of NATO. 
3- The limitation on China’s more traditional military assets might indirectly be the third 
reason behind China’s reliance on geoeconomics in its relations with Pakistan 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  It is well known that the United States had blocked any 
military relationship with Pakistan in the last epoch, and had overshadowed the Chinese 
military contribution there since the 9/11 (U.S. Department of State, 2014), by 
consolidating their bilateral relations (US – Pakistan) through collaborating in the War 
on Terror (Jetly, 2012). 
Moreover, the United States had designated Pakistan as a main “Non-NATO ally”, and 
had put a large economic and military aid to represent a “front-line state in the war on 
terror” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.122). 
Herein, Chinese leaders had found that their government could not match U.S military 
aid levels that totaled from 2002 to 2012: $ 15.8 billion (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013) - 
knowing that China was known as “Pakistan’s primary supplier of sophisticated 
military technology” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.122) - that is why they considered 
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that China will gain more strategic influence in Pakistan through its geoeconomic 
means (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  
It can be plainly put here that there is an external force which stimulates the execution of 
all the dealings between the three countries of the strategic triangle, and that force is 
certainly the United States… 
This choice of geoeconomic geo-strategy was not only due to intuition, but because of the 
potential that China has in the region, which enables it to practice geoeconomic influence 
in its deals with India and Pakistan (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  As per Blackwill and 
Harris (2017), this potential has been formed due to “China's asymmetric trade relations 
(China is the largest partner for both India and Pakistan), heavy assistance levels in the 
case of Pakistan, and sporadic investments in the region” (pp.123-124). 
These Chinese geoeconomic policies are accurately exercised, and the following examples 
aim to explain how that mission has been accomplished:  
• China’s Xinjiang province has borders with Pakistan, and in March 2012, the Party 
chairman of this province castigated the ties between the extremist groups of Xinjiang 
and Taliban forces in Pakistan (Dasgupta, 2012).  For its part, Pakistan has not 
succeeded in persuading China that it will deny the export of extremism across its 
borders (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  Herein, China signaled its dissatisfaction by 
stopping the ongoing financing for a pipeline of gas promised to be expanded from Iran 
to Pakistan (Pantucci, 2012).  
• From another perspective, China always aims to keep Pakistan in its sphere of influence 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017), and that is why it does not lose any opportunity to present 
its incentives in its dealings with Pakistan (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  The “China-
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Pakistan Economic Corridor” is one of Beijing’s efforts towards Pakistan – to keep its 
leverage on it – and it is also the centerpiece of its famous OBOR Initiative (One Belt 
One Road Initiative) … The total investment of $ 46 billion in this “Corridor”, as per 
the prime minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, was “an example of the very close 
friendship between the two countries” (Aftab, 2014).  Even many other Pakistani 
officials have considered this initiative as “the game changer for the entire region” 
(Menon, 2014). 
China’s geoeconomic leverage was outstanding in this specific initiative which included 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017): 
a- Promises of enhancement of the Pakistani transportation and trade through 
constructing an airport at the port of Gwadar, built and managed by China; 
b- Renovating roads and upgrading the rail system between Lahore and Karachi; 
c- Transforming Gwadar into a major international oil port between the Middle East 
and East Asia; 
d- Building a new nuclear power plant near Karachi; 
e- Modeling new specialized economic zones after China’s Shanghai free trade zone. 
In this project’s plan, the Corridor generates at Gwadar, passes by the Karakoram Highway 
in Pakistan, then goes on to the Pak-China border and on to Urumqi and Western China 
(Blakcwill & Harris, 2017).  As estimated, this corridor will not only bring geoeconomic 
leverage for China over Pakistan, but will also be the path of more than one-quarter of 
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              Figure 15: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
 
Source: Aamir, 2018 
 
China’s leverage through that corridor (when accomplished) will expand over the entire 
region… Even when Gwadar port was built by China, it was intended to be “a nexus 
between Pakistan, Iran, China and Central Asian States” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.124); 
through this step, the port will be under the control of the COPHC (China Overseas Ports 
Holding Company), in order to ensure that the expansive corridor will stay firmly within 
China’s sphere of influence, as stated by the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(2015) … 
In their turn, Indian security officials doubted in the good intentions of China from this 
plan, and considered that the Chinese government is aiming to increase its economic 
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leverage in South Asia, and feared that Gwadar port was intended to be used as “one of a 
string of Chinese-financed ports in the region, where [the Chinese] navy could seek shelter 
and supplies as it expands operations in the Indian Ocean” (Page, 2014). 
We cannot deny that the Indian officials are totally right in their fear of the intentions of 
China, and that is because China always has undeclared hidden goals in any project it plans 
and aims to execute… For example, one of its hidden targets from the New Silk Road 
initiative is to decrease its dependence on maritime trade routes that are under the control 
of the United States (Blackwill & Harris, 2017) …   This can help us understand that 
China’s major strategy in the region is to link land and maritime routes, and to minimize 
the distance of any maritime leg of Chinese shipping, as Thomas Vien analyzed in his study 
“The Grand Design of China’s New Trade Routes” (Vien, 2015). 
Herein, the CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor), will allow Chinese products to be 
exported overland to Pakistan, which might be helpful, before arriving to Europe through 
the Gwadar, port constructed and controlled by China (Blackwill & Harris, 2017). 
And besides that corridor, China has always applied the same geostrategy in Pakistan, most 
of all in the energy projects: 
• In 2013, Beijing accepted a deal of $ 9 billion, to construct two nuclear power plants 
of 1100 megawatt in Karachi “financed largely through a concessional loan from 
China” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.125); 
• In 2015, after a wave of heat in the summer that claimed around 2000 Pakistani lives, 
Beijing took advantage of that “opportunity” and stated that it would build a power line 
of 2000 km from the province of Xinjiang to Lahore as a support to the Pakistani 
surcharged power grid (Haider & Anis, 2015). 
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From the Pakistani point of view, the Chinese projects are a win-win game, and even the 
Pakistani government has done big efforts to improve security and stability in the areas 
where China is willing to invest, which are areas seeking the Chinese investment in fact… 
This improvement is by the end of the day, a real prevail for China in Pakistan, which 
considers according to its official that “the success of the Economic Corridor depends on 
stability” (Page, 2014). 
Geoeconomically speaking, China does not respond to any crisis or problem that broke out 
in Pakistan in a traditional way, and its sway or dominance has technically improved over 
the years; it even stopped to grant cash outright if the receiving government in Islamabad 
does not guarantee structural reforms (Perlez, 2008). 
China has always been a resort for Islamabad; in the financial crisis of 2008, the U.S.A and 
many other global nations were preoccupied by their own financial problems, and the 
traditional ally for Pakistan, K.S.A has also refused to offer it oil concessions… That is 
why Islamabad has again seen China “as the last port of call before the IMF” (Blackwill & 
Harris, 2017, p.127). 
On the other side, China’s “tough” geoeconomic policies aim more at India than Pakistan, 
to undermine the political will of India related to territorial conflicts along the Sino-Indian 
border (Blackwill & Harris, 2017) …  In 2009, Beijing stopped a multilateral aid of $ 9 
billion to India due to tensions that broke up around a region governed by India but claimed 
by China: Arunachal Pradesh (Blair, 2009).  
Due to large consequences on its course of events, India began lately to adopt 
geoeconomics-led foreign policy (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  Indian Prime Minister 
Narednar Modi, who took office in 2014, was the leader of this shift of style towards 
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geoeconomics in India, as he considers that economic fundamentals are the surest way on 
which the country could expand power and influence (Blackwill & Harris, 2017).  In one 
of his speeches in October 2013, Modi stated that: “I believe a strong economy is the driver 
of an effective foreign policy” (Jaishankar, 2014) ...  Many experts had analyzed then that 
the statements and intentions of Modi to turn India into a geoeconomic country are partly 
a response and reaction to China’s own geoeconomic statecraft (Balázs, 2015). 
When Modi took office, things got harder for China; and it could not step into the breach 
previously caused by Modi’s predecessors (Bagga, 2014); Modi’s government billed an 
upgrade to the long-standing Indian approach “Look East”, and transformed it into “Act 
East” policy, which aimed to “remedy any regional vacuum left by the previous 
government” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.126).  
This new approach was analyzed by the Indian media and considered as a policy that 
strengthens “strategic and economic ties with Southeast Asian countries that would 
possibly act as a counterweight to the influence of China in the region” (Jacob, 2014). 
Bilateral relations have become difficult between China and India; especially that Modi 
has declared at his swearing ceremony, in its strategy of resetting India’s relations with its 
neighborhood that he aims to secure the participation of most South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation leaders (including Pakistan’s prime minister Nawaz Sharif), and 
chose Bhutan – a country courted by China – as his first foreign destination after taking 
office (Sahoo, 2014). 
But no one can deny the mutual interests and benefits of good economic ties between China 
and India, knowing that both countries are aware that they are in mutual need for each 
other: China needs the big Indian market, and India needs the Chinese investments to 
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accomplish transit, infrastructure and many other projects essential to its economic revival, 
as Sahoo (2014) explained ...  Herein, it appears clearly, that these neighbors consider 
economics as “a means of anchoring relations amid rising geopolitical struggles” 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.126).  That is why New Delhi chose TRADE to be the 
centerpiece of its policy towards Beijing, despite the acrimony over borders and the 
geopolitical rivalry in the region (Sahoo, 2014). 
Driven by concerns over China’s tough geoeconomic policies, India’s priority is to try to 
rely on good economic ties with the United States and its allies in the region (Blackwill & 
Harris, 2017); Modi’s efforts are to pave routes of trade for India, and to strengthen ties 
with big powers necessary to India’s economic revival and geopolitical rise (Kabraji, 
2012).  
In a strong bilateral act from India’s and United States of America’s part, Modi and 
President Obama agreed on a joint statement of cooperation on plants to “integrate the 
subcontinent with the markets of East Asia through an Indio-Pacific Economic Corridor” 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p.127).  This project’s proposal reminds us of the pre-mentioned 
CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), and it is also similar to China’s project to 
build a maritime silk road linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans… So India tries to face its 
own concerns over China’s influence in the region by taking its first steps with the Support 
of the United States to build its own maritime silk road (Balázs, 2015). 
 
          Briefly, and after discussing two main examples of China’s geoeconomic displays in Asia: 
Taiwan and the strategic triangle China – India – Pakistan, we can conclude that China’s foreign 
geoeconomic geo-strategies lie in the hidden layers of its geoeconomic assets and policies, and 
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could be summed up by the ability of these policies to intimidate their competitors, and to threaten 
them, through employing geoeconomics as a tool to pursue a large range of targets locally, 
regionally and globally; knowing that a superpower which seeks international control must go for 
it gradually.   
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Part III: Integration Between China and Russia in Eurasia 
 
Chapter 1: Russian Interests in Eurasia 
Chapter 2: Cooperation or Competition Between China and Russia in Eurasia? 
Chapter 3: An Empirical Analysis – Bringing Together Convergent and Divergent 
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Chapter 1: Russian Interests in Eurasia 
 
          As Zbigniew Brzezinski stated, Eurasia is the Great Chessboard where all the superpowers 
turn into being competitors, for this zone of the world attracts their geo-strategic ambitions and 
reflects the real balance of world power measuring and indicating the authentic levels of those 
competitors.  
          This is the main cause behind choosing Eurasia as a scale to measure the Sino-Russian 
integration “degrees” either in cooperating or in competing over interests and strategic objectives. 
          If we contemplate the geographical location of the Eurasian continent, we become aware 
that it is located in a specific center on the planet, which causes a geopolitical impact beyond its 
regional domain, turning it out to be the center of the world. 
          Herein we can conclude that this region does not constitute a strategic depth for only one 
nation, but superpowers, even those far away geographically – such as the United States – are 
competing between themselves on the “vital and dynamic depths” they are seeing in its lands… 
Thus, if this fact is applicable on the distant nation, what will be the case of the near ones? More 
specifically those located in its geographical arena, on its true lands: China and Russia. 
          This will evidently cause many ups and downs in the built-up relations between these two 
countries, knowing that the game of interests flips all equations, and requires at its end a full 
operation of reconstruction and rehabilitation, where new global, regional and national balances 
and rivals enter as milestones introducing another game of geopolitics… 
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          This new game will produce new potential of influence to the resulting winner, where the 
winning phase will depend on the competitors’ geo-strategies and their turn in the future 
geopolitical reconstruction of the world order… 
          Therefore, the hardest step in winning this nations’ game is to expand one’s control over the 
Eurasian Nation, which guarantees in its turn the ability to control the destinies of the entire world.  
          To understand how this game is being played, we must first have a clear perspective in terms 
of the Russian geopolitical interests in the Eurasian continent, so we could after that, compare 
them with China’s pre-mentioned ones in the second chapter of the previous part of this thesis, to 
know if there is a conflict or a mating in their interests; in a way that assists us in elaborating the 
second chapter of this part, that will in turn study the reality of the Sino-Russian relations in terms 












UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





Section 1: Russian Interests in Eurasia 
 
          The main task Russia is looking for achieving in the Eurasian continent is to “meet pragmatic 
goals in the fields of security and development” (Timofeev & Alekseenova, 2015, p.12) … In the 
framework of this task we can conclude its main geopolitical and geoeconomic interests there. 
 
A- The Economic and Human “Resources and Energies” 
 
Knowing that its local resources either in the economic or the personnel terms are limited and 
dependent on different foreign factors, Russia’s policies and foreign diplomacy prudently 
concentrates on “collecting them” through producing the “greatest possible number of friendly 
or neutral neighbors” (Timofeev & Alekseenova, 2015, p.12), especially that the geopolitical 
competition does not have an end in that region which is very rich in all kinds of resources and 
energies. And if that geopolitical competition gets extended, these resources will be dispersed 
and therefore “the force that Russia can bring to bear will also be dispersed, and the country 
will fall behind” (Timofeev & Alekseenova, 2015, p.12).  
Herein, another interest sheds its light on the fact that if not having friendly neighbors, at least 
neutral ones that do not negatively affect the regional stability and participate in the 
competition wave, which might produce more pressure and tension on Russia and threaten the 
majority of its interests in Eurasia.  
Through the newly-produced “circle of friends”, Russia could strongly face any kind of threats 
to its security or national interests, and have partners that will ally together and invest in their 
efforts to solve any problem of development they might face because of the pre-mentioned 
geopolitical competition.  
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Therefore, Russia tries to face the competition by a counter-coalition to snuff-out and 
extinguish its negative impact… And if a coalition is not possible, Russia works on maintaining 
the existing status of neutrality of the remaining parties, which if they took a negative step 
against Russia’s vision, might affect the developed strategy of achieving its objectives and 
goals in the region.  
 
B-  The Region’s Stability  
 
The fact that many fundamental regions of Eurasia - Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia - are 
always under stress of instability, might cause Russia’s grappling with a chaos. Especially that 
these countries are considered as extensive ones, which increases the threat of descending 
Russia into Chaos. Many social problems will arise then: drug trafficking, spontaneous 
migration, terrorism, and illegal use of weapons (Timofeev & Alekseenova, 2015, p.13). 
Russia finds itself here as the responsible of the region’s stability, for the instability will be 
affecting its national security and interests before anyone else. And from another perspective, 
Russia has to show up as the security provider for the weak and instable states of the Eurasian 
region, requesting from its government to deploy its forces along their borders in order to 
prevent any threat from sneaking into their lands.  
This will be an added-value for Russia, a new strength point that will be added to its list, 
increasing its potential of influence and control in the region, due to the status of security it is 
ensuring for the states in need. 
While there are gaps in the systems and mechanism of preventing any security threat from 
occupying their lands, Russia works on filling the gaps of these weak countries of Eurasia and 
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removing the main causes behind turning their lands into grounds of social disorders, terrorism, 
and extremism threatening their stability. 
By assisting its neighbors in reaching stability, Russia will evidently increase its power and 
protect its borders from any kind of security threats, besides empowering its regional influence 
and control over the Eurasian lands.     
 
C- The Common Development Theory 
 
Having been given that Russia is not a country that encourages internal or external system 
changes and amendments; in other words, Russia is mainly a status-quo power, and not a 
revisionist one: “Whereas revisionists seek to change the way things are in international 
politics, status-quo seekers strive to preserve things as they are” (Davidson, 2006, p.1). 
Therefore, Russia prevents internal changes in policies, and supports conservative forces to 
prevent any political difficulty from releasing and threatening its national security. 
Thus, in order to become more effective and efficient, Russian policy makers thought to find 
other ways to preserve their stability and prevent future problems, especially after the colored 
revolutions that occurred in Ukraine and Central Asia – Russia’s neighborhood.  
These new pragmatic strategies turned around supporting projects of infrastructure in both 
Russia and its neighboring countries, through sharpening the huge edges between them in a 
way that removes any barrier blocking the free movement of capital, goods, services and 
manpower (Reduction of transaction costs); this will lead to a proper common development in 
the region, through unifying the economic standards there and increasing the world market 
competitiveness. 
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Therefore, when the neighbor countries in Eurasia witness that Russian policy makers are 
treating them as they are treating their own country in its internal economic and developmental 
policies, they will definitely accept the implementation of that theory named as common 
development; this is because there are really common development projects between them, 
implemented reciprocally.   
The major example of global initiatives inducing developmental projects in the region is the 
construction of the Silk Road routes which are traversing the Southern regions of Russia and 
Central Asian countries; since the new routes are passing by the region, the development 
projects will be definitively accompanying them. 
Hence, Russia – the country that does not have direct outlet to the warm waters - benefitted 
from a valuable competitive advantage in transporting cargo overland from Western China to 
Europe, and that has also had a positive impact on both China and Europe through saving their 
times in terms of exports and imports.  
Therefore, new infrastructure is constructed in Russia’s Southern region due to that Silk Road 
project, new working opportunities took places, and new possibilities are being spelled in order 
to expand markets through the routes of the Silk Road. 
Russia’s other fundamental interests in Eurasia is to develop a base of firm economic 
foundations for cooperation with its partners there, under the theory stating that “if integration 
yields real economic benefits, it will inevitably serve to strengthen political ties between 
acknowledged equals” (Timofeev & Alekseenova, 2015, p.13). And we can add to this theory 
that when Russia holds good political and diplomatic ties with its partners in the Eurasian 
Region, it will inevitably affect their common underdeveloped ground in a positive way to 
overcome it. 
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D- Inter-Regional Cooperation Institutions 
 
The step following the process of the Eurasian integration, will be that of external expansion, 
where Russia and its partners will put all their efforts to benefit from the possibility of 
developing new political and economic ties with new countries outside the Eurasian borders, 
that will pave them the path for future cooperation.  
One main example of this inter-regional expansion is that of the FTA with Vietnam stipulated 
in 2015, and many other countries started negotiating chances to join the agreement, such as 
Egypt recently, knowing that the bilateral exchanges between Egypt and Russia are recently 
increasing in a way that forced them to build cooperation ties in terms of investments and 
infrastructure projects in the first place. 
A second major example of inter-regional cooperation involves Russian relations with the EU 
especially that the recent Eurasian economic integration has a huge chance to lead to a 
renaissance in the bilateral relations between Russia and the EU. 
And since Russia is a major member of the EEU (Eurasian Economic Union) – in addition to 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan – (World Data, n.d.), the standards and 
principles stipulated in the EEU alliance, including: “sovereign equality of the member-states, 
respect to the specifics of the political set-up of the members to the association, ensuring the 
mutual benefit in the cooperation, observing the market economy principles and its functioning 
(as a rule) without exemptions and restrictions” (Greater Europe, 2017);  these standards 
eventually affected the cooperation opportunities between the European countries and those 
members in the EEU.  
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So the major interest that Russian policymakers are working on consists of deepening the 
Eurasian integration, for as it deepens, the European countries will direct their economic 
policies towards it and its neighbors in a way that convenes with its geopolitical interests.  
Therefore, the EU and the EEU has to create a forum for discussing the political differences 
between them, and upon the results develop a detailed and fixed cooperation strategy. 
It is extremely possible that the Eurasian integration processes, such as that of the EEU, will 
positively affect the idea of “a common space from Lisbon to Vladivostok: that is a greater 
Europe or a greater Eurasia” (Khristenko, 2015). 
 
          To conclude, Russia’s interests in Eurasia – and especially after the cold war, the epoch of 
deterioration – fall under one main title: Its reputation as a constructive partner… 
          All the pre-mentioned interests, starting by investing in the economic and human resources 
and energies of Eurasia, passing by maintaining the region’s stability and implementing the 
common development theory, and down to establishing the inter-regional cooperation institutions 
are all about Russia’s main needs to rebuild its image as an “equal, constructive, and reliable 
partner” from a side, in addition to “throw off its reputation as a state that threatens weaker 
neighbors and nourishes imperial ambitions towards the former republics of the USSR” (Timofeev 
& Alekseenova, 2015, p.15). 
          Russia works on demonstrating its strength through the development projects, knowing that 
it has failed to do so through media and soft power because of the Western huge information 
system… But what affects Russia’s task and make it very accurate is the fact that China, the master 
of soft power, is geographically located in its neighboring, in the same Eurasian region. 
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         Does the fact that China is Russia’s neighbor facilitates realizing Russia’s objectives and 
targets, or make them more difficult to achieve? This is what will be clarified in the upcoming 
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Section 2: Conflict of Sino-Russian Interests in Eurasia 
 
         At the time when Russia and China are rising or re-emerging as major powers, it is inevitable 
and natural that bilateral conflicts emerge on their path due to similarity of interests in Eurasia… 
This similarity definitely increases the competition level between these two Eurasian powers, 
where they invest in their interests and develop them as a prior step to achieve their regional and 
international objectives simultaneously.  
          In view of this, the most appropriate methodology to understand the Sino-Russian Eurasian 
Interests’ status is the comparative one, knowing that we have already discussed in details China’s 
interests in Eurasia in the previous part of the dissertation, in addition to Russia’s interests in 
Eurasia in the previous chapter of this part of the dissertation. 
          Therefore, the upcoming paragraphs will compare between the interests of these two nations 
in Eurasia, to conclude what are the similar ones and wether the conflict of interests exist, in a way 
that clarifies the situation before the final chapter of the thesis discusses the reality of competition 
or cooperation between China and Russia in Eurasia. 
          Thus, a clear table displaying each nation’s major interests in Eurasia will be developed in 
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Table 2: Chinese and Russian Interests in Eurasia 
Chinese Interests in Eurasia  Russian Interests in Eurasia 
1) The Vacuum of Influence  1)   The Region’s Stability 
2) The Map of the OBOR Initiative  2)   Common Development Theory 
3) Natural Resources  3)   Economic and Human Resources 
4) Safe and Secure Borders  4)   Inter-Regional Cooperation Institutions 
 
          This table clearly shows the similarities and differences between the Sino-Russian interests 
in Eurasia, but it is necessary to go deep in the geopolitical meaning of each one of them compared 
to the other so we might conclude the inner essence of their bilateral relation as a prelude to the 
next and final chapter of the dissertation showing up the competition or cooperation between China 
and Russia over the Eurasian Continent.  
 
A- Interest Number 1  
 
          China’s first major interest in Eurasia is to fill in the vacuum of influence existing in 
the Eurasian supercontinent, for there is no focal influencer there, and it is impossible for 
Eurasian nations other than China, such as Russia, India or even Japan to do the job as 
demonstrated in the previous part of the dissertation…  
That makes China’s dream of dominating the throne of Eurasia’s leadership, to begin from 
filling in that gap or vacuum of influence existing there. 
          As for Russia’s first major geopolitical interest in the region, it is about maintaining 
its stability to prevent any threat from arising and descending Moscow into chaos and 
affecting its national security. 
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So in the same context of that of China, Russia works on providing assistance to its weak 
neighbors, in a way that leads to stabilizing the whole region, strengthening the weak 
governments, and preventing any threat from sneaking into its lands. 
          So, either through filling the gap of influence, or through maintaining the region’s 
stability, China and Russia are seeking geopolitical control over the Eurasian lands in a 
way that benefits them from existing gaps and faults, and standing up steadily to deploy 
their forces and powers (hard or soft) wherever and whenever in need. 
          So this first interest (as well as the upcoming ones) constitutes a valuable material 
for the following chapter, and analyzing it will shed lights on the Sino-Russian zones of 
cooperation from one site and competition from the other.   
 
B-  Interest Number 2  
 
          Concerning the second geopolitical interest of China related to the map of the OBOR 
initiative, we could say that this is an “extending” interest aiming for geopolitical and 
geoeconomic expansion from the Chinese lands and seas to the European ones, through 
building many infrastructure projects across Eurasia to encourage trade, in addition to 
strengthening its relations with Europe as the second pole of the Eurasian region.  
Through pragmatically investing in this geopolitical interest, China could ensure its 
geoeconomic control over the supercontinent of Eurasia from its two sides East and West!  
          As for Russia, the corresponding geopolitical interest is that of implementing the 
common development theory all over the Eurasian lands generally, and with its 
neighboring countries specifically… It turned out that this interest became a geo-strategy 
through supporting many infrastructure projects internally and regionally (with the 
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neighbors) in a way that helps in erasing the differences between them and free out the 
movement of services, human power, capital and goods. 
Russia here spreads unified economic standards in its neighborhood, knowing that it is 
applying these same standards in its own internal economic policies. This theory increases 
the trust of the region’s countries in Russia’s policies, and therefore, increases Russia’s 
control over it.   
 
C- Interest Number 3  
 
          Starting with China, accessing and investing in Eurasia’s natural resources and raw 
materials constitute the third main geopolitical interest for its policymakers… In order to 
face any probable deficiency in resources in the future, they focus on Eurasia as “a source 
of major energy resources, water, and food” (Cohen, 2003). 
This created an additional reason to cooperate with Eurasian countries, and above them all 
Russia, for most of China’s imports of resources (1/3) come from Russia… To achieve its 
aims, China started building a network of railroads and pipelines to impose its influence 
over Eurasia, and ensure its access to natural resources and energies whenever needed. 
          And as per Russia, accessing the economic and human resources and energies, is the 
third main geopolitical interest to “fight for”; and the reason behind this, is that its local 
resources in both the economic and personnel terms are limited and unstable… Russia 
works on “collecting” them through diplomatic and friendly ties with the countries of its 
neighborhood… And when the “circle of friends” is created, Russia can maintain an 
evident access to resources from the region, even when the geopolitical competition 
arises… So it is fundamental for Russia to have “partners” around its borders, in a way that 
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prevents threats to its national security and interests, in addition to providing support to 
any one of them that might find any kind of threat in the same context. 
If a partnership is not possible, safeguarding the neutrality status could also prevent a 
negative impact from arising against Russia’s operations and goals in the region. 
 
D- Interest Number 4 
 
          Maintaining safe and secure borders is China’s fourth main geopolitical interests in 
Eurasia, in order to invoke its intervention in the region, and combat the majority of the 
security threats against it…  
Through intervening in that way and protecting its national security at the same time, China 
was able to expand its geopolitical control over the threatened countries in the region, and 
protect its interests there from any probable danger that might occur.  
          In contrary, concerning Russia’s fourth interest, it is all about a jointly external 
expansion outside Eurasia through mutually developing with its partners, new political and 
economic ties with countries outside the Eurasian borders, in order to take further steps 
towards future collaboration and cooperation. 
For that aim, the EEU and many other cooperation institutions were established, and many 
agreements were developed like the Free Trade Agreements recently under process with 
Vietnam and Egypt… These policies push the interested countries to build cooperation ties 
with Russia (and its partners) from one side, and reinforce the pre-built political and 
economic ties with its partners from the other.  
Through investments and infrastructure projects, needy countries are mostly attracted; and 
this could pave the road behind Russia’s intervention in their internal policies, and 
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therefore extending its control over their lands under the pretext of cooperation and 
development.  
 
          After displaying China’s and Russia’s main geopolitical interests in Eurasia, we can 
conclude that the two countries have large similarities in their way of thinking to elaborate different 
convenient strategies aiming at investing in and protecting their geopolitical interests in Eurasia. 
          While China works on filling the gaps or vacuum of influence existing in Eurasia, Russia 
from its side puts all its efforts to maintain the region’s stability… The two interests are different 
in appearance but similar in results: expanding control all over the supercontinent of Eurasia, and 
most specifically through exploiting the fact that most of the Eurasian countries are politically and 
economically weak, and need assistance to improve their wellbeing. 
          As per the second interest, and while China is achieving many infrastructure projects from 
China (lands and seas) to Europe (lands and seas) via the OBOR initiative, Russia is busy 
implementing the common development theory with its neighboring countries and overall the 
Eurasian lands, through many developmental projects… Thus, China is encouraging trade in 
Eurasia, and Russia is working on removing barriers between them, to free out the movement of 
services, good, and capitals. We can here conclude a new theory stating: Development for Trade, 
and Trade for Sovereignty. 
          When we say Development for trade, we mean that the main aim of China and/or Russia – 
from implementing developmental and infrastructures projects in Eurasia is increasing their trade 
exchanges with the Eurasian countries in a way that strengthen their economies in the first place… 
But if we look deeply into their geo-strategies (related to the pre-mentioned interest), we can 
conclude that in addition to reinforcing their internal economies through investing in this interest, 
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China and Russia increase their control and supremacy over the Eurasian lands through their 
infrastructure projects ensuring the exchange of goods, capitals, workforces, and services… and 
this is why we say Trade for Sovereignty.   
          On the third level, and while China started building a whole network of railroads and 
pipelines in Eurasia to ensure its access to natural resources and energies existing in the region and 
prevent any probable deficiency in the future, Russia works on developing diplomatic and friendly 
relationships with the countries of its neighborhood to ensure its access to human resources and 
energies available there due to the limit, lack, and instability of national human personnel and 
economic resources locally… Therefore, having a good “circle of friends” is Russia’s mean to 
realize its pre-mentioned aim, and building pipelines and railroads is China’s mean to realize its 
aim in its turn. Russia uses diplomacy, and China uses geoeconomics: here is a fundamental point 
of difference, even if the main objective is similar. And this will be discussed later on.  
          And finally, while China looks for ways to maintain safe and secure borders to prevent its 
national security from any threat or terrorist permeation to its lands, in addition to protecting 
Eurasian countries from any probable unsecure situation, Russia is busy establishing inter-regional 
cooperation institutions that start from Eurasia and cross its geopolitical boundaries; this happens 
in cooperation with its Eurasian partners with whom it has built diplomatic ties through applying 
its own geo-strategy to invest in its third main interest clarified above… This is how China invokes 
its intervention in the region while preventing it from any security threat that might occur, and this 
is how Russia benefits from its “circle of friends” to expand its control outside the Eurasian 
borders… What distinguishes China from Russia here, is that the first invests in its interest slowly 
and pragmatically, while the latter works on it in a faster geo-strategy; and that will also be 
discussed in the upcoming chapter of the dissertation.  
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Chapter 2: Cooperation or Competition Between China and 
Russia in Eurasia? 
 
          Russia and China have been recently pursuing different and distinct regional cooperation 
projects in the supercontinent of Eurasia: the EEU and the SREB, respectively; but at the same 
time they are trying to avoid direct competition in the region… What the world sees about their 
relationship is really unclear, for some analysts see a harmonization while others see a clash of 
influence and a conflict of interest at some point.  
          In a quick glance at the Sino-Russian relations, we can see that the epoch of the Soviet Union 
collapse and the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991 was a turnover in that term; these 
two countries are now recovering from a sizable decline in terms of diplomatic and economic 
relations at the first decade of the 21st century, and major geopolitical interests are playing an 
important role in converging both perspectives in order to maintain a good alliance in the face of 
any “western” enmity…  
          But when it comes to national security, national interests, and self-esteem, it is inevitable 
that each country retracts to protect its own objectives, and invest in all its efforts to exclusively 
fulfill its hopes on the international scene, especially when they are related to its expansionist 
ambitions… 
          Herein, knowing that both of China and Russia have the similar aim of expansion – even if 
each one of them are implementing different strategies to do so – we have to take into consideration 
that this fact will lead them into another level of “Power Race”, either in Eurasia or outside of its 
borders…   
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





          On another side, the recent development phenomenon emerging on the international scene 
in what is related to the Russo-American ties and the Putin-Trump relationship, contrary to the 
Sino-American ties and the trade war between Xi Jinping and Trump, constitute a first look at the 
complexity of the Sino-Russian relations under the principle of good neighborliness, and in what 
is compliant with the bilaterally signed treaty of 2001 “friendship and cooperation”, which was 
the outcome of previous agreements on “constructive partnership” in 1992, and “strategic 
partnership” in 1996.    
         In this chapter, we are going to dissect the competition and cooperation areas between these 
two superpowers, especially in the period following the Chinese adoption of geoeconomic 
statecraft, in order to answer the problematic of the thesis and conclude how did geoeconomics 
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Section 1: Sino-Russian Cooperation in Eurasia 
 
          China’s and Russia’s engagements in the Eurasian theater is testing their abilities to 
control their differences and create opportunities for cooperation despite all challenges… It is 
true that each country of them has its projects and strategies, but searching for common ground 
for cooperation makes things better.  
          Thus, in the upcoming paragraphs we will be displaying where does China and Russia 
cooperate in what is related to their pre-mentioned major interests, and analyzing the main 
reasons behind this cooperation in order to have a clear image that might assist us in 
understanding the areas of competition that will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.  
 
A- Alliance Against Washington – Assimilation of Projects  
 
Since 2014, the time when the Russian conflict with the West got bigger, Moscow and Beijing 
have entered a new cooperation stage at all levels, military, political, and economy… Thus, 
due to the increasing tensions with Washington that both nations are suffering from, 
interdependence between them has been growing, and they always seem like moving closer to 
an alliance, but number of problems and asymmetries in their relations prevent them to reach 
a clear and comprehensive one. 
What concerns us here, is how does China and Russia cooperate to face the United States’ 
policies of expansionist ambitions towards their region? 
Geoeconomics is the answer; it constitutes the main road that both China and Russia are taking 
to face the U.S. hostility in the Eurasian region. 
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In April 2019, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin called their states as “good friends” (Jeong-ho, 
2019), and that was a translation of their aim to unify their efforts in order to achieve a greater 
economic integration in the supercontinent of Eurasia during the increasing economic and 
military competition with the United States (Jeong-ho, 2019). 
In the light of this objective, the Chinese president stated that his country counts Russia as “an 
important partner in co-building the Belt and Road Initiative” (Jeong-ho, 2019), for both 
countries “have enjoyed the highest level of mutual trust, the closest cooperation, and huge 
strategic importance” (Jeong-ho, 2019). 
From his side, the Russian president stated that China had “built an important platform for 
expanding international cooperation” (Jeong-ho, 2019), he added that “Russia is willing to 
strengthen exchanges and cooperation, and work with China in energy, connectivity and other 
major projects” (Jeong-ho, 2019). By that statement, Putin declared that Russia is offering its 
support to the Chinese OBOR aiming at boosting economic and trade ties in the region through 
investments in infrastructure and energy. 
In an analysis to what was displayed above, we can see that China and Russia are unifying 
their efforts together in order to face the threat challenging them from the western side of the 
planet, specifically from the United States aiming to impose its authority on the Chessboard of 
the world, Eurasia… Their president’s statements regarding each country’s project in the 
region, appear like a bilateral “assimilation” to each party’s ambition of expansion… 
They encourage each other publicly, on the contrary, every one of them implicitly understands 
the value of the good relationship with the other, but does not forget that they are in a strategic 
competition, for Russia fears of depending on China, and China has a traditional distrust with 
Russia since the Sino-Soviet split during the cold war…  
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In addition to that, the similarity of interests has not led to any clear alliance between them, 
and will not lead to, as it appears in the near future, and because of that they could not cooperate 
to the extreme levels of cooperation in the region, and this will be clearly discussed in the 
forthcoming section of the chapter. 
Therefore, China and Russia used to control the stability of their relationships and manage the 
strategic gaps between them in order to face their common rival, the United States of America, 
imposing “growing trends of protectionism, illegitimate sanctions bypassing the United 
Nations Security Council, and even trade wars” (Jeong-ho, 2019), in a way that slows down 
the international economy and causes new conflicts…  
This was achievable through encouraging each other’s projects: Russia supported China’s 
OBOR as we clarified above, and China also supported the Eurasian Economic Union created 
by Russia with a target of greater economic cooperation and integration on the Eurasian 
continent. 
Thus, Putin affirmed that states gathering under the OBOR and the EAEU have mutual long-
term strategic interests under the context of peace and growth (Jeong-ho, 2019); Therefore, 
each country provides support to its counterpart’s projects in order to exchange “legitimacy” 
between them and in the Eurasian countries in order to face the American hostility that might 
occur during its expansion trials towards the Eastern part of the globe.  
A real turnover has been done in the Sino-Russian relations since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union; they shifted from being adversaries of the Cold War, into becoming partners commonly 
aiming to pragmatically interrupt the execution of a western-dominated international system 
(mainly dominated by the USA).  
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





This policy will ensure China and Russia’s control over the Eurasian lands and resources, 
despite the fact that “China holds the upper hand in the relationship” (Stronski & Ng, 2018, 
p.1).  And even if there were an imbalance between their powers and decisions regarding the 
“bilateral friendship”, China and Russia consider that they can gain more benefit from their 
cooperation than from their outright competition (Stronski & Ng, 2018).  
Finally, we can say that through this cooperation, China and Russia became able to protect and 
invest in the majority of their main geopolitical interests in the Eurasian continent. 
 
B-  China’s and Russia’s Main Geopolitical Interests in the 
Eurasian Continent   
 
1-  In what is related to China 
 
• China was able to profit from this cooperation, and from the geographical, political and 
economic conditions to have the legitimacy to its OBOR project and extend its roadmap 
between the two sides of Eurasia, Europe and Asia to ensure the exchange of the 
services, goods, resources, and capitals… It is also important to mention that Russia 
and China are cooperating in terms of education also; and this cooperation and 
exchanges have increased fast: “both sides have a large number of international 
students studying in each other’s countries” (Jeong-ho, 2019) … Even president Putin 
received an honorary doctorate from Tsinghua University in a ceremony following a 
meeting with President Jinping (Jeong-ho, 2019) … Education will evidently improve 
Sino-Russian relations in the future and increase the level of cooperation in specific 
domains.   
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• China was able to fill the gap of influence existing in the Eurasian supercontinent, due 
to the efforts done to evacuate, if we do not want to say eliminate, the western 
antagonism and hostility represented by the American ambitions to boost in efforts and 
exercise authority over weak and fragile Eurasian states. So the people of these states 
felt safe regarding China’s protection to their homelands, and they welcomed its own 
kind of intervention to maintain security and stability in their countries, and to prevent 
them from any foreign attempt of violation or aggression.  
 
•  In addition to that, and through attaining the level of agreement on cooperation with 
Russia and its president’s declaration of support towards the OBOR initiative, China 
was able to ensure its access to raw materials, and energy resources from Russia and 
from its neighboring countries in the Eurasian continent, in addition to prevent its 
nation from any probable deficiency in resources in the future due to the belt and road 
project, ensuring its connection to the majority of the world map markets, and most 
specifically to states rich in resources.  
 
 
2-  In what is related to Russia 
 
• Through the cooperation agreement with China, Russia became able to spread its 
control and authority largely on the Eurasian lands, and implement its common 
development theory with its neighbors in order to preserve stability in the region and 
prevent future problems from occurring… The OBOR initiative executed by China, 
had got the support of the Russian Federation for the outcomes and returns from which 
it benefits in executing infrastructures and developmental projects within the common 
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development strategy it is implementing in the Eurasian supercontinent. And since the 
new roads of this project traverse the southern region of Russia and pass by Central 
Asia, Russian developmental projects accompany them and benefit from the fact that 
new trade roads are constructed in its national zone… Therefore, Russia is benefitting 
from the cooperation with China, for it facilitates the execution of the decided 
developmental projects inside and outside the Russian borders, in a way that improves 
Russia’s reputation in the region… And the most recent news in these terms is that: 
“the first direct e-commerce cargo air route was launched on the 30th of October 2019 
to link the eastern Chinese city of Hangzhou with Moscow, Russia” (Bianji, 2019). 
 
• On the second hand, Russia profited from the cooperation with China to facilitate the 
access to the economic and human resources existing in the Eurasian region, and that 
is happening through the Chinese constructed silk road… That built road required a 
specified and professional personnel to participate in its building, and that has ensured 
Russia that it will not find itself facing a serious need of manpower initially limited in 
the country… In addition to that, according to Ren Qi (2019), Putin believes that the 
BRI is in line with the EAEU goals: The BRI aims to connect Asia and Europe, Africa 
and Beyond through the Silk Road Economic Belt, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road; In its turn, the EAEU seeks to optimize the flow of goods and services among 
its members (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia). This pushed the 
two presidents to sign a “Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Linking the Construction 
of the Silk Road Economic Belt, and the Eurasian Economic Union in May 2015” to 
develop the bilateral relations at a strategic level (Qi, 2019) … Herein, and under the 
BRIEAEU alignment, China and Russia have consolidated cooperation in sectors of 
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nuclear energy, aerospace and infrastructure; and their trade has exceeded the record 
of $ 100 billion in 2018 (Qi, 2019).  Finally, we could not forget that this cooperation 
has facilitated the named “people-to-people exchanges” and has also bolstered the 
opinion of the Chinese and Russian citizens towards a stronger bilateral relationship, 
for it has consolidated their stability and ensured their wellbeing. Cultural exchanges, 
state-level activities, such as: “the Year of Tourism, the China-Russia Fourth Friendly 
Exchange Year, and the Year of China-Russia Local Cooperation and Exchange” have 
also positively contributed in the harmony among the two peoples (Qi, 2019).  
 
• Furthermore, and from another perspective, Russia benefited from cooperating with 
China to protect its interest aiming at safeguarding the stability of the Eurasian region, 
for any probable challenge that might occur will adversely affect its national security 
and negatively influence its economic leverage… Therefore, building a strong 
relationship with China will definitely affect Russia’s reputation in the region and 
increases its power to take the responsibility of protecting the weak countries from 
security menaces… In addition to that, when China supports Russia’s idea concerning 
the greater Eurasian partnership, this automatically bolsters the stability and harmony 
in the region… The Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) stretching from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok, involving the 4 states of the EAEU, in addition to countries which Russia 
has close partnership with: China, Pakistan, India, Iran, and the remaining 
Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) Partners (Moldova, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan), in addition to other interested countries and 
associations (Li, 2018). Its main idea is to seek strategic development not only with the 
EAEU, but also with the majority of the countries region while holding a leading 
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position; and this is how it started its “Pivot to East”, not only towards China, but also 
towards all Asia with a special focus on China, and their cooperation has helped a lot 
in achieving Russia’s aim. This geo-strategy helped Russia to re-win the universal 
respect and to become a wealthy and powerful country, and this was the first step to 
link strategies and strengthen bilateral cooperation with China, and efforts were paid 
off by signing the Joint Declaration on Cooperation on Linking the Construction of the 
Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union, which has reinforced the 
practical cooperation between China and the EAEU states as a practical introductory 
to the realization of Russia’s dream: The Greater Eurasian Partnership.  
 
• From another side, Russia’s intentions are to become the number one security and 
diplomatic leader in the supercontinent of Eurasia, and to leave the role of economic 
leader to the People’s Republic of China. In other words, “China would be the bank, 
and Russia would be the gun” (Standish, 2015).  Therefore, it is trying to benefit from 
its cooperation with China to create a new order for the Eurasian continent where it 
aspires to become the leader, reflected in its diplomatic efforts to ensure the admission 
of India and Pakistan to the SCO and in its advocacy to the future membership of Iran… 
By this – the GEP – Russia tries to present an antithesis to the Western world order, 
but that will definitely cause a power struggle with China seeing itself as the strongest 
power in the world. And it is also unexpected that China would accept that its 
preeminence should be constrained and balanced while Russia’s authority is increasing 
over the region. And even if it accepted that, no one can forget that China’s economy 
is eight to nine times bigger than Russia’s economy; and this economic inequality will 
be reflected as a political one if China ever feels that Russia is threatening its national 
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or regional geopolitical interests; therefore, it will prevent Russia from attaining its 
goals, and will stop any term of cooperation with China, hence leading to the loss of 
all vested interests and to falling down to the lowest layers of power… And this 
scenario is exactly the one Russia is working hard to prevent itself from falling into… 
Pragmatically thinking, it is better to have two main powers controlling the Eurasian 
region and its states, for creating a system of regional balance of power, will make the 
smaller states of the region never feel that they are under the influence of one dominant 
power; and that will also transform China and Russia’s authority there into a softer and 
more acceptable one, especially that Post-Soviet Russia is still seen as the state capable 
of exercising military power beyond its borders, and that will decline Moscow’s 
position in Eurasia. It is also important to mention that it is true that Russia has gained 
influence over the Eurasian region, but it is also aware that some regional security 
problems might occur and prevent it from achieving its responsibility in providing 
security. This is why it has to refer that role to China, which in its turn might decline 
the request to provide security to central Asian countries due to national security 
reasons, and this will create a gap of influence that will be exploited by the common 
rival, the USA, if not managed pragmatically… Herein we understand the importance 
of the high level of cooperation between Russia and China, in a way that prevents any 
kind of failure that might occur in the future. 
 
          Between China’s Dream and Russia’s Dream, there lay many differences and similarities, 
and the bilateral cooperation agreements between them are definitely contributing into achieving 
their dreams, and are furthermore leading into the globalization of the OBOR and the EAEU, rather 
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than regionalization… This means that cooperation between two powerful states leads to 
unexpected results for both parties, who surely want to maintain their political as well as economic 
influence over the region at the end of the day. 
          Speaking of cooperation, the linkage of the OBOR and the EAEU projects has not only 
facilitated their achievement but has also provided a secure background to the mechanism of their 
achievement, knowing that a strong and solid relationship based on cooperation empowers both of 
the cooperative parties and unifies their efforts not only to protect their existing geopolitical 
interests, but to invest in them and increase their strategic outcomes in a way that serves the 
realization of their dreams. 
          No one can deny that this kind of cooperation and alignment of projects between China and 
Russia has entered a new wave of development to every zone of the Eurasian supercontinent… It 
has also revealed USA’s intentions and removed its hands, preventing it from demolishing the so-
created bilateral integration in the Eurasian supercontinent, the chessboard where all of the world’s 
power race to compete and checkmate. 
          From the discussion above, it appears evident that the Sino-Russian cooperation in Eurasia 
is attracting them closer to each other, knowing that each party understands deeply that this 
supercontinent cannot be controlled by one single country, despite the fact of how powerful this 
country is either economically, or politically and diplomatically. 
          Although both Beijing and Moscow understand the high importance of collaboration and 
cooperation – especially in the Eurasian region – and however they signed the joint declaration on 
cooperation and linkage of their projects, they have until now not agreed on a clear strategic 
alliance to define their future cooperative roles either regionally or globally… And this indirectly 
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means that both of them have some question marks about their counterpart’s geo-strategic 
behavior. 
          This also sheds lights on the fact that even if the cooperation was highly-valued by both 
parties, competition will never leave an empty place without filling it back; At the end of the day, 
– and as we said before – relationships are important and everyone understands their value, but 
when it comes to strategic competition over preeminence and geopolitical interests, things 
ultimately change.  
          This is what the next chapter comes for: clarifying areas of competition between China and 
Russia in Eurasia, and analyzing and explaining their main reasons to continue the roadmap 
leading to the final conclusion that will answer the fundamental problematic of the dissertation.   
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Section 2: Sino-Russian Competition in Eurasia 
 
 
          It is clearly true that China and Russia are doing great efforts to avoid the highly predicted 
future of a bilateral open competition between them, but if we read that between the lines we 
understand that instances of competition are taking front places in their relationship and that should 
be studied and understood. 
          The bold question that arises here, is related to the two main projects of China and Russia 
in Eurasia, the OBOR and the EAEU respectively… What kind of impact are they having on their 
bilateral relation? And does the intersection of these projects ultimately lead to the feared Sino-
Russian competition? 
          No one can deny China and Russia’s initiatives to manage their distinct regional politics, re-
arrange their neighborhoods and preserve their national stability, but as we said before, all their 
aspirations, approaches, and agreements have not lead into a clear and unbreakable cooperative 
friendship.  
          Russia’s dreams and policies to gain authority over China’s economic expansion in Eurasia, 
and China’s use of its economic leverage to expand its direct influence over all the region including 
Russia, in addition to all the unilateral policies developed and implemented by each side without 
being able to reach an agreement (at the economic level mainly) are being translated and 
understood as an indirect rivalry status that will be hard to overcome. 
          Furthermore, the only clear relationship competition experienced by China and Russia after 
the establishment of the Russian Federation was in their Race Power towards Central Asia in the 
late 2000s, and precisely towards Turkmenistan’s energies and resources (natural gas), and more, 
over the construction of pipeline routes to benefit from this gas; and this is where the economic 
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competition restarted years after the adversarial one of the Cold War… Central Asia, the Post-
Soviet space reincarnated the rivalry game between these two powers, and that will be further 
explained in the forthcoming paragraphs. 
 
A- Central Asia 
 
          Central Asia, that Post-Soviet Region of Eurasia and the backyard of both China and Russia 
is the mirror reflecting the actual reality in the bilateral relations between them, whether they 
cooperate regionally, whether they manage the preserve of their interests under the pretext of “co-
existence”, or they leave the ground for conflict of interests and competition… In other words, 
their interference in Central Asia gives clear hints about their behavior towards each other as 
partners or adversaries. 
           Let us briefly see what is the geo-strategic importance of Central Asia for both Russia and 
China to understand the aspects of competition: 
1-  For Russia  
 
Besides the historical connection and the Soviet past that embrace Russia to Asia, the 
infrastructure plays also an important role in strengthening the bond between them. Moscow 
have realized what is so-called a “monopoly” over the natural gas existing there in Central 
Asia, and defended its transit to its land by preventing the European Union’s individual access 
to them in what is compliant with the perspective and policies of the Central Asian states, 
however China’s OBOR passes by the latters’ lands and arrives into Europe, which puts the 
natural resources and gas of the region under threat of a “strange exploitation” …  
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2-  For China  
 
Central Asia constitutes the treasure of energy that should be exploited fast, especially the 
natural resources of gas and oil in addition to uranium from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
And since China’s energy resources are mostly supplied from “less stable countries and 
through waters largely controlled by the United States” (Zogg, 2019), Chinese policymakers 
have seen in Central Asia the rope of salvation; they have held it and are still hardly holding 
on it… In addition to that, and as we explained in the so first sections of this dissertation, 
Central Asia is considered the stable neighbor of the Xinjiang province that will protect 
China’s national security from the threat of separatist Uyghur, if China succeeded in achieving 
a sustainable good relationship with its countries… It is also important to mention that Beijing 
is establishing “re-education camps” at the borders between Xinjiang and each of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to pacify the negative intentions of the Uyghur through improving 
their behaviors and developing their mentalities; this is without forgetting that Central Asian 
states constitute a trade “vent” for the less developed countries of Western Asia.  
          All what was stated above, remind us of when Russia signed an agreement in 2007 with 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to establish a new gas pipeline and link it to the Russian gas 
network, but the agreement was never executed; so China benefited from that matter and issued at 
the same time agreements with the same Central Asian countries: the agreements stated the 
construction and transit of gas and oil (Kaczmarski, 2018). 
          After that, the famous oil and gas prices drop happened in 2009, so Russia put a limit to its 
import of gas from Turkmenistan and then stopped it when it realized its high cost for Russia’s 
Gazprom during its trials of renegotiating the already existing deal…  
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          This gap represented a big opportunity for China to benefit from, so it directly took a step 
behind to help Turkmenistan in facing the Russian pressure caused by the decision to stop buying 
its resources; that step was a loan of $ 4 billion (Kaczmarski, 2018). 
          After that step, China approached further when it aimed to achieve the establishment of a 
gas pipeline extending from the Turkmen’s lands to China; and that pipeline started operating in 
2009 (Kaczmarski, 2018). This has proportionally led to the Russian gradual limitation of its 
presence in the sector of energy in that region in the 2010s (Kaczmarski, 2018). 
          I relied on these examples to say that any gap of influence caused by one party turns out 
directly to be a strategic opportunity to seize and benefit from by the other; and that clearly means 
that there is no partnership between China and Russia – at least in Central Asia – for partners do 
not wait each other’s failure in order to build their success on it; on the contrary, partners are the 
ones who provide support to their associates when in need; and this is not the case for Russia and 
China in Central Asia, especially at the economic level, and will never be so.  
 
B-  The Western World 
 
 Without neglecting the mutual efforts made by Russia and China to put pressures on the 
West ambitions in invading the politics and economy of the region, it is obvious that these efforts 
“have increased each state’s room for manoeuvre in international politics” (Kaczmarski, 2019); 
and that has subsequently increased each state’s intention to compete with the other in order to 
extend its authority and impose its influence regionally and globally… What confirms this analysis 
is that Russia and China have until now “not transformed their relationship into a fully-fledged 
alliance” (Kaczmarski, 2019).  
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          According to Sapolski (2011), it is true that the mil-to-mil alliance between China and 
Russia have strengthened the economic and political ties between them, and the opinions stating 
that China directly contributed in the consolidation of Putin’s pillars on the international scene at 
the economic and political levels are also true; and we will not say that it has helped him internally, 
since Putin was the “crane” which elevated Russia from the deep bottom… Especially that he came 
directly after the Yeltsin “dark” era marked by corruption, economic collapse, social and political 
chaos in Russia…  
          On the other hand, China’s recent rise has created a big threat in the Russian minds; they 
considered it as a menace because of its high economic leverage and evolving military strength 
over the past decade until now… Concerning the ruling-elite, this rise was still considered publicly 
as a strong potential for Russia, and a beneficial factor in terms of the bilateral relations, but deep 
down they figured out that this will diminish their position nationally, regionally and globally; 
moreover this might be the main cause behind not signing a full partnership agreement and not 
emerging to a fully-fledged Sino-Russian alliance. 
          Besides the Race Power and the competition over influence, the large differences in point 
of views and perspectives regarding the world order in terms of politics and economy, also play, a 
negative role in expanding the existing gap in the relationship between China and Russia… 
          Practically, Russia encourages every form of globalization, anti-institutionalism, and 
populism such as the Brexit deal, and the presidency of Donald Trump… In terms of the Brexit 
deal, Putin insisted on Theresa May to “fulfill the will of people” (Roth, 2018), and in what is 
related to the USA’s presidential elections in 2016, Putin “have taken unprecedented steps to 
influence the electoral process” and help Trump becoming a president (McFaul, 2016).  And at the 
beginning of October 2019, and although the ambitions of bilateral partnership between Russia 
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and the United States have not arrived to a concrete result yet, Putin has praised Trump’s economic 
policies telling that they boosted economic growth in the US, and rebounded their mutual trade 
from $20 billion under President Obama era to $25 billion per annum, as per the CNBC 
(Srivastava, 2019) …  
          In contrary, China prefers not to encourage such perspectives, especially in what is related 
to the economic globalization, and that is due to its export-oriented economy… At the same level 
and based on similar examples, we will display China’s opinions towards the Brexit deal and 
Donald Trump’s presidency. 
 
1-  Brexit  
 
          Every passionate about the Chinese policies, knows that it is very rare for Beijing to give an 
official clear opinion in sovereign affairs related to other states and powers, in accordance to the 
principle of reciprocity, to protect its domestic preoccupations from any foreign interference or 
criticism; But in what is related to the Brexit deal, China have quietly tried many times to warn 
Britain away from leaving the European Union, and when president Xi Jinping visited the UK on 
October 2015, he privately said that Beijing supported Britain to stay in the EU (Brown, 2016).  
Xi’s arguments in this term, is that it is better to the UK to preserve its friendship with the European 
Union than to build adversary with it while it is located in its geographical bloc. However, 
concerning its own national interests, China does not encourage UK to leave the European Union, 
for this latter constitutes China’s pass key to influence all the European continent as what was 
mentioned before in the section of China’s geo-strategy in the United Kingdom. And if the UK 
leaves Europe, China’s effort in expanding its influence in the UK will not be beneficial to achieve 
its aim in ‘proving its economic existence’ in the European continent.  
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2-  Donald Trump’s Presidency 
 
 Concerning the Donald Trump’s presidency, it is true that Beijing supported him rather 
than Hillary Clinton and the Democrats Party, but that happened for more than a specific cause, 
one of them was that the US media was so biased to Clinton against Trump, and this has been 
proved by the elections results, because if media represented the reality, Clinton would have been 
elected. That is why China has supported Trump, for when he succeeds, the US Media would have 
proved itself to be not credible. This issue will also help China in whatever event it may find 
necessary to condemn Trump and point out at the failure of the American political spectrum; All 
this catches the nation’s eye and improves the Chinese media credibility over the US one, and 
therefore in this way China would have achieved the Media credibility victory.  
          Therefore, supporting Trump against Clinton happened because of a different pragmatic 
perspective from the Chinese elite which is reflected in four main strategic goals concluded by 
(Palmer, 2016):  
 
1- The Geopolitical Triumph: Cancel the probability to face a strong opponent experienced 
in politics like Hillary Clinton; Instead, it faces a simple and ignorant TV character who 
hardly knows that China is a strategic adversary to the United States, possessing nuclear 
weapons and has frequently decreased its credibility as a partner in the Eurasian region 
especially with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan like strong U.S allies from a side and 
Vietnam, Myanmar and Philippines from the other; for these countries will definitely 
neither prefer to partner nor to keep alliance with a country led by a crazy man who ruined 
their trust in the United States nuclear protection and pushed them to find other 
alternatives… In other words, in China’s eyes Donald Trump will lead to the geopolitical 
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defeat of the United States in Eurasia, and this formed the main cause behind China’s 
support to Trump in face of Clinton. 
 
2- The Leadership Triumph: Knowing that China and the USA are always in a race of power 
to impose their primacy over the world, and that race of power is translated by the toughest 
contest between the two main poles of the world, the East and the West; where each pole 
has its own allies and partners, but is respectively led by China and the U.S.A… This non-
ending “war” between these two poles definitely needs strong and wise leaders to prevent 
any defect or failure from manifesting in its ranks. Thus, and from a Chinese point of view, 
“an electoral system that produces somebody like Trump – utterly inexperienced in 
governance but a skilled demagogue – is an absurdity, the equivalent of picking a major 
company’s CEO through a horse race” (Palmer, 2016).  In contrast, the case in China is 
very different, besides the known wisdom and strength of Xi Jinping, the procedure to 
choose leaders there is very picky and careful; yet no one can be nominated for presidency 
elections if he does not have the experience at every level of the Communist Party system; 
this is because leading a superpower country is not a digital game satisfying one’s desire 
for leadership of thrones, especially when that throne is the one that used to be leading the 
world on the international scene… Therefore, Xi Jinping vs. Donald Trump is a definitive 
victory for China as per their perspectives.  
 
3- The Triumph in Human Rights Battle: The observer of the Sino-American relations 
knows very well that every year the United States releases a report about the damages 
caused by the Chinese governments at the human rights level; and in its turn, China 
publishes out its own report displaying America’s inequality between genders in terms of 
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salaries and payments, in addition to racism in the treatment of minorities… But this time, 
things are different, for with Donald Trump, arguments and facts in terms of violating 
human rights are “fatty” materials for China’s reports, which if used conveniently leads to 
the wining of the Human Rights Battle. Donald Trump clearly reflects U.S hypocrisy in 
protecting human rights when he values white nationalist groups among others, attacks the 
freedom of press, and builds barrier walls against his country’s neighbors, calling for 
isolation in foreign affairs… That is used in China’s soft power strategies in a way that 
assists it in turning away the world’s blind eyes to human rights violations in Xinjiang and 
Hong Kong, and drawing all their attention to America’s crackdowns. 
 
4- The Soft Power Triumph: Talking about competitive media reports creating battles 
between the two superpowers during Donald Trump’s era, has led to the fourth goal or 
triumph realized by China through supporting Trump to win the American presidential 
elections… China benefited from the United States’ decreased commitment to global 
security since Trump’s first step towards the White House, to attract the world’s eyes and 
prove that it is able to contribute to the global security. 
Then, some Chinese scholars and academics tried to promote a more active China through 
a new international order centered over China and ruled WANGDAO: by Chinese Virtues, 
instead of BADAO: by Western coercive force (Xeutong, 2013).  These studies, and 
repeated trials to catch the nations’ eyes fall under the soft power and media credibility of 
China… It is also important to mention, that Chinese media platforms do not miss any 
opportunity that helps in condemning Trump and staining his image in order to have their 
own effect over the political spectrum, without forgetting the American citizens and voters 
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in a way that produces a double effect inside and outside of America, pointing out to its 
numerous failings on TV, Radios and Newspapers. 
         Displaying China’s achieved victories because of Donald Trumps’ success in the United 
States presidential elections, urges us to show out how the trade war between America and China 
increases the competition circle between the latter and Russia, especially that Moscow is working 
on building bridges of friendship with Washington during Trump’s era.   
          However, Russia would always present a diplomatic hand and a political support to China, 
but could never compensate Beijing’s economic loss from the increasingly open Sino-American 
rivalry. But at the same time, if Moscow took side with Beijing against Washington in that war, 
its room for manoeuvre would be limited, and that do not comply with its goals, for it re-creates 
an inequality in the bilateral relationship with China and takes Russia back to that era when there 
was no value to its taken decisions.... Yet, if Russia refused to support China in this challenge, that 
will ruin the built ties between them and will negatively impact their future and their mutual aims 
and dreams for Eurasia…  
          The complexity caused by the recent war between China and the United States, is expected 
to re-divide the world again into two main camps, and to re-dissolve Russia’s role in the Chinese 
one, and to remove away Moscow’s dream in multi-polarity. In other words, this war has widened 
the divergent angle between Beijing and Moscow, and subsequently has promoted the competition 
between them, even if certain aspects of cooperation appear like strongly tied; but if the course of 
events will pursue as it started, specific features of that collaboration policies will be subject to 
change. 
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          Taking a side in this war requires a wise decision, which only Vladimir Putin could take… 
And here is the difference; Russia’s role during this war is not dissolved in China’s one, contrary 
to all expectations, and that is because of Putin’s vision. From his perspective, that trade war 
between China and the USA is beneficial for Russia, even if his country is not directly involved in 
it. And that reminds us of the famous Arabic proverb: “Some people’s disasters are others’ 
benefits”. Let us see how that trade war disaster turned out to be beneficial for Russia from Putin’s 
point of view.  
          As the economic impact of the subsequent fallout caused by the trade war is huge on both 
America and China, and most specifically on China that is looking for extension of its dominance, 
Russia turned out suddenly to be a more appreciated partner for China; in other words, Sino-
Russian relationship became stronger and ties became closer… Are these emerging new ties going 
to limit the competition, or hide them under their ‘glow’?  
          Politically, supporting China in the international and regional working groups meetings such 
as the UNSC, BRICS and others, rebounded Russia in huge economic agreements signed in June 
2019 to increase the bilateral integration with China… One of the agreements was from Huawei 
and aims at developing 5G network in Russia, and the other was about research and technologies 
development, in addition to deals on natural gas (Bradley, 2019).  We do not forget that China is 
the biggest trade partner for Russia, and Russia is the biggest supplier of weapons for China. 
          Thus, when Russia and China joined their condemnation of Trump as a protectionist and 
bully who will negatively affect the international trade and increase the pressure on the world’s 
economy; And when Putin splashed Trump by saying that the BRICS countries are contributing 
to the economic growth while the wide usage of unfair competition in trade, unilateral sanctions, 
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protectionism and politically motivated ones are badly influencing the global economy; 
Washington started thinking twice about the new joint ‘anti-trump campaign’. 
          In other words, this new trade war between China and the United states of America has given 
Russia the opportunity to “bolden its stance on the US, meaning Washington could become 
increasingly under threat from Putin’s political interference at a time when Kremlin is already 
outthinking the US president on the world’s stage” (Bradley, 2019). 
          Herein, we could assume that no phenomenon other than the trade war that happened at this 
specific moment when the relations between Russia – the first supporter of Trump during his 
electoral campaign for presidency – and the USA started ameliorating, could be so relevant to 
Russia’s position against the USA specifically and on the global level generally; so Putin is playing 
on both of the Chinese and American grounds, and each ground requires his contentment and 
goodwill, in order to prevent him from marking scores in their goal… 
          In Venezuela, embattled by the USA, Putin has succeeded to seize control, especially that 
Trump’s efforts to take President Nicolas Maduro off had failed; In Syria, Putin has succeeded in 
filling the power gap caused by the US after withdrawing its forces from the northeast of the 
country, which has led to Turkey’s violent intervention; so at that moment, Putin became the power 
broker in the Middle East. He met with Erdogan and signed a bilateral agreement that stopped the 
Turkish attack and defined each party’s military control on ground in a way that prevented 
conflict… In addition to that, the last visits of Putin to the USA allies in the Middle East: The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and The United Arab Emirates, and his good ties with Qatar reflect his 
new emerging role in that region…  
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          And this kind of policies adopted by Russia to fill in the vacuum of power, is recently 
becoming the first main threat to the United States and its geopolitical interests in Lebanon also 
when joined with China’s efforts, and that was clearly stated by the former US department 
undersecretary Jeffrey Feltman in his testimony done in light of the popular uprising of the 17th of 
October 2019, when he said: “Lebanon’s three ports and offshore hydrocarbon reserves, if 
exploited by Russia, would add to the sense that Russia is winning in the eastern and southern 
Mediterranean, at our expense. With over 400 Chinese nationals in UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, 
China, too, may see potential in Lebanon’s ports and location – and the Lebanese may find China’s 
5G technology hard to resist, given the sorry state of Lebanon’s current telecommunications 
networks” (Naharnet, 2019). 
          We have all the right to think that this trade war has consolidated the Sino-Russian 
relationship and strengthened the Eastern position in Eurasia and is extending it globally, but we 
will not be wrong if we state that this war could have another effect in upgrading the competition 
levels between China and Russia, for this latter’s economy is evolving increasingly due to its recent 
policies that resulted an economic growth of 1.1% in 2019; knowing that analysts are also 
expecting a growth of 1.6% in 2020 (Cordell, 2019).  And if these expectations become true, then 
Russia will gradually stop its reliance on the Chinese economy, and subsequently will extend its 
marge of independence in decision making and establishing new political ties that might not be 
compliant with China’s standards and perspective.  
          However, and if we get back to the reality of the relationship between China and Russia in 
the Eurasian region and mainly in Central Asia, and for concluding the whole section we could 
clearly say that the emergence of China as the major and only controlling actor in the sectors of 
energy and infrastructure in Central Asia, in addition to being the “lender of choice” there, will 
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definitively affect Russia’s concerns and would have political prerequisites over its presence there; 
especially that in the last decade, Russia was the leader of that region, which depended on Moscow 
to export its goods and natural resources to the international markets… And this is how Russia 
maintained its control over its sphere of interests and influence. 
          On the contrary, China today – and not the United States – was the party which broke 
Russia’s control over the Central Asian lands and energies, to protect the built routes - of energy 
export from the region to its lands - from the Russian monopoly. Moreover, the Belt and Road 
initiative established by China – and not the United States – is attracting the region and appears to 
be a new opportunity to link Central Asia to international markets different than the Russian ones 
(limited by the instable economic leverage) …  
          Therefore, the built economic ties between Central Asia and Russia -  which has traditionally 
been Central Asia’s number one trading partner – are being undermined over the past decade due 
to the Chinese interference that has literally replaced Russia’s authority there.     
          For concluding, it seems that China’s thrive for natural resources and energies existing in 
Central Asia is driving much of its policies there, not taking into consideration the interests of 
Russia, its so-called partner, in the region. And that – if pursued – will lead to negative 
consequences that will affect Russia and China before any other power. Therefore, each 
government is unstoppably announcing new projects of infrastructure and development to attract 
the mind and hearts of the region…  
          Beijing and Moscow’s policies and projects in the Eurasian region are effectively creating a 
new global activism.      
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Chapter 3: An Empirical Analysis – Bringing Together 
Convergent and Divergent Point of Views 
 
 After such a long dissertation, including many topics, and treating the actual concrete 
applications of a “new” politico-economic concept on the international scene – Geoeconomics –, 
and after all the recent actualities occurring all over the world, having their own repercussions at 
all levels; we find it necessary to elaborate an empirical study chapter, where all the executed 
interviews with academic professors, ambassadors, political and economic researchers, strategists, 
and high-level intelligence agents, will be inserted, analyzed, and compared with the point of view 
discussed in this thesis.  
          In this final part of the thesis, appear multiple perspectives and opinions regarding the 
discussed problematic and the main subject of the dissertation; and in this occasion, allow me 
please to thank again each and every person who contributed with their cognition, knowledge and 
above all, their precious time to enrich this research, and assisted me in answering all my questions 
and queries and obtaining my final conclusion. 
 This chapter consists of an empirical analysis in order to bring together the convergent and 
divergent point of views of experts, and compare them to the point of view that we acquired from 
our document analysis.  Therefore, we are going to describe the research methodology conducted 
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Section 1: Research Methodology 
 
 This section involves the research methodology of our study, in which we are going to 
delineate the research method and approach, data collection method and tools used, and sample 
selection in which we also discuss the research process, bearing in mind as well the ethical 
considerations and research limitations. 
 
A- Research Method  
 
1- 	Research Method 
 
 In order to fulfill the purposes of the dissertation, we adopted a qualitative research.  It is a 
research planning that stresses on words rather than numbers in the data collection and analysis 
(Hammersley, 2013); this would best serve our study, because the geo-strategy of a state and its 
impact on its foreign policy towards other states on one hand, and on the determination of the 
state’s primacy on the other, cannot be quantified or measured in numbers.  Moreover, our topic 
lies in the field of social sciences, and particularly within the sub-field of political science and 
international relations.  In fact, qualitative research recently has been the most widely used 
methodology in the field of social sciences in general, and in political science and international 
relations in particular (Blatter et al., 2016).  For instance, our topic in the dissertation is about 
geopolitics and world order, which also necessitates a thorough qualitative document analysis of 
historical events and secondary data; and this is what we have done in all the previous parts of our 
study.  According to Sandelowski (2004), qualitative research refers to an arrangement of 
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viewpoints that are aimed at finding out how individuals perceive, understand, analyze, and make 
the social world.  Interpretivists argue that “social world is not an objectively existing object” 
(Tsang et al., 2019, p.2); it is rather built by subjectivity (Tsang et al., 2019).  And if so, then the 
actuality and the fact cannot be revealed and obtained through objective scientific methods (Tsang 
et al., 2019).  According to Creswell (2007), subjective truths should only be realized and 
discovered by approaching people, acknowledging their point of views, and explaining the 
significances that they offer to the world.  The main distinguishing feature of qualitative research, 
in contrast to quantitative research, is that it presents an absolute interpretation and description of 
the research topic, without restricting the research extent (Collis and Hussey, 2003); and this is 
also why we adopted it as a research method in our dissertation. 
 
2-  Research Approach 
 
 As for the research approach, this study follows an inductive one.  In qualitative research, 
information is acquired through using the inductive approach instead of the deductive one (Lai, 
2019), where concepts and perceptions are developed from specimens in the data rather than 
evaluating predetermined theories after data collection (Taylor et al., 2016).  In other words, the 
inductive approach begins with data collection, from which generalized theories are produced 
(Blaikie, 2004); it contends from a sequence of details to a universal statement (Maxim, 2004).  
Herein, this is what we are applying in our study, whether in our document analysis by delving 
into the details of every case to develop generalizations, or in our analysis of the primary data that 
we collected from the selected sample of interviewees in order to draw out a general conclusion; 
and this is what will be displayed in the next section of this chapter.  And since we mentioned in 
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the previous paragraph that the major advantage of the qualitative research is that it displays a 
thorough analysis and interpretation of the research topic, it is through the inductive method that 
this analysis is done in order to develop findings and concepts (Whitman-Cobb, 2020).  Therefore, 
it would be essential to adopt the qualitative research method and the inductive approach which 
best suit our study, for as most scholars of political science also believe that such methodology is 
more appropriate and pertinent than digits or numerals that could barely convey something outside 
an econometric or statistical software (Whitman-Cobb, 2020), and which may not serve in any 
way our research subject in particular.  
 
B-  Data Collection 
 
 
1- Data Collection Method 
 
 To achieve the objectives of this research, in-depth interviews were used.  Social 
researchers depend heavily on rhetorical techniques to gain information about the social world 
(Taylor et al., 2016).  And since our research subject is classified within the field of social science, 
the interview is considered to be the most recommended method to be used by researchers in this 
field (Benney & Hughes, 1956), and political science researchers particularly often use interviews 
as their method for collecting data (Lynch, 2013).  Cammett (2013) confirms that in-depth 
interviews comprise a worthy technique for collecting reliable data in political science research. 
 In-depth interviews involve open-ended and unstructured types of questions (Taylor et al., 
2016); which means they are malleable, yet efficient.  In terms of efficiency, well-managed 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





interviews may supply us with information or facts that may not be found in any other source 
(Lynch, 2013).  In-depth interviews help us understand the experience that individuals have lived 
and the relative significance they have developed out of it (Seidman, 2013).  Herein, the purpose 
behind using in-depth interviews in our dissertation is to search for missing information that could 
not be readily available in the secondary data we have collected.  For instance, China’s intentions 
behind implementing its unique geo-strategy may not be evident; whether it is trying to change the 
global order and rule this world politically and economically or willing to ruin USA’s polarity, 
this will be better interpreted through interviews.  Likewise, the absence of a clear definition of 
geoeconomics in most academic sources such as books and journals, the question of whether or 
not military means will be replaced by economic ones, and the lack of a comprehensible 
description of the Sino-Russian relations, all of which necessitate in-depth interviews to elicit 
definitive conclusions.  We should not forget to mention the outbreak of Covid-19 and its impact 
on the international relations’ track, which is still too fresh and recent to find sources talking about 
it.  This subject however is not within the time frame of our dissertation, but we cannot ignore an 
important event of this magnitude that has shaken the globe, and not take into consideration its 
repercussions on the course of international relations.  This may have an impact on our discussion 
especially due to the reciprocal accusations that have intensified between China and USA on one 
hand, and China and the rest of the world on the other hand; but as we said that this pandemic has 
erupted outside the time range of our study, so we will only discuss it in general.  Therefore, the 
use of such interviews is crucial because from one side we are given the opportunity to be 
following up the interviewees’ responses and asking them to elaborate particular points (Gillham, 
2000), and from another side because they are more inclined to draw out trustworthy answers 
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(Cammett, 2013), provided of course that interviewers have acquired the essential competences to 
effectively perform interviews (Fischer, 2006; Kothari, 2004). 
 Moreover, the role of using in-depth interviews in a dissertation extends to “complement 
other modes of data collection” (Cammett, 2013, p.134).  In other words, in order to benefit from 
the effectiveness of the data obtained from interviews and reduce as much as possible the 
shortcomings, interviews are often used jointly with other sort of data to formulate arguments 
(Lynch, 2013); and this is what we have done in the dissertation.  The choice behind adopting in-
depth interviews also is to validate the findings we have obtained from our document analysis and 
have a greater conviction in them.  For example, the shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics which 
we have inferred from our analysis in the second section of the second chapter of the first part of 
the dissertation, needs to be verified by consulting professors in that research field, particularly the 
recent one: Geoeconomics.  Thus, this open-ended kind of interviews is an enriching substance for 
the concluding outcome, despite the fact that the preconceived theories may change during the 
research’s track (Cammett, 2013); in this respect, we should be cautious about the risk of the 
research’s deviation from its pre-planned objectives (Gill & Johnson, 2010). 
 
2-  Data Collection Tools 
 
 Concerning the data collection tools, the chosen method should be in accordance with the 
nature of what the research is asking for (Gillham, 2000).  Since our research involves in-depth 
interviews to yield detailed responses, it should require the use of semi-structured questions.  Such 
questions do not require the interviewer or the researcher to pursue a fixed list of questions (Doyle, 
2020).  They rather constitute of an interview guide for the researcher that can offer valid 
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qualitative data (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006).  This interview guide gives the interviewer the 
advantage of directing the procedure of gathering information from the participant, with the 
flexibility to diverge from the formalized scope of questions (Bernard, 1988).  In our study, we 
have prepared a specific list of questions that has guided us in conducting the interviews for the 
sake of fulfilling the objectives of the research.  During the course of the interviews however, 
additional questions have emerged; this has happened because at the beginning of every interview, 
the questions would merely serve as topics of enquiry.  But later on, and since each interviewee 
has different knowledge and experience to share, further questions were asked during the 
interviews to better clarify and illustrate their point of views.  Nevertheless, some of these 
additional questions have become prioritized, in the sense that we have tended to ask them in every 
other interview, even if they have not existed among the specific set of questions that we have 
prepared and which we are going to display next in this section.   
 So, as we were moving on through our interviews, we have been learning and discovering 
more information that better avail our topic and which we have not even thought of searching for 
in our secondary data in the first place.  As a matter of fact, we have acquired much experience 
and confidence after conducting each interview, the reason which led us to know more about what 
to ask in later interviews than earlier ones.  Gillham (2000) confirms that “as you find out more, 
more specific questions emerge” (p.20).  He adds that as you are progressing in your research, 
some subjects become a priority that you want to ask more about, despite the technique used, but 
specifically for in-depth interviews and semi-structured questions (Gillham, 2000).  
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 The basic semi-structured questions that were involved in our in-depth interviews were the 
following: 
Question 1: How would you describe China’s influence over Eurasia and subsequently (in soft 
steps) over the world? Is it trying to change the global order and rule this world politically 
and economically or willing to ruin USA’s polarity by attaining and achieving the international 
primacy? 
 
Question 2: How do you see the large shift – led by China – from geopolitics to geoeconomics? 
And do you think that economic means will completely replace military ones in bilateral 
“wars” between superpowers in the near future? (Define Geoeconomics Please) 
 
 
Question 3: What is in your opinion the main major capability that differentiates: 
- China from USA? 
- China from Russia? 
 
Question 4: How do you see the future of the Eurasian region – land of the Grand Chessboard 
as per Brzezinski – especially that it contains Russia and China on its lands? 
 
Question 5: Based on the last question, how do you describe the existing relation between 
China and Russia? Are they allies or competitors? 
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Question 6: How do you think the OBOR initiative will affect Russia’s role in the Eurasia 
region? 
 
Question 7: Finally, and based on your personal estimation: 
- How will COVID-19 affect the international relations tracks? 
- Will it assist China in expanding its influence over the world? 
- What about the European Union’s destiny? 
- How will it affect the American presidency’s elections? and do you see any probable 
“trade war” breaking out again between Beijing and Washington? 
 
 The questions were wisely chosen, and their order was carefully considered.  The order of 
the questions must show some kind of logic, whether topically or sequentially (Gillham, 2000).  In 
other words, questions should be arranged in a series-way in which they seem to follow each other, 
whether in terms of their themes or in terms of their generality and specificity.   
 In our dissertation for instance, the questions were asked starting with the most general 
one.  The first question entails a description of the Chinese influence and whether China’s intention 
is to rule the globe or achieve international primacy.  In terms of order, this question serves as an 
introduction for the interviewees about our topic, in which its generality would put them at ease 
for the sake of bringing out of them the most satisfying responses during the course of the 
interviews; and in terms of content, the first question constitutes the main essence of our subject 
or the most important part of our problematic.   
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 The second question is as important as the first one in terms of content, because it embraces 
the theoretical aspect of the dissertation to whether geoeconomics’ approaches will be superseding 
the classical geopolitical theories and by which military means would be giving their way to 
geoeconomic power.  In this question however, we have moved from “more to less” general by 
delving into the nature of the geo-strategy that China has followed to display its influence, and 
inspecting whether it is leading a shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics.  Furthermore, an 
additional question was made encountered here which is about asking the interviewees to give 
their own definition of geoeconomics, so we had to avail this opportunity in order to add a valuable 
material to our theoretical part. 
 Moving on to the third question, the main reason behind asking it is to assess the 
capabilities of the three powers: China, Russia and the USA, in order to have a clearer idea 
regarding the vision and objectives of the three of them.  Moreover, with this question, we have 
deepened more our enquiry to explore the capabilities that China enjoys and their importance in 
the implementation of its geo-strategy.  Herein, we have gathered information from our 
participants’ opinions about the major capabilities that differentiates China from the United States 
on one hand, and China from Russia on the other hand.  Whether these opinions were in favor of 
China or not, they would either support our arguments, or point out the deficiencies that China 
should fulfill in order to achieve its objectives; in either cases, such information would be an added 
value to our study. 
 For the fourth, fifth, and sixth questions, we have narrowed our interrogation to look more 
into the regional aspect than the international one, without neglecting the fact of its implications 
on the international scene.  As we have devoted a significant portion for Eurasia in our dissertation 
in which we have proved its strategic value, it was essential to dedicate the fourth question to 
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support this actuality and visualize the future of this region, especially that it contains on its lands 
two major players: China and Russia.  Herein, the fifth question has come in place to offer 
responses that would crystallize the nature of the relationship between these two powers, and the 
sixth question to discuss whether or not Russia’s role has dwindled in the Eurasian region as a 
result of China’s expansion, specifically through the Belt and Road Initiative.  
 The seventh and last question was not intended to be included in our list.  As we mentioned 
previously, the Covid-19 incident is not within the time frame of the dissertation, but we found it 
necessary to talk and inquire about it to know the extent of its impacts on the course of international 
relations.   
 It is worth noting that the order of questions in the interviews is also in accordance with 
the sequence of subjects treated in the dissertation.  While the first question is a general inquiry 
about our topic and which may correspond to the introduction of our dissertation, the second 
question refers to the first part (theoretical), the third question to the second part (descriptive), the 
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C- Sample Selection  
 
1-  Sampling Method 
 
 Selecting our samples from the population of interest is also a matter that requires much 
attentive concern.  For this reason, we have chosen the non-random purposive sampling as a 
method for the selection of our interviewees.  This method, which some sources may call it also 
judgment sampling, falls under the form of non-probability sampling (Walliman, 2011).  It is a 
type of non-random sampling that requires selecting persons based on their expertise and 
knowledge that would best serve a research (Freedman et al., 2007), and knowing sufficient 
information about them to make sure that they are relevant for the topic under study (Lynch, 2013).    
 Based on that, and to satisfy the objectives of our dissertation, we have chosen our 
interviewees very carefully and in a balanced way, whether in terms of their nationalities to avoid 
or at least reduce any political bias, or in terms of their professions to give each question its value 
and significance.  For example, while some questions could be answered by diplomats, political 
analysts, or journalists, they may require much explanation from academic professors and 
researchers; or vice versa.  For this reason, we chose to interview eleven participants from eight 
different nationalities, of whom there were four professors, three researchers, one diplomat, one 
political analyst, one journalist, and one military and political veteran.  The nationalities were 
distributed as such: three Americans, two French, one Chinese, one Spanish, one Italian, one 
Dutch, one Norwegian, and one Armenian.  The following table lists our participants’ respective 
nationalities and professions.  (More detailed information about the participants’ profiles 
including their professions, expertise, and education is available in the thesis annex).  
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The interviewees are listed in the table below as blind profiles in order to preserve their privacy 
and their comfort in expressing their opinions.  
Table 3: Interviewees’ Nationalities and Professions 
Interviewee Nationality Profession 
Interviewee 1  American Journalist 
Interviewee 2 American Researcher 
Interviewee 3 Italian Professor 
Interviewee 4 Norwegian Author/Professor 
Interviewee 5  American  Military/Political Veteran 
Interviewee 6 French  Researcher 
Interviewee 7 Armenian Researcher 
Interviewee 8 Spanish Political Analyst 
Interviewee 9 Dutch Diplomat 
Interviewee 10 French Professor 
Interviewee 11 Chinese Author/Professor  
 
 
 When it comes to the pool of interviewees, one will reflect upon their educational 
background and their relationship to the topic.  In the political field and within international 
relations and affiliated issues, one cannot easily address a topic from an unbiased perspective, as 
a spectator, due to the extensive interconnectedness that drives international politics.  The selection 
process for my pool of interviewees revolved around various factors. One would notice that the 
pool only involved one Chinese individual, since involving multiple Chinese nationals would lead 
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to biased results as those are likely to be driven by their nationalist beliefs and are hence prone to 
defend and aggrandize the weight of China and its importance when it comes to our topic, which 
could lead to the assumption that information is cherry-picked to fit the trajectory of the thesis.  
Additionally, one may also highlight that Russian academics and experts were not part of the pool 
of the interviewees as I believe that the result presented would not be as transparent and accurate 
as required for the study or as wanted by the experts in question due to the increasing shift towards 
authoritarianism in Russia which has led journalists as well as political experts to feel oppressed 
and incapable of expressing their opinions freely.  Hence, the pool of interviewees was centered 
around individuals from the Western hemisphere as democratic principles and freedoms are 
protected, which contributes to transparency and diversity of answers as they are inclined to 
provide their personal observations free of pressure. Additionally, experts from Western countries, 
notably from Europe and the USA, are capable of assessing the impact of China’s rise from the 
perspective of affected nations and can offer insight on how China’s rise has had an impact 
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2-  Research Process 
  
 The interviews with the above listed participants were held during the period between 
March and June of year 2020.  And since that period was the primitive stage of the outbreak of the 
Covid-19 pandemic which has resulted in a complete lockdown in nearly all parts of the world, 
the interviews were conducted remotely.  While some participants agreed to hold our discussions 
live over the phone, Skype, or Zoom, others have only accepted to make it through email.  The 
duration of the live discussions varied from one participant to another, but they lasted 
approximately between a minimum of 33 minutes and a maximum of 75 minutes.  In order to 
successfully and effectively analyze the gathered data, we have taken notes and recorded the 
discussions, of course under the consent of each respondent.  This is because according to Gillham 
(2000), interviews cannot be analyzed and therefore yield a meaningful sense if they are not 
completely recorded or written down. 
 During the course of the interviews, the interviewees had the ultimate freedom to convey 
their point of views, even beyond the themes that were included in our specified list of questions; 
and as we mentioned previously, this is in line with the nature of the qualitative research method 
in general, and the in-depth and semi-structural interviews in particular.  As a whole, we can say 







UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





3-  Ethical Considerations 
 
 An essential duty regarding any researcher is to secure the protection, comfort, and respect 
of the participants in the research study (Brooks, 2013).  For this reason, our research was 
dependent upon certain ethical issues.  At first, all the interviewees were reached through email, 
by which each has confirmed his or her voluntary participation in the interview.  However, and as 
we previously said, the names of our interviewees are not mentioned (blind profiles) in order to 
protect their privacies and their comforts while expressing their opinions. 
Moreover, the interviewees were informed ahead about the contents and objectives of our study, 
and that their participation and responses are only used for academic reasons and for satisfying the 
purposes of this study in particular.   
 
4-  Research Limitations 
 
 As it is the case with every research, there exist some limitations that we have to mention.  
While interviews may supply potentially important data, they may sometimes be considered a 
doubted source of proof in the examination of political concepts (Bleich & Pekkanen, 2013).  In 
some of our interviews for instance, interviewees refrained from answering certain questions and 
others may have not genuinely expressed their responses for political reasons; and this is normally 
the case with any interview that involves a political discussion.  However, the choice of adopting 
non-random persuasive sampling have played an important role in mitigating the extent of bias as 
much as possible and this is, as we mentioned before, by carefully selecting our interviewees 
whether according to their nationalities or professions.  
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 Furthermore, the problem of language proficiency is another limitation of our study.  Since 
the interviews were conducted in English, some interviewees, whose native language is not 
English, have faced some difficulties in expressing their responses. Therefore, it was challenging 
to often intervene in the discussions and ask the interviewees to elaborate their answers in order to 
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Section 2:  Data Analysis 
 
 
 After describing the research methodology in details in the first section of this chapter, we 
are going to display and analyze the data collected from the interviews in this second section.  
Since the method adopted for collecting data is in-depth interviews, it may be confusing to show 
all the collected responses in details.  However, we have created a table that involves the main 
responses of the participants, and this would make it clearer for the reader and for ourselves in the 
analysis afterwards. 
 This section will therefore be divided into two parts.  In the first one, we are going to 
display in a table each interviewee’s answers, opinions, and analysis, to twelve questions and sub-
questions, asked to all of them (in a way that convened their available time) which will make it 
easy for the reader to compare and contrast among the converging and diverging point of views of 
each of the participants.  The second part of this section however, is dedicated to the analysis of 
the interview responses. 
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over the world 
Chinese have 
instincts that 
desire power, and 
they are taking 
their time slowly, 
for they have a 
long view to take, 
and would like to 
strategically 
manage the 
possible risks that 




the world order. 
China and Russia 
share the desire to 




China wants to do 
its own aid 






there are aspects 
of the 
international order 
that China is 
trying to shape; 
areas like internet 
governance would 
be an example of 
where we do not 
really have rules 
for cyber and 
internet 
governance.  
If you want to 
relate with me, we 
can negotiate 
something that 
can be potentially 
with mutual 
benefits, but I do 
not impose and 
judge your 
political system; 
in other words, I 
may look at you 
as the worst guy 
in the world, but I 
do not care about 
it. I would rather 







system is your 
own political 
system and China 
adopted this 
approach because 
they do not want 
to be judged about 
their own political 
system; this is the 
macro picture.  
So, I believe that 
our mistake is 
always looking 
with zero-sum 
game approach in 
international 
relations and not 
allowing the 
possibility that it 
may be possible 
to configure and 
forge different 
equilibrium in a 
multipolar world, 
where no one is 
the only head of 
this system but 
there are groups 
of countries that 




as China has done 
with the AIIB. 
 
China is always 
seeking to re-
organize Eurasia 
to a large extent 
around itself 
instead of the 
United States by 
the West. The 
main instrument is 
also that it cannot 
achieve this by 
military, or 
simply 
information; it is 
primarily an 
economic 
initiative. I would 
say they had been 
doing this for a 
quite long time, 
from Belt and 




puts China in the 
center. Also, 
China has been 
engaged in the 
banking sector, 
currencies, new 






Today based on 
current events, it 
is going slowly 
but eventually it 
will be going back 
rapidly. China is 




Middle East, GCC 
countries and the 
USA. That was 
their main 
objective (to 
change the global 




willing to ruin 




primacy), but as 





was proven to be 
made by Chinese 
laboratories, 
China is on the 
verge of losing its 
economic power. 
Coronavirus is a 
major divergent in 
current events. 
China created 
Corona to drain 
the economic 




they ended up 
with the problem.  








/competition. I do 
not believe China 
is interested in 
rebalancing poles 
in the world order. 
What Beijing 







make them more 
‘Chinese business 
friendly’. China 
needs the current 
rules of the game 
- but also wants to 





and it rises its 
influence in entire 
mainland through 
its Belt and Road 
Initiative. China's 
main aim is to 
create multi-polar 
World Order, 
where it will stand 
separate political 
economic pole. It 
is also creating 
strong ties with 
other Eurasian 
states, that in the 
era of possible 
conflict with the 
West, it will not 
stay alone. 
 






Europe, China is 
having mixed 
results, building 
up its influence in 
the periphery, at 




only wants to 
protect its internal 
stability or 
become a global 
hegemon; it will 
need to pursue a 
policy to increase 
its global power 
as much as 
possible. Thus, 
that means that it 
would somehow 
have to tackle the 
US position 
down. 
China grew for 
domestic reasons; 
it’s a long history 
where China’s 
rulers have never 
been challenged 
by external forces. 
China never had 
an outward 
looking agenda or 
reach, but it was 
basically self-
centered in the 
inward looking 
and the Chinese 
dynasties always 
came from inside, 
and we relate it to 
poverty, foods, 
riots… In 
addition, now that 
China has become 




there are countries 
like the US 
notably that sees 
China as a rival; it 
is pure rivalry! 
So, China cannot 
afford to be any 
more friendly 
with the rest of 
the world. 
I admit that there 
is some sort of 
international 
primacy that 
China is seeking. 
It is probable that 
China wants to 
get back to what it 
has been in the 
past, which was 
an empire. As 
China has been 
humiliated during 
the nineteenth 
century, it wants 
in a way to erase 
these 
humiliations, 
especially that it 
knows it has the 
capabilities to do 
that…  China is 
trying to maintain 
its unity first, and 
to be more present 
and influential on 





penetration in the 




economic and the 
purchase of the 






the Belt and Road 
project. The Belt 
and Road project 
is one of the key 
strategies through 
which China is 
gaining influence 
in the outside 
world and in the 
region. And when 
the state country 
reaches a certain 





“We” Chinese are 
very strong but 
self-centered. 
Also, the OBOR 
is assisting China 
through several 
ways: Most 
important one is 
that through the 
OBOR, it can find 
its “Spatial Fix”.  





capitalism in the 
years 1970s-80s. 
Now it is China’s 
turn!  This 
justifies China’s 
move to Eurasia, 




for its own Spatial 
Fix. 
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is the idea that 






means such as 
trade and blocking 
trade by imposing 
sanctions. 
I would define 
geoeconomics as 
economic trends 
and how they 
relate with 
geopolitics, how 




refer to a much 
more dynamic 
analysis on 
current affairs in 








because it is a 
current affairs 
strategic analysis 

















favored role in the 
balance of 
dependents. In 
other words, I see 
it as a way that 
other countries 
should be 
dependent on you, 
but you should be 
less dependent on 
others; and you 
can do this 
through a variety 
of ways; you can 
diversify your 
dependencies 
    Defining 
Geoeconomics, it 













could be defined 
as the 
representation 
into the space of 
the economic 
forces. It is a 




3 Shift from 
Geopolitics to 
Geoeconomics 









and this is where 
their power lies. 
The successful 
tools that china 
uses to promotes 
its influence 
around the world, 
are the economic 
ones used to build 
more political 
tools. They have 
spent a lot of 
money to build 
their ‘soft power’. 




by 2035 as per Xi 
Jinping has 
articulated in the 
19th party 
congress. 
I think that in a 
much more 
complex world in 
terms of 
population and 





dynamics also on 
the political level 
are played on 
economic field at 
a higher extent in 
comparison to the 
past because you 
have much more 
economic 
leverage in these 
global value chain 
system in NATO 




I think that 
Geoeconomics 
has winds in the 
sail (challenges) 





has found its way 
because the 
military weapons 
we have cause so 
much destruction 
and difficult often 
to use them for 
power. Taking the 
example of 
nuclear weapons, 
the costs, and 
benefits of 
seeking to expand 
your power with 
purely military 
means have made 
this weapon to 
In China yes 




the world no. 
Japan cannot be a 
geoeconomic 
power. They tried, 
but we Americans 
stopped them. 
Plus, japan is 
small and has 
always been a 
follower. 
Economic means 
will not replace 
military ones, but 
we will never go 
to a military war 
because of an 
economic conflict. 








replace the ‘old’ 
world of 
geopolitics? No. I 
do not think so. 
Because military 
affairs and war as 
continuity of 




like Russia is here 
to remind us that 
‘old wars’ still 
exist, whether we 




China is getting 
through 
implementation of 
its BRI, already 
bringing it 
political 
influence. I do not 
think that China is 
going to make a 
war with the US, 
or the US will 
start a war with 
China, as they are 
both nuclear 
powers and it will 
prevent large 
scale War 
between them, but 
two sides will 





has always been 
around, although, 
of course, military 
conflicts caught 
most of the 
attention. For 
instance, China's 
foreign policy has 
always had a 
geoeconomic 
approach. 
Yes, I see a shift, 
but I think China 
hardly had a 
geopolitical 
tradition. China 




China never had 





always said if we 
do not partner 
with the outside 
world, the outside 
world would not 
partner with us. 
So, China did not 
have a 
geopolitical 
tradition.  In my 
view, China will 
I have worked a 






geopolitics is in a 
way the shale of 
the orange; it’s 
the surface and 






but in fact if you 
look down into 
the orange, it’s the 
geo-economics. 
Geopolitics in fact 
is led by geo-
economics. Geo-
economics is the 
heart.  This is 
I don’t see a shift 
between the two 




second part of 
your question, I 
say that military 
means still have 
their place. This is 
because the geo-
economic interest 
can only be 
safeguarded by 
military means; 
This is a dilemma. 
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This is not new in 
absolute sense but 
surely the extent 
of using economic 





because of the 
extent of the 
global economy 
and complexity in 
comparison to the 
past. So, it is 
nothing new but 
surely, we have 
much more 
conflict based on 
the economy. 
 
become a less 
suitable tool; this 
is also because of 
the way the 
technologies have 
developed the 
economies to be 
more 
interdependent, so 
there is more 
ability to draw 




there are always 
changes in the 
technology, there 
is a good 
possibility that 
military weapons 
can become again 
more conducive 
towards creating 
or building power. 
that the US has a 
great advantage if 
we compare 
armies of two 
Superpowers. For 
this reason, 
Beijing will not 
try to escalate the 
situation. I do not 
think that the US 
will go to war 
with China as it is 
their main trade 
partner. Of 
course, the US 




China, so that it 
does not grow in a 
level, which will 
let it to challenge 
the US for World 
hegemony, 
anyway we must 
take into 
consideration that 
these two powers 
are responsible 
powers, and they 
will compete 
but not go to war 
which will harm 
entire the World 
security. 
have to realize 
that being so big 
is relevant for the 
world (not just the 
world economy) 
in terms of 
responsibilities. 
This is something 
which China 
never had (global 
responsibility). I 
would not say that 







nothing new at all. 
why, there is no 
shift; it’s just an 
impression. What 
already counts I 






means, I would 
say that now we 
are in a time of 
de-globalization. 
In fact, we are 
seeing the return 
of nations and I 
think the collapse 
of a sub-liberal 
order. And we 
have seen that 
already in history 
when you look at 
Europe, at the end 
of the fifteenth 
century when the 
model of Venice, 





nation states like 













China and mainly 
Chinese human 
capital are smart, 
they figure out 
their mistakes and 
those of their 
allies and learn 
from them, and 
they also work on 
having access to a 
lot of information; 
but china will 
never be capable 
of producing the 




that can make top-
down decisions, 
which in turn can 
be implemented 
very rapidly.  
They can mobilize 
a great deal of 
resources, and 
people very 
quickly deploy it 
because they do 
not have to have 
the support of the 
different 
constituencies in 
the system or 
society, in the 
the Chinese have 
a certain sense as 
population and 
collectivity 
because of their 
civilization, they 
have a sense of 
superiority and 
respect to some 
parts of the world. 




like in the US 
tradition; they 
don’t want to 
exert this sense of 
superiority 
through the brutal 
forces of Moscow 




some time. They 
officially kept 
their currency 
weak or cheap in 
order to maximize 
exports; so, 
they’ve been able 
to shift all 
productive powers 





which now they 




China never did 





on par with the 
US, but does not 
have the same soft 
power impact than 
the US 
The US military 
expenditure is 
approximately 2 
time more than 
Russia's and 
China's both 
together. The US 
also is the largest 
economy (GDP) 
and it is leading in 
the field of 
Research and 
Development. 
China has a more 
efficient 
government and a 
societal 
confidence in the 
future. While the 
US has a very 
inefficient 
government, and 




 History! The 
United States is a 
purely artificial 
civilization. 
Therefore, it will 
not last because it 
is completely 
artificial.  The 
Chinese have a 
deep sense of who 
they are, their 
identity, and their 
history... and this 
is a big advantage 
for them to move 
forward.  
















based on elections 
or voting. The 
Chinese political 
system is based 
on merit, capacity, 
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that USA can do, 
and therefore, will 
not be able to 
produce internal 
stability.   
way that the 
democracy does. 
and weapons, but 
through culture; 
their sense of 
superiority is a 
cultural sense.  In 
technology, China 













processes. So, in 
this field, there is 





the world; USA 
however, is 
crippled by debt. 
Americans have 




they are very 
much in debt. And 




while China has 





based on whether 
people like you or 
not Next point is 
state-market 
relations: Chinese 
state has certain 
power in 
controlling the 








He stated:  It is 
true that China 
restricts somehow 
its human capital 
as we said in the 
previous part, but 
China has done a 
lot for its human 
capital, while 
Russia has done 
almost nothing. 
Russia and China 
are two different 
worlds! 
Russia is a 
declining power, 
while China is a 
growing power. 
Russia relies 
mainly on energy 
exports; it has 





that Russia does 
not have. 
  Military and 
Economic. China 





Russia is a dwarf 
economically 
compared to 
Global West but 
remains a major 
military player. 
If we want to 
compare the soft 
power of both 
countries in the 
region, we can say 
that Russia is 
much more 
advanced than 
China. Most of 
the Central Asian 
population speaks 
Russian very well 
and are influenced 




citizens live in 
Central Asia and 
many Central 
Asians also reside 
and work in 
Moscow. China is 
a young 
superpower; 
Russia is a great 
power. Together 
they have enough 
capabilities for 
challenging the 
US in several 
regions.  
Russia is a 
declining force in 
all aspects. 
Nevertheless, 
Russia has a smart 
leadership, and it 
is playing far 
better than China 
in the soft-power 
and information 
battle. China is 
still very clumsy 
on its external 
propaganda. 
China, on the 
other hand, has all 





 The common 
points between 
the two countries 
are that they 
beheaded the 
elites one century 
ago or 50 years 
ago. Both have 
demographic 
weakness; both of 




but I think the 
Chinese have a 
longer past and 
they’ve been able 
to live throughout 
history for the last 
4000 years 




have been driven 
by expansion to 
the south and the 
east of the 
country. I think 
this is a big 
geopolitical 
difference.  
I think it is the 
industrial capacity 
for China. As for 





Russia is, as I 
mentioned, its 
resources. Russia 
indeed has a vast 
resource if you 






China, and as I 
said, China is 
labeled today by 
the United 
Nations as the 
country that can 
produce almost 
every item. China 
is the world 
factory. 
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6 Future of the 
Eurasian 
Region 
Eurasia is going 




shrink in space 
and therefore the 
people of Eurasia 
will come in 
greater conflicts 
with each other 
because of the 
different culture 
they come from. 
It seems to be an 
area of potential 
competition 
between China 
and Russia, but in 




 what is different 
now from the 
Russian empire in 
the Soviet Union, 
is that Russia now 
does not have the 
ability or the 
intention to 
dominate Eurasia. 
If they want 
Eurasian 
integration, they 
must be in 
partnership with 
China. China is 
the main 
economic power 
in Eurasia, and, 
they have similar 







is to become less 
depending on the 
west, and the 
conflicting 
interest is for 
example in 
Central Asia, but 
this competition is 
kept under 
control. 







Brzezinski, it was 
from a military 
point of view. 





as a region still 
needs to go 
through the 
internal process of 
post- Soviet 
‘decolonization’ 
and coming to 
terms with their 
own national 
destinies. So far, 
we have had 
continuity in these 
countries than 
actual change – 
save for Ukraine 
and Georgia, but 
they paid a high 
price for it. Short 




and China, as they 
already do now - 
but with higher 
stakes and less 
freedom of 
maneuver. But 
how to keep 
Eurasia 
meaningful as a 
region? To have 
‘meaning’ is to be 
able to project a 
sense of purpose 
and destiny. I do 
not think Eurasia 
– and more 
specifically the 
FSU region - will 
be able to project 
meaning over the 
long-term. But 
who knows what 
the world will be 
like in 20-30 









Asia and the 
Middle East are 
more interesting 
as markets than 
battlefields. So, 
China would like 
to help to foster 
some stability in 
the area, let new 
markets grow and 
to sell its 
products, and 
China could buy 
their resources. 
First, Eurasian 
region as such 





does not exist.  
For China and 
OBOR, China 
realized which 






And they did this 
project just to 
export their 
infrastructure 
which has become 
saturated 
domestically, and 
not for any 
influence. To sum 
up, there has no 
countries that 
became dependent 
on China because 
of OBOR; 
however, they 
may be more 
dependent on 
China than the 
past. This is 
because first, they 
are indebted to 
China (they must 
pay China back); 











Eurasia, the big 
advantage of 
China in Eurasia 
is its huge 
population, even 
though now it is 
aging. However, 
for the next 50 
years, the Chinese 
will have the 
biggest advantage 
in Eurasia, and 
this is clear. 
 
If you read 
Mackinder’s 
theory, then 
Eurasia is exactly 
what he delivered 
as the pivotal 





understood by the 
United States and 
the European 
Union as a kind of 
challenge, there’s 




China and Russia 
are only allies to 
weaken the west 
and especially US 
Glaser said: I am 
of the view that it 
is definitely a 
complex 
It is a complex 
relationship, 
historically 
speaking; at the 
The Sino-Russian 
relations are 
primarily allying I 
would say. For 
Competitors. 
There are four 
countries, which 
if they become 
Good question! 
Forget about the 
whole ‘strategic 
partnership’ or 




They can be both, 
allies, and 
competitors, and 
in a multipolar 
China and Russia 
do not really look 
at each other in 
the eye, they do 
For a long time, 
the two countries 
had no relations. 
And when Russia 
We should not be 
fooled by western 
political experts 
or professors 
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(because the US is 
a military power 
and Europe being 
not much) for two 
reasons: They 
want to weaken 
the west as a 
geopolitical 
military rival, and 
they do not want 
their populations 
to see the liberal 
democracy as “a 
candle in the 
dark”, and 
therefore call for 
it. China is 
stronger than 
Russia in Eurasia 
for the exception 
that Russia causes 
more an 
immediate threat 
to western Eurasia 
or Europe than 
China does! 
relationship and 
I’m struck by how 
they are able to 
compartmentalize 
their differences 
and work together 
where they see or 
share interest. 
same time right 
now, the current 
analysis 
demonstrates that 
they are building 
a real strategic 
alliance. They are 
more than just 
partners, and this 
comes from the 
agreements of the 
last years since 








the key actors of 
Russia, Iran, and 
China however, 
there is obviously 
some fear in 
Russia because of 
the economic gap. 
The fear is that 
Russia can be too 
much depending 
on China in terms 
of technology 
prevalently and 
market share. But 




stronger, at least 
during the last 
fifteen years but 
with acceleration 
in the last years 





now has become 
the most 
important ally in 
terms of re-
organizing itself 
away from the 
west. Russia can 
make a life very 
comfortable or 
complicated for 
China; so, which 
means that the 
Chinese can either 
have Russia as 
their best friend or 
their worst 
enemy. China is 
very sensitive to 
Russia’s behavior 
in Central Asia. 
The extent to 
which Russia and 
China can form a 
partnership will 
also depend on 





very seriously; it 
cannot integrate 
deeply with a 
more powerful 
actor. So, it 
neither wants to 
become a junior 
partner of the EU, 
nor of China. 
allies, the United 
States will fail. 
These countries 
are Pakistan, 
India, China, and 
Russia. Pakistan 
and India can 
never ally. And 
Russia will never 
accept to be a 
junior partner 
with any country 
(with China). 
They are fake 







that you can read 
here and there. It 
is true Russia and 






they do not share 
the same pathway 
to change and 
endgame. Russia 
wants to destroy 
the current order; 
China needs the 
current system but 
wants to make it 
more compatible 
or reshape it to its 
interest. 
partners in the era 
of changing 
World Order. In 
fact, they have 
divided their 
duties in the 
region, with 
Russia holding 
security tasks and 
China focusing 
basically on the 
economic growth 
through investing 
in infrastructure. I 
would see that 




which will bring 
opportunity to 












United States.   
system that is 
going to be more 
the norm than the 
exception. They 
will be allies as 
long as the US 
and the EU keep 
an anti-Russian 
approach, but they 
will be watching 
carefully each 
other movements 
in Central Asia. 
not really do 
something 
together; there is 
neither rivalry nor 
partnership. They 
fear each other to 
a large extent; 
they realize that 
the other part is a 
size too big to 
take. It is a very 
unhappy 
marriage! 
at the end touched 
China, the 
relations were 
complex because I 
think that the 
Russians distrust 
the Chinese. But 
at the same time, 
they must 
cooperate. And if 
you look at the 
United States, it 
had made a huge 
mistake which is 
the simultaneous 
fight against 




constitute a huge 
adversary for the 
United States. It 
should have at 
least made Russia 
play against 
China, or the 
reverse. 
 
when they talk 
about the cold 
war. It is true that 
during the cold 
war, Soviet Union 
and China began 
to split and 
somehow, they 
had a lot of 
conflicts, which 
made the 
possibility of the 
United States and 
China to make an 
alliance or kind of 
semi-alliance.  
Russia and China 
can act as 
competitors only 
when it comes in 
terms of Eurasia 
as key area and 
competitors in 
terms of the 
influence in North 
Korea. Also, they 
can be 
competitors on 
issues related to 
military 
expansion 
because if you 
read about the 
rankings of the 
military power, 
some American 
think tanks list 
Russia as number 
2, and some other 
think tanks list 
China as number 















between the two 
countries. China 
is trying to 
develop networks 
to increase its 
I think that if 
China’s economic 
cloud continues to 
grow, it is 
inevitable that 
there is going to 
be a security 
component that 
must be combined 
Russia has these 
military 
capabilities that 
also China needs. 
So, in terms of oil 
and gas, military 
capabilities, China 
is much more 
subordinated to 
Well, obviously 
all the Central 
Asian countries 
have now China 
as their main 
trading partner. 







Let us be honest! 
BRI is not meant 
to bring local 
development, or 
growth, for host 
countries. BRI is a 
label only. Also, 
China can very 
well decide to 
The declaration of 
what would 
develop because 
of the Belt and 
Road Initiative 
(BRI) had raised 
anticipations that 
China and Russia 
would compete 
Russia is taking a 
secondary role in 
the region. For the 
moment Russia 
keeps as a 
provider of 
security and arms, 
while China a 
provider of 
If the OBOR 
becomes in the 
long run a 
network as the 
Chinese hope for, 
then Russia 
becomes isolated. 
The connection of 
China to the 
Persian Gulf by 
land and by sea, 
does not change 
very much the 
strategy of Russia. 
Russia is trying to 
connect itself with 
  the western 
scholars focus 
very much on 
Russia’s worry 
over Belt and 
Road. However, 
from a Chinese 
source, and I have 
talked about that 
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Russia that is 
handicapped as it 
is by its 
geography, is not 
doing even that! 




is not going to 
feel threatened if 
China must 
introduce private 




that would not be 
true if it is closer 
to Russia’s 
borders. So, one 
could envision 




begins to push 
against some of 
Russia’s security 
interest. 
Russia. But for 
the rest, it is the 
opposite.  For the 
Belt and Road 
Initiative, it will 
increase the vision 
consensus that can 
create some 
problems to the 
Russian ideas and 
role in Eurasia in 
this process of 
integration. But 
strategically on 
the long term, 
they are on the 
same level 
because both 
China and Russia 
want Eurasia 
integration as a 





on a large extent, 
and Russians 
cannot do 
anything about it; 
It seems better for 
the Russians to be 






taken a very 
different 
approach; they 
tried to go into the 
region and make 
sure that they 
want to expand 
their economic 
influence and 
power, but also, 
they have been 
very sensitive not 
to step on Russia. 
Their goal is not 
to exclude Russia 
from the region, 
which makes 
them very 







Russia’s role in 
Eurasia will be 
more affected by: 
• China’s bilateral 




• China’s security 
inroads in Central 
Asia specifically. 
That is definitely 
the game 
changers. 
for supremacy and 
dominance in 
Eurasia. However, 
the two countries 
have followed a 
cooperative 
approach to 





Central Asia or 
even Eurasia, will 
result in 
weakening their 
ability to resist 
Washington’s 





goods. If this 
relation is going 
to keep working 
in the future will 





China, in a way to 
operate a sort of 
balance in its 
exportation of oil 
between Europe 








partly because it 
knows it cannot 
stop it.  They can 
make a lot of 
troubles, but they 
cannot stop this 
Chinese influence. 
Rather than 
stopping it or 
making troubles, 
Russia thinks of 
taking advantage.  
As for Russia’s 
role, I would see 
Russia as playing 




will really be a 
fiasco honestly. If 
Russia and China 
had troubles, then 
this would affect 
China’s strategies 
in other places of 
the world, not 
only in OBOR. 





It is going to 
reduce 
globalization. It is 
going to weaken 
super-national or 
international 
bodies like the 
United Nations 
because the nation 
states are the 
actors which can 





scenario is that 
China presents 
itself effectively 
of the new leader 
of the world, the 
provider of public 
goods, the country 




that the United 
States is seen as 
stepping back in 
global leadership. 
Another scenario 




that the world 
 I think what this 
virus will 
contribute to do is 
maybe to 
decouple a lot of 
international 
supply chains. 
You can see how 
already the 
Americans are 
seeking to reduce 
their dependence 

















COVID is a bit of 
a game changer 





soon. Europe in 
disarray with no 
solidarity... It is a 
brave new world. 
One thing I am 
relatively 
confident about is 
that there will not 
be a ‘return to 
normal’. The 
world as we know 
it will not be the 
same. 
International 
society needs to 
come together, as 
Covid-19 is 
already not only 
Chinese or 
American security 
problem, but it is 
International 
security issue.  
 
It is still soon to 
know what is 
going to happen 
after COVID19. 
What we can 
expect is an 
acceleration of 
certain dynamics 
that have been 
going on since the 
Crisis of 2007. On 








Again, it will add 
to the negative 
image of China. It 
will certainly not 
help China to gain 
confidence. A lot 
of people said 
China should have 
taken more 
measures; there is 
still a story that 
China may have 
been reacting too 
late, nobody 
really knows. 
Overall, it does 
not do good for 
the Chinese in the 
short run, I think. 
In the long run, I 
do not think 
COVID-19 will 
affect the world. 
Covid-19 is a test 
for the ability of a 
government to 
adapt very quickly 
to a new 
challenge. In fact, 






imagination of the 
leaders. For once, 
they must decide 
very quickly; and 
those who have 
not decided, they 
have brought a lot 
of chaos 
Tremendously, 
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blames China for 
COVID-19. 
moreover, I think 
the virus will 
contribute to 
doing this, as we 
are becoming less 
dependent on 
other actors now. 
There are much 
more serious 
challenges that the 
5 superpowers of 
the world should 










world is and must 
be. 




China may pull 
out of it without 
any catastrophic 
damages to its 
system and may 




countries may be 
willing to have 
trade transactions 
with China. But 
this does not 




I think it is 
premature to say 
that COVID-19 is 
going to take 
China to the 
position of global 
leadership, and I 
also think that the 
United States is 
not going to 
withdraw into 
isolation, 
especially that we 
have an election 
later this year. 
 It could be 
negative for the 
Chinese because 
China is the main 
benefactor of 
globalization; 
they took all 
productive power, 
and the more 
integrated the 
world is, the 
better it will be 
for China. On one 
hand, that could 
weaken them; on 
the other hand, 
there is a big 
chance that the 
Americans will 
come out very 
weakened, while 
the Chinese will 
come out very 
strengthened. 
Will not assist 
china in 
expanding its 
influence over the 
world. 
The US is 
crumbling 
beneath the 






been replaced by 
hard borders and 
national 
preference. China 
is judged between 
‘destroyer of 
worlds’ and ‘the 
Chinese virus’... 
well, they will 
have to do a 
charm offensive 
to convince that 
hiding the 
epidemic in China 
for over a month 
was ‘a good 
thing’... 
I think that 
COVID-19 
harmed China's 
economy and it is 
continuing to 
make problems 
for China, I do not 
think, that it can 




 In the short run, it 
will certainly not 
help in assisting 
China to gain 
influence; even 
the worse due to 
this, the whole 
world will come 
into recession. 
The whole idea is 
that the Chinese 
economy was 




decline will be 
speeded up by the 
global recession 
tremendously. 
And I am not 
saying this with 
pleasure because 
the world needs 
China. 







Chinese have won 
the battle of the 
data because they 
have gathered the 
most important 






interesting is that 
the virus could be 
used as to gather 
medical data of 
the citizens.  
 











better it is for 
China: This is 






many areas of the 
production chain 
and value chain; 
but de-
globalization 
definitely is not 




the other hand, 
what is good for 
China is that de-
globalization can 
push China to 
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like the United 
States, China will 
be the real power.  
11 European 




Broadly, this is 
time of a crisis, a 
time of “less trust 
of the other” 
across borders, 
and the supposed 
unity in the 
European Union 
is not happening. 
In recent years, it 
is becoming 
increasingly 




must rely on 
themselves, and 
they cannot rely 
on multilateral 
institutions that 
are not going to 
be there in a 
crisis, like what 
we witnessed in 
COVID-19. 
 I think the EU is 




the EU is not 
working anymore; 
it’s not providing 
enough material 
benefits for its 
members, and this 
is leaving the 
Union very 
divided. I do not 
see a great future 
for the EU; I think 
it’s going to be 
struggling in the 
years to come, 




like breaking up. 
But overall, I 
think that this 
Coronavirus crisis 
has done nothing 
good for the EU. 







This is a major 
stress test for 
European 
solidarity in time 
of crisis. So far, 
we are failing it. 
At first the EU 
could not work in 
organized manner, 
but we see, that 
now it is working 
very effective and 
helping not only 
EU member 
states, but it has 
sent aid to other 
neighbors as well.  
 
Covid-19 affects 
the EU in which 
every nation is 
going to look for 
itself. In this 
context, China, 
Russia, and the 
US are going to 






going to develop 
stronger ties, 
because they have 
a common threat, 
Russia. 




the EU has been 
already weakened 




emerging, and in 
fact it accelerates 




I do not have any 
good optimism 
towards the EU. 
Later, the EU will 
go to a weak 
direction. This is 
partly because of 
the Euro zone, the 
withdraw of the 
UK, and the rise 
of the rightest 
way of the 
population and the 
populism. So, 
Europe is already 
moving to that 


















I think Covid-19 
could hurt Trump 
but not to the 
extent of putting 
him out of office. 
I think trade wars 
will keep going 
on to a certain 
extent. 
It will certainly 
affect how people 
view President 
Trump, and I 
think he knows 
that. We could 




and a change in 
election, a change 
in leader in the 
United States 
would potentially 
lead to a dramatic 
shift in global 
opinion. 
The trade war has 
never been over! 
 Trump’s main 
platform is 
dealing with the 
economy. If the 
economy falls 
apart and it shows 
inability to deal 
with this virus, 
that will be 
playing against 
him. I think the 
elections will be 
mainly on the 
economy. I think 
it really depends 
on how much this 
administration 
will deal with this 
crisis. 





and a great health 
system are the 
most two 
important reason 
to re-elect or elect 
a president, and 
that what Trump 
has done or 
improved. The 
war started 3 
years ago; a year 
ago we signed a 
trade agreement 
with China that 
was fair for the 2 
countries. The 
second phase was 
Trump will be 
judged on his 
response to the 
pandemic 
internally, not on 
his foreign policy 
record. Voters in 
the US do not care 
about China right 
now. They care 
about surviving 
(and stockpile 
guns and toilet 
paper…). Trade 
war? both 
countries do not 
need Covid-19 for 
that. It will only 
get worse before 
it gets bad. 
I do not agree 
with the term 
"Trade war", I 
prefer "Trade 
conflict" and yes, 
of course as China 
is rising 
superpower, we 
will see many 
economic and 
political conflicts 
between the main 
Superpower-the 






and the US are 
going to worsen, 
the decoupling is 
going to keep its 
track, and the 
trade war is still 
going on, so yeah 
it could be worse.  
 
 Covid-19 would 
affect the 
presidential 
elections if it had 
a real effect on the 
health of the 
population. But I 
think naturally 
that Trump would 
have been re-
elected if the 
COVID-19 has 
not out broken. 
But now, not sure 
whether yes or no.  
I think this trade 
war will never 
end, and at the 
same time the 




voting system is 
very strange. For 
instance, Hillary 
Clinton she won 
the number of 
votes, but she lost 
the number of 
states. It is the 
states that matter, 
not the total 
voting. I believe 
the United States 
is on the way 
further down. 




to criticize this 
coronavirus, they 
want to seal China 
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negotiated at the 
time when 
COVID started, 
so the agreement 
came to a halt.  
 
they will have to 
cooperate. It 
could be also 
interesting to 
imagine a sort of 
alliance between 
the two countries, 
or a consensus, or 
kind of agreement 
between them. 
 






said if you seal 
me, I will start to 
seal you from the 
beginning: the 
financial crisis 
started from you 
(US), the AIDS 
disease started 
from you, the bird 
flu, and all these 
damages that 
happened to the 
world… So, it is 
you who must be 
sealed. The 
United States is 
trying to criticize 
things, and I 
understand that 
there will be 
conflicts 
especially that this 
year is a year of 
elections, so it 
will be the year of 
conflicts.  
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B-  Data Analysis 
 
Before diving into the point of view of each the of the interviewees according to the questions, and 
as a comment, their participation in my dissertation was an added value regardless of my opinion 
towards theirs, and all this constitute an enrichment to the subject and the way it got treated.  In 
order to have a clear analysis, this part will be divided into two sub-parts.  While the first one is 
going to be a discussion which entails an in-depth exploration of the responses in order to infer the 
results, the second one will involve a comprehensive reasoning. 
 
1-  Discussion 
 
Question No. 1: How would you describe China’s influence over Eurasia and subsequently (in 
soft steps) over the world? Is it trying to change the global order and rule this world politically 
and economically or willing to ruin USA’s polarity by attaining and achieving the international 
primacy? 
          This first question has shown how much academic opinions are divergent towards the 
thought “accusing” China of having the aim to rule the word, despite its expansion in Eurasia. 
Many interviewees approved, and many others denied this “accusation”, but the ones who 
approved have expressed “reservations” about it. However, the following paragraph will display 
the two different opinions: 
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• Opinions Agreeing with the Idea that China Aims to Rule the World with Some 
Reservations: While the American journalist interviewee stated that China is taking its 
time slowly, in order for her to release its instincts that desire power, another American 
researcher considered that China is trying to shape the world order in a way that convenes 
its interests. In his turn, the Norwegian author affirmed that China is always seeking to 
organize Eurasia around itself, instead of the West-led by the United States, and that it has 
been doing that for a quite long time, through its projects such as the OBOR, and China’s 
engagement in the banking sector, currencies, new industries and technologies, which has 
put China in the center. From his side, an American military and political veteran has 
confirmed that ruling the world was indeed the objective of China, but it is going on slowly 
nowadays due to challenging events occurring around the world. Much more, a French 
interviewee admits that there is some sort of international primacy that China is seeking, 
for maybe it wants to get its past victory and imperial history back; but he stated that China 
is trying to maintain its internal unity first, more than being present and influential on the 
world stage. And Finally, the Chinese professor interviewee, despite denying the theory 
that China is aiming to rule the world, affirmed that the Chinese influence is getting higher 
recently through the OBOR, that is a key strategy through which China is gaining influence 
in the outside world and the region; he admitted that when China reaches a certain level of 
material power, international primacy will come anyway.  Hence, it is apparent that the 
interviewees consisting of experts from different fields hold a realist approach to the 
Chinese question in Eurasia, whereas they see China as a threat to the global order and to 
the instated status quo, and paint China as an entity that seeks to change established norms 
to fit its ideological, geoeconomic expansionist agenda and to reap greater profits and 
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influence as part of national interests. 
• Opinions Arguing the Idea that China Aims to Rule the World: 
As for the opposite opinions, our Italian interviewee for example, said that we have to deal 
with the idea of a multipolar world, where no one is the only head of the system, but there 
are groups of countries that will shape reforms of international institutions. In his turn, 
another interviewee believes that China is not interested in rebalancing poles in the world 
order; in contrary, it seeks slow normative changes in financial regulations and to make the 
current rules of the game more “Chinese compatible”.  And agreeing with the former one, 
the Armenian researcher considered that China’s main aim is to create a multipolar world 
order and to strengthen its ties in Eurasia in order to beat the West.  Furthermore, the 
Spanish political analyst that I have interviewed, sees that China only wants to protect its 
internal stability.  He added that in order for China to become a global hegemon, it needs 
to pursue a policy to increase its global power as much as possible. Having a similar 
opinion to him, the Dutch diplomat stated that China never had an outward looking agenda 
or reach, but it was basically centered in the inward looking; and he considered that now 
China has become “big” and therefore it cannot be friendly anymore with the rest of the 
world, because there are countries – friends with the US – that sees China as a pure rival! 
          The main reason behind separating the interviewees opinions in two groups, was the fact 
that I have faced some surprising reactions while asking the question of China’s aim to rule the 
world. What I want to display here, is that it might be true that China is probably not expressing 
publicly its global objective behind all the geo-strategies it is applying, but one thing that I have 
concluded from combining these point of views and comparing between them, is that China is 
creating a new phenomenon around the globe, stoking the “enthusiasm” of its rivals. China has 
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become a hard player in the world game, and confessing it or not, its main aim is to combat the 
United States of America, through all the possible means it is capable of “inventing” and making 
use of. We have the right to academically ask ourselves: “what will be the particular undercover 
geo-strategic goal of China after attaining the revealed one of international primacy?”, knowing 
that – according to most of our interviewees – China has recently reached a large scope of 
international primacy, despite all the challenges occurring on the international scene. 
          Therefore, let us check the interviewees’ answers on the following questions, to compare 
between the analysis results of each question. But please note that, in order to avoid duplication, 
the following paragraphs will not show what has been stated in the interviews in detail, but will 
focus on discussing the main ideas in the given answers, and comparing between them, in order to 
get the final required conclusion for each question, as milestones towards the comprehensive 
reasoning of this chapter. 
 
Question No. 2: How do you see the large shift – led by China – from geopolitics to 
geoeconomics? And do you think that economic means will completely replace military ones 
in bilateral “wars” between superpowers in the near future? (Define Geoeconomics Please) 
          First of all, and before discussing the shift, many definitions for Geoeconomics have 
been given through the interviews. But as stated in the dissertation, there is no clear or specific 
academic definition that clearly explains Geoeconomics. However, displaying some of them 
might be of help for us to understand the eloquent opinions given in terms of the shift. 
- Exercising geopolitical power through economic non-military means. 
- Perceiving a favored role in the balance of dependents, where other countries are depending 
on the state implementing geoeconomics, which in turn should be less dependent on others.  
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- Using international economic policy tools for political reasons, which do not have to be 
international political reasons. 
- Representing into the space of the economic forces, for it is a changing map of the 
economic forces. 
 
          These divergent definitions, converges in terms of employing economic means to attain 
geopolitical goals, creating change in the international map, and modifying the power balance. 
          Back to the core idea of the question, and as expected, interviewees opinions were also 
categorized in two groups; the first one agrees that there is a shift, and the second one considers 
that there is no real shift from geopolitics theories to geoeconomics approach in the countries’ geo-
strategies around the world. 
• The Opinion of the Group Agreeing on the Existence of Such Shift was Based on Many 
Reasons: Compared to the past, countries can now persuade, impose, and retaliate through 
economic means instead of military ones; in addition to the fact that the use of economic tools 
in strategic issues and competing dynamics appears to be bigger nowadays, because of the 
extent of the global economy, and that actually most of the international conflicts are based on 
the economy.  Moreover, some consider that economic means have found their way in the 
international scene because of the negative and destructive effects that have resulted from the 
use of the military means, such as the nuclear weapon.  And they affirm their opinion by stating 
that the rise of technology has given a push to economics to be more interdependent, and this 
has increased the rivalry between “technological” countries, in a way that make them 
susceptible to military wars, while they are trying their best to avoid them; so, in order to 
protect their power, they replaced the military wars by economic ones.  As the cost of war at 
such high stakes is exorbitant, advanced and developed nations are more likely to pursue their 
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interests through alternative measures, most notably economic due to the fact that 
interdependence has been on the rise as a result of globalization. 
 
• The Opinion of the Group Denying the Existence of Such Shift was also Based on Many 
Reasons also: Countries start realizing the importance of mixture between economics and 
military forces in the world politics, and the fact that while China by itself keeps its military 
means with the aim to promoting them in the next decade, it is focusing in the present on 
economic tools to promote its influence over the world. In addition, China might have shifted 
from geopolitics to geoeconomics, but not the whole world; this is knowing that economic 
means will never replace military ones, but no country will ever dive into a military war 
because of economic conflicts. From another side, there were opinions admitting that there is 
a shift happening, and that China is accelerating it, but they affirmed that whatever happens 
through this shift, geoeconomics and geo-technology will never replace the “old world of 
geopolitics”, because “military affairs and war as continuity of politics will not disappear 
anytime soon”, and because geoeconomic interests can only be protected through military 
means – according to their perspective.  
          To conclude, it seems that the shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics is still not complete, 
at least outside China.  This is why analysts do not affirm its existence with perceptible arguments, 
but what is certain is that even if China and USA are growing up their military potential, they will 
definitely not make use of it in a bilateral war. And this in turn affirms that there is a large shift 
happening in the world, whose past is known in the world wars and present has started with the 
Cold War, while the “wars” of its future seem to be purely economic and technological.  Hence, it 
is apparent that a dichotomy exists when addressing the shift towards geoeconomic strategies, 
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whereas many believe that the shift has occurred, with China being at the forefront, whilst others 
are convinced that one cannot eliminate the traditional model of warfare as nations are constantly 
investing in their military capabilities, even though direct bilateral altercations between major 
states such as China and the U.S. are unlikely to occur as that would lead to global imbalance. 
 
   Question No. 3: What is in your opinion the main major capability that differentiates: 
- China from USA? 
China: Large population - collective political system - economic growth - Chinese smart human 
capital - Chinese access to information - decision-making communist party - fast implementation 
of decisions - capability of mobilizing great deals of resources - History - Culture and Civilization 
- comparative advantages in technology, telecommunications, and internal and external huge 
infrastructure projects -evolution of Chinese artificial intelligence - big data management - robotics 
automatic processes - high exports - cheap currency - shifting all productive powers to China - 
huge amount of foreign reserves - independence on military resources - efficient government - 
societal confidence in the future - very strong meritocratic system - strong state-market relations.  
USA: Internal stability - wealthy citizens - sense of superiority and respect from some parts of the 
world - stable currency - distinguished soft power impact - large military expenditure - largest 
economy (GDP) - competing technologies - leading the field of Research and Development - 
democratic system.  
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- China from Russia? 
China: China has done a lot for its human capital, while Russia has done almost nothing - China 
is a growing power - enormous economic cloud - young superpower - industrial capacity: China 
is the world factory 
Russia: Energy exports - major military player internationally - regional soft power - Russian 
language and Russian citizens’ invasion of Central Asian countries - great power - smart leadership 
- strong in information battle - richness in raw materials and resources. 
          The main reason behind this question, as we mentioned in the previous section, is to assess 
the capabilities of the three powers: China, Russia and the USA, in order to have a clearer idea 
regarding the vision and objectives of the three of them. And as it appears clearly, China is 
expanding the scope of its capabilities, in a way that helps it to become “capable” at all levels, 
especially where its competitors show a distinguished potential. So China is strong historically, 
culturally, socially, politically, diplomatically, militarily, technologically, developmentally, in all 
terms of industrial means, but above all, it is strong economically, locally, regionally, and globally. 
This affirms the fact that China is geoeconomically changing the map of the world order, even 
without the need to employ military means; and this is the shift we are talking about. 
 
Question No. 4: How do you see the future of the Eurasian region – land of the Grand 
Chessboard as per Brzezinski – especially that it contains Russia and China on its lands? 
          From assessing the three superpowers capabilities, here we come to assess the future of 
Eurasia in the presence of these superpowers. Thus, many arguments have been given in this term, 
and these arguments can be categorized into three main ideas: 
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• Eurasia will be in Conflict: 
In this point of view, researchers diagnosed the actual reality of Eurasia, and put their 
perspectives based on that. They see that because of the different cultures existing in 
Eurasia, and the high competition between superpowers, Eurasia is becoming more 
“violent”, and that will expose it to greater conflicts. 
 
• China will be the Main Economic Power in Eurasia with Power Balancing: 
This second argument was the most common point of view between all interviewees. Some 
considered that the USA is disinterested in this area, which is becoming an area of potential 
competition between Russia and China. But this competition is still under control, and 
some saw it as a rational balance of power between them; and this is because – always 
according to the given answers – Russia does not have the ability, or intention, to dominate 
Eurasia, but it must be in partnership with China in it.  And that was when the French 
professor interviewee affirmed that China will have the biggest advantage in Eurasia for 
the upcoming years, one interviewee stated that China will be the main economic power in 
Eurasia, and another one also considered that China will foster the stability of that area.  
The balance of power is crucial when addressing Eurasia in terms of regional interests, and 
this has been maintained even though Chinese influence is on the rise, due to the fact that 
Russia relies on its natural gas and oil exports to China; hence, concessions are required in 
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• Western Powers Are Still Dominating Eurasia: 
In contrast to the previous argument, one of the interviewees considered that Western 
powers are still dominating Eurasia. And from a similar “Surprising” side, another one 
stated that Eurasia might exist geographically, but conceptually it does not at all. 
 
          After this separation of point of views concerning the future of the Eurasian region, the most 
accurate argument clearly shows that China will be shaping the future of Eurasia, in partnership 
with Russia.  This is because, from one side, the partnership will help in keeping the situation 
under control and avoiding any probable conflict that might break out due to any “violent” 
competition, and for being a tough and solid shield against any western intention of intervention 
in the region, from another side.  
          It is true that Eurasia will be exposed to many potential conflicts, but what is not so accurate, 
is that western powers are still dominating Eurasia. They might still have some existence and 
influence, but that does not reach the extent of domination.  
          However, the Sino-Russian relations and the probable bilateral conflict that might break out 
between them and affect Eurasia – according to some interviewees, was the core of the following 
question asked to them.  
 
Question No. 5: Based on the last question, how do you describe the existing relation between 
China and Russia? Are they allies or competitors? 
          In the past question, the Norwegian interviewee assumed that there is a common interest 
between China and Russia in Eurasia, to become less depending on the west. On the contrary, 
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the conflicting interest was mainly condensed in Central Asia. But he said that things in this 
matter were under control. Let us see the kind of that “control”. Is it based on an alliance? Or 
conversely, on an under-covered competition?  Many opinions have been given in this term; 
and they will be separated into four main categories. 
 
• China and Russia - Allies Against the West:  
Most of the interviewees have agreed that the Sino-Russian relationship is very complex, 
not in the present only, but it was historically known as a complex relationship. 
One of them deemed that China and Russia are only allies to weaken the west – especially 
the US – as a geopolitical military rival. Furthermore, he thinks one of the main reasons 
behind their friendship, is that they agreed on preventing their people from seeing the 
liberal democracy as a “candle in the dark” and call for it. 
As for another interviewee who described their relationship as a historically complex one, 
he figured that they are currently building a real strategic alliance, to become more than 
partners.  He also stated that this strategic cooperation between them is becoming stronger 
in the last years, as a consequence to the Western pressure over them…  
Moreover, the Norwegian author has his own view herein, where he sees China and Russia 
as the most important allies in terms of reorganizing themselves away from the West.  As 
previously highlighted, the former statement reaffirms the fact that the symbiotic 
relationship between China and Russia is necessary to curb Western influence in the region 
and this is why the relationship still stands, even as frenemies. 
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• China and Russia - Competitors: 
One of the interviewees who had this idea, assumed it in stating that if China and Russia 
were true allies, the United States would have fallen; affirming that there are four countries, 
which if they become allies, the US will fail… These countries are Pakistan, India, China, 
and Russia. He also considered that Russia will never accept to be a junior partner with any 
country, especially with China.   
 
• China and Russia - Neither Allies, Nor Competitors: 
In her turn, the American researcher whom I interviewed, has also considered the Sino-
Russian relationship as complex, and she is “struck” by the methods they are implementing 
to “compartmentalize their differences and work together where they see or share interest”. 
As for the French researcher, one of the interviewees – who did not set a clear word 
regarding whether they were allies or competitors – it is important to forget about the 
popular “strategic partnership” or “strategic alliance” between China and Russia, despite 
having them sharing the same diagnostics of current international affairs; however – and 
always according to him – they do not share the same pathway to change and endgame. 
While Russia wants to destroy the current order, China needs it, but wants to make it more 
compatible with its interests… 
Furthermore, the Spanish political analyst clearly stated that there is neither rivalry nor 
partnership between China and Russia, but what exists between them is a fear to a large 
extent. Considering that “it is a very unhappy marriage”. 
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• China and Russia - Allies and Competitors: 
According to the Armenian researcher, they can be both: As long as the US and the EU 
keep an anti-Russian approach, they are allies; and in Central Asia, they are competitors 
who will be carefully watching each other movements. 
In addition, the interviewed diplomat sees that the relation between them is very complex, 
and that the Russians distrust the Chinese, but at the same time they must cooperate. And 
he considered that the huge mistake made by the United States, in the simultaneous fight 
against Russia and China, is the reason that made them both allying and constituting a huge 
adversary against the US. 
And finally, the Chinese interviewee’s vision is against any “western” fool talking about 
any cold war breaking out between China and Russia, because that was true in time of the 
Soviet Union when they began to split somehow and had a lot of conflicts. But currently, 
Russia and China can act as competitors only when it comes to Eurasia as key area and in 
terms of the influence in North Korea. They might also be competitors on issues related to 
military expansion, especially that some think tanks consider that China has surpassed 
Russia in military expansion, and this can probably cause some kind of political 
convulsion.  
 
          Thus, and based on all the given answers and their analysis, we can clearly see that there is 
no clear image regarding the reality of the Sino-Russian relationship, per contra, the ties between 
them are more likely misty and mysterious. However, the most common point of view between all 
the interviewees is that they are either allies and competitors at one time, or considered neither 
allies nor competitors.  
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          Anyway, it should be mentioned that because of the complexity of the Sino-Russian relation, 
their ability to form a long-lasting partnership depends on Russia’s flexibility in terms of 
sovereignty and independence, which are taken seriously and prevent it from deeply integrating 
with an actor more powerful than itself.  And on China’s “emotions” towards Russia in each new 
event occurring at the international scene generally, and in Eurasia – most specifically Central 
Asia, at the regional level, because of the OBOR effect there. 
 
 
Question No. 6: How do you think the OBOR initiative will affect Russia’s role in the Eurasia 
region? 
          As concluded in the last question, the Sino-Russian partnership is under control of the 
OBOR effect, because it is up to China’s feelings towards Russia, and Russia’s flexibility 
towards China “breaking through its principles of sovereignty and independence”, that the 
alliance can be built and maintained or destructed and demolished.  And therefore, this question 
came into mind, so let us see what it is hiding behind our interviewees’ answers on it.  
• The OBOR will put Russia in Risk: 
Many of the interviewees emphasized the idea that the OBOR is downgrading Russia’s 
role in the region. 
Interviewee 1, the American journalist, was one of the interviewees who considered that 
the OBOR will accentuate the differences between China and Russia, for China is trying 
to increase its power through developing networks, and this makes Russia powerless 
because it is already “handicapped by its geography”.  
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That was the much similar view of the other American researcher interviewee, who asserts 
that over time, China’s involvement in Central Asia, especially in terms of economic, 
infrastructure, and security, will push against some of Russia’s security interests. 
In his turn, the Norwegian author has unbiasedly described the factual situation in Central 
Asia, where the countries currently have China as their main trading partner, which has 
largely displaced the Russian influence, yet Russians cannot do anything about that. 
But the French researcher that I have interviewed, was very clear in his point of view, 
where he marked out that the OBOR is a label hiding Chinese real objectives and 
aspirations which really affects Russia’s role in the region and constitute the definitive 
game changer there. These objectives are: China’s bilateral economic and soft policies 
towards FSU countries; and China’s security inroads in Central Asia. 
Concerning the interviewed diplomat, if the OBOR becomes in the long run a network as 
the Chinese hope for, then Russia becomes isolated. 
 
• The OBOR will not affect Russia’s Position in Eurasia: 
For the Italian professor, it is true that the OBOR can create some problems to Russian 
ideas and role in Eurasia, but strategically and on the long term, China and Russia are on 
the same level, because they both want Eurasia integration to defend space from western 
aggression. 
Moreover, and according to the Norwegian interviewee who saw that the Chinese 
integration has displaced the Russian influence from Central Asia, China will never take 
any step that will exclude Russia from the region, for they both together constitute a “strong 
weapon” against the Western goals. 
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For the Armenian researcher, China and Russia might compete over supremacy in Eurasia, 
but per contra, these countries have followed a cooperative strategy to encounter the US 
there. So, any conflict that might occur between them, will result in weakening their 
capability to resist US’s power in the region. Thus, China will keep things under control, 
working on not to put Russia’s position in risk, for the sake of their mutual objective of 
containing Washington’s presence in Eurasia. 
Furthermore, the Spanish political analyst considered that China and Russia are sharing 
roles in Eurasia: Russia is a provider of security and arms, while China is a provider of 
investments and goods. And this policy will maintain Russia’s role in the region, but that 
will depend on the alternative options they have, especially for Russia. 
As for the interviewed French professor, Russia by itself will work on maintaining its 
position in Eurasia, for it is trying to connect itself to China, in a way to operate a sort of 
balance in its exportation of oil between Europe and China. 
And finally, according to the Chinese vision given by the Chinese interviewee, and in 
opposite to the fallacies spread on Russia’s worry over OBOR, Russia is much more 
optimistic and calms towards it, “partly because it knows it cannot stop it”.  For rather than 
trying to stop it or make troubles, Russia thinks on taking advantages of it.  And this 
interviewee considered that Russia will be playing a good role in supporting the OBOR. 
He also mentioned that if China and Russia had troubles, this would affect China’s 
strategies in other places of the world, not only in the OBOR.   
 
          It can be clearly stated here that it is better for Russia to cooperate with China, than working 
against it in Eurasia. But none can ever deny that Chinese goal is different from the Westerns’, for 
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they have been very sensitive to step on Russia, and they never want to exclude them from the 
region. So, both China and Russia are keen to keep their relationship as stable as possible, for both 
have their own interests, that would be affected if this relationship went into superfluous trouble. 
Therefore, the OBOR will not put Russia into risk on purpose.   
 
Question No. 7: Finally, and based on your personal estimation: 
          Here we come to questions related to actualities, regardless of the timeframe during which 
we committed to treat this dissertation’s subject. But the main aim behind these questions is to 
form a comprehensive perspective of the recent events around the world, to compare them with 
the way we addressed our topic, and to have an accurate conclusion according to that. 
 
- How will COVID-19 affect the international relations tracks? 
 
As a brief combination of the given answers, all the interviewees see that this epidemic 
will have negative effect on the international relations, it is going to reduce globalization, 
weaken super-national or international actors. It will contribute to decoupling a lot of 
international supply chains, and in countries becoming less dependent on other foreign 
actors. 
Some has described Covid-19 as an international security issue, a game changer that has 
weakened superpowers; and confirmed that there will not be “a return to normal”, the world 
will not be the same.  
Hence, I can solely say that Covid-19’s effect over the world is similar to the military wars 
effects at all levels.  
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a. On the demographic level in terms of damages, patients, number of deaths, 
curfews, …   
b. On the economic level in terms of economic drops and collapses, deficits in trade 
balances, …  
c. On the politico-diplomatic level in terms of interruption of in-person relations 
between countries, competition between superpowers over “vaccines creation”, … 
In other words, Covid-19 has the wars effects, but does not use military means.  And 
this is the new approach that this dissertation is trying to prove, regardless which 
country is behind the existence of this virus.  
Two other scenarios are worth to be mentioned here. According to the American 
researcher that I have interviewed, it is either that China presents itself effectively as 
a new leader of the world, the provider of public goods, the country that has helped all 
economies recover from Covid-19 effect, while the US steps back in global leadership. 
Or the world blames China after legal investigations for being the responsible of 
Covid-19 spread.  
 
- Will it assist China in expanding its influence over the world? 
 
After linking Covid-19 scenarios to China positively and/or negatively, it was necessary to 
get the interviewees opinions in this regard, to know if this virus will act as assistant to 
China in attaining its aspirations, or as an impediment facing it.  
And this is maybe the first question where all the interviewees had the same point of view 
stating that Covid-19 will have negative effects on China… It may pull out of it without 
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any catastrophic damages to its system but will not be able to achieve its assigned targets 
smoothly through the strategies it has designed.  
Covid-19 will definitely not take China into the position of global leadership, neither push 
the US into isolation… We should bear well in mind that China is the main benefactor of 
globalization, and Covid-19 has made us witness a relatively de-globalization, which harms 
China’s strength based on industrial power, and prevent it from becoming stronger than 
before. 
 
- What about the European Union’s destiny? 
 
In such a time of crisis, one must have a clear image about the European Union’s future, 
which seems not so good according to the given answers after each interview. Some says 
that Covid-19 has put the unity of the EU at risk, and others considered that it was the 
economic and political system which was threatened by Covid-19.   
 
 
• Unity of the Union at Risk 
Three of the interviewees agreed on the fact that it will be very hard to hold on together the 
European Union, and that the supposed unity is barely happening. The European countries 
are relying on themselves, and every nation is going to look for itself especially during 
Covid-19. 
Another interviewee has also stated that this actual situation is a major stress test for the 
European solidarity in time of crisis, and so far, they are failing it.   
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• Economy and Political System of the Union at Risk 
The Eurozone, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, and the rise of the rightest wing of 
population and populism, knowing that they lost the elections only with little margin. All 
these are possibly weakening the European Union economically and politically, according 
to four interviewees of different nationalities: Norwegian, American, French, and Chinese. 
Hence, the Norwegian author thinks that Covid -19 has done nothing good to the EU, which 
is in huge economic problems, for its Geoeconomics is not working anymore: it is not 
providing enough material benefits for its members, and it is leaving the Union very 
divided.  He does not even see a great future for the EU, for he thinks it is going to struggle 
in the years to come, from one crisis to another, and he expected a possible breakup.   
Eventually, the EU was not able to wisely manage the critical situation, but according to 
one of the interviewees, specifically the Armenian researcher, it is now working very 
effectively, and helping not only the EU member states, but sending aids to other 
neighboring countries as well.   
 
- And from another side, how will COVID-19 outbreak affect the American presidency’s 
elections? and do you see any probable “trade war” breaking out again between Beijing 
and Washington? 
 
What is extremely sure, is that almost no one expected Trump to be put out of office after 
the last Presidential elections in USA, but Covid-19 was a real game changer in this file. 
And this is what appeared clearly in the interviewees’ answers to this specific question.  
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And because it is a double question, pointing out not only to the presidential elections, but 
to the probable trade war that might break out between China and USA, due to the Covid-
19 phase, it was more convenient for comparison and analysis processes, that some of the 
given answers be inserted in a table, and followed by a brief conclusion, combining all 
similar point of views and shedding light on any distinct answer, different from the 
majority.  
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Table 4: The impact of Covid-19 on US Presidential Elections and Sino-American Trade War 
 
                Question 
 
Interviewee 
Effects of Covid-19 on USA’s Presidential 
Elections 
Will a “trade war” break out between 
Beijing and Washington? 
Interviewee 1 Covid-19 could hurt Trump, but not to the extent 
that he will lose the elections. 
Trade wars will keep going to a certain extent. 
Interviewee 2 
We could easily end up with a different outcome 
because of Covid-19, and a change in election, 
a change in the US leader would potentially 
leads to a dramatic shift in global opinion. 
Trade war has never been over! 
Interviewee 4 
The elections will be mainly based on the 
economy and depends on how wisely the 
administration will deal with this virus’ crisis. 
 
Interviewee 5 
Covid-19 has no relevance for Trump’s re-
election. Trump has improved the economy and 
the health system which are the most important 
reasons to elect or re-elect a president. 
Trade war started 3 years ago; 1 year ago, a fair 
trade agreement was signed. Its second phase 
was negotiated at the time when Covid-19 
started, so the agreement came to a halt. 
Interviewee 6 
Trump will be judged internally on his response 
to the pandemic. Voters care about surviving.  
Both countries do not need Covid-19 for a 
trade war. It will only get worse before it gets 
bad. 
Interviewee 7 
 Trade conflict instead of trade war. And of 
course, China is a rising superpower, so we 
will see many economic and political conflicts 
breaking out between them. 
Interviewee 8 
 The relations between them are going to 
worsen, the decoupling is going to keep its 
track, and the trade war is still going on, so it 
could be worse. 
Interviewee 10 
Covid-19 will affect the presidential elections, 
and if it did not breakout, Trump would be re-
elected. 
This trade war will never end. 
Interviewee 11 
The American voting system is very strange. For 
instance, Hillary Clinton she won the number of 
votes, but she lost the number of states. It is the 
states that matter, not the total voting. I believe 
the United States is on the way further down. 
I see a lot of conflicts coming, because US 
wants to seal China with this coronavirus, and 
ask it to pay the compensations. While the 
Chinese ministry of foreign affairs stated: if 
you seal China, we will start sealing you from 
the beginning: you were the reason behind the 
financial crisis, the AIDS, the bird flu, and all 
these damages that happened to the world… so 
it is you that must be sealed. 
There will be conflicts, especially that this year 
is a year of elections, so it will be a year of 
conflicts. 
CONCLUSION 
In spite of interviewee 5’s point of view, Covid-
19 played roughly against Donald Trump’s re-
election and came up with Joe Biden as a new 
President for the United States. 
Trade war have never stopped to break up 
again, and Covid-19 quashed any probable 
kind of agreement. But let us see what Biden’s 
future steps in this term are.   
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In terms of the presidential elections, we can say that former President Donald Trump has 
not managed the coronavirus crisis and its ramifications, in a way that could be of help to 
his electoral campaign, which has been reflected in the results of the elections.  Maybe if 
the coronavirus phase was not accompanying the elections, Trump would have more 
chance of winning instead of Biden.  But this virus has played an exceptional role and went 
against all expectations. It was definitively a game changer! 
As for the trade war that would probably break out between the two superpowers due to 
Covid-19, everyone has said that it has never stopped to break out again. Some preferred 
it to be named by a trade conflict - instead of trade war - and expected this year to be a year 
of conflicts between China and USA, because it was a year of delicate presidential elections 
that changed the course of events. However, both countries do not need Covid-19 for a 
trade war, as one of the interviewee stated. 
 
2-  Comprehensive Reasoning 
 
         Combining between convergent and divergent point of views related to the core subject of 
this dissertation, which is being displayed in the most recent events occurring all over the world, 
was the main target behind this chapter, and it has perfectly met it.  Different researchers, 
academics and  politico-economic analysts have given their opinions on 12 different questions, 
which has combined comprehensive data from different perspectives in this term. 
          Eventually, and as expected, many of the interviewees agreed on the fact that China is having 
an intangible aim to rule the world – with some reservations, and many others argued with it. But 
obviously, what China is doing internally, regionally, and internationally around the world has 
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created some sort of extremely new phenomenon, which made it a hard player using soft economic 
power in the world game, and mainly against the USA. Assuredly, there is an unrevealed geo-
strategic goal behind the exposed one of international primacy, which has been reached despite all 
challenges and obstacles on the international level.  So, what could be the next level to reach after 
international primacy? A question leaving its answer for the days.   
         Just in the same way, the shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics has separated interviewees 
opinions to two groups; the first one agrees that there is a shift, and the second one considers that 
there is no real shift in this term.  However, China and the USA are increasing their military 
potential since the collapse of the Soviet Union and are not willing to make use of it in a what-so-
called military war. This by itself expresses how large is the shift happening, and it is tending to 
invade the whole world.  
          With this in mind, it seems that China is expanding its scope of capabilities in a way that 
helps it to become “capable” at all levels.  China is changing the map of the world order without 
the need to implement military power, and this is the real shift.  
          Accordingly, even the future of Eurasia is being shaped by China. Because Chinese 
policymakers are benefitting from its infrastructures – mainly from the OBOR – to “export” its 
influence to other countries in the Eurasian area, making them indebted to China and depending 
on it.  And even if western powers are still having some existence in there, the 50 years to come 
are totally Chinese designed. 
          Moreover, and when assessing that if China and Russia are allies or competitors, the 
interviewees have spontaneously and without any coordination, evaluated the strength and 
weakness of each country unbiasedly.  Most of them have concluded that China is stronger in 
Eurasia, and some see a fear in Russia to be dependent on China, because of its internal economic 
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gap.  And China in its turn, is very sensitive to Russia’s behavior in Central Asia, which makes it 
compelled to decide on every event either if Russia is its ally or its rival.  
          However, Russia’s position will not be affected by China in Eurasia according to the 
interviewees, for it will always take care not to lose its friendship that makes them a stronger shield 
facing any western intervention in Eurasia.  But China’s influence is growing up continuously in 
the region, the fact that can indirectly cause a decrease in Russia’s influence there.  
          On the other hand, and when asked about Covid-19 effects on the international relations 
track, all agreed that it is a test for the ability of the governments to deal and adapt to a very quick 
new challenge, testing the political flexibility of everyone and even the imagination of the leaders. 
This new crisis has had and is still having negative effects all over the world. But what about 
China? 
          A question about Covid-19 impacts on China was asked to all the interviewees, and it 
appeared that China may pull out of this crisis genuinely, without catastrophic damages, but will 
not be able to expand its influence as it wanted on the long run. Although, the coming out of this 
crisis is the main evaluation that needs to be done; where until now, China won the battle of 
medical data, as stated by one of our interviewees, and this crisis has shown how much the world 
needs China, described by the world’s largest factory.  
          As for the European Union destiny after such a global crisis, most of the interviewees saw 
that the unity of the Union is at high risk, and not only its unity but its economy.  And what is 
admissible is that the collapse of economy is the main cause threatening the Union of division, 
which has started with Brexit, and we hope that it will end here.  
          In a separate context, but under the same pretext, all interviewees were expecting that Ex-
President Donald Trump gets re-elected as president of the USA, only if Covid-19 did not 
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breakout.  Covid-19 has also aggravated the tension of the Sino-American relations so much that 
it has consequently increased the intensity of the trade war already blowing out between them. 
          All things considered, course of international events is being subject to a large shift in geo-
strategies of superpowers, where China plays a major role. It is a multiple players’ chess game, 
and the king’s zone in the next level is Eurasia, where different strategies are being applied to 
attain the hardest level of the world.  And the future will tell us who has chased the victory, fought 
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          After the so long domination of the Geopolitics and its manipulation of the international 
scene in all its details over the past decade, here are we witnessing a radical transformation on this 
level. Hence, have we ever asked ourselves, why after the WWI, WWII, and the Cold War 
concluded by the Soviet Union Collapse, all the expectations of a military WWIII were not correct 
neither achievable? What is stopping the superpowers of the world from waging military wars 
against each other’s, and makes them “satisfied” with economic trade wars? 
          Therefore, it is well known that the countries’ aim behind every rivalry, competition, or war 
is common between them all, and it is to expand their influence and extend their authorities and 
sovereignty over the territories; in addition, they seek to establish power and impose control over 
the world’s natural and energy resources… And it is true that this aim is combined with specific 
geopolitical interests on the ground according to each power alone, but what is fixed is that this 
aim will never change whatsoever. Thus, what are these superpowers doing nowadays? And what 
geo-strategies are they adopting to realize their aim, knowing that there is no world war looming, 
neither in the near perspective nor in the far one?  
          This is literally what was displayed in this dissertation, when we showed-up the rise of the 
geoeconomics’ approach instead of that of geopolitics, more specifically when China carried its 
banner.  Herein, it was obviously clear that China has had a distinct perspective and different point 
of view in setting out its foreign policies when developing its geo-strategies, compared to those of 
the superpowers with which it is competing in this world.  
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          People’s Republic of China is being different in geo-strategically acting on the international 
scene, because it has learned from precedent mistakes in this term, and evacuated an “innovative 
tool” which when referred for and utilized, could eventually assist it in achieving its ambitions and 
aims, with minimum probable failures and military losses.  Thus, in order to increase the potential 
of success in protecting and investing in its geopolitical interests nationally and globally, China 
has adopted this new distinguished approach named by Geoeconomics.   
          And as we could have concluded after we referred to many definitions and approaches, such 
as that of Edward Luttwak, Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris stating that geoeconomics is “the 
systematic use of economic instruments to accomplish geopolitical objectives” (Blackwill, 2016).  
This uprising Geoeconomics approach is proving itself capable of replacing geopolitics theories 
which purely implements military means to achieve their goals, without neglecting the 
improvement of one’s military capabilities and its importance at the international level of 
competition.  
          Here, a question should be asked: Why is China still developing nuclear weapons, and 
building nuclear shelter until this day if it is adopting the Geoeconomics approach as geo-strategy? 
And the answer is that: it is true that military force is considered as hard power, but it is also a 
double-sided coin, or a coin with two faces; in addition to the hard power face, military force holds 
also a soft power one.  And as explained during the dissertation, a country that increases and 
expands its military assets and acts under the geoeconomic banner, does not aim at implementing 
its military means in future, but at showing up its strength and increased ability to compete, and 
this is the case of China, master at Soft Power tactics.  Whilst China has shaped its domestic and 
foreign policies around the concept of geoeconomics, military development is crucial to maintain 
the balance of power and to secure its interests, maintaining its status as a global competitor that 
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is not to be undermined for the sake of focusing on geoeconomics rather than military 
interventionism and expansionist agendas.  
          Therefore, a country that is characterized by a strong economic leverage, and makes use of 
it in expanding its military budget and developing its assets to geo-strategically achieve political 
objectives could be considered as a geopolitical state, but a country holding the same 
characteristics and making use of its economic strength that is able to increase its military means 
in order to achieve geo-strategic goals without the use of these means is definitely considered as a 
geoeconomic country. 
         In these terms, this geo-strategy was first adopted by China on the international scene. 
Moreover, China is still developing its tactics, and mastering its practice undergrounds in order to 
benefit from each and every detail that could assist it in replacing the use of military assets with 
economic ones, and therefore achieve its goals through the pre-mentioned geo-strategy of 
geoeconomic statecraft.  
          And after being able to personally conclude a clear definition of Geoeconomics as displayed 
in the second section of the first chapter of this dissertation: “A scientific method that studies the 
internal economic statuses of the nations and their international relations based on concrete 
elements and components, in order to develop a strategic economic policy that helps those nations 
in realizing their geopolitical goals, commanding their national situations, and manipulating the 
ties that binds the states economically together”. We were able to affirm that “Geoeconomics does 
not only refer to a foreign policy strategy that represents the implementation of economic means 
of power to achieve strategic goals, but it also refers to a particular strategic practice, or a new 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





statecraft which substitutes by its application the use of military power policies nationally and 
internationally”. 
          Thus, a power that executes a radical shift in its own statecraft could never be far from 
applying it either with its allies or its neighbors: and this is precisely the case of China’s bilateral 
relations with its ally and neighbor, Russia.  
          Based on the strategic value of Eurasia proved along the thesis, and mainly when we stated 
that it is now becoming the focus of every great power’s attention, since expanding control over 
its lands might lead to control the destinies of the whole World; this is actually becoming a 
Chessboard game as described by Brzezinski - but in an upgraded version combining multiple 
players and not only two as the standard one - and China constitutes one of the major players in 
this international game showing its geoeconomic skills to pave its way leading to the Eurasian 
throne, at first level, and to the international primacy on the long-term.  Following the end of the 
Cold War, succeeded by a period of US hegemony, the international chessboard has shifted from 
a bipolar scheme towards unipolarity, and today has evolved into a multipartite system in which 
different states can impact global governance.  This is observed in the case of China with its 
innovative approach to geostrategic interests, which it has been actively pursuing and securing by 
adopting an economic approach, hence geoeconomics, rather than a traditional military and 
political interventionist approach as is the pattern observed by the likes of Russia as well as the 
United States of America.   
          Indeed, all the geopolitical theories displayed in this dissertation, and accompanied by the 
explained geoeconomics approaches have indirectly agreed on the same final goal of expanding 
influence over the world; However, what differentiates them is the HOW. The HOW of geopolitics 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 





is summarized by the military means, while the HOW of the geoeconomics is against the use of 
these means and replaces them with economic tools. In other words, nations that adopt 
geoeconomic approaches tend to improve their geopolitical potential and invest in their 
geopolitical interests to achieve their goals through using their own economic instruments, in order 
to benefit internally and externally with a zero-sum game. 
          At the first impression, implementing geoeconomic geo-strategies seems “peaceful” while 
compared to the military invasions done during the past decade of wars under the pretext of 
geopolitics; but when we dive deeply into the reality of geoeconomics and in what it is really 
happening on the international scene between allies before competitors we can understand that 
Geoeconomics has harder and heavier results at the level of international relations, without 
neglecting its impact on the national economies of the competing countries.  It is true that it does 
not cost lives, but it loads the states adopting it with complex affairs for the sake of achieving their 
only one geopolitical dream of global order, using multiple non-ending strategies and methods. 
          Therefore, it became clear for us, that even geoeconomics is not peaceful at all; and here we 
remember the fact of “FRENEMIES” as Ian Bremmer described them when clarifying the reality 
of geoeconomics saying: “As a non-violent yet unquestionably potent foreign policy tool, 
Geoeconomics is the perfect weapon for a relationship between frenemies” (Bremmer, 2016).  This 
concept reminds us of China and Russia and the fact that they might meet in many international 
affair, but without becoming allies as Bremmer also stated in one of his famous published studies 
entitled: “China may meet Russia for War Games, But That Does Not Make Them Allies” 
(Bremmer, 2018). 
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          It is totally true that Beijing and Moscow always seek to advance their strategic objectives 
and cooperate within the framework of SCO, but their relation stays extremely complicated when 
it comes to Eurasia, sometimes they appear as friends, and sometimes as enemies; and this literally 
clarifies why Bremmer described them as frenemies. Geopolitics does not rule China’s geo-
strategies; However, the geopolitics and geo-strategies of China, in addition to its national and 
international policies are all ruled by its Geoeconomic approach, which transforms Russia into its 
frenemy in each and every mutual affair that might get them involved together.  
          Herein, even if China supported Russia in any affair in the international community, it will 
not do that to the extreme, for it will always be cautious from any probable betrayal from Russia. 
This is due to the conflict of interests between them resulting from the divergence of perspective 
due to the adoption of Geoeconomics from China’s side… But if we look at this relation from the 
positive side, we see that Russia and China are still saving the highest possible levels of 
friendliness because of adopting Geoeconomics, which has worked as a precaution tool to prevent 
any probable military war between them due to the effervescence of competition in Eurasia and 
especially in its core region, the region of Central Asia where China has proved increasing 
economic power. 
          Geoeconomics has not only played the role of protecting the already-existing relationship 
between China and Russia from any bilateral war that might urge, but it has also reinforced their 
relation to counter any foreign war or menace that might threaten them together, as it has recently 
happened when they were both threatened by the USA: sanctions over Russia, and tariffs on 
China… So the harder the pressure was put on them, the more incentive they had to work together, 
especially in what is related to financial and commercial issues. Plus, they have a complementary 
relationship based on mutual interests, for “Russia is among the world's leading exporters of oil 
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and natural gas. And China consumes vast amounts of these commodities” (Bremmer, 2018). 
Herein, they supported each other to overcome any common foreign threat on their economies.  It 
is thus apparent that both entities are in a symbiotic relationship in which cooperation and 
concessions are to be made for mutual interests on the one hand, and falling in line with Chinese 
geoeconomic strategies is essential if Russia wishes to preserve its interests, rendering the 
relationship of both states, one that can be described as “frenemies”. 
          From another side, the shift of statecraft executed by China from geopolitics to 
geoeconomics, has indirectly obliged Russia to do so, at least in situations of coping with China… 
And as we displayed the competition happening in Central Asia’s region, we should mention that 
to counter-balance China’s increasing economic power there, Russia is working on reaching an 
FTA between the EAEU - where it plays a predominant role - and India, that was concluded by 
2020 as stated in an article for Yuan Jiang published by the Diplomat Magazine (Jiang, 2020).  
          Jiang analyzed that this convergence between Russia and India, and mainly through linking 
up India to the EAEU “appears to be a Russian tactic of using India to balance China’s increasing 
economic power in Central Asia” (Jiang, 2020).  And this justifies the fact that Russia is also 
relying on geoeconomics in its relations with China to prevent any political, diplomatic, or military 
conflict that might occur between them due to their race of power in the Eurasian region, and more 
specifically in Central Asia in this example. 
          To get things clear, we affirm that what combines Russia and China is a very close and 
distinguished relation that definitely deters them from publicly admitting their desires to restrain 
each other’s influence either over Central Asia, or even over Eurasia. But at the end of the day, 
they abstractly work on protecting their interests from any concurrence; and this is what is being 
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done by Russia while working on integrating India in the EAEU to conclude a “greater economic 
cooperation” (Jiang, 2020) with it, and create a counter-balance against China there. 
          We could say here, that after many trials and all over the years, China and Russia have found 
that they will never become compatible and harmonious partners, and this reality is recently 
becoming more serious for they are showing intentions to compete rather than cooperate, 
especially in terms related to ‘Greater Eurasia’.  
          Political news affirms that Putin has not met any head of state more often than President Xi 
Jinping, and that was because of the crucial role played by China in the context of the Eurasian 
region where Russia is tending to highlight its power and extend its influence and control. These 
meetings clarify that there is a unique relationship between these two countries but could not deny 
the fact of existing complexity due to the conflict of interests and power race invading the region.  
          Common interests with solid friendship from a side, and conflict of interests with lack of 
trust from the other are the main factors that describes the Sino-Russian relation; without forgetting 
that this equation does not rule their relation in all the affairs they are dealing with. However, it is 
in the most important sphere of this relation that complexity supremely reigns: “It is in the 
economic sphere that the closer relations, but also the asymmetry between the two powers are most 
prominent” (Perović & Zogg, 2019, p.2). 
          And when talking about the Chinese huge BRI that highlights China as a dominant economic 
superpower over the Eurasian region, we notice that Russia does not have a great role in it, even 
though it has lobbied to let the trade routes cross its territory with an intention to benefit from them 
on the high-tech industry level. Moreover, it is true that both states consider the mutual relationship 
between them as opportunistic ‘partnership’, but despite that, this strategic project of BRI has 
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increased the lingering mistrust between them due to the large gap in mutual trade of both sides. 
Figure 16 below shows up the real situation of this existing gap constituting one of the main 
reasons behind that mistrust; This is because China is normally known as the number one trading 
partner of Russia, and has executed new shifts at its foreign trade levels and divided it between 
other directions. 
 
Figure 16: Trade Relations Between Russia and China in 2018 
 
 Source: Perović & Zogg, 2019, p.3 
 
 
                    Only 2% (48 billion USD) of all China’s exports were allocated to Russia compared 
to 98% (2231 billion USD) to the rest of the world, and from the other side, China imported only 
18% of Russia’s exports (59 billion USD) while the rest of the world imported the remaining 82% 
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(336 billion USD). China has managed to do this shift softly since 2009, for one fundamental aim 
to become the largest trade partner and investor in the Eurasian region through its Belt and Road 
initiative; and this is its own soft way to “marginalize” Russia from the trade map of the region 
and compete with it by building strong ties with Central Asian’ republics, investing in their oil and 
gas through establishing pipelines, and building up infrastructure projects - as mentioned in the 
dissertation – accompanied with good diplomatic and political relations with each of the five 
countries, persuading them with its good intentions against the greed of the west.  
          Therefore, and after all what was mentioned and discussed over all this dissertation, we 
could definitely conclude that the so unique relation combining China with Russia is literally worth 
the high geo-strategic importance of Eurasia, proved through all the geopolitical theories of 
Mackinder, Spykman and Brzezinski; where the international eyes and muscles are focusing their 
efforts, and competing in order to achieve primacy over its lands. So what could be the case of 
China and Russia in such situation of power race towards interests and control?  
          Moreover, and as justified above, exercising control over the Central Asian region is the 
primary step before extending influence over the whole region of Eurasia.  And here it must be 
said, that the geo-strategic reality of this region requires from Beijing and Moscow to rely on the 
distinguished capabilities and skills of their countries’ policymakers in a precise and pragmatic 
way, in order to achieve the goals and targets they expected when applying their own approaches 
for the sake of domination.  And it is for this one same reason that the international scene is 
witnessing a remarkable elevation in the competition pace between China and Russia in addition 
to the United States of America and their allies. 
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         It is effectively true that this competition has intensified increasingly after September 2001, 
not only through the relentless efforts of China and Russia to expand control over the production 
areas in the Central Asian republics, but also through the direct participation of these republics in 
expanding the gap of influence between them through signing multiple agreements with China 
instead of Russia; knowing that these republics constitute a soviet heritage that Russia relies on to 
restore its image of historic grandeur when necessary.  
          Things are not that clear in terms of bilateral relation between them, but contrariwise, the 
Sino-Russian ties are much complex in a way that they might easily constitute a problem statement 
for a PhD dissertation without any debate…  
          Furthermore, we can here display the “personal-political” relation combining Putin and 
Jinping together against Trump; according to the old adage stating that “my enemy’s enemy is my 
friend”, China’s leader and his Russian counterpart have publicly agreed on December 2019 to 
increase military and economic cooperation. And beside the economic benefit of this agreement, 
they see in it a political opportunity to expand their influence at the expense of the United States, 
and to indirectly defeat Donald Trump, through their “good appearing and appealing friendship”.  
          And before concluding, many opinions can be given, and many points of view can present 
an answer to the main problem statement of this thesis, but no one can deny that China is the main 
responsible of the World Order new shape, and of the course of events currently occurring all over 
the planet. This world and its history got used to military wars between superpowers for all the 
previous epochs, but what is happening now, is totally new, in all means. And as one of the people 
interviewed for this thesis said: “yes! I see a shift, (…) and US is not the respected superpower 
that rules the world.  On the contrary, we are in a multipolar world”. 
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          We can finally say that China is smoothly paving its way for international primacy with its 
utmost efforts and geo-strategies.  It has passed the most difficult levels of world’s polarity 
transformations, from a Unipolar world, to a bipolar then a multipolar world.  And if that can 
simply refer to an emerging international issue, it shows up the multiple efforts China attributes in 
its seeking for dramatically weakening the United States.  On the 3rd of November 2020, contrary 
to popular expectations, and following a series of controversies, Donald Trump lost the electoral 
battle to Joe Biden and hence failed to secure a second mandate, which would have been beneficial 
to the likes of China.  Nonetheless, whilst many look forward to Biden's mandate in terms of 
domestic and foreign policies, one should not expect radical changes when it comes to the 
economic war with China as that is a matter of national interest that goes beyond partisanship and 
model of governance per president.  As the findings of the interviews convey, the trade war 
between both entities is set to continue as China aims at pursuing further economic achievements, 
and the United States is not set on scaling back and watching its hegemony challenged easily.  
Hence, the situation of China's rising economic power and the United States' stance is not set to 
change under the newly elected and sworn in President of the US, Joe Biden. 
 International governance, in my opinion, is described adequately by looking at the realist 
school of thought which dictates that international relations are shaped by state interactions, their 
interests, and the balance of power.  Nonetheless, when it comes to understanding patterns of 
interactions and state behavior, one must not undermine the liberal perspective whereas several 
entities pursue their interests in terms of economic gain rather than military expansionist agendas 
and do so through non-violent mediums, contrary to traditional approach which revolves around 
employing hard power.  Hence, both realist and liberal schools are complementary to one another 
in today’s world.  Both theories are materialized in the rise of China following Western hegemony 
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and USA supremacy, leveling the playing field into a multipolar system in which it has been 
capable of fulfilling its interests through different strategies, most notably geoeconomics. As a 
result, many have addressed the Chinese rise on the global scene as one that is capable of 
dethroning the United States of America, primarily in terms of economic supremacy. The Chinese 
model of economic competitiveness is not restricted to certain regions or to certain sectors and can 
be adapted to innovations in which profitability and recognition can be found. 
 As the cost of traditional warfare often exceeds the projected or aspired benefits to be 
reaped, states have been seeking competition and the weakening of one another by aspiring to 
fulfill the role of innovator and to dominate certain markets. One of those markets in which state 
competition is rampant is that of technology, all of which has led to coining in the term of techno-
wars, which points towards the efforts poured into keeping state-of-the-art technology or cutting-
edge technology, such as 5G networks, and their diffusion confined in the hands of certain 
nation(s) in order to present itself as a dominant entity in the field who is to be respected as it holds 
the reins of technological advance.  Up until recently, technological supremacy has been confined 
in the hands of the likes of the United States of America and its allies, but many have highlighted 
the fact that China’s capabilities to acquire a hypothetical blueprint when it comes to cutting edge 
technology have been increasing, which has led the likes of the United States to impose sanctions 
and actively pursue policies to curb Chinese efforts to acquire such capacities as that would 
constitute an additional setback to the remaining supremacy and hegemony of the United States.  
If the Far East giant is capable of acquiring such technological capabilities, its geoeconomic 
strategy would be reinforced and bolstered as it would be capable of spreading this technology in 
geostrategic regions of the world, increasing its global influence, and reaping massive profits. 
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 As this thesis has previously shown, China relies on the consumption of natural resources 
to a great extent, a great part of which is sourced from Russia, its frenemy. On the western 
hemisphere of the globe, the United States of America is “addicted to oil” as its former president 
George W. Bush put it back in 2006, a reality that is still applicable to date.  Natural resources and 
geostrategic interests are in a proven correlation, as observed by US interventionism for example 
in the MENA region. The same can be asserted when it comes to geoeconomics as the oil and gas 
sector is one of the pillars of Chinese geoeconomics strategy, which can be a vulnerability due to 
the extensive influence of the United States and its allies, such as OPEC member states, on the 
global market of oil and gas. When it comes to natural resources, the norm has been to look beneath 
the earth’s soil, but today, states can look up as the prospect of space exploration and mining for 
resources in outer space is becoming a feasible reality. It is no secret that outer space is rich in 
resources such as minerals and raw materials, all of which can be used to fuel the geoeconomic 
outlook of states, most notably China.  Hence, this takes us back to a potential race to outer space 
for space exploration and mining. It is important to highlight the fact that, contrary to terrestrial 
resources, outer space and all of its aspects cannot be claimed by a certain entity or state according 
to international law and treaty law, all of which facilitates the process of taking advantage of the 
untapped resources.  Additionally, issues cannot easily arise as with the case of techno-wars due 
to the fact that international and treaty law protect the freedom to exploit natural resources found 
in outer-space and hence limitations cannot be enforced to keep China, the global challenger, from 
contributing to its global standing and assert its geoeconomic supremacy. 
 Technology, outer space resource exploitation, as well as many emerging innovations 
should remain on the radars of researchers, economic and political experts and analysts, as well as 
policymakers and definitely states due to their sheer importance and potential of altering the global 
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status quo when it comes to governance as well as state interests. All of those innovations and 
realities have the potential of becoming highly interesting and matters of controversy as well in 
the near future, all of which supplements the need to address them early on and to shed further 
light upon them.  In a world where most people still predict state behavior according to earth and 
material objects and resources, attention to the cyberspace as well as outer-space is necessary as 
emerging realities have the potential of becoming the norm rather than the exception. 
As transparency is important when it comes to such research efforts, one must highlight 
certain limitations that have been experienced throughout the research process and while 
compiling this dissertation. As this piece is an exploratory study, a topic that has not been 
addressed sufficiently, the limitations experienced were limited to the diversification of the pool 
of experts constituting and the number of experts that have contributed to the study. The efforts 
that have been put in this dissertation could have been bolstered if the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic did not have such a ravaging impact on day-to-day activities as well as professional 
activity, which has affected the final pool of interviewees and its composition. The aforementioned 
limitations are to be taken into account as well for future research efforts, such as those concerned 
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- What about the European Union’s destiny? 
- How will it affect the American presidency’s elections? and do you see any probable 
“trade war” breaking out again between Beijing and Washington? 
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